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Abstract 
Afghanistan has been in political turmoil since the late 1970s. The coup d’état in April 
1978 was followed by Soviet intervention, civil war, Taliban rule and recent international 
intervention. This dissertation identifies modalities of local governance by analyzing the 
patterns of representation, conflict mediation, legitimacy, and power of Afghan rural 
society in the second half of the post-2001 decade as well as changes in local governance 
patterns over the past three decades. The study is based on more than 14 months of field 
research, which was conducted between 2006 and 2009 in seven districts of three 
provinces of northeastern Afghanistan: Kunduz, Takhar, and Baghlan.  
Adopting a broad understanding of local governance as field-specific activities that 
regulate the collective coexistence of social communities in different action arenas, this 
study posits that local governance is more than local government. It enables a 
comprehensive consideration of non-government-related influences, the life-worlds of 
rural dwellers, and the everyday practices and underlying norms and experiences 
(moralities) that structure self-conduct, intra- and inter-community governance processes, 
local politics, and social order of rural society in northeastern Afghanistan. The dissertation 
adopts natural resource user communities as a level of analysis in which a particular 
environmental resource is used and access to it is negotiated between its actual and 
potential users. The primarily qualitative analysis used in this study examines access 
patterns, bundles of power resources, and legitimacy in three types of local resource user 
arenas. Specifically, the study explores the negotiation of access to irrigation water in five 
canal areas of the Kunduz oasis, the access to pastures and rangeland in two mountainous 
districts of Takhar, and the access to wood and other non-woody fuel plants in selected 
communities of Baghlan and Takhar. By considering the social differentiations within 
resource user communities, the study outlines the ambitions and dilemmas of average local 
resource users and their appointed caretakers in terms of their attempts to secure equitable 
access amidst the competing interests of rural elites. Different types of local 
representatives are shown to determine the fate of the rural population and to exert a key 
role in rural development in terms of locals’ attitudes towards their government and the 
international aid community. This work evaluates the implementation process of three 
natural resource management projects under international guidance in the research area and 
concludes that Afghanistan’s rural development and reconstruction processes establish an 
image of reforms and state-building. Instead, negotiated state-making with highly uncertain 
outcomes is manifest.  
In conclusion, the key features of everyday politics in rural northeast Afghanistan and the 
main concepts are revisited. It is argued that popular dichotomist notions such as the 
distinction between state versus society or formal versus informal institutions are not 
applicable, as structural-relational factors explain governance processes better than rights-
based approaches. The analysis presents bundles of power resources as an operational 
concept of power. The author suggests that the disconnect between local social order and 
the ordering ideal of the international community can only be bridged by acknowledging 
local realities and designing programs and interventions accordingly. This recognition of 
rural Afghans’ life-worlds and local realities is the precondition for a qualitatively different 
engagement between the international community and Afghanistan, which would 
presumably lead to sustainable reconstruction. 
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Kurzfassung 
 
Vorliegende Dissertation trägt den Titel: „(Re-)Constructing Afghanistan? Rewriting Rural 
Afghans‘ Lebenswelten into Recent Development and State-making Processes. An Analysis 
of Local Governance and Social Order”. Der Titel ist Programm, anhand der ihm 
inhärenten Sinneinheiten sollen im ersten Teil der deutschsprachigen Kurzfassung 
Grundanliegen und Kernaussagen zusammengefasst werden. Daran schließt sich die 
Kurzzusammenfassung der Einzelkapitel 2-9 an.  
I – Bezug, Relevanz und Kernaussagen 
Das Dissertationsprojekt, dessen Ergebnisse hiermit vorgelegt werden, nahm in der erst 
einmal unspezifischen Frage, wie sich die ländliche Gesellschaft Nordostafghanistans 
selbst organisiert, seinen Ausgangspunkt. Auf der Grundlage von Überlegungen zu sozialer 
Ordnung, deren stets fortdauernde Existenz gleich welcher Qualität angenommen wird, 
richtete sich das Forschungsinteresse vor allem auf die Fragen nach den der sozialen 
Ordnung zugrunde liegenden strukturellen Logiken, auf die Evolution derselben und 
zurückliegende Wandlungsprozesse, aber auch Wandlungspotenziale der zwischen 2005 
und 2010 empirisch untersuchten lokalen Politikprozesse, sowie auf die Rolle staatlichen 
Einflusses auf lokaler Ebene. Die Relevanz dieser Fragestellungen ergab sich aus der 
Konfliktgeschichte Afghanistans und der dadurch wahrgenommenen Unsicherheit auf 
lokaler Ebene, die sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung und eine Anknüpfung an die sehr 
umfangreich wie diverse anthropologische Forschung aus der Vorkriegszeit bis dato 
verhindert hatten. So gab es zu Beginn des Dissertationsvorhabens 2005 kaum Kenntnisse 
und Informationen darüber, welche Auswirkungen der Gewaltkonflikt in Afghanistan auf 
die sozialen, mentalen und politischen Organisationsmuster der lokalen Bevölkerung hatte. 
Dies bedeutete gleichzeitig, dass die Intervention der internationalen Gemeinschaft ab 
Ende 2001 in ihren zivilen Dimensionen, die darauf abzielten, vermeintliche bad 
governance-Strukturen mit demokratischen zu ersetzen, weitgehend auf hypothetischen 
Annahmen und Schwarzweiß-Denken beruhte und somit nicht viel mehr als ein Stochern 
im Nebel darstellte.  
Eine der ungeprüften Annahmen, die die Interventen in Absichtserklärungen und einem 
Maßnahmenportfolio an Entwicklungsmaßnahmen zum Staats- und Institutionenbau 
durchpausten, war die, dass man es in Afghanistan mit einem völligen Zusammenbruch 
sowohl der physischen wie auch der sozialen Infrastruktur zu tun hat. Daraus wurde die 
logische Schlussfolgerung abgeleitet, man würde den Aufbau der ‚Hardware‘ und 
‚Software‘ von Null beginnen. Die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Dissertation, die auf einer 
mehr als 14-monatigen Feldforschung im ländlichen Nordostafghanistan basieren, 
widerlegen diese Annahme eindeutig. Es konnte nachgewiesen werden, dass die lokale 
ländliche Gesellschaft über diverse soziale Regularien und normative Prinzipien verfügt, 
die den Alltag der Bevölkerung strukturieren und das Zusammenleben regeln. Die 
Infragestellung des Wiederaufbau-Topos‘ versus einer Neuerfindung („Re-/ Constructing 
Afghanistan?“) ist somit berechtigt. Zudem wird damit in einer zweiten Dimension auf die 
Rolle der Forscherin selbst angespielt, nämlich das Bewusstsein und die Reflexion darüber, 
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dass jede Interpretation der lokalen Verhältnisse immer ein Konstrukt des jeweiligen 
Wissenschaftlers ist. Entsprechend könnte man die vorgelegte Arbeit als Neukonstruktion 
(reconstruction) im Sinne einer aktualisierten (Neu-)Interpretation der sozial-politischen, 
ökonomischen und kulturellen Funktions- und Strukturierungslogiken der afghanischen 
Gesellschaft im Untersuchungsraum Nordostafghanistan im Vergleich zu 
Vorkriegsdarstellungen der älteren Forschergeneration sehen.   
Das grundsätzliche Anliegen der Arbeit besteht darin, die Befindlichkeiten der 
durchschnittlichen Einwohner Nordostafghanistans mit dem Entwicklungs- und 
Staatsaufbauprozess, der im Ergebnis als ausgehandelte Staatsbildung mit ungewissem 
Ausgang (state-making) erkennbar wird, in Beziehung zu setzen („Rewriting Rural 
Afghans‘ Lebenswelten into Recent Development and State-making Processes“). Das 
Forschungsdesign inkorporierte deshalb ‚Lebenswelten‘ als heuristisches Hilfskonstrukt, 
um die Stimmen ‚von unten‘ einzufangen, ihnen Raum zu geben und Geltung zu 
verschaffen, ohne sie dabei als Opfer darzustellen. Methodologisch reflektieren 
Lebenswelten die subjektiv geteilte, alltägliche Erfahrungswelt der Teilhaber sozio-
räumlicher Gemeinschaften. Als so identifizierte emische Kategorie wurden sie im 
Rahmen der Analyse durch die Interpretationsleistung der Forscherin in local governance-
Strukturen übersetzt – das etische Pendant zu Lebenswelten wenn man so will.  
Ziel der Untersuchung ist dabei nicht eine normative Beurteilung lokaler Politikprozesse 
(good versus bad local governance). Vielmehr ging es um die Erfassung des Alltags der 
durchschnittlichen Landbevölkerung (des ‚kleinen Mannes‘ und der ‚kleinen Frau‘), von 
denen die Masse in Subsistenzökonomien um das tägliche Überleben kämpft. Dabei sind 
die Landbewohner in Ermangelung anderer Einkommensmöglichkeiten hochgradig von 
der Verfügbarkeit und dem Zugang zu Ressourcen ihrer natürlichen Umwelt abhängig, 
zum Beispiel zu Land und Wasser für die Bewässerung der Felder in den Oasengebieten 
rund um Kunduz, zu Weidegründen in den Gebirgsausläufern im südlichen Takhār und zu 
Brennmaterialien (Holz, Biomasse) in den Lösshügellandschaften von Baghlān und 
Takhār. Die Analyse lokaler Politik(strukturen) setzt an der Beobachtung an, dass diese 
Alltagsressourcen aufgrund von situativ und temporär auftretender Wasserknappheit, 
fortschreitender Degradation und nichtregenerativen Verlusten (im Fall von Holz und 
Biomasse, aber auch von Weidegründen)  in unterschiedlichem Maße lokal umkämpft sind 
(contestation). Aus den empirischen Daten lässt sich ableiten, dass die Ausstattung mit 
Machtressourcen der bestimmende Faktor für die Fähigkeit und das Vermögen Einzelner 
bzw. von Gruppen ist, bestimmte Ressourcen zu nutzen (access). Eigentumsrechte spielen 
in Abwesenheit staatlicher Gesetzgebung und einem identifizierten Normpluralismus auf 
lokaler Ebene real keine Rolle für den Zugang zu natürlichen Ressourcen des Alltags.  
Die Arbeit zeigt darüber hinaus die Modalitäten lokaler Politik auf und die Rolle, die 
kognitive Faktoren sowie Normen und Wertekonzepte (moralities) dabei spielen. Neben 
der Analyse von Zugangsmechanismen zu Ressourcen des Alltags werden Modi der 
Konfliktmediation, Repräsentationsmuster, sowohl innerhalb der lokalen Gemeinschaften 
als auch zwischen Staat und lokaler Ebene, sowie Überlegungen zu Legitimitätskonzepten 
präsentiert. Die Politik des Alltags präsentiert sich als Komplex diverser miteinander 
verwobener Interaktionen, deren Motivation und Rationalität in der Akkumulation von 
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Machtressourcen liegt. Dabei stechen als zugrundeliegende Phänomene vor allem 
personalisierte Beziehungsnetzwerke und unsolidarisches Verhalten unter Teilhabern einer 
Nutzergemeinschaft hervor. Es wird herausgearbeitet, dass die ländliche Gesellschaft 
Nordostafghanistans von starken sozialen Ungleichheiten geprägt ist, die sich trotz 
gegenteiliger Intentionen durch die Intervention der internationalen Gemeinschaft noch 
weiter verfestigen.  
Das Nachzeichnen der Prozesse, wie dies geschieht, erlaubt Schlussfolgerungen im 
Hinblick auf die soziale Ordnung der ländlichen Gesellschaft, die in Erweiterung früherer 
Überlegungen (Mielke et al. 2011) als Zusammenspiel von sozialen Praktiken und 
Moralitäten konzeptualisiert wurde, die jedwede Interaktionen in sozio-räumlichen 
Gemeinschaften prägen („An Analysis of Local Governance and Social Order“). Die 
Ergebnisse der Dissertation sind somit nicht nur von wissenschaftlichem Interesse, sondern 
beinhalten auch praxisrelevante Implikationen für die Durchführung von 
Entwicklungsprojekten im ländlichen Afghanistan (Entwicklungspraxis) und nicht zuletzt 
interventionspolitisch relevante Hinweise was den vermeintlichen Aufbau staatlicher 
Strukturen betrifft. 
II – Kurzzusammenfassung der Einzelkapitel 
Die Dissertation ist in vier Teile untergliedert: eine (I) Einführung mit konzeptuellem 
Rahmen und methodologischen Anmerkungen (Kapitel 1-3), einen (II) Literaturüberblick 
zum Forschungsstand (Kapitel 4), die (III) empirisch untermauerte Analyse (Kapitel 5-8) 
sowie (IV) Zusammenfassung und Schlussbemerkungen (Kapitel 9).  
Zwar ist die Arbeit stark empirisch ausgerichtet, jedoch wird anerkannt, dass selbst 
induktiv gelagerte Untersuchungen mit hermeneutischem Erkenntnisinteresse sich einer 
gewissen theoretischen Vorprägung des jeweiligen Forschers, der aufgrund seiner 
wissenschaftlichen und persönlichen Sozialisation über grundlegende 
Orientierungskategorien verfügt, nicht völlig entledigen können. Deshalb ist Kapitel 2 
(Konzeptueller Rahmen) der Offenlegung konzeptueller Orientierungsthesen gewidmet. 
Die bereits im Verlauf der Datenerhebung und während der vorläufigen Analyse 
angestellten Überlegungen zum Konzept der sozialen Ordnung (Mielke et al. 2011) werden 
in diesem Abschnitt weiterentwickelt, vor allem um sie empirisch fruchtbar zu machen. 
Dazu wird der Begriff der Macht als relationales Konzept noch stärker ausdifferenziert. 
Soziale Ordnung wird als von Machtbeziehungen konstituiert verstanden (Macht in 
Netzwerken). Erklärend ist allerdings nicht ‚die Macht‘ als solche, sondern die Betonung 
liegt auf den zugrundeliegenden Machtressourcen, die die Qualität, die Prozesse und den 
Ausgang lokaler Politik  maßgeblich strukturieren. Bei der Frage nach lokaler Politik geht 
es darum, wie Macht ausgeübt wird, also um die Prozessdimension (local governance).  
Des Weiteren dient das Kapitel der Herleitung der grundlegenden, in der Arbeit 
verwandten Konzepte. Die Neufassung von sozialer Ordnung als analytisch kaum 
trennbares Zusammenspiel von Macht-unterlegten sozialen Praktiken und Moralitäten, die 
sinnhafte soziale Interaktionsprozesse strukturieren, aber auch von diesen jeweils 
strukturiert werden, speist sich aus der Kritik an dem zuvor benutzten Konzept der 
Institutionen (Mielke et al. 2011). Es wird argumentiert, dass die Unterscheidung in 
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formale und informelle Institutionen Aspekten von agency – dem Vermögen, proaktive 
Handlungen zu initiieren und durchzusetzen – nicht gerecht wird. Vielmehr lässt das 
Konzept informeller Institutionen diese Handlungsebene sowie die kognitive Dimension 
der Präferenzenformulierung und Interessendurchsetzung unterbelichtet. Aus diesem 
Grund wird das vorherige Modell von Institutionen und worldview aufgegeben (post-
institutionelle Perspektive zur Erfassung kollektiver Handlungen) und mit dem sozialer 
Praktiken und Moralitäten ersetzt. Erstere werden materiell und diskursiv verstanden, sind 
jedoch von letzteren kaum empirisch abgrenzbar, denn Moralitäten offenbaren sich in 
Handlungsmustern (inklusive den diskursiven) und beeinflussen Entscheidungsprozesse im 
realen Leben, das wiederum von außen beobachtet werden kann. Unter anderem bewirken 
Moralitäten, was als legitim oder illegitim wahrgenommen wird. Legitimität wird dabei als 
soziales Konstrukt verstanden, die das rationalistische Moment institutionalistischer 
Ansätze subjektiv wirksamen Einschränkungen unterwirft.  
Local governance wird von local government – der staatszentrierten Sichtweise – 
abgegrenzt und als die Summe der Aktivitäten verstanden, die über Machtausübung das 
kollektive Zusammenleben von sozialen Gemeinschaften (den Zugang, die Produktion, 
Umverteilung und Weitergabe von Ressourcen) feldspezifisch für einzelne 
Handlungsarenen regeln. Wichtig dabei ist, dass das Verständnis von governance auch die 
subjektive Führung, also das Benehmen Einzelner und Verhaltensmuster (conduct) von 
Gruppen mit einbezieht. Local governance wird als empirisch erforschbarer Niederschlag 
von sozialer Ordnung herausgearbeitet. Demnach spiegeln lokale Politikmuster die soziale 
Ordnung auf der Mikroebene wieder – eine Ordnungsleistung in Gemeinschaften mit 
festen sozio-räumlichen Grenzen, die durch soziale Interaktionen in Handlungsräumen 
festgelegt sind.  
Der Erfassung von local governance-Mustern liegt die Interpretationsleistung der Autorin 
zugrunde, denn die Brille auf die lokale Politik des Alltags verkörpert die externe 
Perspektive auf die multiplen, individuell erfahrenen und mit Bedeutung ausgestatteten 
alltäglichen sozialen Interaktionsprozesse. Aus der emischen Perspektive bilden diese von 
den Teilhabern einer bestimmten sozialen Gemeinschaft geteilte Lebenswelten. Sie sind 
deshalb ebenfalls Arena-spezifisch, bezeichnen jedoch nicht den Ort, sondern die 
intersubjektiv geteilte Erfahrung, das darauf aufbauende Wissen und die Gewissheit über 
das Verhalten anderer Teilhaber, die die gleichen Interessen und Deutungsmuster haben. 
Hinzu kommt im empirischen Teil der Arbeit die Konnotation der Lebenswelt als 
Alltagswelt vor dem Hintergrund, dass die vorliegende Analyse das ‚Banale‘, also 
alltäglich gebrauchte Ressourcen aus der natürlichen Umwelt und deren umstrittene 
Zugangsmechanismen sowie Verteilung und Reproduktion in den Mittelpunkt stellt.  
Das Kapitel führt schließlich die Konzepte Basislegitimität, Ordnungswert und 
Ordnungssicherheit ein, wenn es um vorhandene Erklärungsmuster für abweichendes 
Verhalten und die Langlebigkeit von sozialen Ungleichheitsstrukturen geht. Demnach 
erkennen Betroffene trotz sozialer Benachteiligung durch die Zumessung von 
Basislegitimitäten die Umstände ihrer Unterdrückung  und die damit verbundene 
Machtordnung grundlegend an (Konformität) und lehnen sich nicht dagegen auf, weil sie 
damit eine gewisse Ordnungssicherheit verbinden. Die Idee des Ordnungswertes, der vor 
  xi 
diesem Hintergrund sogar ungleich unvorteilhaften Kontextbedingungen zugeschrieben 
wird, hilft zu verstehen, warum im Rahmen hier diskutierter sozialer Ordnung/en 
Veränderungen und sozialer Wandel praktisch nur inkrementell stattfinden, große oder 
spontane Umbrüche aber weitgehend unwahrscheinlich sind.  
Kapitel 3 diskutiert methodologische Aspekte. Nach einer Zusammenschau der 
Orientierungsthesen aus dem vorhergehenden Kapitel mit Methoden der Datensammlung 
(u.a. anthropologische Feldforschung, biographische und mündliche Geschichtsinterviews) 
und Datenanalyse, werden der Zugang zum ‚Feld‘ und Limitationen der praktischen 
Forschung vor dem Hintergrund der kontinuierlichen Verschlechterung der Sicherheitslage 
in Afghanistan während des Untersuchungszeitraums 2006-2009 diskutiert. Zentral für das 
Verständnis wie die empirischen Daten im weiteren Verlauf, insbesondere in Kapitel 6, 
präsentiert werden, ist die Einführung des von mir so bezeichneten ‚Franzosenzopf-
Ansatzes‘ (French braid approach) als methodologisches Hilfsmittel zur Abbildung 
gesellschaftlicher Komplexität und für die subsequente Sichtbarmachung interstitieller 
Merkmale (des ‚Unsichtbaren‘) von Interaktionsnetzwerken. Auf der einen Seite sind diese 
weder institutionalisiert noch für den Beobachter offensichtlich, auf der anderen Seite 
bilden sie einen wichtigen Teil sozialer Interaktionsprozesse, sind bedeutungsvoll für 
lokale Politikgestaltung und gewichtige Charakteristiken der lokalen sozialen Ordnung. 
Der Vergleich mit dem Flechten eines sogenannten Franzosenzopfes (dabei wird mit jedem 
Flechtschritt etwas Haar hinzugenommen, wobei der Zopf natürlicherweise aufgrund der 
Haarstruktur mit der Länge am Ende dünner wird) drängte sich auf, weil nach 
Zugrundelegung des empirischen Kontextes einschließlich der Bestimmung der 
Analyseeinheiten und Analyseebene in Kapitel 5, mit jedem Teilkapitel und Unterabschnitt 
in Kapitel 6 weitere Erkenntnisse in die ursprüngliche deskriptive Darstellung der 
empirischen Realitäten in den Fallstudien eingeflochten wurden. So entstand aufgrund der 
Zunahme an Komplexität durch die allmähliche Einführung neuer empirischer 
Dimensionen und vorläufiger analytischer Erkenntnisse ein umfassendes Bild, das zu 
einem tieferen Verständnis lokaler Politikprozesse des Alltags beiträgt als lediglich die 
Analyse der Summe selektiver Einzelaspekte.   
In Kapitel 4 wird der Forschungsstand zu lokaler Politik bis zum Ablauf der ersten 
längeren Feldforschungsperiode Ende 2007 zusammengefasst. Dabei fällt auf, dass das 
Erkenntnisinteresse im Hinblick auf durch Machtbeziehungen strukturierte local 
governance-Prozesse ein völlig neues ist, das in der Vergangenheit, d.h. vor Beginn des 
Gewaltkonfliktes in Afghanistan 1978, von Forschern so nicht untersucht wurde. Dies ist 
nicht zuletzt den disziplinären Moden der Vergangenheit, die sich auch in der Erforschung 
Afghanistans niedergeschlagen haben, geschuldet. Auch die vorhandenen Auslegungen der 
‚Revolution‘ einschließlich der 1980er Jahre, des Bürgerkriegs oder auch der post-Taliban-
Zeit sind im Hinblick auf lokale Politikprozesse nur bedingt erhellend, in dem Fall vor 
allem, weil ab 1980 kaum Forschung stattfand. Nichtsdestotrotz führt das Kapitel in die 
grundlegenden Stränge zur Deutung von Organisationsprinzipien auf lokaler Ebene im 
ländlichen Nordostafghanistan ein. Die Bedeutung von qawm versus Ethnizität, die 
Irrelevanz von Klassen als Analysekategorie gegenüber Abhängigkeiten und Patron-
Klient-Beziehungen, sowie die Relativität von religiöser Ideologie und stattdessen die 
Bedeutung von Islam als Kultur sind die wichtigsten Punkte, die für die Vorkriegsperiode 
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identifiziert werden. Der Abschnitt 1978 bis 2001 stellt einen Versuch dar, die anfängliche 
Mobilisierung im lokalen ländlichen Raum nachzuvollziehen. Darüber hinaus wird die 
soziale Transformation infolge der Bürgerkriegsökonomie nachgezeichnet, bevor der 
Fokus auf das Staatenbauprojekt und Regierungsführung (governance) nach 2001 fällt. Es 
wird herausgestellt, dass das verfügbare Wissen weder konsistent noch kohärent erscheint 
und die lokale Ebene kaum berührt. Der Krieg hat die ländliche Gesellschaft stark geprägt, 
aber wie genau ist der Literatur bis 2007 nicht zu entnehmen.  
Der empirische Analyseteil (III) beginnt nach einer Einführung in das Forschungsgebiet 
und die Siedlungsgeschichte mit einer Klärung der Analyseeinheit – Interaktionen um 
umkämpfte Ressourcen in Arena-spezifischen Gemeinschaften – und der Analyseebene 
(Kapitel 5). Letztere bilden die lokalen Nutzergemeinschaften von Ressourcen des Alltags, 
also zum Beispiel (a) die Ackerbauern im Einzugsgebiet eines Bewässerungskanals, die 
auf dessen Wasser angewiesen sind, (b) die Eigentümer von Vieh, die die gleichen 
Weidegründe nutzen, oder (c) die Gemeinschaft der Haushalte, die ganz bestimmte 
Berghänge und Täler zur Beschaffung von Holz und Biomasse nutzt. Kapitel 6 stellt eine 
dichte Beschreibung diverser Fallstudien unterschiedlicher Intensität dar, deren Sequenz 
zunehmende Komplexität generiert. Dabei werden vor allem emische Befindlichkeiten und 
Kategorien dargestellt, die im Verlauf der Langzeitbeobachtung im Feld identifiziert 
wurden (‚vom Wassermanager zum lokalen Kommandeur‘). Die Forschung fand in sieben 
Distrikten der drei Provinzen Kunduz, Takhār und Baghlān statt. Neben drei Fallstudien 
aus dem Bewässerungssektor (Kapitel 6.1), beruhen die Aussagen zu der Regulierung von 
Zugang zu Weidegründen wie auch zu Feuerholz auf Forschung in respektive zwei 
Distrikten. Die Holz- und Weidearenen wurden unter der Rubrik ‚Mountain resource 
governance‘ in Abschnitt 6.2 zusammengefasst, da sich einzelne Berghänge und Täler der 
Vorgebirgsregionen als Ressourcenquelle und eigene ökonomische Einkommenseinheiten 
erwiesen – besonders im Vergleich zur Oasenlandschaft in Kunduz.  
Vorläufige Analysekomponenten, die bereits in der dichten Beschreibung in Kapitel 6 
Eingang finden, beziehen sich in den Irrigationsfallstudien auf eine erste Kategorisierung 
von Ältesten und lokalen Repräsentanten, auf die Analyse von Gründen, warum Reformen 
des Bewässerungssektors nicht greifen, sowie auf die Umkämpftheit ländlichen Eigentums, 
die nur teilweise dem Nexus von Wasser und Land geschuldet ist. Um Konflikte geht es 
auch bei der empirischen Betrachtung dreier Fallstudien, bei denen Bergressourcen im 
Mittelpunkt stehen. Die Fallstudie zur Brennstoffökonomie im Fulol-Tal zeigt auf, dass der 
oftmals vermutete Zusammenhang zwischen Armut und Ressourcendegradation nicht 
trägt. Zudem werden Normativität und Realität für den Zugang und die Nutzung der 
Gebirgshänge (rangeland) diskutiert. Den Abschluss beider Unterkapitel bilden 
Zusammenfassungen, in denen Überschneidungen und Aspekte der mikropolitischen 
Ökologie – dem Zusammenhang zwischen Ressourcennutzung, Macht und Politik – 
herausgearbeitet werden. Die dichte Beschreibung mit zunehmenden analytischen 
Elementen in Kapitel 6 stellt einen Wert an sich dar, wenn die in Kapitel 3 erwähnten 
Schwierigkeiten beim Zusammentragen wie der Aufbereitung dieser Daten, die nur einen 
fragmentarischen Teil des insgesamt vorhandenen Materials darstellen, berücksichtigt 
werden. Darüber hinaus erlaubt die Darstellung erstmals Einblicke in Strukturierungs- und 
Organisationsprozesse von Ressourcennutzergemeinschaften auf der lokalen Ebene. Dies 
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stellt eine wertvolle Quelle, beispielsweise für interessierte Entwicklungshelfer im Bereich 
ländliche Entwicklung, dar.  
Kapitel 7 kondensiert auf der Basis der Datenlage im vorherigen Kapitel Modalitäten 
lokaler Politik heraus. Die Analyse des Zugangs potenzieller Nutzer zu natürlichen 
Umweltressourcen des Alltags ist dabei nur der erste Schritt.  
Die in Abschnitt 7.1 zusammengefasste Betrachtung von Durchsetzungsmechanismen 
lokaler Machtausübung in Entscheidungsprozessen und realen Bewässerungspraktiken, die 
zuweilen normativen Vorgaben diametral entgegenstanden, erlaubt den Schluss, dass die 
Ausstattung mit Machtressourcen einzelner bzw. einer Gemeinschaft darüber entscheidet, 
wer warum im Vergleich mit anderen besser in der Lage ist, von einer Ressource zu 
profitieren. Zu den ausschlaggebenden Machtressourcen gehören ortsbasierte Faktoren 
(Umweltbeschaffenheit, Lage), die Zugehörigkeit zu einer sozialen Gemeinschaft 
(Identität), Autorität, sozialer Status (Netzwerkbeziehungen) und ökonomische Ressourcen 
wie Immobilien-, Land- und anderer Besitz sowie Geld. Derjenige oder diejenige 
Gemeinschaft, die über die vorteilhafteste Ressourcenausstattung verfügt, ist auch in der 
Lage, am meisten vom Zugang zu Alltagsressourcen wie Bewässerung, Weide und Wald 
zu profitieren. Die Analyse zeigt, dass es für die Regelung von Zugang und Nutzung eine 
Menge ungeschriebener lokaler Prinzipien und Regularien gibt, die nicht legalistisch 
abgesichert sind, sondern meist nur auf Brauchtum und Tradition beruhen. Trotzdem 
Ressourcen in der Regel umstritten sind, und der Zugang zu ihnen umkämpft sowie in der 
Durchsetzung oft ungerecht ist, hat sich gezeigt, dass alle Teilhaber bemüht sind, Konflikte 
nicht gewaltsam eskalieren zu lassen – ein offensichtlicher Widerspruch zum gängigen 
Stereotyp einer ‚Kultur der Gewalt‘ der Afghanen. Dieses Ergebnis wird als ein Indikator 
dafür gewertet, dass sich die benachteiligte Partei des Machtungleichgewichts durchaus 
bewusst ist und sich aufgrund des zugemessenen Ordnungswerts in die bestehenden 
Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse fügt, um das wahrgenommene Maß an Ordnungssicherheit nicht 
preisgeben zu müssen.  
Zugangsregelungen für Holz und Biomasse oder auch Weidegründe, die ursprünglich 
durchgängig offen (open access) für den ersten Fall und Gemeindeeigentum im Falle der 
Weidegründe (common property regime) waren, unterliegen gegenwärtig Veränderungen, 
da sich in beiden Fällen lokale Nutzergemeinschaften gegenüber externen Nutznießern 
(Nomaden, Holzfäller aus Orten jenseits der unmittelbaren Nachbarschaft) zur Wehr 
setzen.  Der Ausgang der beobachteten Wandlungsprozesse ist ungewiss. Vor dem 
Hintergrund fehlender staatlicher Gesetzgebung für Land, Weideflächen und Wald 
(rangeland) zum Zeitpunkt der Feldforschung bis 2009 kommt Unterkapitel 7.1 zum 
Ergebnis, dass lediglich lokale Rechtsnormen für den Zugang und die Verteilung 
natürlicher Ressourcen des Alltags eine Rolle spielen. Diese stellen allerdings normative 
Regularien dar, die in der Praxis durch relationale Zugangsmechanismen über persönliche 
Beziehungen und die Verfügbarkeit von (Bündeln von) Machtressourcen ausgehebelt 
werden. Dabei zeigt sich eine starke Verwobenheit der Ressourcen Reichtum, Status, 
Autorität und offensichtlich (deskriptiver) Macht.  
Dass die Regierung und ‚der Staat‘ nur eine Größe unter vielen im lokalen Akteursmix 
darstellen, machen sowohl die Ausführungen zu Konfliktmediationsmechanismen (Kapitel 
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7.2) und zu Repräsentation (7.3) deutlich. Im Falle von Bemühungen zur 
Konfliktbeilegung verweisen Regierungsbeamte auf die lokale Ebene und bitten Älteste 
um Schlichtung. Die Tätigkeit der Ältesten (muysafēdi) und die Rolle von Mittelsmännern 
erweist sich als zentral für das Verständnis lokaler Politikprozesse in Afghanistan. Die 
Beziehungen zwischen Staat und lokaler Ebene haben sich seit der Vorkriegszeit stark 
gewandelt. Von einem ursprünglich mit göttlicher Autorität versehenen Herrscher und 
dazugehörigem Staatsapparat, der vor Ausbruch des Krieges auf lokaler Ebene jedoch nur 
mehr geduldet wurde, hält heute eine kleine Elitenschicht die staatlichen Positionen auf 
lokaler Ebene besetzt (state-capture from above), nachdem für die Periode nach Ausbruch 
des Bürgerkrieges 1992 bis Ende 2001 unter den Bewohnern Nordostafghanistans die 
Wahrnehmung vorherrschte, dass in dieser Zeit kein Staat existent war. In diesem 
Zusammenhang ist das Aufkommen einer neuen Kategorie von Ältesten (novel elders) auf 
lokaler Ebene wichtig, deren Autorität oftmals auf eine Vergangenheit als lokale 
Kommandeure (im Widerstand gegen die sowjetische Besatzung, als Mudschahedin oder 
unter den Taliban als Parteigänger oder als deren Opponenten im Kreis der Nordallianz), 
den in diesem Zusammenhang erworbenen Ruf und den damit verbundenen Zugang zu 
materiellen Gütern zurückzuführen ist. Der Abschnitt diskutiert den Rollenwandel 
verschiedener Typen ländlicher Eliten über den Zeitraum 1977-2007. Konventionelle 
(traditionelle) Älteste erfuhren einen Statusverlust, wenn sie nicht vergleichbare 
Machtressourcen aufbieten konnten.  
Die emische Unterscheidung zwischen ‚guten‘ und ‚schlechten‘ bzw. nicht vorhandenen 
Ältesten ist insofern wichtig, als dass sich herausstellte, dass lokale Gemeinschaften aktiv 
Repräsentationsmöglichkeiten gegenüber Außenstehenden (Regierungsstellen und INROs) 
suchen. Beispielsweise bemühten sich die Bewohner eines Siedlungsclusters darum, 
genügend Geld zu sparen, um sich selbst einen Regierungsposten für einen ihrer 
Repräsentanten zu erkaufen. Ein Vergleich der sechs Distrikte, in denen vorwiegend 
Feldforschung stattfand, im Hinblick auf den Zugang zu Regierungsbehörden zeigt, dass 
die zwei Distrikte, aus denen die zweite Riege der Nordallianz-Kämpfer stammte, 
außerordentlich gute Beziehungen nach Kabul unterhält, während Distrikte, deren 
Loyalität unter den Taliban nicht eindeutig der Seite der späteren Gewinner zugeordnet 
werden kann, kaum über Verbindungen verfügen, schon gar nicht über Direktverbindungen 
in die Zentralregierung. Für die lokalen Gemeinschaften bedeutete dies praktische 
Nachteile, beispielsweise eine Marginalisierung beim Zugang zu Projekten im Rahmen 
von Hilfsprogrammen durch (I)NROs oder selbst durch die Regierung.  
Unterkapitel 7.4 reflektiert über die Mehrdeutigkeit von Legitimität, die aus dem 
empirischen Material ersichtlich wurde. Machtausübung und lokalen Politikprozessen 
liegen diverse Legitimitätsquellen zugrunde. Die Analyse demonstriert das Vorhandensein 
eines Normpluralismus und den Wandel der Legitimität von lokalen Akteuren in den 
letzten 40 Jahren auf einem Kontinuum zwischen völliger Zustimmung, leidlicher 
Konformität und dem Vorenthalten von Legitimität.  Während die Regierung in Kabul vor 
dem Ausbruch des Krieges über weitgehende Legitimität verfügte, wird ihr sowie den 
lokalen Beamten heute nur mehr mit Konformität begegnet. Ähnlich, aber nicht ganz so 
gravierend hat sich die Anerkennung religiöser Akteure gewandelt. Klar entzogen wurde 
Legitimität zum Zeitpunkt der Feldforschung bis 2009 den ehemaligen ‚schlechten‘ 
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Kommandeuren, die ihrerseits ihre Machtressourcen – meist durch DIAG und DDR – 
eingebüßt hatten. Teilweise konformes Verhalten aufgrund von Angst wird nach wie vor 
aktiven ‚schlechten‘ Kommandeuren entgegengebracht und auch arbāb. ‚Gute‘ Älteste und 
Kommandeure hingegen erfreuen sich einer gewissen Legitimität über das Niveau von 
Konformität hinaus (Tabelle 13). Eine weitere Beobachtung betrifft die Unterscheidung 
von moralischer versus administrativer Legitimität und der nachgewiesene 
Bedeutungswandel des emischen Konzepts salāhiyat, das ursprünglich für normative 
Legitimität stand, mittlerweile aber aufgrund von Venalität und infolge der damit 
konnotierten Zuschreibung durch Regierungsangestellte untergraben wurde. So wurde 
salāhiyat 2009 vermehrt mit Reichtum verknüpft. Dies kann als Indikator dafür gewertet 
werden, dass Geld eine zunehmend wichtige Rolle in sozialen Beziehungen spielt, weitaus 
wichtiger als Verwandtschaft oder Identität und Gruppenzugehörigkeit.   
Die Zusammenfassung der Modalitäten lokaler Politik in Abschnitt 7.4 betont die Rolle 
von Moralitäten und die Bedeutung relational-struktureller Faktoren für den Zugang zu 
Ressourcen im Gegensatz zu rechtsbasierten. Die Akkumulation von Machtressourcen 
verbunden mit der Ausweitung persönlicher Netzwerke oder die Notwendigkeit, sich über 
Netzwerkbeziehungen mit Personen, die gewisse Ressourcen kontrollieren, selbst Zugang 
zu diesen zu beschaffen, bestimmt somit den Alltag der Afghanen im ländlichen Raum. 
Die Rolle von Mittelsmännern und administrative Korruption sind signifikant, gewähren 
dem Durchschnittsbewohner aber auch ein gewisses Gefühl der Berechenbarkeit des 
Vertrauten und somit Ordnungssicherheit. Die diskursive Betonung von Werten wie 
Gemeinschaft, Einheit, Solidarität, Hilfe und Brüderlichkeit steht den praktizierten 
ungleichen Zugangsbedingungen und Ungerechtigkeiten diametral gegenüber. 
Abweichendes Verhalten sowie Gegenwehr finden lediglich im Rahmen der bestehenden 
Machtverhältnisse statt, aber fordern sie nicht heraus. Plurale Normenstandards, ihre 
Fluidität und die Interpretation der Normen durch lokale Eliten (arbāb, muysafēd, mullahs, 
Beamte) relativieren den Spielraum für Widerstand, genau wie Ritualismus und die 
habituelle Unterstützung dieser Personengruppen durch die Landbevölkerung. Das Streben 
nach Ordnungssicherheit und nach dem Erhalt (des Ordnungswertes) der bestehenden 
Verhältnisse durch Konformität und eine gewisse Basislegitimität bestätigt die 
Grundfesten der sozialen Ordnung stetig neu. Vor diesem Hintergrund verliert die 
Fremdwahrnehmung von lokalen Zuständen in Afghanistan als anarchisch und chaotisch 
ihre Relevanz. Die Situation kann vielmehr als mit einer gewissen Berechenbarkeit und 
Stabilität (an Erwartungen und Wandlungspotenzialen) versehen interpretiert werden. 
Nachdem die Funktionslogiken der lokalen sozialen Ordnung in ländlichen 
Ressourcennutzergemeinden explizit herausgearbeitet wurden, geht Kapitel 8 auf die den 
Hilfs-, Entwicklungs- und Wiederaufbauprogrammen zugrundeliegende Interventionslogik  
der internationalen Gemeinschaft ein. Erneut wird hier deutlich, wie sich die beschriebene 
soziale Ordnung der ländlichen Gesellschaft in Nordostafghanistan inklusive ihrer 
Politikmechanismen an die Ein- und Durchführung von Programmen wie NSP und KRBP 
angepasst haben, die mitunter dafür entworfen wurden, die althergebrachten ungleichen 
Verteilungs- und Zugangsstrukturen sowie die Dominanz traditioneller Eliten zu brechen. 
Ausgehend vom Paradigma des gemeinschaftsgesteuerten Wiederaufbaus (community-
driven reconstruction) in Verbindung mit der Annahme hoher Legitimitätsgeltung der 
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Regierung sowie der Sinnhaftigkeit der Etablierung von Eigentumsrechten wird anhand 
des Kunduz River Basin Programs (KRBP) die Interventionslogik vorgestellt. Sie beruht 
u.a. auf der Bildung von lokalen Gemeinschaftsgremien (Wassernutzerassoziationen, 
Kanalkomitees, sogenannte Ressourcenmanagementräte), die jedoch in der Lebenswelt der 
Landbewohner kaum Bestand haben und nach Beendigung der Maßnahmen jedwede 
Daseinsberechtigung einbüßen.  
Im Unterkapitel 8.3 wird herausgearbeitet, dass es deshalb zu keinen nennenswerten 
Veränderungen der lokalen Machtstrukturen kommt. Allein die lokalen afghanischen 
Mitarbeiter internationaler Organisationen können als neue Machtakteure bezeichnet 
werden, stellen sie doch Mittler (broker) zwischen der Organisation und den ihr 
zugrundeliegenden Arbeitslogiken auf der einen Seite, und der ländlichen Bevölkerung 
mediatisiert durch Mittelsmänner, also lokale Eliten (Älteste, Kommandeure etc.), auf der 
anderen Seite, dar. Als Entwicklungs- und letztlich Staatsaufbaumakler sind sie es, die 
anstelle der nach demokratischen Prinzipien lokal etablierten Gremien die eigentlichen 
Vorreiter und Wegbereiter des Wiederaufbau- und Staatsbildungsprozesses in Afghanistan 
sind. Es wird argumentiert, dass beide Gruppen – lokale ländliche Eliten und die 
nationalen Mitarbeiter internationaler NROs an der Schnittstelle zwischen ihrer 
Organisation und der Zielgruppe – das, was aus der Ferne als ‚Entwicklung‘ und 
Staatsaufbau in Afghanistan wahrgenommen wird, gegenseitig aushandeln. Diese 
Aushandlungsprozesse sind nur bedingt bewusst gesteuert, denn sie richten sich danach, 
wie die typischen Entwicklungsmakler – Gemeindearbeiter, Ingenieure und Übersetzer – 
ihre Projektziele selbst verstanden haben. Die lokalen Ältesten wiederum besitzen die 
Interpretationshoheit über lokale Bedarfe, auf die die (I)NRO-Mitarbeiter für die 
Berichterstattung und Bedarfsformulierung zur Beurteilung der Notwendigkeit von 
bestimmten Projektaktivitäten angewiesen sind. Im Ergebnis finden Wiederaufbau und 
‚Entwicklung‘ oftmals nur vermeintlich statt. Aggregiert zeigt sich hier, wie in 
Afghanistan das Abbild staatlicher Strukturen errichtet wird, ohne dass diese dem 
entsprechen, was die Außenwahrnehmung transportiert, nämlich Erfolge im Staats- und 
Institutionenbau.  
Kapitel 9 schlägt den Bogen zum konzeptionellen Rahmen der Arbeit und fasst den 
methodologischen, inhaltlichen und wissenschaftlichen Mehrwert der Dissertation 
zusammen. Dabei veranschaulichen die Analyse der Politik des Alltags im ländlichen 
Nordostafghanistan und die Schlussfolgerungen über die Beschaffenheit der lokalen 
sozialen Ordnung die Grenzen gemeinschaftlicher Organisation im Untersuchungsraum. 
Die Kernkonzepte – soziale Ordnung, local governance, Politik und Konflikt – werden 
abschließend noch einmal miteinander in Beziehung gesetzt. Der Ausblick in Unterkapitel 
9.3 reflektiert die Ergebnisse der Arbeit im Hinblick auf die Entwicklungspraxis und 
soziale Wandlungspotenziale. Abschließend werden nach wie vor offene und 
weiterführende Forschungsfragen skizziert.  
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Notes on transliteration 
 
Dari English 
ا / آ ‘ (ā) 
ب b 
پ p 
ت t 
ث s 
ج j 
چ ch 
ح h 
خ kh 
د d 
ذ z 
ر r 
ز z 
ژ zh 
س s 
ش sh 
ص s 
ض z 
ط t 
ظ z  
ع ‘ 0F1 
غ gh 
ف f 
ق q 
ک k 
گ g 
ل l 
م m 
ن n 
و w/o/u1F2 
ه -/h 
ى i/y/ē/e (Ezāfe) 
 
 
                                                             
1 Except before capital letters. 
2 Depending on pronunciation. 
In this study, the transliteration of Dari and other 
local language terms (Uzbeki, Pashto, Turkmani, 
and Tajik) as recorded during field research is 
preferred to standardized transcription in order to 
enable the reader to recreate the respondents’ 
accounts as closely as possible. The Dari (script) 
writing of the terms as they are used and 
pronounced in local parlance were transcribed 
following the Persian-German transcription 
suggested by Alavi and Lorenz (1994) with some 
minor adaptations for single letters, as displayed in 
Table 1.  
An attempt has been made to transliterate all local 
terms, except for topographic names that have a 
proper and known counterpart in English (e.g., 
Hindukush, Kandahar, Kabul, and Wakhan) and 
terms designating ethnic group-belonging (Hazara, 
Uzbek, Turkmen) or local concepts, but with 
likewise common usage in English (mujahedin, 
jihad, Taliban). The plural of local terms has 
neither been Anglicized (arbāb to arbābs) nor 
indicated as local plural – whether normal or 
Arabic form – to avoid confusion for the reader 
not familiar with the local languages. For example, 
whether the word muysafēd designates one or 
more elders must be concluded from the relevant 
verb.  
In quotations from secondary literature the 
spelling and plural forms used by the author were 
adopted, even though they might differ from the 
writing in the main text.  
All transliterated terms, except for names, are 
listed in the Glossary (A2). 
US English is used throughout the text. 
Table 1: Transliteration of Dari letters 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I: Introduction 
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1 – Introduction  
 
While I was rewriting the introduction to my thesis for the umpteenth time, suddenly the 
news announced that commander Muhamad Dāod Dāod had been killed along with the 
police chief of Takhār and several other officials, including members of the international 
forces, by a suicide bomber in the Tāluqān headquarters of the provincial governor. During 
my fieldwork, the presence of Dāod was interwoven with events and oral history accounts 
about local politics and changes in northeastern Afghanistan since 2001. He had lately 
served as the highest police officer in Afghanistan’s north after completion of a term as 
Deputy Minister of the Interior in Kabul in charge of narcotics control. He started his 
political career as a body guard and later was regional sub-commander of Ahmad Shāh 
Mas’ud, the head of the Northern Alliance who was killed by two attackers disguised as 
journalists in Khoja Bahā’udin in northern Takhār two days before 9/11. Because the 
ordinary people of the northeast deemed Dāod as Mas’ud’s heir apparent, he inherited the 
latter’s prestige and respect, which rested to a large extent on the common perception that 
Mas’ud had been the only jihad-commander at the time of the Soviet occupation who had 
stayed in Afghanistan to organize military resistance from the battlefield and not a 
residence in Peshawar. Similarly, his military successes throughout the fighting against 
Soviet troops, during the subsequent civil war, and, finally, against the advancing Taliban 
made him famous while alive, and a martyr after his lifetime. Dāod had been on Mas’ud’s 
side from early on, though not in any crucial position. At the national and international 
level, he became widely known after Mas’ud’s death when he fought back the Taliban 
forces from Tāluqān towards Kunduz and finally helped to oust the Taliban from Kunduz 
in one of the fiercest, last battles of 2001. News reports3 disclosed that Dāod had 
threatened to ‘wipe out the Taliban from Afghanistan’s north’ anew only days before his 
death. In hindsight, it seemed logical to assume that he had fallen victim to the Taliban. 
However, rumors suggested that rival Uzbek factions were behind the attack. After all, it 
remained unclear whether he was the prior target of the attack in Tāluqān on 28 May 2011 
or the German general and several soldiers who also attended the security dialogue 
meeting with the Takhār police chief, the governor and others. Clearing up the question is 
not important for this thesis. I chose to include the circumstances of Dāod’s death in the 
introduction because it frames the location, the ramifications of political events and the 
actors in which my own fieldwork was situated. 
This study relies on more than 14 months of fieldwork between 2006 and 2009 in three 
provinces of northeast Afghanistan: Kunduz, Takhār and Baghlān (see Map M1). During 
this period, post-Taliban northeastern Afghanistan witnessed a gradual deterioration of the 
security situation amid the presence of German military forces and the activities of dozens 
of international development organizations. In addition to the foregoing violence following 
a protest in Tāluqān against night raids by international forces a week before, the described 
incident on 28 May 2011 constituted a culmination of these deteriorating conditions. 
Before mid-May 2011, Tāluqān had rarely made it into international news because it was 
                                                             
3 See headlines and reporting in different news portals on 28 May 2011, e.g. “Afghanistan: Suicide blast kills 
top police commander”, and “Na severe Afganistana ubit general Daud Daud” (Russian).  
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considered ‘generally peaceful’, especially in contrast to Kunduz, which had gradually 
gained the reputation of being highly insecure since mid-2006. The main stakeholders in 
the described incident were ‘the Taliban’, government representatives of all rank and style, 
international forces and an uprooted crowd of demonstrators. They displayed the common 
pattern used to interpret events in Afghanistan as a conflict between ‘us and them’ (that is 
democrats against Taliban, good versus bad, secularism versus Islam, developed versus 
backward people), which was based on tentative differences in culture, development and 
religion. However, analyses that were culturally more informed elaborated on the 
northerners’ (non-Pashtun) interests versus Pashtun agendas in the struggle for national 
domination, thus following mainly an ethnic view of the conflict. The resurgence of anti-
government and so-called Taliban forces in Afghanistan’s north since 2006 is commonly 
interpreted as a consequence of failures of the Government of Afghanistan and the 
international military intervention from 2001 onwards. This indicates that the national and 
international context at government level is commonly taken as frame for investigation, 
thereby disregarding local-level processes and ignoring historical path-dependencies.  
 
Map M1: Northeastern Afghanistan with provinces of field research 2006-09 
 
When I began this PhD on local governance in October 2005 and started to conduct 
fieldwork in Kunduz, Takhār, and Baghlān in mid-March 2006, knowledge and 
information about local-level politics, ordering mechanisms and decision-making was 
sparse. Moreover, more than 25 years after the outbreak of violent conflict in Afghanistan 
it was uncertain how the war had affected rural societies and their community structures, 
people’s worldviews and mental cognitive schemes: in short, their life-worlds. This 
uncertainty was reinforced by the absence of scholarly work at the local level because of 
ongoing fighting and insecurity since the late 1970s. Prior to the 1980s, Afghanistan had 
been a popular area of study among German, American and French geographers, social 
anthropologists, and economists who generated extensive insights into local tribal and 
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economic structures according to the disciplinary research questions and theoretical 
paradigms of that time. During and after the conflict, research focused mainly on 
geopolitical questions. In a similar vein, discussions on state-building, failure, and 
development assistance dominate what has been published on Afghanistan since 2001. 
Macro-level studies with an emphasis on state functions and government agendas are on 
par with security-focused analyses related to terrorism and the so-called Taliban 
resurgence in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. However, the subjectivities of ordinary 
Afghans within this political context, their perspectives on the war, on the promise of 
peace after 2001, and on the resurgent and currently worsening armed conflict have been 
understudied.        
Nevertheless, as Dāod’s career demonstrates, local people cannot be treated apart from the 
historical context of events in Afghanistan over the past 30 plus years. They are products, 
agents and subjects of this particular historical trajectory. Dāod was born in a locality 
called Taganchak in one of the side-valleys of Takhār’s Farkhār district, which happened 
to be one of my main fieldsites. He made his way from being ‘the driver of Dr Hussain’ to 
a bodyguard of Mas’ud during the resistance against the Soviet army, to sub-commander 
during the ensuing civil war, to provincial commander (amir) fighting against the Taliban 
in the second half of the 1990s, to Chief of Police (qomāndān-e amniya) of Kunduz 
province (2004), to Deputy Minister of the Interior (2004-2009) in the Karzai 
administration. By the time of his death, he was the highest-ranking police chief of the 
303rd division in north Afghanistan. Dāod’s story is an example of how life stories in this 
part of Afghanistan have been intertwined with the broader political context and even 
international politics. However, at the same time his life path followed the common pattern 
of personalized network relations and factional appointments in order to maintain 
legitimacy and outbalance rival power claims.  
As the title of this thesis suggests, I intend to (re-)locate and position rural Afghans’ life-
worlds (Lebenswelten), that is, everyday practices as well as the cognitive interpretation 
frames, worldviews and moral dispositions within the context of what is perceived to have 
taken place in Afghanistan since 2001. According to the mainstream interpretation, we 
witness state-building processes and development efforts, although their limited success is 
largely acknowledged. I take a critical stance towards this macro-perspective by 
supplementing it with a view ‘from below’. My approach rests on my personal conviction 
that an inside perspective on what seems to an outsider to represent state failure, terror, 
underdevelopment, food insecurity, scarcity and Islamist ideological beliefs, allows the 
researcher to investigate the collective perceptions of locals, the categories they employ to 
make sense of the world surrounding them, and the events they are drawn into and affected 
by. Thus, this approach seeks to reveal the fabric of community relations and the local 
grammar of understanding and interpretation within this society.  
This thesis traces the evolution of the social order approach as a conceptual framework. 
The idea for establishing social order as conceptual framework took its origin from my 
earlier studies of Eastern European transitions and is based on theoretical considerations of 
order in stateless societies that I encountered during my first months as PhD-student at the 
Center for Development Research (ZEF). Subsequently, new insights gained from my 
fieldwork substantiated this concept and motivated me to look into questions of order once 
  4 
again from a theoretical perspective and even motivate my colleagues to do so. The result 
was the initiation of a long-lasting process of discussion within our project group at ZEF 
on the topics of social order, statehood, and institutions, which were augmented by 
empirical insights from the Āmu Daryā border region.  
This thesis is one of three case studies in the research project ‘Local Governance and 
(fragile) Statehood in the Amu Darya Borderlands’, funded by Volkswagen Foundation 
and carried out at ZEF at Bonn University. The project goal was to trace similarities and 
differences in state-society relations and their institutional underpinnings north and south 
of the Āmu Daryā because the region once shared the same social, economic and cultural 
institutions. Guided by several dichotomies implied in the original funding proposal I 
began to study state-society relationships in the scope and role of formal versus informal 
institutions. What I found during fieldwork, however, was that it was naïve to conceive 
‘the state’ as something external from society and that the somewhat normative bias 
underlying the distinction between formal and informal institutions is more confusing than 
heuristically useful. Consequently, one of the main arguments in this thesis is that these 
dichotomies do not hold. Instead, they obstruct a view of deeper explanatory factors and 
power relationships that inform local governance structures and politics.  
In this thesis, I describe and analyze in detail the mechanisms underlying everyday 
resource governance in selected sites of seven districts in Afghanistan’s northeast. The 
result is a field-specific micro-analysis of power derived from different empirical case 
study vignettes of local resource-user communities. The rationale for focusing on ordinary 
environmental resources, such as water for field irrigation and rangeland for livestock, fuel 
wood4 collection and dry-land farming, is that the large majority of population in 
northeastern Afghanistan depends on these resources for their everyday livelihoods, which 
are at the subsistence level. In the absence of other significant income-producing sectors, 
agricultural produce, including the environment, forms the mainstay of the incomes of 
average households. However, these resources become increasingly contested, sometimes 
temporarily as in the case of irrigation water in times of drought, but more permanently in 
the cases of pasture grounds and wood or plant fuel. 
The title of this study, “(Re-)Constructing Afghanistan? Rewriting rural Afghans’ 
Lebenswelten into Recent Development and State-making Processes. An Analysis of Local 
Governance and Social Order”, summarizes the research objective as well as a part of its 
main message, and it also hints at the ethical-methodological considerations I had in mind 
when I conducted the research and progressed to writing this thesis. The latter allude to my 
interpretation of the interview data, documents and other material, as well as the 
recognition and reflection of the fact that it always constitutes a second order construction 
(see Ch. 3). Given the research objective of understanding local governance processes and 
the make-up of rural society’s social order, the analysis aimed to take stock of the 
differences that are characteristic for the post-2001 rural society in contrast to earlier 
accounts about rural Afghan society, which were collected and represented by pre-war 
anthropologists and representatives from other disciplines (see Ch. 4). Against this 
                                                             
4 In this thesis, I speak of fuel wood as entailing wood fuel and non-woody fuel plants. See Ch. 6.2 for 
details. 
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background, the query ‘(Re-)Constructing Afghanistan?’ makes sense. However, even 
more plausible is the second semantic dimension of the term, which refers to the literal 
reconstruction of the country Afghanistan – of its polity, economy, infrastructure, and so 
on. One of several assumptions behind the rationale of the international intervention in 
Afghanistan after 2001 was that the country and its people had experienced a total 
breakdown. This referred not only to the physical infrastructure but included the human 
capital and governance dimensions as well. Moreover, the perception of an institutional 
void spurred the design of good governance components as part of large-scale rural 
reconstruction programs. It was commonly assumed that community organizations should 
be established from scratch in order to replace bad governance structures with democratic 
ones (see Ch. 8).  
However, the results of this thesis clearly negate this assumption, demonstrating that in 
rural Afghan communities, there is no dearth of governing rules, regulations, and 
normative principles for organizing everyday communal coexistence and the access to 
resources. In addition, the insights derived from the fieldwork show that an active 
construction process within the framework of rural development measures has been 
established. At the national level it provides evidence of putative state-building, which I 
term ‘state-making’ given its negotiated character at the local community level (see also 
Ch. 8). A main conclusion of the thesis is that rural society in northeastern Afghanistan is 
characterized by highly unequal power structures that manifest in social inequalities and 
non-solidary behavior within and between communities. Furthermore, it was found that the 
programs and projects of the international development intervention serve to buttress and 
reconfirm existing inequalities, instead of altering and modifying them—despite their good 
intentions.  
The effort to trace the underlying processes of local governance leads to several 
conclusions about the mechanisms and characteristics of the social order of northeast 
Afghanistan’s rural society. Power relations are constitutive of social order. However, 
contrary to authors who are of the view that power is ubiquitous (e.g., Foucault 2008), the 
empirical analysis led me to the conclusion that the idea of omnipresent (relational) power 
is heuristically not very helpful for detecting it. The empirical data showed that a thick 
description (Geertz 1987) and analysis of power are by no means sufficient to use the term 
power as such. Instead, relevant representative concepts such as the notion of power 
resources and bundles of power resources are necessary to develop an operative concept of 
power in relationships.  
Thesis outline 
The thesis is subdivided into four parts that could be also read separately, depending on the 
reader’s primary interest. First is the conceptual framework (Ch. 2), which represents the 
theoretical underpinnings of the predominantly inductive empirical inquiry, including its 
methodological dimension (Ch. 3). Second, Chapter 4 presents a review of the relevant 
literature and a state of the art scientific inquiry into questions of social order and local 
governance in rural northeast Afghanistan from the pre-war decades until 2007. The third 
major part comprises the presentation of the empirical data from the case studies (Chs. 5 
and 6), and the subsequent analysis (Chs. 7 and 8). Part 4 is the conclusion (Ch. 9).   
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Chapter outline 
The second chapter introduces the basic analytical categories – social order, local 
governance, Lebenswelten, power and legitimacy – and discusses their interrelationships. I 
rely on the notion of social order for framing my research on a meta-conceptual level, 
which provides for elaborating guiding theses and possibly a figuration of how local 
governance, the idea of life-worlds (Lebenswelten), and power can be separately 
conceptualized and mutually positioned in interaction with the respective other. To 
elaborate this analytical framework and do justice to the cognitive and discursive elements 
of social order, values, norms and moralities are also clarified. These elaborations serve to 
provide transparency regarding my own theoretical biases and academic socialization as a 
political sociologist by interest and training.  
In Chapter 3 I discuss my methodology, that is, first, the entry into the field and 
limitations of practical fieldwork that were caused by deteriorating security conditions in 
the research area between 2006 and 2009. Second, I discuss the application of a 
methodological approach that I called the ‘French braid approach’. It was developed to 
grasp the complexity, emergent structures and the non-visible of the logic underlying 
everyday local politics in rural Afghanistan. The metaphor is simple: in a French braid, 
every new step in the braiding process gathers additional hair, making it thicker at first and 
in its main part, subsequently forming a thinner end held together by a hairband. Similarly, 
the empirical data was presented as combination of thick description with increasing 
complexity by subsequently adding preliminary analytical thoughts. On this basis, few 
main analytical strands could be singled out for abstraction beyond the natural resource 
realm (see Ch. 7). 
Chapter 4 provides a literature review and summarizes the state of the art of academic 
insights related my local governance in northeastern Afghanistan as conceptualized in this 
thesis (Ch. 2). It is subdivided chronologically into three bodies of literature: 1) academic 
publications on local governance-related themes until the early 1980s; 2) scholarly writings 
based on research during the subsequent 20 years of war in Afghanistan; that is under 
Soviet occupation, in civil war, during Taliban-rule; and 3) the post-2001 literature. The 
chapter concludes that the available knowledge at the time I conducted my own research 
was neither consistent nor coherent; neither was it concerned with questions of governance 
as conduct and everyday political processes. The war has affected local society strongly, 
yet the literature and available knowledge until 2007 does not specify the ways in which it 
changed.   
Based on a mix of empirical insights and further readings of conceptual literature, Chapter 
5 clarifies what constitutes ‘the local(e)’, that is, a meaningful level and unit of analysis for 
this research. After introducing the geographical characteristics and settlement history of 
the research area, the discussion focuses on the contrasting notions of community from an 
emic versus an administrative perspective and the fluidity of place-based notions of 
locality. By concluding on user communities as place-based levels of analysis, I highlight 
that they combine dimensions of territoriality (village) and social interdependence or 
power in networks (community) while operating on various scales. The latter depend on 
the territorial expansion of the use practices for a resource in question, for example, a 
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command areas in canal networks, or mountainsides, valleys, and slopes that are used by 
fuel wood collectors or rangeland user communities.   
In Chapter 6 I present the case studies for three different resource-types, that is, regarding 
the access, allocation and distribution of irrigation water, pasture land and fuel wood, at 
different sites. I illustrate how access to and distribution of everyday environmental 
resources is governed. The amount of detail offered throughout Chapter 6, is meant to 
provide the interested reader with a thorough introduction to emic concepts and normative 
notions that guide the actors’ subjective motivations and rationale for social interaction 
(soziales Handeln). Based on the elaborations in Chapters 2 and 5, local governance is 
operationalized as the exercise of power manifest in the structuring and structured ordinary 
practices to regulate access, of environmental resources within resource user communities 
in Kunduz oasis and Takhār’s and Baghlān’s mountainsides. The presentation of the data – 
based on the empirical question ‘Who gets what and how?’ – focuses on irrigation water 
governance in the first part (Ch. 6.1) and mountain resource governance, such as pastures 
and fuel wood, in the second part (Ch. 6.2).   
Chapter 7 provides in a first step (Ch. 7.1.) a comparative analysis of access patterns to 
irrigation water, grazing land and fuel wood. Resource users’ varied abilities to derive 
benefits from these resources are discussed by looking at the underlying ‘bundles of power 
resources’, such as place-based factors, the belonging to a social community, authority, 
social status and economic resources. In a second step, I abstract from the realm of natural 
resources access patterns and deduct general mechanisms that shape local governance 
processes and the rural social order. These include mechanisms for dispute resolution (7.2), 
the mediation of access in social relationships at the community level, aspects of 
representation, especially towards the government and by the state towards the people 
(7.3), and pluralistic and contested legitimacies (7.4).  
In Chapter 8, I show how the depicted rural social order and local governance 
mechanisms have adapted to the introduction of programs designed to challenge and alter 
traditional local social structures in the framework of the post-2001 development 
intervention. I contrast the intervention logic with empirical examples of three projects of 
the Kunduz River Basin Program (KRBP) to point to the gap between de jure, assumed and 
de facto, putative state-building in Afghanistan’s rural areas. It results in mere state-
making by middlemen and brokers who negotiate the interface between local social order 
and international development paradigms.  
In Chapter 9, I reconnect the empirical findings with the social order approach outlined in 
Chapter 2 in several steps that unfold the methodological, content, and scientific 
contribution of the thesis to different strands of scholarship. The thesis concludes with 
recommendations for further research.     
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2 – Conceptual framework 
 
In this chapter, I detail the scientific theories I have referred to in the research presented in this 
thesis. The research was embedded in a broad conceptual framework to allow inductive5 
inferences. In the first step (2.1), the three-fold meaning of the term social order will be 
introduced in order to convey its significance as an analytical framework within which several 
premises about the configuration of order will be established. In the second step (2.2), I 
conceptualize power as fundamental tenet underlying social order and determining the 
working mechanisms of governance and legitimacy, which also reproduce social order. The 
third subchapter will elaborate on the normative framework that I subsume as moralities to 
show how it qualifies the assumption of rationality in all social action processes (2.3). In this 
context, by emphasizing the harmonization of rationality and moralities, I reason against a 
culture-based or culturally biased interpretation (2.3.1). To demonstrate how, from the 
external perspective, seemingly irrational behavior, such as the tolerance of unequal power 
relations by highly unequal distribution patterns of resources by the disadvantaged can be 
explained by rational logic in the internal perspective. I introduce several approaches in 2.3.2. 
Because such relationships are not abstract, but related to the organization and ordering of 
various facets of everyday human life, I will refer to them as mundane. To capture this aspect, 
as well as to operationalize the subjective perspective of everyday experiences, I emphasize 
the notion of Lebenswelt/en (life-world[s]) (2.3.3). It represents a cognitive locus where 
experience, values, and knowledge inform social interaction (soziales Handeln) and attach 
meaning and significance to them. In the fourth step, I use the theoretical underpinnings to 
derive a concept of local governance for the subsequent analysis of my empirical data (2.4). 
The last paragraph will summarize the main points of this chapter (2.5) and provide guiding 
theses for the empirical analysis following in Chapters 5-7. 
 
2.1 Framing the meta-concept: Social order 
In the social sciences, discourses on the problem of order have been dominated broadly by two 
underlying notions: One notion connotes order and ordering and has stipulated order as the 
antipode of chaos, disorder, fuzziness and violence.6 In contrast to this predominantly 
                                                             
5 The seeming contradiction of inductive inference and the introduction of conceptual-theoretical underpinnings 
provided in this chapter will be dissolved throughout the following elaborations. The concluding guiding theses 
of the conceptual framework summarize the assumptions I carry, without them determining the content of my 
inquiries. Thus the conceptual frame allows a hermeneutic understanding of local governance and social order of 
rural Afghan society that is based on empirical observation and close interaction with ‘the field’ and its agents.   
6 The antipode has been topic of inquiry in mathematics and natural science disciplines, especially chaos theory, 
however, with changing objectives. While the binary contrast dominated until the 1970s, since then chaos and 
order have been seen as complementing each other, a hidden order is sought in chaos, and chaotic processes in 
seeming orderly contexts are investigated. See Kriz (1995) and Anter (2007: 50).  
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normative perspective on order, the second notion emphasizes the constructivist aspect of 
order, according to which it forms at cognitive levels in the observer’s mind and thus implies 
subjective meanings. Both notions are neither mutually exclusive nor are they homogeneous 
concepts. Viewed from a scientific-historical angle both notions can be positioned in 
chronological order. The first is affiliated with modernist scientific thinking and the second is 
attributed to post-modernity’s post-structural approaches. Nevertheless, the latter does not 
necessarily escape a normative bias, as individual processes of ordering are likely to make use 
of normative frameworks for orientation in everyday life. The identified overlap suggests the 
existence of a multitude of phenomena of order. In addition, semantics provides for the 
existence of several parallel meanings of order in popular versus academic accounts (Anter 
2007: 23).   
I do not intend to explore this binary artifice further because it is to some extent artificial and 
random. Moreover, if it is used to reflect upon societal phenomena, it subsides to highly 
complex entanglements that structure social logic empirically. Instead, I argue that the 
rejection of popular dichotomist conceptions has the potential to integrate disorder, violence, 
and fuzziness within a conception of order. I will call this concept ‘social order’ throughout 
the thesis. The sections provide lengthy theoretical exploration and intensive discussion of the 
issues of order, state-society-relations, institutions, and cognitive aspects among members of 
the Amu Darya project group at ZEF between 2006 and 2010. The preliminary results are 
published as a ZEF-working paper titled “Dimensions of social order: Empirical fact, 
analytical framework and boundary concept” (Mielke et al. 2011). The conceptual 
considerations I unfold in the subsequent paragraphs take the joint elaborations further in 
order to develop my empirical analysis.  
 
2.1.1 Social order as distinct from binary notions of orderliness versus chaos 
In social theory and sociology, ontological aspects of social order and its constitutive 
components have been the subject of extensive debates in spite of the apparent omnipresence 
of conflicts, societal changes and multi-level complexity (Münch 1996: 127). Although a 
theory of social order has not yet been developed, several sociologists and academics in 
related subjects (e.g., anthropology, political science, law and economics) have proposed 
various ideas about how to grasp the concept of social order from an epistemological point of 
view, particularly how social order is possible (Parsons 1951) and how it can be investigated.7 
The idea that social order provides a stable equilibrium between ordering and disordering 
moments lies at the core of the majority of sociological thought (Anter 2007: 50). Put 
differently, order is seen as a gradual phenomenon, which implies the absence of order as a 
negative outcome and the achievement of peaceful relations between individuals as a positive 
outcome (Wrong 1994: 2, 20). Social order is commonly seen as a matter of degree in which 
different levels can be crafted and sequenced according to criteria such as the collective 
                                                             
7 For both, the ontological and epistemological inquiries into social order see exemplary the reader compiled by 
Hechter and Horne (2003). 
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orientation of action. Consequently, a common reading argues “the more (…) individual 
behavior is collectively oriented, the higher the level of order” (Hechter and Horne 2003: 27).  
Underlying this interpretation is Thomas Hobbes’ conception that the individual is at war with 
every other man – a war of all against all. To counter this concept, in his Leviathan Hobbes 
outlines the idea of a strong central force that tames people’s destructive behavior (Hobbes 
1962 [1651]). Hobbes is regarded as the first to have posed the problem of order and in the 
Leviathan offered a solution that has enlightened different thinkers in political economy 
(Marx, Engels, Hayek), ethnomethodology (Mead, Goffmann), general sociological theory 
(Durkheim, Weber, Merton 1968), and system theory (Luhmann, Parsons). Essentially, the 
repertoire of resolutions is broadly norm-based,8 holding that large-scale social consensus 
provides the prerequisite to societal integration.  
In close affinity with Hobbes’ idea of the Leviathan as absolute sovereign, modernity has 
conventionalized the state as the main norm-setting and -enforcing institution (Weber 2005 
[1922]; Jellinek 1900; Almond 1988; Skocpol 1985). With the historical dominance of 
Western political thought and the subjugation of territories worldwide during the last two 
hundred years, statehood came to be seen as the principal model for the social organization of 
societies,9 in both academia and politics. From the peace treaty of Westphalia to de-
colonization, the idea of the nation state as the political vehicle that integrates politico-
administrative, economic, legal and social functions within a sovereign entity towards the 
outside, that is, other states, derived universal status and value. As a result, the project of 
statehood is unquestioned in today’s global politics, even if the steering capacities and 
regulatory functions of nation states have become increasingly questioned beyond the 
constitutional regime level, such as security and economic affairs, and have tendencies 
towards supra- and trans-nationalization of governance. The stipulation of statehood as the 
main ordering principle by the authors mentioned above has been epitomized in the recent 
debate among political scientists around state-failure and weaknesses. The discipline 
internalized the Weberian concept of the state (Anstaltsstaat, literally: Anstaltsbetrieb) (Weber 
2005 [1922]: 39). Macrosociology’s preoccupation with methodological nationalism, that is, 
taking the modern nation state as frame of reference for historical, political, and sociological 
inquiries (Mann 1990: 15; Zangl and Zürn 2003), further consolidated both states and 
statehood as units of analysis. The topics of statelessness and stateless societies have been 
addressed by social anthropologists (Halbmayer 2003; Sigrist 1979; Elwert 2001; von Trotha 
and Klute 2001) and social scientists in all disciplines, who have analyzed the long durée 
phenomena (Mann 1999, 1991, 1998, 2001; Elias 1997, 1997a; Popitz 1968/2004).10  
                                                             
8 Representatives of this category are Durkheim (1992 [1930]), Merton (1938), Parsons (1937), Weber (2005), 
Habermas (1995 [1981]) et al. For Thomas Burger’s critique on Parsons see Burger (1977, 320); Durkheim’s 
ideas and Merton’s conceptualization of anomie were developed further by Richard A. Cloward (1959). 
9 For my own understanding of societies, which does not follow the assumptions of methodological nationalism, 
see below.   
10 In the political sciences’ school of International Relations, French researchers were among the first who wrote 
about the peculiarities of statehood in non-OECD areas, particularly Africa, and were able to show that the 
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Although the above discussion is general, I will link the nuances by introducing my own 
approach regarding the nexus between social order and statehood in subsequent paragraphs. It 
follows the example of ethnographers, anthropologists and sociologists who carry out micro- 
and meso-level studies with a primary focus on individuals and groups (local societies). In 
their works, statehood is either qualified by ignorance because it does not constitute a variable 
for the particular research, or statehood is studied ‘from below’ at state-society interfaces 
through an analysis of everyday practices and modes of representations of a particular state 
and its policies (Ferguson 1994; Scott 1998; Gupta 2003; Christophe 2005).11 Given the 
context of my research on local governance in northeastern Afghanistan, the state cannot be 
ignored. However, here the significance of the state is questionable and thus government 
institutions, their representatives and everyday state-society interactions pose one among 
several research threads. In this context, I want to point out the heuristic value of the social 
order concept as an analytical framework. The previous remarks indicated that different 
disciplines deal with aspects of social order such that they try to comprehend the status of 
certain social environments. Applied and policy-related researches more often than not include 
an implicit normative understanding of social order and see it as gradual phenomenon. Most 
contemporary theoreticians agree that social order is to be treated as a non-normative concept 
but not as given. For example, Rehberg (1994: 47) stated that social order embodies any 
durable structuring activity (dauerhafte Strukturierungsleistung) in social relationships. His 
view represents a neutral approach that is usually not taken for granted, given other 
researchers’ preoccupation with attempts to solve the problem of order by identifying causes 
and outcomes to deduct possible social policy implications,12 or equating the meaning of 
social order with that of system, regularity and predictability (Wrong 1994: 37; Anter 2007: 
42).   
I propose to distinguish the normative status description of social order as a factual issue, that 
is, how it is discussed by philosophers and how it is seen by public perception, from social 
order as an analytical framework13 and its potential use as an interdisciplinary and possibly 
transdisciplinary boundary concept (Mielke et al. 2011). Consequently, I understand social 
order as an empirically observable web of social fields consisting of social structures (ibid: 2) 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
standard state centric assumptions are not fruitful for political analysis. See for an early example the joint volume 
of Bayart et al. (1999).   
11 Gupta’s ethnography of the Indian state through a study of bureaucratic practices, the state’s institutional 
culture and its representation in the mass media is most interesting in this regard. See Gupta (2003 [1995]). For 
the former Soviet Union Ledeneva (1998) showed how informal contacts (blat’) and personal networks subverted 
the ideological and moral foundations of Soviet rule and the implications for ‘reconstruction’ (Easter 2000) of the 
post-Soviet Russian state in the 1990s. This state-building process followed network patterns similar to the ones 
identified as crucial for the evolution of the Soviet state in the 1920s (ibid.).  
12 Hechter and Horne’s reader (2003) assembles texts of different authors into five categories of solutions for the 
problem of social order. 
13 As noted by Mielke et al. (2011) the social order concept does not in any way claim to provide a theory. This 
idea is close to the realist theory’s understanding of theory as ‚ordering framework‘, according to which theory 
does not order given observations or data, but instead negotiates their conceptualization, even as observations. 
See Sayer (2010: 53, 84). 
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and define it as the structuring characteristic of individual group members’ and collective 
actors’ socially constructed reality. As structuring device, social order provides the frame and 
basis of social interaction processes (soziales Handeln) that shape outcomes, depending on the 
interplay of social practices and cognitive factors. Conversely, social order is influenced and 
restructured by these same processes and outcomes. As a result, social order constantly 
reproduces itself but never ceases to exist. It is not a universal phenomenon but is subject to 
specific contextualization – cultural, historical or regional – possibly all at the same time and 
changing over time. Thus, not only one but also several social orders can be imagined. I use 
the subjunctive here because viewing social order from a researcher’s perspective always 
depends on the research interest, specific research questions, and the unit and level of inquiry. 
These determine the context that is deemed relevant and valid. However, in marked contrast to 
Anter (2007) and many other authors who conceptualized social order as, for example, ‘three 
fundamental orders of modernity’, that is, modern economy, law, and the state (ibid.: 7), my 
concept of social order positions the individual and social groups of individuals in the center. 
Consequently, the concept of social order is configured from the perspective of collective 
action, as experienced by the subjects who are members of the same community (see Chs. 5.2 
and 5.3). 
Correspondingly, the idea that social order always persists (ibid: 5) has two implications: One, 
in contrast to Anter (1997) and Hechter & Horne (2003), I do not conceptualize social order as 
a phenomenon with characteristics of increasing or decreasing qualities. Thus, I reject the idea 
of gradual change in the status of a certain order that moves between complete order and the 
absence of order, that is, disorder or anomie (Merton 1938). A social order is characterized by 
a complex interplay of processes that link regulatory practices and rules in the form of norms, 
values and underlying cognitive factors. Thus, social order is not judged by the outcomes and 
results of these processes, albeit they could be captured at one point in time, that is, from a 
snapshot perspective. Social order as a process is constituted by the mechanisms and practices 
(incl. discourses), that shape everyday social interactions. In settings where an observer seems 
to witness anomie, chaos and the like, social order cannot be deemed absent. Instead, social 
order follows rules and regulations that the outside observer is not able to perceive 
immediately, because he is not familiar with the context and may be insensitive towards non-
institutionalized practices. Therefore, he cannot grasp its meaning by short-term observation. 
He would also be well advised to not fall into the trap of passing judgment on the normative, 
moral or other quality of the society in question without learning about the perspectives of 
those directly involved in it. Second, also in contrast to Rehberg (1994), I propose that because 
a social order does not change rapidly. Instead, I ascribe a major role to structural variables 
linked with cognitive factors. They make incremental adaptations of the structuring-
restructuring mechanism more likely than sudden radical shifts in the regulation of daily 
affairs among members of a certain society (see below).  
Before explaining my understanding of how social order is constituted and reproduced, two 
other parameters underlying this research are summarized briefly. These are the sociological 
premise and the anthropological premise (Mielke et al. 2011: 5). The first relates to the 
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theoretical approach of ontological constructivism (Finn 2008) in its moderate form. It views 
social reality as socially constructed through the practices and knowledge of social actors 
(ibid: 31). This moderate reading of social constructivism does not extend to physical reality, 
however. Thus, physical surroundings, that is, landscape and nature, do not reflect a 
construction of any kind, but provide the materialist framing and background setting in which 
social relations are embedded. In the tradition of Berger and Luckmann (2001), social order is 
thus to be understood as “the structuring device for processes and realities that are constantly 
being (re-)constructed by its individual or collective protagonists” (Mielke et al. 2011: 5). The 
analysis will partly include a heuristic constructivist approach to show how such construction 
processes are accomplished in rural society of northeastern Afghanistan (see methodology, 
Ch. 3). The conception of humans as social, but not necessarily societal beings (Mann 1990: 
34) delineates the core assumption of the anthropological premise. It assumes that individual 
human beings are always part of interrelations with other individuals or groups; nobody lives 
in isolation. However, there is no necessity for the existence of large-scale collective action 
units like societies on nation-state level or other aggregated, sub-state social totalities. Social 
interaction – even if it takes place indirectly at times – is part of daily life and constitutes 
human existence. It might imply, to put it in popular non-academic terms, hostile or friendly 
relations. From a sociological perspective, social interactions can be conceptualized as 
reflecting power relationships. By exploring the concepts of omnipresent power, power in 
networks and fields of power (FoucauIt 2005; Bourdieu 1987; Mann 1990), I will show how 
all social connections that humans enter can entail power relationships (section 2.2). By 
combining these insights with considerations of theories of action and the life-world-concept, I 
propose that different manifestations of social order can be grasped and analyzed (section 2.3).  
 
2.1.2 Unpacking social order: Towards a post-institutionalist perspective on politics 
The concept of social order must be unpacked to render it empirically investigable. In a 
previous publication, my co-authors and I suggested that the structuring and structured 
character of social order is determined by the interoperation of institutionalized practices, that 
is, institutions, and cognitive factors, which make up a specific worldview. The assumption is 
that social order can be traced empirically in human interactions (Mielke et al. 2011: 7-8). 
Institutions and worldview are mutually enforcing and interdependent. Furthermore, I argued 
that their distinction as constituents of social order serves analytical purposes only (ibid.). 
However, when exploring the history of theoretical research on institutionalism(s), the 
question ‘How to differentiate ‘worldview’ from ‘institutions’?’ also arises on the practical 
analytical level. I show in the next paragraphs that the distinction is not clear cut. 
Consequently, I argue that it is appropriate to use a slightly different terminology throughout 
this thesis. 
For a rapprochement of the concepts of institutions and worldview, it is worthwhile taking a 
closer look at three disciplinary strands produced by conventional institutional thinking: 
historical, sociological and rational choice institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; 
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Orrnert 2006; Srivastava 2004). Political analyses of institutions have heavily borrowed from 
all three branches at different times to varying extents. In the 1950s, theorists who sought to 
understand politics and its outcomes, such as economic and political performance, 
concentrated on an analysis of material and formal structures in the tradition of so-called old 
institutionalism. However, they were not very successful because their analyses tended to be 
descriptive and a-theoretical in nature (Easton 1971; Eckstein 1979). The next two decades 
witnessed the predominance of behavioral approaches in political science to explain political 
outcomes by focusing on the behavior and beliefs of groups and individuals. However, these 
studies did not explain differences in performance or policy outcomes among countries and 
societies; therefore, institutionalism was newly revived with a focus on organization studies. 
In the 1980s, the dimension of power and its interrelation with institutions were used as 
variables in investigations (Wrong 1979). Since the 1990s, North’s interpretation of 
institutions as rules of the game has reset the focus of institutional thinking on individuals and 
incentive systems (North 1998).  
The prominence new institutional economics (NIE) gained after Douglass C. North (together 
with Robert W. Fogel) received the Nobel Prize award for their new economic theory on 
institutional change in 1993 has to some extent overshadowed other traditions of institutional 
thinking in neighboring social science disciplines. North’s success has to be seen in close 
connection to the failure of other scientists and conventional neo-classic economic models to 
foresee the dissolution of the Soviet Union (North 1993). His distinction of informal versus 
formal institutions as incentive structures that shape human interaction represented a 
broadening of the explanation of economic performance by adding the idea of slow-changing 
cognitive factors, necessary legitimacy patterns and respectively evolving path dependencies, 
the role and combination of which enabled a new understanding of long-term processes of 
economic change (North 1993, 1998). Subsequently, it provided new insights into why some 
states are better off than others. North’s widely adopted definition of institutions as rules of the 
game and their clear distinction from organizations (players in the game) marked a major 
contrast to earlier conceptualizations of institutions by conventional theories of 
institutionalism and institution, especially in political science. Given North’s reservation about 
classical rational choice assumptions as well as the emphasis he placed on the importance of 
ideas, mental models and collective learning processes, NIE occupied a center position 
between classical rational choice institutionalism on the one side and traditions of historical 
and sociological institutionalism on the other side (North 1993; Denzau and North 1994). The 
introduction of the formal versus informal institutions distinction became a paradigm of new 
institutionalism, with the effect that a generation of scholars in the last twenty years has 
grappled with this distinction and applied it to processes of political change, particularly, but 
not exclusively, in post-socialist transition contexts.  
As this brief overview shows, political institutional analyses traditionally focused more or less 
on material and formal aspects and lately predominantly organizational aspects related to 
macro- and meso-polities. Given that my own research originates from the micro-level of 
politics and is widely concerned with immaterial structures, particularly the process 
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dimension, it is relevant to explore the tradition of sociological institutionalism at this point.14 
Sociology was once coined by one of its main founding fathers, Emile Durkheim, as the 
science of institutions (Durkheim 1995 [1935]: 100). The discipline has conceptualized 
institutions as beliefs, values, ideas, and cognitive scripts that are assumed to affect actor 
behavior and thus to have explanatory value for understanding macro-sociological 
phenomena.15 In this view, the broader institutional context affects material and organizational 
structures, but this linkage also functions in reverse. Distinct from rational choice 
institutionalism, and the historical strand, sociological institutionalism does not simply 
presume the existence of institutions. Instead, it aims at explaining the generation and 
persistence of institutions (Nee 1998: 1) and the consequences they have for social and 
economic actions and thus social change. Hence, it is plausible that power has been 
conceptualized as embedded in institutions rather than as manifest in individual behavior 
(Orrnert 2006: 451). In addition, the idea of multiple layers of institutions that form highly 
diverse figurations depending on the characteristics and directions of causal links in different 
empirical settings is central to the sociologists’ view (ibid.). 
In their reading, informal institutions or constraints (North 1993, 1991), ideas, values, and 
symbols are assumed to embed formal institutions (Srivastava 2004: 17). The emergence of 
concepts, such as shared mental models (Denzau and North 1994), habitus (Bourdieu 1987), 
structuration (Giddens 1997), habits and frames (Esser 2004), and symbolic universes (Berger 
and Luckmann 1966) proves the high degree of relevance sociologists ascribe to cognitive 
patterns in understanding individual behavior, societies, and politics. However, although 
sociological institutionalism offers a non-functionalist view of the emergence, persistence and 
change of institutions, it also has been criticized for neglecting factors of human agency and 
ideas (Srivastava 2004: 3). Underlying this observation is the insinuation that the acceptance 
of the rational choice paradigm forestalls an understanding of complex dynamics in society 
and the role of culture in social change processes (ibid.: 12-17).  
Indeed, the question of rationality, or assumptions about its degree, demarcates the three 
branches of institutionalism most emphatically. Obviously, rational choice institutionalism 
assumes complete information about the acting individual and neglects transaction costs, as in 
classical economic theory. In this functional reading, institutions provide constraints and 
opportunities for choice-making and thus determine the behavior of every single individual 
and his or her gain-maximizing strategies. Accordingly, institutional change sets in when 
conventional institutions have become dysfunctional and are automatically supplanted with a 
functional alternative to solve collective action dilemmas (Orrnert 2006: 452; Srivastava 2004: 
                                                             
14 There has not been any explicit relation between anthropology and institutionalism until the end of the 1990s. 
According to Mehta et al. (1999: 6) anthropological works related to natural resource management often 
considered institutions as practices determined by social, cultural and political factors. In contrast, however, 
anthropological analyses of socialism often relied on neo-institutional approaches, uncritically so as Thelen 
(2011) pointed out.  
15 Such phenomena include, for example, social development, economic performance, political outcomes, the 
modes of societal production and reproduction (Vergesellschaftung). 
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21). In contrast, historical institutionalism acknowledges not only the possibility of unintended 
consequences of institutional constraints and of tensions resulting from the multiplicity of 
institutions with distinct patterns, but also their dependence on external cause variables (ibid.), 
which are all held to account for causing change. In the sociological tradition, however, 
change is generated from inside the institutional framework because of variations in the 
perception of surrounding conditions and the way these are translated into preferences, which 
then – as evaluated information – determine a certain decision. Classical rational choice 
theories are distinguished by the fact that they treat the perception and evaluation, that is, the 
processing of information and the formulation of preferences and interests, like a black box. 
The differentiation of interest and preference formation, the value assigned to ideas, and as a 
result the recognition that preferences are socially constructed is the merit of the sociological 
school and in part are also shared by representatives whose works fit the historical branch 
(North 1993). 
None of the three institutional branches adequately considers factors of human agency. 
Several frameworks have been put forward that acknowledge the need to combine 
institutionalist approaches with actor theory, including cognitive factors, such as perceptions 
and preferences. For example, Renate Mayntz and Fritz W. Scharpf termed their approach 
‘actor-centered institutionalism’ because it combines institution-centered analysis with a 
strong actor focus (Scharpf 1997; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995). Similarly, Ostrom et al. 
developed the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework based on extensive 
research on the access and distribution of common-pool resources emphasizing the diversity of 
action arenas16 for institutional analysis (Ostrom 2005). It is remarkable that North’s concept 
of institutions as formal rules, informal norms and enforcement mechanisms has been widely 
cited in defining institutions as ‘rules of the game’. Even though North himself elaborated in 
depth on the challenges of ‘typically imperfect’ enforcement in the economic realm (North 
1990: 54), I argue that it is exactly in the stage of rule-enforcement that new institutionalism 
lacks analytical clarity regarding agency. Given that “Human agents actively interpret the 
world and develop discourses that justify the particular worldview that they hold” (Chang and 
Evans 2000: 18, cited in Srivastava 2004: 20), the roles of mental models and human 
cognition deserve more systematic attention.  
According to Orrnert (2006: 450), analytical confusion was caused by the fact that cognitive 
factors were commonly subsumed under the label informal rules, which, along with so-called 
formal rules, have been categorized as institutions. However, the confusion arises only partly 
because of the lack of a coherent definition of institutions. It is mainly caused by a normative 
bias that attributes a negative connotation to the informal and a positive one to the formal. The 
origin of this normative categorization goes back to the efficiency-oriented perspective of 
institutional economics, which conceptualized informal institutions predominantly as 
constraints to economic growth. Nevertheless, Helmke and Levitsky highlighted the 
                                                             
16 Ostrom conceptualizes different action arenas – each consisting of participants and the respective action 
situation – as possible levels of analysis (Ostrom 2005: 13).  
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potentially positive and enabling contributions of informal institutions as potentially 
complementing weak formal institutions, accommodating the functioning of organizations, 
and substituting dysfunctional formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727ff). Hence, 
it seems inconsequential to differentiate cognitive patterns or an ascribed worldview from 
institutions per se because in the sociological tradition the former constitute institutions as 
well.  
In this thesis, I intend to put forth the argument that the widely popular distinction between 
informal and formal institutions is inconsequential and should be abandoned. In an earlier 
paper, I used the labels institutions and worldview (while acknowledging their mere analytical 
distinction and subsequent institutional characteristics) to replace the distinction of formal and 
informal institutions, respectively. In the present empirical investigation of local governance 
processes, I propose to go a step further and suggest dissolving the idea of the binary 
composition of the concept of social order by turning to the concepts of life-world and 
moralities (2.3) and embedding both in an action-oriented (agency) approach. Consequently, 
conceptualizing institutions as social practices and moralities as cognitive factors without the 
formal-informal binary could be a first step towards a new, post-institutionalist perspective 
(Mehta 2007: 661) on collective action and agency. Underlying this proceeding is the 
consideration that my research, because it is designed empirically, takes a clearly inductive-
hermeneutic perspective (see methodology Ch. 3), focusing less on policies as content and 
outcomes, and more on politics as the process dimension of local governance (2.5). 
 
2.2 The political and the social: Power relationships and legitimacy 
In this subchapter, I will elucidate my understanding of power as a concept in order to 
substantiate the proposition that social order is ordinarily structured by power relations. The 
explanation requires several steps. First, I should clarify what I mean by politics and ‘the 
political’ (2.2.1). Furthermore, the distinction of the political from the social deserves a brief 
elaboration in this regard. Second, I will discuss the notion of power by reviewing the works 
of selected authors (2.2.2) that are the most relevant for my intention of further 
conceptualizing social order. The ultimate aim is to anchor social practices and cognitive 
factors (i.e., moralities) in a micro-analysis of power. Third, the aspect of legitimacy will be 
introduced as a key concern in my effort to develop an empirically applicable 
conceptualization of power (2.2.3).   
 
2.2.1 The political and the social  
Consistent with the social order framework, my understanding of the political escapes narrow 
terms of political science. The common assumption in political science is that politics is 
embedded in society in a multi-dimensional way via institutions, norms and processes that are 
limited to a political field of action. This differentiation complies with the distinction of three 
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main dimensions of politics in the German political science tradition: polity (form), politics 
(process), and policy (content). This conceptualization separates political action from 
economic or social action and subsumes politics to entail the totality of actions that bring 
about binding decisions among the members of a certain society for the benefit of society as a 
whole and for the purpose of enhancing public welfare. However, underlying notions of 
interests, preferences, and preference formation are usually assumed and are not linked to 
resources and subsequent struggles over these resources. If the role of interests, preferences, 
values and ideas is considered more closely, the delimitation of the political from the 
economic and the social becomes untenable.   
Instead, the diversity of interests, ideas, values and subsequent preferences in any single 
society (see 2.4) is tied to competition and conflicts about existing and available resources 
among the members of that particular society. Thus, the mitigation of the conflict between this 
diversity on the one side and the inter-subjective social character of humans, who live in 
constant interaction with others, on the other side (Popitz 1980: 50), is what I conceptualize as 
the political. According to Leftwich, politics entails “all the activities of conflict, cooperation 
and negotiation involved in the use, production and distribution of resources, whether material 
or ideal and whether at local, national, or international levels” (Leftwich 1994: 365). This 
definition renders the delimitation of a political sphere from an economic or social field 
artificial. Conflict over resources is a characteristic of everyday life and even if it is not 
obvious, it is assumed to exist in latent form and yields the potential for escalation and 
surfacing (Coser 1956, Dahrendorf 1994). The way in which conflict is mediated is inherently 
political. The assumption that everything in principle is political does not foreclose that 
actions, resources or conflict also become politicized by certain agents because of their own 
interests and rationalities (Sennelart 2006: 486). According to Foucault, everything can be 
politicized.17 
Thus, the political and power relations (see 2.2.2 below) are closely interwoven and multi-
dimensionally entangled with social structure. Although some authors introduced distinctions 
between culture and social structure, I want to propose that they belong together and fuse with 
the political. For example, Luckmann (2007: 139) attributed symbols to culture and norms to 
social structure, both providing meaning for daily social interaction. However, culture is also 
constituted by institutionalized collective action embodied in norms and rules (ibid.: 143). 
Accordingly, social realities entail social, cultural and political dimensions. Thus, for the 
remainder of this thesis, the question is not whether something or some action is political, 
normative or social, but in which way and from which perspective it is deemed so and how 
this affects the peculiarities of local governance and social order in certain localities. 
 
                                                             
17 This idea was sketched out by Foucault as part of his manuscript on governmentality, pp. 22-24, and added in 
between the published lectures No. 7 (of 21 February 1979) and No. 8 (7 March 1979) of Foucault (2006) (edited 
by Sennelart), see fn. 133, 139 ibid.: 484, 486. 
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2.2.2 Social order is structured by power relations 
My understanding of the political is that it penetrates social structures in every corner of 
societal relations. I employ a view of social power as a relational and dispositional concept 
(Poggi 2001: 12). The well-read reader will tend to put my approach in the ‘Foucault-Lukes-
Bourdieu-box’ as this view implies that power is not something a person can possess and use 
as a resource. In this reading, neither does power necessarily have something to do with 
conflict, violence, or domination and authority (Herrschaft), nor does it occur episodically 
(Wrong 1979: 2). The academic discussion on power is largely dominated by a binary 
stylization between theorists who associate power with conflict on the one side (Wrong 1979; 
Hobbes 1962 [1651]) and those who emphasize the ordering dimension of power on the other 
side (Parsons 1969; Foucault 2005, 2005b, 2005c). However, if the discussion is followed 
closely, this it is not unequivocally dichotomist. Among political theorists, it is almost a truism 
that Max Weber, one of the main sources of inspiration for sociological and political thinking 
in the 20th century, remained vague on this issue. He defined power as the ‘probability 
(Chance) within a social relationship of realizing one’s own will even against resistance, 
regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’ (Weber 2005: 38).  
The debate on power is entrenched in several major cleavages: one is constituted by 
contrasting perspectives on whether power is integrated in societal structures (Foucault 2005, 
2008; Bourdieu 1998; Lukes 2005) and characteristic thereof or whether it is a characteristic 
assigned to a person (Wrong 1979: 1), that is, the ability to do something (such as in terms of 
potency versus mastery18). In this case, the lines of contention resemble the structure-agency 
debate in sociology (Giddens 1997; Esser 2004, 2004b). Following this idea, one is tempted to 
advocate the elaboration of an understanding of power to bridge these two seemingly 
antagonistic poles. One pole puts the intentionality of exercising power in the center and is 
thus closely linked to ‘doers’ and agency (Bourdieu 1998, Lukes 2005a). The other pole 
emphasizes multi-level linkages of structured figurations as an outcome of power execution 
(Foucault 2008a; Elias 1997, 2006).19 A second cleavage manifests in the question of whether 
the execution of power is a resource and an end in itself (Weber 2005 [1922]; Arendt 1970) or 
a medium the usage of which rests on certain resources (Giddens 1997 [1984]; Uphoff 1989; 
Mann 1990; Bourdieu 2005 [1992]).20 Various types and forms of resources have been 
                                                             
18 Among the authors who considered the potency factor are Arendt (1970) and Parsons (1969); the prominent 
domination or mastery-perspective of power is represented by Hobbes (1962 [1651]), Weber (2005 [1922]), and 
others. 
19 I owe this idea to Rehberg (1994: 71) who pointed out the basic distinction between power in the form of 
action-oriented enforcement intentions of will (handlungsbezogene Durchsetzungsorientierung/akteursbezogenes 
Machthandeln mit Betonung der Willensdurchsetzung) and solidified multi-dimensional figurations of power 
relations resulting from actions (geronnene Machtbeziehungen/durch Machthandeln hervorgebrachte 
Spannungsverflechtungen).  
20 In popular usage it is common parlance that achieving power is an end in itself (Machtstreben, i.e. ‘striving for 
power’).  Michael Mann mentions military power that becomes an end during the process of power accumulation 
because at that emergent stage it constitutes a major organizational means to achieve other ends (e.g. deterrence, 
respect, authority and domination etc.). See Mann (1990: 21).  
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introduced into the discussion. For example, Uphoff (1989) distinguished six kinds of material 
and immaterial resources corresponding to six main kinds of power: political (authority), 
moral (legitimacy), physical (force), informational, social (status) and economic power. 
According to Mann (1990: 21), power is sought within social relationships at a point when its 
potentiality (Poggi 2001: 11f) to become a means to achieve a certain end has become evident. 
Put differently, social relations as such are conceptualized as resources for goal attainment 
achieved with the help of medium sources of power and its organizational means, which are a 
variety of ideological, economic, political and military factors (ibid.: 46-56). Thirdly, attempts 
to distinguish power from related concepts – influence, authority, domination, violence, force, 
coercion and even ‘state’ – have repeatedly brought new impulses to the debate.21 A fourth 
cleavage manifests in differences about how the generation of power and authority is 
conceptualized if it is not taken to be something primordial altogether.22  
As this overview of selected lines of discussion in the debate on power already suggests, no 
coherent and widely accepted definition of the concept exists (Wrong 1979: 1-20; Poggi 2001: 
1; Lukes 2005: 15; 2005a: 61). It has become quite common among scholars to emphasize its 
contestedness (Lukes 2005: 110-124, 2005c: 477); it is seen as complex (Alber 2003), diffuse 
(versus authoritative in Mann 1990: 24f) and multi-dimensional (Lukes 2005c).23 Such general 
categorizations are of little value, however, even if they qualify traditional mainstream 
thinking and invite new ideas. For example, the constructivist contribution that even the fact 
that what counts as power and being powerful matters, although it is usually also highly 
controversial (Guzzini 2005: 511), is a case in point. Guzzini pointed out the performative role 
or function of power in discourse. According to Guzzini, “how we conceive of power makes a 
difference to how we think and act in general, and especially in political contexts” (cited after 
Lukes 2005c: 477).  
Hence, I follow Norman Uphoff’s conclusion to view power as a descriptive term that is not 
itself explanatory (Uphoff 1989: 321). According to him, “context and norms are major 
influences on any power-wielder and on his or her power means” (ibid.: 321f). Furthermore, I 
propose to speak of power relations as those in which power is being exercised. In this sense, 
my concept of power always alludes to social power relations.24 Foucault (2005: 255f) defined 
                                                             
21 The spectrum of studies cannot be summarized at this point. See Uphoff (1989) for an attempt to clarify the 
concepts of power, legitimacy and authority. 
22 Giddens, for example, conceptualized structures of domination (Herrschaftsstrukturen) as a precondition for 
the existence of power. See Giddens (1997: 314 [1984: 257]).  
23 Weber himself characterized power as ‘sociologically amorphous’ concept and assigned less explanatory 
precision to it than to the concept of authority (Herrschaft) (Weber 2005: 38). 
24 I conceptualize social power relations further below as including both – constructive and domination aspects. 
Against this background, for example Poggi’s definition of social power relations as existing “wherever some 
human subjects (individual or collective) are able to lay routine, enforceable boundaries upon the activities of 
other human subjects (individual or collective), in so far as that ability rests on the former subjects’ control over 
resources allowing them, if they so choose, to deprive the latter subjects of salient human values. The chief 
among such values are bodily integrity; freedom from restraint, danger or pain; reliable access to nourishment, 
shelter or other primary material goods; the enjoyment of a degree of assurance of one’s worth and significance.”, 
is unsatisfactory because it entails only the domination perspective (Poggi 2001: 12). 
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power relations as action oriented towards influencing action (auf Handeln ausgerichtetes 
Handeln), what he called ‘strategic’ action.25 He built his power analytics around the 
distinction of strategic power relations from rule or, in his words, ‘states of authority and 
domination’26 (Herrschaftszustände). However, contrary to other classical thinkers like Weber 
(2005), Foucault introduced an additional dimension labeled ‘technologies of government’ 
(Regierungstechnologien)27 and located it in the intermediate zone on the implicitly 
contemplated continuum from power to rule or authority.28 Thus, he conceptualized rule or 
authority as an outcome and concentration of the technologies of government, which 
successfully stabilize and systematize strategic power relations. These governmental 
techniques include all forms, modalities and possibilities of guiding humans to regulate their 
behavior, to constrain their actions, and place reflexive reactions upon constraints (Foucault 
2006: 13). However, they have not yet taken the form of institutionalization, that is, durable 
and stable modes of power execution, which is characteristic of states of rule and authority.  
Foucault assumed that strategic power relations were a precondition for the existence of 
society and took the omnipresence of power as a given that constantly reproduces itself 
(Foucault 2008: 1090ff.)29 Popitz, although he saw power in all social relationships, 
emphasized the origins and genesis of power, defining the latter as the ability to change 
something, including certain situations (Popitz 1968, 2004). Thus, although both authors share 
the assumption of omnipresence of power, Popitz’ view contains a fruitful bias towards 
agency, whereas according to Foucault power can only be traced in modes of action (Foucault 
2005b: 255), which are abstract (e.g., traceable exclusively in discourse) and of structural 
nature, such as gouvernement (das Regieren). Nevertheless, the approaches of both authors 
allow the conceptualization of forms of power execution that are not fully institutionalized to 
the degree that they represent states of authority or domination or even institutionalized rule of 
                                                             
25 Foucault speaks of strategies with regard to power relations against the backdrop that power relations include 
the exertion of influence on possible and expected action of others. See Foucault 2005: 261, also 2008: 1100. 
26 According to Foucault, such ‚states of authority and domination‘ describe what is popularly meant with 
‘power’ or ‘to possess power’.  See Foucault (2005: 298), cited after „L’éthique du souci de soi comme pratique 
de la liberté” (Conversation with Helmut Becker, Raúl Fornet Betancourt, Alfred Gomez-Müller, 20 January 
1984) in: Concordia. Revista international de filosofia, No. 6, July-December 1984, 99-116.  
27 Foucault’s concept of government is very broad because it includes all kinds of dimensions, from how wife and 
kids are mastered to how an institution is managed (Foucault 1984: 298). The modalities of guiding people, the 
steering of their behavior, the restriction of their actions and reactions, resemble systematized, regulated and 
reflected forms of power execution below the threshold of authority (Herrschaft) and above the threshold of 
spontaneous power enforcement.  
28 Despite the fact that his writings focused largely on power relations, Foucault did not elaborate any ‘theory of 
power’, neither did he publish coherently on it. Instead, he deduced concepts like discourse, dispositive, and 
governmentality from his concrete analyses. See Lemke 2005: 319f. Thus, it is no surprise that the volume 
‘Analytics of Power’ (published in German 2005) is merely an assemblage of diverse fragments such as lecture 
scripts, articles and interviews with Michel Foucault on and related to power (Foucault 2005).   
29 Foucault’s thoughts on a ‘genealogy of power’ consequently comply with his assumption of the ever-existence, 
constant reproduction and thus omnipresence of power as a given (2008: 1098) because the genealogy is merely 
concerned with the theorizing of the historical changes of power mechanisms, not any possible initial evolution 
(of power mechanisms). 
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state (i.e., Weber’s Herrschaft: institutionalized political power and authority).30 Popitz (2004: 
236ff) introduced the idea of different stages of institutionalization of power31 (from power to 
legitimate authority to political societal entity [Verband] and state or government rule). As 
mentioned above, for Foucault, the dimension of ‘technologies of government’ was prefixed to 
a state of rule. Both authors stressed the process dimension of power, that is, what actually 
happens when somebody is said to exercise power over others, and how the institutionalization 
of power relations takes place (ibid.; Foucault 2005: 251). Accordingly – and in contrast to 
Giddens, who sees institutionalized authority or rule as precondition for power (fn. 22) – 
authority and rule (Herrschaft) do not necessarily have to evolve; a concentration can be 
lacking depending on the degree of institutionalization of power and its negotiated distribution 
in social relationships. Uphoff suggested that one can have power without authority and 
authority with little32 or no power, assigning authority the status of a possible power resource 
(among many others, see above) (Uphoff 1989: 315). In this sense, power always refers to the 
(assumed or de facto) capacity to exercise power and not to the due exercise of power alone. 
Using the empirical example of the Yukpa tribe in the border area between Venezuela and 
Columbia, Halbmayer (2003) pointed out that the traditional leadership exercised power 
without having established authority structures. At the same time, government-appointed 
cacique33 were imparted with legitimacy by the government, but unable to exert any influence 
on or direct the conduct of the members of the tribe, thus possessing authority void of power 
(ibid.: 97). In the case where power can be exercised without authority, the access, use and 
control of sufficient other power resources is secured, possibly even to a greater extent than 
would be possible for agents endowed with authority (Uphoff 1989: 315).  
With his theory of social fields and symbolic power, Pierre Bourdieu (1998) added another 
dimension to this view of power. However, it is located neither beyond nor beneath the level 
of authority, but generally avoids such categorization.34 Accordingly, power is constituted in a 
                                                             
30 Throughout this book ‘rule’ shall denote what Weber called Herrschaft—domination in the sense of fully 
institutionalized political power (Weber 2005: 157; Poggi 2001: 29). Terminology, especially even among 
German sociologists who have written on power, authority, rule and domination is incoherent and confusing at 
times. For example, Popitz clearly distinguishes power from authority in the sense of Weber’s Herrschaft, yet he 
identifies four different basic ‘anthropological’ forms of power, e.g. power of action (Aktionsmacht), instrumental 
power (instrumentelle Macht), authoritative power (autoritäre Macht), and data setting power (datensetzende 
Macht) independently of the institutionalized stage of Herrschaft (Popitz 2004: 22-39). Against this backdrop 
translation is often difficult.  
31 Popitz understood institutionalization as increasing de-personalization, formalization and integration and on 
these grounds suggested that the identification of ‘stages’ of institutionalization and their model-like description 
must be possible (Popitz 2004: 236).  
32 Authority with ‘little’ power can be imagined if legitimacy is the only source of power and no other sources 
can be tapped additionally. See Uphoff (1989: 319).    
33 Cacique (Spanish) is a title of indigenous leaders in Latin and South America.  
34 Bourdieu did never systematically distinguish authority from power in any of his works. Though he 
occasionally speaks of the ruling classes (herrschende Klassen), the logic of social fields which assigns the 
position for classes and their endowment with different capital and power renders the idea of authority as 
separated from power redundant. He uses power and authority synonymously at times, for example in Bourdieu 
(2005: 86) where he exchanges the hidden mechanisms of ‘power’ with ‘authority’.   
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field of relational forces that are embodiments of historical cultural practices. The respective 
positioning of these forces towards each other and the situation of actors moving within these 
fields are objects of fierce competition and a function of the accumulation of different types of 
cultural, social, and economic capital. However, only if these are legitimized and 
acknowledged does symbolic capital form a basis for symbolic power. Symbolic power 
unfolds at a level of meaning and cognition and by being claimed and acknowledged at the 
same time ensures that the structures of the social world are never questioned in any critical 
way (Bourdieu 2005: 82). By introducing the concept of habitus, Bourdieu (1987) proposed 
that habitual specific patterns of perception, evaluation and thinking sustain the structural 
distribution of power. Accordingly, power is attributed to structures and produces effects 
through normalization and penetration of everyday routines that are not reflected upon. Hence, 
habitus produces a certain worldview and value system, which legitimizes the domination of 
one group by another, whereby the former accept their situation as ‘natural’.35 Similar to 
Foucault’s view that there is no escape from domination, Bourdieu allows the possibility that 
structured structures can be undermined – albeit only in theory – by a change of habitus. In 
practice, he is skeptical that habitus can be altered in any substantial way, except over a long 
period of time or in revolutionary circumstances of societal transition (Bourdieu 1987). 
Consequently, the scope for agency in Bourdieu’s concept of power is also very limited. 
Thus, rule as institutionalized power and authority as claims to power that are more or less 
complied with (Popitz 2004) – including all political power institutions such as the state – can 
indeed be treated as special cases of power (Weber 2005: 691) and subsequently be 
marginalized in an analysis of less institutionalized social relations that are more concerned 
with forms of power and less with the political execution of power (Alber 2003: 151).36 
However, in Mann’s view, institutionalization is necessary to solve collective action problems 
(Mann 1990: 23). I will return to this point below (2.4). So far I have argued that power does 
not have a ‘locus’, meaning it is not possessed by individuals or institutions, but is inherent in 
social relations and fuels their internal dynamics of change. Moreover, based on the writings 
of Foucault, Bourdieu and Popitz, I have suggested that there are several degrees of 
institutionalization of power relations in the preliminary stages to rule (Herrschaft). I have 
emphasized the aspect of agency with what I called the relational dimension of power 
relations. It entails individual and collective actors who dominate or are dominated by the 
structures of power relations in which they are embedded. 
Though this may seem quite abstract, this relational dimension of power relations captures the 
multi-dimensionality and inter-connectedness of different levels of interaction and 
dependencies similar to Mann’s concept of societies (Mann 1990: 33), which I intend to 
                                                             
35 Han (2005: 56) elaborated on the somatic dimension of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (Bourdieu 1987). 
36 It probably deserves a special remark that Weber did not devote any thoughts worth of mentioning to forms of 
power and its mechanisms beyond what he saw as institutionalized power/authority (Herrschaft). See Alber 
(2003: 151). Because Weber did not – contrary to Popitz, who was actually trained in philosophy (Pohlmann 
2006: 14) – conceptualize stages of institutionalization he plainly distinguished power from authority as power’s 
institutionalized form.  
24 
 
employ throughout this thesis (see section 2.4). In Mann’s view, societies are made up of 
networked figurations that emerge from interactions among people within more or less fixed 
socio-spatial boundaries (ibid.).37 What matters is that, according to Mann, not the 
institutionalization of interactions, but the desire of humans to establish and enter diverse 
forms of networks of power relations is what functions as the mainspring of societies. 
Institutionalization tends to arise only with growing complexity at different levels and in its 
process induces unintended results. Consequently, heterogeneous, overlapping networks of 
interaction and power relations evolve and are sustained (ibid.: 37). It is this complexity at the 
heart of power relations and their effects that first I want to argue qualifies the binary view of 
power-holders versus sufferers, and thus shifts the attention towards underlying structures 
(Alber 2003: 156). Second, it dissolves the pivotal controversy among theorists about whether 
phenomena that are not directly visible and observable can be attributed to the quiet working 
of power figurations and relations. In my view, this is the case.38  
My standpoint is that the complexity of social relationships, especially given the overlaps and 
multiple layers of networks of power relations as conceptualized by Mann (1990) and in 
different social fields as suggested by Bourdieu (1998), provides agents – whether they are 
regarded as able to bring about significant effects39 (powerful agents) or unable to do so 
(powerless agents) – with a wide range of possibilities for action (Alber 2003: 159). Therefore, 
the scope of action is not limited to the usual unambiguousness that the powerful are endowed 
with the capacity to exercise power over the powerless (deprived of power resources) and the 
latter to suffer and endure the consequences. On the one hand, several authors provided 
empirical evidence of the scope of action of the putative powerless. For example, James Scott, 
in his seminal work Weapons of the Weak (1985) gave an account of the resistance patterns of 
subordinate rural peasants. Albert Hirschman (1970, 1981) showed that exit is another option 
in cases when resistance in the form of voicing discontent does not bring about the desired 
effects (Alber 2003: 152).40 On the other hand, underlying the complexity of power relations 
are two essential assumptions: First, power can be exercised unconsciously through implicit 
societal values, norms and interests (Lukes 2005, 2005b).41 Second, power in its broad 
                                                             
37 Mann, in his socio-spatial conceptualization of society, spoke of ‚interaction ditches’ with regard to the 
periphery and border zones of societies marking the transition from one society to another. See Mann (1990: 33). 
For a more in-depth reflection on Mann’s concept of society see section 2.4 below.      
38 This discussion is one of the most fascinating and interesting I came across when writing this thesis. I have not 
come to a final conclusion, but hope that this thesis, in a way, can shed more light on how power relations can be 
studied. See 2.3 for further details. My impression is also supported by Bierschenk’s remark about the 
methodological tightrope walk when trying to empirically record non-events (Bierschenk 2003:5), see also Ch. 3 
for a methodological operationalization.   
39 In his late essay, Lukes (2005b: 65) re-defined power as the “agents’ abilities to bring about significant change 
effects, especially by furthering their own interests and/or affecting the interests of others, whether positively or 
negatively.”     
40 However, it would be misleading to assume that exit is always an available option.  
41 For a detailed discussion to what extent interests can be assumed to influence decision-making processes, how 
and by whom, see Young (1978). The issue relates to what Steven Lukes (2005) has called the third dimension of 
power.  
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understanding as capacity may be exercised or not,42 but “you can be powerful by satisfying 
and advancing others’ interests” (Lukes 2005: 12), which are, however, “multiple, conflicting 
and of different kinds” (ibid.: 13).43  
Rehberg (1994) pointed out that the fields of forces that entail discourses, symbols, exercises 
and performances of power, that is, that are dispositive of power, by far surpass intentional 
interaction processes between two or more agents. This implies that the idea of power as 
exclusively executed in binary social relations should be abandoned because such negotiations 
form only one specific case among manifold options to exert power in relationships. Instead, 
the exercise of power can be defined as the relational ability of individuals or groups to 
exercise control over actions and resources within highly complex social fields (as 
characterized above following Lukes) that include multi-faceted social relationships (Alber 
2003: 158). With intensifying complexity, power becomes increasingly more fragmented and 
dispersed (Han 2005: 24ff); consequently, it cannot be measured. Power phenomena dispose 
of ordering aspects in the broadest sense, including factual and normative power, to shape a 
certain kind of order44 (Popitz 2004), discourse (Foucault 2008a [1969]), and communication 
(Habermas 1995 [1981]). As Poggi (2001: 32f) observed,  
Perhaps a further reason why political power appears as social power par excellence is exactly 
that it must confront in a particularly explicit fashion the problem of the incompatibility of 
power relations with an assumed equality, a problem that in principle affects social power in all 
its forms. Being constructed and managed largely through communication, political 
relationships must also, to a greater or lesser extent, communicate about themselves, and most 
particularly […] about why they are intrinsically unequal.  
In brief, I hope to have demonstrated how social order is structured by power relations. 
However, in everyday routines, the domination and rule aspect is not perceived as such. It is 
usually only conceived in crises and conflict situations. Similarly, the exercise of power is 
ordinarily passive, without needing a person to exercise and consciously enforce it. 
 
2.2.3 Forms of legitimacy  
The modes in which power relations exist and power is exercised vary depending on the 
context of the social field and resources. Whereas Weber captured it as the realization of a 
person’s will (see above), in other contexts, power relations might work via the accumulation 
of prestige, wealth, knowledge, and so on in order to bring about a certain effect or bolster a 
                                                             
42 Lukes points to what he calls the ‚exercise fallacy‘, he blundered into himself with his 1974 book. 
Accordingly, “Power is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity (it may never be, and never need to be, 
exercised)” (Lukes 2005: 12). 
43 As a consequence power can be accumulated or transformed without depriving somebody else of it, thus power 
relations do not necessarily embody zero-sum-games as the popular reading suggests. See the empirical example 
of Alber (2003: 161). 
44 Popitz (1992: 22-39) distinguishes four kinds of power: authoritative, data-defining, instrumental and proactive 
power (Aktionsmacht). In relation to their ordering function, they can be analytically separated into factual 
(Gestaltungsmacht) and normative power Definitionsmacht). 
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claim and hence enforce contestation. In any case, the enforcement of power relations, 
including the reliance on certain resources, indirectly or directly requires justification, consent, 
and compliance or acceptance by individual and collective agents inhabiting and sharing the 
same social environment in the same social fields. Power in the form of domination involves 
both the dominating and those who are being dominated, the acknowledgement and 
acceptance by the latter of the former’s rule, and the legitimating processes that secure that 
rule. Similarly, for the execution of power as the general ability to further interests and bring 
about significant change, effects must rely on certain resources. Access to these resources 
similarly requires either active or silent consent by others who might claim access to the same 
resources. Here, again, it should be considered that the execution of power is as fluid as the 
concept of power. It can take on various shapes: coercion (the enforcement of domination by 
violent means), persuasion under threat of force, voluntary compliance with or without threat, 
unconscious subordination, and conscious consent. Thus, any kind of social inequality, which 
is conceptualized throughout section 2.2 as the presence of social power relations in multi-
dimensional social fields, involves the question of legitimacy: in Lukes’ words, “How do the 
powerful secure the compliance of those they dominate” (2005b: 110) and “How do they 
secure the latter’s willing compliance?” (Lukes 2005: 12). As indicated above, the question of 
the enforcement of legitimacy entails two dimensions: legitimation and acceptance. The 
former is the need for justification of actions by the powerful or those who control the 
resources in a particular social field; the latter is affirmation of this ability by the dominated or 
by those who do not dispose of the same opportunities or resources.  
Max Weber did not concern himself with power in its non-institutionalized form prior to the 
stage of rule (Herrschaft). He proposed three ideal types of legitimate authority for modern 
societies, based on the belief in and different possible claims to legitimacy, and distinguished 
them accordingly (Weber 2005: 157). The first type, rational-legal authority, is based on the 
belief in the legality of an existing order and the rightfulness of the claim of instruction and 
orders by those legally endowed with authority. The second type, traditional authority, rests on 
the mundane belief in divine qualities of applicable traditions and the legitimacy of the ones 
empowered to rule by those traditions. Third, charismatic authority relies on thorough and 
extraordinary devotion to the divinity, heroism or exemplariness of a person and the associated 
rule system (ibid.: 159ff). In his writings, Weber stressed that these identified ideal types of 
authority hardly ever appear in pure form (and have never done so historically).45 To 
demonstrate the bricolage character of empirical legitimacy Weber, for example, elaborated on 
the prosaic modification of charismatic authority, which in its pure form is thought to lie 
beyond prosaic influences (ibid.: 182ff). Because of everyday practical necessities, charisma 
transforms by mixing with elements of other types of legitimacy. Interestingly and often 
overlooked, Weber did not suggest that legitimacy rests on full belief at all times by 
                                                             
45 Ibid. Nevertheless, he argues, the formulation of ideal types, a sociological typology, is useful for scientific 
analysis. Given that the singular concepts can never capture all aspects of empirical reality, Weber stresses that at 
least the descriptive notions need to be unequivocal in order to analyze what the empirical reality is like, e.g. 
what is charismatic about a certain form of government, in what sense of charisma (inherited, patriarchy, other) 
etc. (ibid.: 160).   
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everybody. Instead, he stated quite realistically that compliance can be simulated as an 
opportunistic strategy, to further material interests, for example (ibid.: 158). It is not clear 
whether Weber had both the pretension of compliance and of claim in mind, that is, whether 
he thought opportunistic behavior possible from the perspective of the subordinate on the one 
hand as well as from the ruler or ruling class on the other hand. In empirical cases, especially 
where traditional and personal charismatic legitimacy dominates, rich opportunities for 
manipulation can be assumed. For example, a charismatic leader may exploit the people’s 
recognition and trust by directing their behavior and attitude according to personal benefit at 
the cost of his followers, despite claiming (and thus legitimizing his prior role by saying) the 
opposite.  
With regard to power and legitimacy underlying the stages of rule, Popitz’ concept of basic 
legitimacies (Basislegitimitäten) and, related to it, the notions of Ordnungswert and 
Investitionswert (Popitz 1968), provide valuable elements for my analysis. In contrast to 
Weber and others (Uphoff 1989, Parsons 1969) who are mainly concerned with rule as 
institutionalized power, he takes the notion of legitimacy beyond the vertical top-down versus 
bottom-up dichotomy. In his 1968 short book on the genesis of power, Popitz demonstrates 
that the principle of legitimacy (Legitimitätsgeltung) is rooted in reciprocal social relations 
among initial equals some of whom come to mutually recognize privileges over time and 
subsequently validate power relations and patterns of rule (Herrschaft).  
Corresponding to his thoughts on process-style power formation, Popitz locates what he calls 
basic legitimacy, in midrange between the full formation of the types of legitimacy Weber 
suggested and a mere conformity of interests and habits (Popitz 1968: 38). According to 
Popitz, power and authority are generated when the internal acceptance of power figurations 
(Machtordnung) by the subordinated and underprivileged sets in; power subsequently 
consolidates or increases with proliferating acceptance. The rationale behind this acceptance 
lies in the fact that the disadvantaged powerless – in a sense of self-justification with the aim 
to preserve their own dignity and self-recognition – at some poin start to reinterpret their own 
subjugation as voluntary compliance.46 A precondition to enact such legitimation processes 
manifests in the perception of certainty about regular arrangements of order. For this certainty 
to take effect, agents must be sure of what they and others are allowed and obliged to do. In 
short, they dispose of a certain stability of expectations and orientation with regard to their 
everyday routines. Once this is achieved, predictability acquires valence, which is a value of 
stability and certainty (Ordnungswert) the subjugated attach to the predictable circumstances 
(‘orderliness’, Ordnung) surrounding them (Popitz 1968: 35).  
                                                             
46 In original Popitz (1968: 34, fn. 3) formulated this idea as follows, „Der Ansatz eines Legitimitätsglaubens 
kann gerade bei extrem unterdrückten Gruppen eine gewisse Parallele zu der beschriebenen Selbstanerkennung 
der Privilegierten aufweisen: Auch die extrem Unterdrückten beginnen eventuell die Legitimität einer 
Machtordnung anzuerkennen, weil sie sich selbst anerkennen.“ (emphasis in original). It remains open whether 
this reinterpretation is undertaken consciously or sub-consciously. In section 2.3 this thought will be taken up 
again. 
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In addition to the general predictability of others’ actions and certainty regarding expectations, 
a scope of action opens up for the relatively disadvantaged and they reacquire agency.47 
Naturally, Ordnungssicherheit – the predictability of actions and certainty of expectations – 
forms the background of investments that agents usually make with the aim to improve their 
particular position in different social fields.48 These investments spawn additional valence, a 
value of investment (Investitionswert) connected to the agents’ life-world, in particular social 
fields (ibid.: 36). Investments increase with enduring stability. They indicate neither consent to 
existing circumstances nor a high degree of opportunism. Instead, as Popitz pointed out, 
conformity is sufficient to bring about this special state of mind that allows individuals to 
create an interest in the kind of order subjugating them (ibid.: 37). No matter how subjective 
the values attached to a certain order, the recognition of such basic legitimacy forebodes the 
acceptance of the greater structural totality of power relations. In the next sub-section (2.3), I 
will elaborate this state of mind, which produces basic legitimacy, in more detail. The 
acceptance (from the outside perspective) of unjust or unequal power relations and incidences 
of affirmative (re)actions by the disempowered in cases when the structures that shape their 
life-worlds are threatened by change, is connected to the question of what I suggest are 
moralities and (bounded) rational behavior. Moreover, the question of subjective awareness, 
that is, whether unequal power relations are constantly reproduced consciously or 
unconsciously, deserves elaboration with regard to rationality.  
 
2.3 Social action and Lebenswelten 
Power relations and structures of legitimacy are inherent in all social action (Foucault 2005b: 
255; Giddens 2001: 66). Power relations manifest in inequalities that might be overt or covert 
when ingrained in the structural relations of a social order and embedded life-worlds (see 
2.3.3) such that they do not surface in individual perception. In most of these cases, if 
inequality is not enforced by violent means and coercion, it requires more subtle forms of 
legitimation and acceptance processes. Resources for both can be material and cognitive. 
Material resources include natural resources and raw material found in the surrounding natural 
environment, such as material production and reproduction tools, including technologies, and 
manufactured goods. Immaterial or cognitive resources entail the complete normative 
framework that influences human social action, such as values and norms. I propose the term 
‘moralities’ to refer to this normative framework (see 2.3.1).  
                                                             
47 The degree or amount of agency that can be reacquired is considerable, given that it never vanishes even in 
situations where uncertainty prevails to large extent. Alber (2003: 153, fn. 4) gives the historical example of 
scopes of action that are known to have even existed among inmates in concentration camps. 
48 ‘Social fields’ is used here in line with the logic of the argument I intend to unfold in this thesis (see ‘on 
complexities…’ above). In Popitz’ parlance Ordnung (order, social environment/framework) is the proper term. 
It is important to stress that Popitz’ interpretation of power and ‘order’ are characterized by an underlying 
(system oriented) understanding as put forward by system theory (Pohlmann 2006: 31, fn. 36). This is the reason 
why – in my view and thus being the interpretation unfolded throughout the book – his sociological ideas require 
amplification.    
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Before I explicate the dimensions of moralities, however, I feel that a few words are necessary 
to introduce the concept of social action and social relations in more detail. Though subject to 
scholarly debate, in this thesis, social action is defined as meaningful behavior that considers 
others’ meaningful doings (Weber 2005: 16f) including communication.49 Moreover, Weber 
also categorized forbearance and quiescence as forms of social action (ibid.: 16).50 Situations 
that entail more than two agents engaged in social action as defined above are termed ‘social 
situations’ (Esser 2000: 2). The agents thereby enter social relations with each other for a 
specific reason (in addition to the general motive to achieve some kind of goal) and with 
whatever character (Weber 2005: 19). This emphasis on the openness of the character of any 
social relation allows for all kinds of characteristics, ranging from conflict to cooperation.51 
Put differently, social action can also be conceptualized as the conscious or unconscious 
meaningful mutual interaction of persons and groups of persons by using certain resources for 
achieving implicit or explicit ends by influencing other people’s actions. In mutual relations of 
contingency, which is a characteristic of unequal relations and social relations in general, the 
minimal aim is to preserve the status quo of a person’s positioning in the respective social 
situation and the wider environment of interfaces of diverse social fields. This minimal aim is 
the worst-case scenario for any agent, despite striving for maximal interest realization and 
subsequently improvement of the situation. However, if things do not turn out as envisaged, 
the outcome may revert to the desired preservation of the status quo, thus resulting in a 
significant deterioration of the individual’s position. In other words, conscious or unconscious 
interests perceived by individuals are directly or indirectly used in interaction processes to 
acquire material or cognitive resources in order to gain, establish, or enhance social control, to 
reduce or maintain inequality, or – in most cases – to maintain equilibrium regarding the 
mental and cognitive structures of relevance and meaning (Esser 2004a: 79).   
 
                                                             
49 Communication is thought alongside with internal and external action. The latter refers to action that impacts 
upon the immediate material environment whereas internal action does not carry this dimension but refers mainly 
to thoughts, feelings etc. Weber (2005 [1922]), Habermas (1995), Luckmann (2007), Giddens (1997) and Popitz 
(2004) also interpret communication as form of action. Especially Luckmann argued that communication 
generates and reproduces social structures (2007: 20) through which traditions, knowledge, and the moral belief 
system of a society get passed on. Often this is expressed in codes such as in jokes, proverbs, gossip. See also 
ibid.: 255ff.   
50 Social (inter-)action is assumed to be the regular form of action in societies, even though empirically, it is not 
the rule in all cases, as Esser notes (Esser 2000: 5). He states that due to the fact that humans are not interested in 
their co-inhabitants but only in the resources these others have at their disposal, other humans are more often than 
not treated (ignorantly) as objects rather than equal subjects (ibid.). Nevertheless, the aim of accessing other 
actors‘ resources implicitly considers the others‘ existence, and for this reason, I nevertheless frame any such 
kind of action as social action.         
51 Weber’s proper definition of social relation reads “The term ‘social relationship’ will be used to denote the 
behavior of a plurality of actors insofar as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of that of 
the others and is oriented in these terms.  The social relationship thus consists entirely and exclusively in the 
existence of a probability that there will be a meaningful course of social action – irrespective, for the time being, 
of the basis of this probability.” (2005: 19). Therein nothing is mentioned about actors‘ solidarity. 
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2.3.1 Rationality bounded… by moralities 
Social action theories differ in the extent to which they employ assumptions about rationality 
to explain meaningful human behavior and its outcomes. As I have shown above, rational 
choice-institutionalism has particularly tended to borrow heavily from neo-classical models of 
price and economic theory. It assumes that the actor disposes of complete information and 
stable, hierarchically ranked preference sets that allow an objective cost-benefit calculation 
prior to decision-making regarding a certain action, and consequently the best outcome. 
However, most other social action theories subsume a more realistic idea of man that refrains 
from the ideal notion of unbounded rationality in classical rational choice theory. Instead, the 
individual is assigned mental abilities and processes of perception, evaluation, and preference 
formation. Thus, decision-making is suggested to take place based on subjective perceptions 
of reality, not objective reality. A review of social action theories and some of their elements, 
especially social norms, emotions, and motivations for social interactions (Scharpf 2000: 
148f), showed that scientific concepts cannot grasp this wide array of subjective mental 
processes entirely (Mielke et al. 2011) and some would even argue not nearly satisfactorily 
enough (Elster 1999: 61). This shortcoming – that social scientists can only model standard 
expectations in contexts that are limited in space and time – has been countered somewhat 
with the notions of bounded rationality and subjective expected utility (Esser 2004b: 50). 
Underlying both concepts is the assumption that, as a rule, action is always rational from the 
actor’s point of view, yet naturally conditioned by his beliefs and the available evidence for 
taking a decision and acting in a certain way.52  
This includes the subconscious dimension and its potential influences on the normative 
framework at the actor’s disposal as part of his life-world (see 2.3.2). Weber’s definition of a 
social relation as the chance that social action takes place based on whatever motive (see 2.3) 
encompasses the idea that this action is guided by fixed ideas, prior established bonds, or 
preference sets, such as friendship, piety, class companionship, competition, struggle, enmity, 
and so on (Weber 2005: 19). Here, the link with emotions and with what Scharpf called 
‘motivations for social interaction’ (Interaktionsorientierungen), such as individualism, 
solidarity, competition, altruism, and enmity is obvious (Scharpf 2000: 152). In addition, the 
contribution of social constructivists’ ideas about how sense and meaning find expression in 
social action have directed attention to the dimension of sedimented knowledge based on past 
experience. Their point is that individuals always dispose of a stock of types of experiences 
and templates of social action, which constitute problem solving schemes that form a 
subjective repertoire of knowledge (Luckmann 2007). Moreover, the assumptions of social 
action theories (as expressed in an idea of man) suggest that rational decision-making or the 
realization of a person’s desire, which is considered the best achievable result, is not 
necessarily limited to the realizations of someone’s personal well-being. Instead, the 
                                                             
52 Accordingly, in this book I take the perspective that social action theory and rational choice do not contradict 
each other, but rather constitute complementing views. See Scharpf (2000) and Esser (2004a, 2004b).    
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individual may value common goals more than personal goals. Similarly, long-term interests 
may be given preference over short-term benefits.53  
Esser introduced the concepts of frames, framing and habits to demonstrate how individuals 
simplify complex situations (Esser 2004b) to offset their bounded rationality. Framing is a 
conscious process of refining the complexity of a situation and the formation of artificial 
assumptions about the environment that enable the actor to take a considered decision to act 
(that is, to select the right script) against the backdrop of the limited information available in a 
particular situation. Normally, frames already exist as part of the actor’s stock of knowledge as 
institutionalized structures of relevance (Relevanzstrukturen des Alltags) significant in 
everyday interaction. Different frames and scripts for action are available for different 
situations of everyday life. These frames can be understood as preference rankings that are 
chronologically and situationally contextualized and provide an orientation for action. The 
underlying idea is that individuals are overstrained by always seeking to obtain complete 
information about a certain situation. Hence, institutionalized frames provide the possibility of 
taking individually perceived best decisions in everyday contexts by choosing the adequate 
script. Similarly, according to Esser (2004b: 53-61), habits comprise all unconscious routine 
actions that take place without reflection and cost-benefit analysis. That the reliance on habits 
and frames can be viewed as rational is based on the notion of institutions and 
institutionalization. Accordingly, an institutionalization of routines and actions takes place 
when it is neither wasteful nor costly, but is instead efficient in providing certainty in 
expectations and when it is normatively substantiated (ibid: 55).  
Viewed from this perspective, even Alfred Schütz’ theory of action in everyday life (Schütz 
1991), which ascribes more or less all social interaction to institutionalized routines that are 
not being reflected upon consciously, comprises rational motives. With his notion of the 
‘unquestionably given’ knowledge of the ordinary individual about his or her environment 
(life-world) and the conceptualization of responding recipes for typical action in typical 
situations, Schütz included all phenomena that Esser categorized as habits, such as 
habitualization, automatism, and half consciousness. Although the actor may not be conscious 
of it, these action orientations are possessed as a result of past experiences of social conflict 
(Knight 1992). These experiences have acquired the status of institutionalized, sedimented 
knowledge and are not longer reflected upon as long as they prove to be sufficient for 
everyday problem-solving.54 Similarly, Edelman (2005), in his analysis of the role of symbols 
                                                             
53 Lukes (2005: 81f) distinguishes three ways to conceptualize interests: One, as preferences; secondly, as 
necessary condition for human welfare; thirdly, “as constitutive of well-being” (ibid.: 82), which he 
conceptualizes as living a vision of a worthwhile life. This may be costly in terms of personal energy, resources 
and money and consequently actually turn out to be detrimental to the concerned person’s well-being. 
54 Schütz (1991 [1932]: 80ff) emphasized that the acquisition of new information for decision-making processes 
is fostered as long as a satisfying problem solution is not found. However, if – based on acquired knowledge and 
information – a situation is thought to be manageable to a satisfying and sufficient degree, the further 
accumulation of information is not pursued. As a result, the average person can be considered as highly or well 
informed only for few relevant fields of their everyday life. For the major part, he must be viewed as a layperson 
navigating his way through (Esser 2004b: 92). Here, the difference between ‘satisficing’ as ‘principle of choosing 
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in politics, found that symbols and signs, as result of stereotypes, simplifications and 
placation, provide the means with which groups cope in complex situations that they are 
unable to understand rationally or even perceive fully. Thus, both aspects, conscious choice 
and unconscious decision-making, aim to maximize subjectively expected utility.55 Decision-
making and most action is based on the subjective weighing of situational context factors and 
the abilities of the actor on the one hand against potential gains, which results in flexible 
preference ranking regarding available alternatives on the other hand (Esser 2004b: 50ff). 
Consequently, according to Esser, “the knowledge of an individual who acts and thinks in his 
life-world of daily interaction, is prevailingly incoherent, only partially clear and not free of 
contradictions”, although it is usually fully sufficient (Esser 2004a: 92). Cost-benefit interests 
in goal achievement and low input costs are assumed to guide any kind of social action, 
whether consciously or unconsciously. Moreover, all social action processes entail symbolic 
(see below) as well as material motivations (Orientierungen) (Esser 2000: 15).   
Kron criticizes Esser’s framing approach by stating that it should not be the concern of 
sociologists to explain why certain frames are selected by individuals; this puzzle should be 
left to psychological research. Instead, sociologists should work with given frame 
assumptions, that is, the processing of a certain chosen script in social interaction (Kron 2004: 
201). In my view, this criticism is consistent with how unconscious decision-making and 
action are modeled by habits or what Schütz called ‘unquestionably given’ knowledge. 
Likewise, when it comes to norms and emotions (see above), sociologists refrain from asking 
how it is that certain motivations prevail and take them as givens.56 However, the difficulty for 
the researcher lies in knowing what types of motivations apply in which situations. He or she 
is confronted with fuzzy logic57 and tries to make sense of individual decisions. Accordingly, 
much more attention needs to be paid to the situational contexts in which agents are embedded 
(ibid.; Schmid 1989: 133) in order to learn about the structural constraints to which their scope 
of agency is subjected. 
The most common and uncertain, that is, fuzzy logic to which such constraints are attributed 
concerns social norms. Whereas Elster proposed that norms are a result of “psychological 
propensities about which we know little” (Elster 1999: 123), other authors referred to norms as 
cultural phenomena and explain their emergence from values (e.g., Hechter and Horne 2003: 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
something that is good enough’ and maximizing as components of rational choice models becomes rather clear 
(Elster 1999: 35). 
55 Esser (2004b: 50) calls this the ‘SEU’ (subjectively expected utility)-version of rational choice theories. 
56 In this regard, Esser’s action theory falls short of a plausible explanation for his assumption about single 
motivations. According to Kron (2004: 201), more consideration needs to be given to the empirical likelihood 
that it is usually not only just a single motivation which fuels action, but several at the same time. 
57 Fuzzy logic refers to the haziness, ambiguities, paradoxes, and marginal and borderline cases that characterize 
the social and its complexity. Fuzziness is thus conceptualized not as an exceptional state, but as a typical status 
attribution of the social as holistic object of inquiry in sociological analyses. It acknowledges uncertainty and 
enables the study of diversity. Kron (2004: 199f) uses the fuzzy logic argument to reason for a way of simple 
modeling of actors’ decisions.  
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91-100; Heintz 2009: 4).58 In this reading, both values and norms determine appropriate and 
inappropriate behavior. The difference is rooted in the sanctioning mechanism attached. 
Norms are often conceptualized as institutionalized rules that guide human interaction. In the 
case of non-compliance, such as disobedience, sanctions will be enforced (Popitz 1980: 25). In 
contrast, values are thought to be internalized codes of behavior that are constantly enforced 
through feelings of guilt and shame, and subsequent self-control (Hechter and Horne 2003: 
94f); thus, external sanctions are not necessary. From the perspective of rational choice, which 
implies internal and external sanctioning mechanisms, norm-following can and must be 
interpreted as rational behavior.59 Hence, social norms (including values) can be 
conceptualized as the background folio underlying social interaction.60 Every social actor is 
endowed with these values through internalized cognitive characteristics and mental models 
(Denzau and North 1994) and meaning. These comprise assumptions, perceptions, and 
evaluations of the world that an actor shares with others in the immediate environment (life-
world) because they are born into and socialized in the same group.  
In an earlier publication, this endowment was termed ‘worldview’ (Mielke et al. 2011: 8). It 
subsumed the cognitive dimension of social order as a way of thinking and perceiving, a 
construct comprising ideas, belief systems, norms, and so on (ibid.: 9ff), which relies on 
notions of habitus (Bourdieu 1978), shared mental models (Denzau and North 1994), 
Durkheim’s distinction of solidarité méchanique versus solidarité organique (1992), Scharpf’s 
(2000) thoughts about motivations of social interaction (Interaktionsorientierungen), Berger 
and Luckmann’s symbolic Sinnwelten (2001), Esser’s ‘habits and frames’ (2004a, b), and 
Giddens’ thoughts on structuration (1984) (ibid.). However, I want to argue that in retrospect 
both the term and the concept worldview, as elaborated earlier, insufficiently capture the 
everyday practice dimension of social order.61 In the following, I will provide my reason and 
suggest the term ‘moralities’ instead. 
                                                             
58 For a detailed account on the origins of norms and values, see Hechter and Horne (2003: 91-100), who refer to 
the works of Sigmund Freud and Emile Durkheim, among others, to shed light on value-creation, and assign 
institutionalization and inter-subjectivity a crucial role for norm-generation. Due to limitations of space and 
limited relevance in conjunction to what Kron’s critique stated above – that it is not the sociologists’ task to enter 
psychologists’ domain and explain the origin of norms and action motivations – I will not elaborate this topic 
further.  
59 From a narrow rational choice-theory perspective, subjective factors like emotions and motivations for social 
interaction on the one hand and inter-subjectively shared norms on the other hand, are often interpreted as 
‘failure’ of rationality. For example, see Elster (1999: 30). Lukes pointed out that power could induce and 
encourage ‘failures of rationality’ (Lukes 2005b: 123). (See the section on Understanding deviance (2.3.2) for 
further elaborations in this direction.) Instead, bounded rationality assumes – given the limited capabilities of 
human beings with respect to information – that “an individual only ‘intends’ to be rational, and ‘the intended 
rationality’ of an actor requires him to construct a simplified model of the real situation in order to deal with it’” 
(Kato 1996: 576, citing H.A. Simon 1987: Models of Man. Social and Rational. New York: Garland Publishing, 
198.).  
60 This is not to argue that social norms are static, though. For further details see below. 
61 I do not argue that it does not relate to the practice dimension at all. The authors of Mielke et al. (2011) have 
made it very clear that the distinction of institutions versus worldview is merely analytical and that empirically, 
both can hardly be distinguished (Mielke et al. 2011: 8). However, the social action dimension was largely 
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My research focuses on the analysis of everyday practices of rural society in northeastern 
Afghanistan. For the purpose of this empirical investigation, I insist that the prevailing concept 
of worldview needs to be refined, that is, differentiated. I do not intend to deconstruct the 
umbrella-view notion argued previously (Mielke et al. 2011). However, based on the 
discussion of rationality provided above, the idea of seeming irrationality or failing rationality 
and its contextual contingency deserves further attention. An argument based on cultural traits, 
that is, psychological characteristics and social values of the individual members of a different 
society, is common in the event that incompatibility between the behavior and choices 
(ir/rationality) of members belonging to one society has to be explained.62 If the same society 
is viewed using a choice-theoretic approach, the picture can just be the opposite, however 
(Kato 1996: 565):  
That is, ‘behavior that has been interpreted to be the result of tradition, passed on by 
socialization and learning, can instead be interpreted to be the result of choice.’ More 
specifically, individuals in agrarian societies in Africa, if they resist modernization, ‘choose to 
do so’ instead of suffering from misinformation or ignorance. Applications of the assumption 
of individual rationality (…) leads to a successful demonstration of the similarities in the 
pattern of individual behavior across different societies and to a refutation of the uniqueness of 
the case studied. (ibid.). 
I argue to combine both, assumptions about the rationality of individual and collective action 
in social practices and constraints and qualifications of rationality by cognitive, contextual 
factors that I call moralities, that is, the role of values and norms as particularities of a specific 
environment in which social action is embedded. Moralities can be broadly understood as a 
normative framework that guides social interaction and not as invocation regarding a desirable 
conduct (moralization). Moralities define what is right and wrong, such that from the outsight 
perspective, ‘right’ does not necessarily match rational behavior or action; neither does 
‘wrong’ match seemingly irrational conduct.63 To define what I mean by the term moralities 
more specifically, I follow Heintz (2009) and Howell (1997) to some extent. They subsumed 
ethics, values, social norms, and moral orders, including reasoning, emotionality and moral 
discourses, within the field of moralities. For my purposes, moralities integrate all normative 
aspects that guide human interactions. Moralities include social norms that are implemented 
inter-subjectively and shared by members of a certain group (including, for example, shared 
mental models), and which are at least partly sustained by their acceptance or disapproval.64 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
neglected in these early elaborations and the here proposed ‘post-institutionalist’ perspective allows to re-
emphasize agency.   
62 An example from the past is the explanation of a society’s low level of economic and political development 
with cultural factors like attitudes, social values, and vague concepts of ‘culture’. See Bates (1983).  
63 For the English language, the Oxford Dictionary (2000: 826) gives three meanings for morality: “(1) principles 
concerning right and wrong or good and bad behavior; (2) the degree to which something is right or wrong, good 
or bad, etc. according to moral principles; (3) a system of moral principles followed by a particular group of 
people.” Heintz (2009: 3) points out that because such principles and judgments are based on cultural concepts 
and beliefs, terminology varies accordingly in different languages. The sentences following this footnote in the 
text above clarify that I distinguish moralities from the narrower concept of ‘morale’. 
64 Elster points out that social norms are typically “also sustained by the emotions that are triggered when they 
are violated: embarrassment, guilt, shame, anger and indignation” (Elster 1999: 113). 
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Furthermore, moralities encompass values and morals underlying social norms. They guide 
individual motivations for interaction, actions and reactions, such as emotional and 
spontaneous acts, including communication and discourse. Depending on the context, different 
moralities can be operative; moreover, several can operate at the same time in the same 
context setting or social situation, possibly accepted according to variable strength and validity 
by different reference groups. 
Thus, the concept of moralities first integrates the dimension of collective action as well as 
subjective acts and individual motivations.65 Second, I argue that moralities can only be 
understood by considering the particular cultural contexts in which they are embedded. 
Morality and even morale as such, in the sense of a universal definition, does not exist. 
Instead, it is a question of validity in a certain social environment and depends on existing 
social norms in that environment. This does not mean that I take the stance of cultural 
relativism.66 As already pointed out in the previous paragraph, context matters, but all social 
action can be interpreted as rational to the extent that it is conditioned by context-specific 
moralities and their distinct resources. Consequently, moralities both enable and constrain 
individual selves (Howell 1997: 4) and thus shape social action through choices and practices, 
including discursive ones. They are lived and relational, instead of clearly conceived.67 Third, 
from the outside perspective, moralities are hard to trace empirically, for they seem entirely 
entangled with social action (Heintz 2009: 2),68 even the actor is not always fully aware of 
which normative rules he or she is following when interacting with others. Moralities thus 
encompass all cognitive factors that affect how an individual or collectivity engages with 
others, whether consciously or unconsciously perceived or at least acknowledged as legitimate 
by all involved.  
Viewed from this perspective, the advantage of employing moralities instead of worldview as 
conceptual lens rests on two aspects: One, the notion of worldview as employed by Mielke et 
al. (2011) was conceptualized as an abstract component of an analytical framework developed 
to complement institutions in a concept of social order. On the contrary, the notion of 
moralities is more concerned with real life, that is, mundane existence as it guides choices and 
                                                             
65 Gerecke (1998) distinguished norm sets the individual ought to follow (Motivmoral) from norm sets 
immediately underpinning social interaction and thus acting like de facto incentives (Anreizmoral). The latter 
constitutes the totality of legitimate social norms in any one society, including all ‘institutions’ and the norms 
internalized with socialization. All action within the scope of alternatives following these norms is rendered 
moral. Action transcending given alternatives are thought immoral (Gerecke 1998: 351f).    
66 Rather, speaking with Heintz (2009: 5) I see myself clinging to a ‘weak’ form of cultural relativism, that is 
‘methodological relativism’. It avoids ethnocentrism by putting emphasis on “’thick description’ of beliefs or 
values that would enable them to appear meaningful in their cultural context: the other is rational (or moral), but 
he sees the world differently and understands it differently.”  
67 I borrow this idea from Bourdieu who, in his writings on honour in Kabyle society, discussed to what extent 
values of honour are consciously accepted and respected versus remaining in the unconscious and “colour one’s 
attitudes without ever being formulated” (Bourdieu 1965: 231).  
68 At times moralities are linked to illusive values and not always spelled out. It is a methodological challenge 
how to trace them and identify empirical manifestations of moralities (see Ch. 3). Often they are accepted as tacit 
or hidden knowledge (Heintz 2009: 3). 
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social practices. The inherent focus on making practically distinctions between right and 
wrong is essential for humans to meet the ordinary challenges of everyday life. In this respect, 
the symbolic dimension is more significant and the tension between an individual and group 
perspective is mitigated. Second, in the approach of methodological relativism, indigenous 
moral precepts, codes and values can be explored without falling into the trap of cultural 
relativism. Thus, it is possible that normative concepts of meaning that underlie social action 
in contexts other than that of the researcher can be grasped in more depth. 
The belief in legitimacy at large includes the rightfulness of a certain order reproduced by 
social action. The situationally perceived rightfulness of a social act, which is contingent upon 
moralities, cannot be underestimated. It also ensures that inequalities are disguised. 
Furthermore, the relational dimension of norms, that is, that they are not necessarily just and 
based on morals that are held legitimate, has resulted in a cynical view of norms as tools of 
manipulation. According to Elster, “… if nobody believed in norms, there would be nothing to 
manipulate” (1999: 118). Other cultural contexts are not necessary in order to recognize that 
rational decision-making and actions may result in seemingly irrational outcomes (Olson 
1968).69 As Elster and Douglas pointed out, rationality is a notion defined for individuals, not 
collectivities (Elster 1999: 29; Douglas 1986: 9).70 The explanatory value of assumptions 
based on the rational choice theory of collective behavior is inane. According to Scharpf 
(2000: 51), individuals are capable of ignoring their own survival interests, and they are also 
capable of violating institutionalized rules and social norms, even if they have to pay a price 
for it. Based on these assumptions – that subjective rational action can well run contrary to the 
interests of collective well-being in the short, medium, and long term – individual phenomena, 
such as deviant behavior by indiduals and in societies and the persistence and substantiation of 
inequalities and hierarchies can be conceptualized and understood. 
 
2.3.2 Understanding deviance and the persistence of social inequalities 
As pointed out above (2.2.3), legitimacy can be interpreted as a condition of all social relations 
because it combines claim to and acceptance of power, rule, and – according to the same logic 
– all underlying social actions (2.3). In the discussion of moralities as a normative framework 
(2.3.1), I have indicated what might be called the relativity of social norms and their potential 
for manipulation. If all aspects of moralities are considered, that is, not only manipulation but 
also competing interpretations of norms, values, and moral codes, competing rationalities 
regarding the selection of a certain norm or ethical practice to guide decisions, and historically 
evolved patterns of legitimacy attached to certain moralities are significant in the analysis of 
how the normative framework affects social action and vice versa. Bourdieu, in contrast to 
                                                             
69 The nexus was made prominent as collective action dilemma or free-rider problem by Mancur Olson (1968).  
70 It is closely linked to methodological individualism (Popper 1934) which argues that social phenomena cannot 
be explained sufficiently by assuming homogeneous patterns to exist among actors acting in concert. Instead, 
situational logic (agents’ cognitive features and environmental setting) have to be considered in order to assess a 
situation as objective as possible from a scientific point of view. 
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Weber, reasoned that the recognition of legitimacy is not a conscious act, but is a result of the 
mental and behavioral absorption of certain structures of inequality by individual members or 
groups of societies over generations. The effect is that the surrounding socio-political and 
physical environment is perceived as objectively given and – except in crisis situations – no 
longer reflected upon (Bourdieu 1998: 119). This unquestioned legitimacy feeds into the 
persistence of inequalities as expression of power relations. It determines that these 
inequalities reproduce the same patterns of social action and legitimacy and results in habitual 
compliance to exercised authority. In other words, consent among the members of a society 
regarding the social order in which they are embedded underlies legitimacy. Thus, legitimacy 
is a social construct. This is particularly obvious in the case of violence and force which are 
not exceptions with regard to legitimacy, but they can be deemed legitimate even by those 
subjugated by such means. How can seemingly irrational consent be explained rationally?   
Several authors in different social science disciplines have (both directly and indirectly) 
provided insights that can help shed light on the question of why inequalities and hierarchies 
persist (e.g., Gramsci 1991, 1992; Bourdieu 1987, 1998; Foucault 2005e; Mann 1990; Lukes 
2005, 2005a, 2005b; Popitz 1968; Douglas 1986). All allude to the unconscious sphere of 
social behavior and action, which accounts for differentiated forms of consent to structural 
givens, including power relations. Furthermore, in each concept, the potential and power of 
agency are largely neglected or at least qualified by structural or symbolic influences. 
Legitimacy on the collective scale encompasses several dimensions that can be differentiated 
between the poles of full consent or acceptance and resignation.71 Following Merton (1968), I 
suggest distinguishing among conformity, ritualism, and retreat72 as analytical interpretative 
lenses to group the approaches of these authors.73  
The three concepts are closely related because conformity and retreat may have become 
ritualized in many instances. Lukes, as the most recent74 author who reconfirms his argument 
by critically reviewing the like of Foucault (Lukes 2005a) and Bourdieu (Lukes 2005b) 
follows the idea that (through the operation of social forces, institutional practices or 
individual decisions) preferences of subjects are systematically influenced such that their 
                                                             
71 Resignation might encompass being dominated through symbolic violence as conceptualized by Bourdieu 
(1998: 173ff; 2005: 82). In that case, the effect and conditions of its efficacy are durably and deeply embedded in 
the body in the form of dispositions, and generate the respective practices.  
72 In the context of his structural strain theory, Merton elaborated five types of reactions for the case that the 
objectives (‘cultural goals’) and available legitimate means to achieve them do not comply anymore and the 
subsequent evolution of a gap between claim and acceptance. Accordingly, much in compliance with rational 
choice theoretic assumptions he interpreted deviance as a social vehicle for mitigating tensions in any given 
society (on deviance and my related evaluation of the other two reaction types – rebellion and innovation – see 
further below). Note that in line with such functionalist reasoning deviance can act as catalyst for social change. 
73 If we assume that deviance can act as catalyst for social change, the identified dimensions of consent and 
resignation present the view from below. From the ‚above-perspective‘, they would focus on social control, 
hegemony, rule, authority, and power in order to enforce conformity among the members of a given society. 
74 Note that the second and third essay (2005a, 2005b) were indeed authored recently and arranged to 
complement the new publication of his 1976 book Power: A Radical View. They can be read as Lukes’ reaction 
to the long and involute debate his book had evoked and as the reaffirmation of the validity of his 1976-argument.  
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willing compliance with inequalities and domination (in his terminology) is produced through 
the exercise of power and consequently does not evoke conflict or resistance, not even in its 
covert version (Lukes 2005: 11).75 Interest formation is an unconscious process. Therefore, the 
securing of consent to domination by willing subjects caused by employed ‘strategies’ might 
be even more effective because they work indiscernibly. According to Lukes, this failure of 
rationality is induced by power: “Power can be deployed to block or impair its subjects‘ 
capacity to reason well, not least by instilling and sustaining misleading or illusory ideas of 
what is ‚natural‘ and what sort of life their distinctive ‚nature‘ dictates, and in general, by 
stunting or blunting their capacity for rational judgment” (Lukes 2005b: 115). In essence, here 
Lukes expresses what he (2005a; 1974) initially conceptualized as the third dimension of 
power: the possible distortion of people’s judgment through the imposition of internal 
constraints. It refers to the existence of societal values and individual interests that remain in 
the sphere of unconsciousness of agents, but nevertheless because of their characteristic 
potentiality, determine how consent to domination among willing subjects is formed by 
leading them “to acquire beliefs and form desires that result in their consenting or adapting to 
being dominated, in coercive and non-coercive settings” (ibid.: 13).76 
In contrast, the works of Foucault and Bourdieu offer insights into how voluntary compliance 
is ensured through non-obvious mechanisms from an internal subjective perspective, although 
it is also largely determined by objectivist structuring by symbols and remains in the 
unconscious.77 Bourdieu’s ‘construct’78 of habitus has explanatory value for understanding 
typical everyday behavior that is not reflected upon and not carried out consciously, but 
                                                             
75 Lukes (2005b: 69) pointed out that “social life can only properly be understood as an interplay of power and 
structure”, though at the same time he noted the opaqueness of the relations between both and the role of agency 
(ibid.: 68). 
76 With what he conceptualized as third dimension of power, Lukes assigned interpretative responsibility to an 
external observer to case-specifically trace and uncover these invisible power structures (Lukes 2005, 2005b: 
146f). This is problematic and has raised valid criticism; see for example Young (1978) and Scott (1990, 1985).   
77 Despite writing from an internal subjective perspective, the focus is not on agency per se. In Foucault’s 
writings, largely concerned with the investigation of disciplinary practices, the assumption of omnipresent power, 
which reproduces itself from within even the bodies and minds of individuals, has given priority to structures 
over agency. Since even individual identities are seen as determined by power relations, the autonomous actor is 
non-existent (Lukes 2005b: 89) and agency redundant. The claim of ubiquitous power makes it difficult to 
distinguish power relations from general social structure in its totality; and it puts the use of power as analytical – 
even descriptive – concept under scrutiny (Alber 2003: 156). Reviewing several Foucault-inspired empirical 
analyses, Lukes concluded that Foucault’s notion of disciplinary practices was unfit for studying real-world 
social phenomena. He suggested that Foucault was first and foremost interested in the design of disciplinary 
practices on a more or less abstract-rhetoric level, but never tried to trace ‘government techniques’ etc. 
empirically.  Bourdieu’s ideas of symbolic power and habitus can similarly be interpreted to evade agency 
because the habitus is conceptually located in between structure and agency (see next fn.) and not assigned a ‘free 
will’, but determined by structural-relational factors (Bourdieu 1987, 1998). 
78 ‚Construct‘ is written in inverted commas here because habitus according to Bourdieu has always been an 
auxiliary, abstract notion which he made very clear does not have empirical substance as a ‘thing’, but resembles 
the link between structure and agency, which is subject of structured structure (opus operatum) and operator of 
structuring structure (modus operandi) at the same time. See Bourdieu (1984, 2005: 31).    
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legitimates existing figurations of social inequality and power.79 Habitus is the principle that 
social groups are specifically oriented towards perceiving, thinking, and acting in typical 
ways. Moreover, habitus is a reflection of the social structures ingrained in the bodies and 
minds of individuals as the result of group-specific practical experiences over long periods of 
history into which they are born and by which they are socialized throughout childhood. As 
such, habitus resembles a disposition of preferences (including tastes) and subsequent regular 
behavior shared by members of a more or less clearly distinguishable social group (e.g., 
milieu) that inhabit diverse social fields (Bourdieu 1987). In La distinction Bourdieu (ibid.) 
demonstrated the ways in which status distinctions are maintained and reinforced as people 
tend to position themselves in a classification scheme exposed ‘naturally’ by their social 
surroundings. Thus, two kinds of objectifications exist: inside bodies and minds (habitus) and 
in the surrounding structures, that is, organizations, institutions, and fields (Bourdieu 1993: 
106). They are mutually conditioned and object to the same socially structuring processes. A 
person’s habitus enables him or her to generate diverse situation-specific patterns of behavior 
that are stored and constantly updated, that is, reconfirmed or adjusted in the social group’s 
collective memory as a repertoire of experiences for effectively dealing with and assessing 
practical challenges in current and future interactions.  
Among such experiences is the subconscious recognition of the symbolic quality of various 
possible resources and thus the acceptance of certain value judgments as unquestionable facts. 
According to Bourdieu, ‘capitals’80, which can be understood as resources of diverse social 
fields, shape these fields from the inside and consequently also generate the habitus in a 
deterministic manner that is similar to a closed circuit. In the case where a type of capital and 
its distribution and structures within a certain social field has ingrained itself so deeply into 
social patterns of perception, evaluation and categorization that no external legitimation is 
necessary, the capital in question takes on symbolic status. Once this is achieved, the specific 
symbolic capital legitimizes and re-affirms the same structural distribution of resources and 
power relations for the respective social field and symbolic power is exercised. Bourdieu 
assigned to the ‘symbolic order’, which is generated by these processes, the status of a 
legitimating authority underlying the political sphere, embedded in basic and general everyday 
social interaction processes (Kraemer 1994: 180). Distinct from Weber, Bourdieu explicated 
that legitimacy does not entail conscious acceptance and claim of action as legitimate. Instead, 
it results from the pre-reflexive congruence of incorporated structures, which do not surface in 
human consciousness (Bourdieu 1985: 199).   
This unconscious legitimacy provides the grounds for ritualistic, but still meaningful behavior, 
which follows largely circular logic in its underlying production and reproduction (that is, 
structuring and being structured) patterns. Consequently, in theory the disposition of the 
                                                             
79 Bourdieu called the acceptance of something as ‘given’ and as seemingly natural social environment ‘doxa’. It 
conditions that the social world the individual is embedded in is neither questioned nor its functioning reflected 
upon. See also 2.3.3.  
80 Bourdieu distinguished three broad categories of capital (cultural, economic, and social), which entail many 
more specific capital sorts each. See Bourdieu (1998). 
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habitus of members of a certain social group ensures that they perceive their conditions and 
the power relations in which they are embedded as ‘natural’. This explains unconscious 
anticipatory obedience and conformity of marginalized and excluded groups with the 
symbolically structured relations that make up their social world, and thus stabilize inequality. 
‘Poverty’, for example, could become a self-chosen way of life and force, coercion and 
exploitation experienced as freedom (Sen 2002; Nussbaum 2000; Han 2005: 56). The habitus 
generates certain mental attitudes and value assumptions that facilitate the broad acceptance of 
power relations that favor others over members of one’s group.  
Similarly, Foucault emphasized disciplinary techniques and related manipulations of bio-
politics (Foucault 2004). Claiming that power operates through individuals’ souls and bodies, 
in his late works he focused his argument on processes of subjection and objectification that 
are grounded in specific forms of daily conduct and lifestyles, particularly technologies of the 
self. The latter enable the individual to make his or her body, soul, thinking, behavior and 
existence seem life-fulfilling (Foucault 2005a: 966). However, the technologies of the self 
should be seen in close relation to the technologies of power, of sign systems and of 
knowledge production.81 He explained the linkage between technologies of the self and 
technologies of subjugation as control mentality (ibid: 967). Accordingly, in everyday life 
individuals are categorized, assigned an identity, tied to this identity and exposed to a reality 
they constantly naturalize for themselves, and through which others see them. Consequently, 
individuals become objectivized subjects subjugated to and dependent upon the rule, power, or 
authority of others, and at the same time, submitting by means of the identity they accept as 
their own (Foucault 2005b: 245). Thus, for Foucault subjection means the subjugation of 
subjectivity, that is, in a subjugating and submitting – actually objectifying (ibid.: 246) sense 
where the scope of agency and resistance is clearly limited. In particular, with the assumption 
that individual identity is already a product of power relations, Foucault’s approach does not 
allow conceptualizing individuals as autonomous decision-makers but as subordinates to 
bounded rationality within the framework of the power structures to which they have been 
subjected. Consequently, structuration processes and objectification overrules agency and its 
potentialities more strongly than in Bourdieu’s habitus, which at least allows for limited 
creative potentials and incremental change. In the context of Bourdieu’s habitus as production 
and reproduction of ritualistic features, Foucault’s technologies of the self can be read as a 
more totalizing, retreating form of consent, that is, as one form of legitimacy attribution.  
The idea of conformity as a loose form of consent broadly resembles Popitz’ explanations 
(2.2.3) of how individuals generate interests in a certain order and start investing in it. 
Consequently, individuals attach value to both individual investments and the broader 
circumstances, despite subjection and inequality. The value attached to an existing order 
(Ordnungswert) is evident in everyday experiences. It is fueled by individual investments in 
                                                             
81 However, Foucault did not confine subjectivation processes to harsh disciplinary practices and their 
normalization per se, but included also lifestyle practices through which contemporary states establish 
safeguarding societies (Absicherungsgesellschaften). The difference lies in the latters’ tolerance towards deviance 
within certain boundaries, which do not put imposed control under scrutiny (Foucault 2005d: 141). 
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the very small everyday acts that create a net of interdependencies that not only becomes 
tighter but also enlarges over time. Popitz emphasizes that such action neither implies 
affirmation by the respective order, nor should it be interpreted as pure opportunism. Because 
it is not the acceptance of the conditions that create a certain order, which have to be enforced 
and accepted, but more significantly, their mere interpretation and meaning (Popitz 1968: 
38).82 Thus, full conformity is sufficient. The subjective interests underlying conformity 
guarantee overall stability because they are interwoven with societal structures. Popitz argues 
that this explains why the prospect of another, ‘better’ social, political or economic 
environment hardly convinces individuals to object their position or even to rebel. Different 
milieus can be assumed to have generated basic acceptance and legitimacy patterns (ibid.).83 
They are not willing to risk existing investments in an order that ensures them planned 
security and certainty of expectations. In an imaginary prospective order, they would have to 
start investing from zero without certainty regarding potential benefits (ibid.: 36f). Because 
even the subordinated and disadvantaged have come to accept their condition as natural and 
indeed have come to value it, they prefer to maintain this inequality and all subsequent effects 
instead to rebel or resist. 
Related arguments can be found in the works of Douglas, Gramsci and Mann, although these 
theorists are mainly interested in the symbolic and historical dimensions of internalization and 
the persistence of inequalities. To underline their argumentations, all authors refer to aspects 
of power, social control and sometimes violence. With the notion of hegemony, Gramsci 
(1991: 101f; 1992: 752) alluded to structural social inequality as a historical product of how 
social life is organized. He suggests that ‘reality’ is disguised by structures with the help of 
control rituals that make the hierarchical structuring of power appear natural because of its 
penetration of the consciousness of the subjugated (Pfohl 1985: 352). According to Pfohl, 
“The penetration is often as subtle as it is deep” (ibid.). Mann, in his multi-volume opus 
magnum on the history of power (1990, 1991, 1998, 2001), cites the example of the working 
class, which failed to revolt against exploitation and miserable social working conditions 
throughout various periods of history because it was not able to organize adequately. He 
concluded that individual rational action does not necessarily result in collective rationalities. 
In this reading, the individual interests of members of the working class who are most often 
concerned with modest survival above all, are likely to cause them to refrain from organizing 
against the propertied industrialist class. In addition to the lack of organizational capacity, 
Mann mentions several other reasons that could account for this non-action, including the 
likely lack of full confidence in abilities and organizing capacities, fatalistic feelings of 
powerlessness given the particular conditions of the socio-political framework, and 
motivations for free-riding, which is a classical problem of collective action (Mann 1990: 23). 
                                                             
82 To quote the original text from Popitz (1968: 38), “Der Ordnungswert der bestehenden Ordnung wird als 
alltägliche Erfahrung evident, und zwar so, dass seine Bedingungen – die bestehende Machtordnung – mit in 
diese Erfahrung eingehen. Durchzusetzen bleibt nicht die Anerkennung dieser Bedingungen selbst, sondern ihre 
Deutung und Bedeutung.“ Here again, similar to Bourdieu, the symbolic dimension of social action is considered 
highly significant. 
83 Note the similarity of Popitz’ milieus (Mentalitätslagen) with Bourdieu’s ‘construct’ of habitus.  
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Finally, Douglas (1986) spoke of the social control of human cognition through institutions, 
organizations and other collectivities that provide ready-made classification and knowledge 
schemes in all spheres of social life. According to Douglas, human beings only act within the 
framework of the given schemes, and are thus bounded with regard to freedom of choice. She 
concluded that conflict mediation should focus less on individuals’ attitudes and more on 
institutional change because incompatible principles are at the heart of any conflict in 
situations when institutions are assumed to decide life and death issues and ‘do most of the 
thinking’ (Douglas 1986: 125). For example, humanitarian crises, such as famines have 
repeatedly not resulted in rebellions of the starving against the propertied, which external 
observers would evaluate as rational action because it complies with objective ideas of equity. 
Instead, as Douglas points out, “Crisis behavior depends on what patterns of justice have been 
internalized, what institutions have been legitimated” (ibid.: 122).     
In brief, the approaches presented above explain the persistence of inequality and - viewed 
from the external observer’s perspective – that irrational behavior relies on assumptions of 
internal constraints that influence individuals’ preference formation. In Lukes’ words, “they 
address the ways in which domination can work against people’s interests by stunting, 
diminishing and undermining their powers of judgment and by falsifying, distorting and 
reducing their self-perceptions and self-understanding” (Lukes 2005b: 123). The constraints in 
question can be read as generated by and actively generating moralities that both affect and 
reproduce power relations. Active rebellion, that is, conscious resistance to domination, 
disadvantages, exploitation, and unequal treatment in general thus is an exception and seems 
unlikely to occur. A limited scope of agency exists only within a given state of affairs 
structured by certain moralities. Viewed in the context of this normatively legitimated meta-
structure, it can only surface as acts of deviance dissociated from consent. Recalling Merton’s 
types of action (see above fn. 72), I have argued that rebellion must be ruled out. However, I 
suggest that deviant behavior can be read as innovation.84 To show how, I limit myself in the 
following paragraphs to introducing two ideas: the popular ‘weapons of the weak’-resistance 
perspective of James Scott (1976, 1985, 1990) and the ‘leveling’ phenomena described by 
Miller and Cook (1998) and Elster (1999).   
 
Both demonstrate that even in situations where (social) force prevails, in totalitarian settings 
and highly exploitative circumstances, the scope of agency with which individuals are 
endowed should not be assumed to be zero. As Giddens put it, individuals can act even when 
they do not seem to have a choice: “To ‘have no choice’ does not mean that action has been 
replaced by re-action” (Giddens 1984: 15). Similarly, Alber (2003: 53) admitted that all social 
                                                             
84 The main difference between rebellion and innovation is that the latter remains within the ‘structurally given’ 
framework of actions whereas the former rejects this framework based on conscious reflections about its 
constraining nature (Merton 1938: 676). Rebels might use illegitimate means: civil disobedience, sabotage, 
assassination, hijacking, kidnapping etc. and usually seek to replace the societal goals, not to put themselves on 
top of the hierarchy reinforcing these goals (Pfohl 1985). In distinction, ‘innovators’ follow goals within the 
realm of what is deemed legitimate in the respective context. However, they also employ illegitimate methods 
and means to realize their aims (Merton 1938: 678). 
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relations more or less entail multi-layer dependencies in which not only one side is able to 
enforce its interests all the time. Thus, contrary to Weber, who conceptualized social (power) 
relations as limited to connecting rulers and followers or interest enforcers versus those who 
obey, Alber refers to the ‘power of the weak’, which likely manifests itself even in situations 
characterized by ‘naked violence’, such as in concentration camps (ibid.). On the one hand, the 
scope of action of the dominated85 is never only limited to reactions that express full 
obedience. On the other hand, agency in the form of deviance occurs within the scope of 
existing norms, thus to label it ‘pro-active’ would be an exaggeration.86 
In his seminal book on the everyday forms of peasant resistance, which he described as 
‘weapons of the weak’, Scott (1985) identified a number of low-profile techniques used by 
subordinates to exploit small advantages through non-compliance. These techniques entail two 
dimensions: actual deception through dissimulation, desertion87, pilfering, slander, arson, 
piecemeal squatting and sabotage (Scott 1985: xvi); and false compliance in the moral sphere 
and symbolic opposition expressed by the creation and dispersal of proverbs, folk sayings, oral 
history, legends, jokes, ritual, religion and language. Scott relates both dimensions to the 
content of what is being communicated and the style or aesthetic forms of expression (Scott 
1976: 238). The argument for the latter should be understood against the backdrop of Scott’s 
book on the moral economy of the subsistence ethic (Scott 1976).88 Scott argued that 
questions of exploitation and rebellion must be tackled by studying peasant culture and 
religion because they provide a symbolic refuge, an alternative moral universe (ibid.: 240), the 
understanding of which would enable the researcher to trace the differences between the moral 
universes of the peasants versus those of the landholders. Although Scott’s research was 
carried out from a class-struggle perspective,89 his findings can be related to other situations of 
                                                             
85 I am toiling with the selection of adequate terminology to capture the ‘dominated’. The term is used here for 
lack of better alternatives which could be ‘weak’, ‘disadvantaged’, ‘subaltern’, ‘dependent’, ‘subordinated, 
’powerless’, but all are the same ideologically underpinned. In the subsequent paragraphs they are used 
synonymously, but meant to be value-free.  
86 In line with how I conceptualize deviance here – by not going beyond the given normative framework or trying 
to replace it – other forms of outright ‘dysfunctioning’ like Foucault’s mental ill or criminals are excluded from 
the discussion (Foucault 1996). The question that automatically arises is when and how does deviance turn into 
‘rebellion’ and can this be recognized? Thus, where is the dividing line between ‘deviance’ as conceptualized 
above and the reaching of a tipping point for ‘revolutionary’ social change? Scott (1976: 238ff) raised related 
questions. From a social-functionalist perspective it could be argued that deviance is quite normal (Durkheim 
1992 [1930]) and serves a purpose in society because it can become an exit valve for social change – again 
depending on many variables, among them the socio-political setting. If the focus is more on everyday-practices 
of deviance, it can serve to solidify valid norms and solidarity among the norm-obedient. In this case 
‘deviantization’ – the process of labeling members of society as rule-breakers – is used as a strategy by the group 
that can rely on ideological and normative power sources to affirm what is right or wrong. Again, here it becomes 
quite clear that deviance is socially constructed and can only be defined in distinction to dominant, valid norms in 
any one society (Pfohl 1985).  
87 Desertion equals the ‘exit’-option in Hirschman’s parlance above (2.2.2). See Hirschmann (1970: 17). 
88 The empirical research for the 1976 book was carried out in lower Burma and Vietnam; the Weapons of the 
Weak (1985) relies on material collected during a two years field stay in Malaysia. 
89 The perspective of class-struggle can be interpreted as narrow power-lens. It distinguishes rich versus poor 
without attributing external agents, such as the government, a role within the local social unit of analysis. While 
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inequality that are not confined to monolithic local classes. This particularly concerns his 
reflections on the nature of everyday deviances: First, they usually do not constitute collective 
violations, but some form of individual self-help in the realm of subsistence economies, 
impoverishment and rights deprivation. Second, as a rule, such resistance actions do not 
require coordination and planning because they rely on informal network relations and shared 
alternative moral universes. Finally, non-compliance remains hidden below the surface of 
open confrontation with superiors, the more powerful, and the better-off (Scott 1985: xvi).  
Scott took these ideas further in the distinction between hidden and public transcripts and the 
assumption of a dialectic relationship between both (Scott 1990: 27). Hidden transcripts – 
discourses in form of gesture, speech, and practices – are a result of the exercise of power. 
Accordingly, Scott ascribed not only subordinates but also the powerful with the development 
of a backstage discourse, as opposed to a public transcript, in which ‘carefully calculated 
conformity’ (Scott 1985: xvii) prevailed. By connoting the different patterns of disguising 
insubordination with 'tactics' (1990: xii), Scott came to speak of the ‘infrapolitics of the 
powerless’ (ibid.: 184). It includes phenomena, such as the self-interest of the subordinates, 
which more or less actively reinforce the appearance of being disadvantaged because this 
provides space for unnoticed, backstage petty deviances. Accordingly, infrapolitics entails the 
hidden cultural and structural underpinnings of more visible political actions:  
Because open political activity is all but precluded, resistance is confined to the informal 
networks of kin, neighbors, friends, and community rather than formal organization. Just as 
the symbolic resistance found in forms of folk culture has a possibly innocent meaning, so do 
the elementary organizational units of infrapolitics have an alternative, innocent existence. The 
informal assemblages of market, neighbors, family, and community thus provide both a 
structure and a cover for resistance. Since resistance is conducted in small groups, 
individually, and, if on a larger scale, makes use of the anonymity of folk culture or actual 
disguises, it is well adapted to thwart surveillance. There are no leaders to round up, no 
membership lists to investigate, no manifestos to denounce, no public activities to draw 
attention. These are, one might say, the elementary forms of political life on which more 
elaborate, open, institutional forms may be built and on which they are likely to depend for 
their vitality. Such elementary forms also help explain why infrapolitics so often escapes 
notice. If formal political organization is the realm of elites, of written records, and of public 
action, infrapolitics is, by contrast, the realm of informal leadership and nonelites, of 
conversation and oral discourse, and of surreptitious resistance. (Scott 1990: 200).  
The described everyday behaviors of deviance, including ‘infrapolitics’, can be read as 
innovative practices developed and conducted more or less strategically by the disadvantaged 
to mitigate inequalities. A related phenomenon on a collective level was identified by Miller 
and Cook as intentional ‘leveling’ in trying to answer the question of the extent to which 
coalitions of the weak can exert political power and induce social change (Miller and Cook 
1998: 71). According to them, leveling occurs instrumentally as part of spontaneous coalitions 
of ‘the weak against potentially powerful actors’ and in already existing hierarchical settings. 
Intentional leveling aims at checking in the sense of constraining a potential leader’s advance 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Scott started out his research career based on such rather monolithic assumption, he later shifted towards 
hegemonic arguments (Scott 1990).  
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on the hierarchical ladder of power (that is, by accumulating power resources) and may entail 
ridicule, avoidance, subterfuge and sabotage (ibid.: 72). These behaviors constitute 
mechanisms that do not require organization, which are very similar to the techniques 
identified by Scott. However, leveling is a collective strategy, that is, “Individuals who seek to 
undermine leaders or potential leaders by gossip, ridicule, economic boycott, or social 
shunning may collectively bring a leader down without organizing to do so” (ibid.: 92).90 The 
authors argued that the threat of social ostracism conditions those outside, who proclaim an 
egalitarian ethos underpinned by a public script, whereas below the surface, efforts are made 
to prevent the evolution and disguise the existence of differences in wealth and power. The 
underlying rationale is constituted by the social norm that something ‘isn’t done’ (Elster 1999: 
116); differences in wealth would disturb social relations among neighbors if they were too 
blatantly displayed.  
Thus, in theory the threat of leveling applies to anybody who seeks leadership positions, 
visibility or socio-economic and political status claims, resulting in ‘a noticeable under-
provision of leadership, collective action and public goods’ (Miller and Cook 1998: 92).91 
However, this model also allows an explanation of the evolution of hierarchies by assuming 
that in practice, natural coalitions fail to check on advancers because they accept side-benefits 
(ibid: 71). Accordingly, it is in the interest of those accepting side-benefits to generate gradual 
differentiation of leaders from followers, because leadership in egalitarian settings may be 
perceived as reducing uncertainty through patronage. This idea is very similar to Popitz’ 
concept of the process dimensions of the institutionalization of power (2.2.2). 
 
2.3.3 Lebenswelten as subjectively experienced arenas of practice 
Having explained how power relations have been conceptualized (2.2) and embedded in a 
framework of social interaction processes from a theoretical perspective in the previous 
section (2.3.1), I now want to introduce the notion of life-world(s) (Lebenswelt[en])92 as the 
mental arena of mundane everyday practices. 
Since its origin, the concept of Lebenswelt has been closely connected to the German 
philosophical tradition of phenomenological thinking. The notion was first introduced around 
1920 (1917, 1920/1924) by Edmund Husserl as synonym for an under-defined idea of ‘natural 
world’ (Welter 1986: 78f). Because Husserl’s definition was ambiguous, the Lebenswelt-
                                                             
90 The underlying assumption is that social sanctions based on crosscutting ties, cheaply available information, 
the spread of gossip and an egalitarian code of conduct in a given community, ensure collective action (Miller 
and Cook 1998: 92). Against the backdrop of what I have stated in the previous sections, this is a vague 
assumption that I do not share. It seems that Miller and Cook treat the subordinate ‘powerless’ as homogeneous 
social entity without allowing for differentiations in preferences etc. 
91 Evidence has been collected and the point is proven for small-scale societies. For example, see Banfield 
(1958), who showed how the competition among inhabitants of one Italian village enslaved them as “prisoners of 
their family-centered ethos” (in a state of culture Banfield coined ‘amoral familism’) and prevented ‘economic 
development’ (ibid.: 163f). 
92 Both terms will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
46 
 
concept gained different meanings among philosophers and sociologists. Today, the debate 
about its ontological features (following Husserl) and the variety of content characteristics is 
ongoing (Blumenberg 2010; Welz 1996). Major milestones in the subsequent discussions have 
been the evolution of different strands in the tradition of interpretative sociological research, 
such as symbolic interactionism (Mead 1973 [1934]; Blumer 2005 [1973]; Whyte 1961) and 
ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967).93 For some, Lebenswelt acquired a broad general 
meaning as ‘universe of natural givens’ (Universum von Selbstverständlichkeiten), which is 
constantly reproducing itself and increasing (Blumenberg 2010: 146), or, put differently, as a 
historically determined, socio-cultural environment in its totality (Bergmann 1981: 69). 
However, more focused writings, such as Schütz’s work paved the way for an empirical 
understanding of life-worlds and caused other sociologists to pay scholarly interest to the 
everydayness of life and social interaction processes – the mundane – as well as related 
challenges regarding content and methodology.94   
For the purposes of my thesis, I understand Lebenswelt as a subjectively experienced locus of 
daily social interactions that entail two main dimensions: First, it is composed of the 
background knowledge and ideational reality surrounding individuals, which is perceived or 
unconsciously accepted as given (doxa). This ‘reality’ consequently frames mundane inter-
subjective behavior and communication within the different local realms of everydayness and 
thus leads to further (re-)production processes of reality through thought and action (Schütz 
1991 [1932]; Berger and Luckmann 2001). The second dimension relates to the physical and 
structural textures of the social realms that form the arena (Schauplatz und Zielgebiet) of all 
social interaction, including the material surroundings, that is, social and natural environments 
(Schütz and Luckmann 2003: 46).95 Hence, life-worlds are always contextualized in time and 
space and thus are specific to respective fields of practice orientation. However, as subjective 
life-worlds structure and are structured by inter-subjective social action processes (Schütz and 
Luckmann 2003: 29, 48ff; Vierhaus 2005: 14), they are never static, but highly dynamic and 
subject to changes through action caused by outside influences or internal processes (ibid.). 
Both dimensions, the given background and ensuing perceived reality, which is experienced 
empirically by the members of groups of people ‘inhabiting’ certain life-worlds in physical 
environments, resemble collective constructions of meaning.96 The assigned meaning is the 
                                                             
93 See Welter for an informative categorization of the different disciplinary strands of life-world ‘theories’ 
(Welter 1986: 224ff).  
94 Schütz initially spoke of the perceived social reality of daily life as ‚social world‘. See Schütz (1991 [1932], 
1971, 1972) and the edition Schütz and Luckmann (2003), prepared and published post mortem by his student 
Thomas Luckmann.  
95 To put it differently: my understanding aims to combine (1) the (broad) phenomenological notion of life-world 
defined as the underlying or background notion of sedimented experience and knowledge, which is always 
interpreted already according to symbols and which leaves no questions to be asked, and (2) the empirical realm 
of everyday action which is not seen as something extraordinary, unheard-of or charismatic, but concerned with 
average (ordinary people and action) and daily routines.  
96 Habermas stresses that communication serves as precondition for collective interpretation processes and the 
assignment of meaning (ibid.). The respective ‘life-worldly’ background provides the source and origin for the 
definition of situations, which are subsequently recognized by the concerned persons as unproblematic.   
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result of a collective’s sedimented interpretations of past experiences, which are taken for 
granted and usually not questioned. All members of a social group have the same underlying 
perception regarding the relevance of a certain issue and on this basis deduce certain interests 
and actions (Schütz 1971; Schütz and Luckmann 2003: 99). Accordingly, a particular 
Lebenswelt thus encompasses all unproblematic issues in the everyday life of its inhabitants 
(ibid.: 29).      
However, as I pointed out in 2.3.1, perceptions of the problematic or non-problematic are not 
clear. I have proposed, with reference to Foucault, Lukes and Bourdieu, that power relations 
are embodied in all social structures and fields, including those that are apparently 
unproblematic and unchallengeable. Thus, just as social interaction and practice, power 
relations are inherent to life-worlds. Life-worlds are formed by inter-subjective social worlds 
(the assigning of meaning) in different realms of everyday life (Schütz and Luckmann 2003: 
44). Here, intersubjectivity relates to the idea that the same experiences are shared among a 
number of individuals and are thus not subjective in the sense of private. Vested with a 
‘natural worldview’, all people sharing the same life-world normally know what the others do, 
why they do it, why they do it at a certain point of time, and under what circumstances (ibid.). 
It is further assumed that they share the same interests: for example, how they make sense of 
the world around them against the backdrop of past experiences and present co-inhabiting of a 
joint material and social world. Within a life-world, its members are able to reach an inter-
subjective understanding because communication is possible and resembles a form of social 
action (Habermas 1995: 107; Schütz and Luckmann 2003: 29, 659ff).97  
I follow Schütz in his idea about the parallel existence of different life-worlds with self-
contained meanings.98 He distinguishes the worlds of everyday life (Alltag), with worlds of 
imagination (e.g., play and religion) and the world of dreams (ibid.: 61ff). Though he 
conceptualized these spheres as distinct ‘provinces of meaning’ with mutual overlaps as the 
exception instead of the rule, he assigns elevated status to the everyday life-sphere as 
‘paramount reality’, because it frames the world of operation where agency produces change99 
                                                             
97 According to Habermas, inhabitants of a life-world form a communication collective 
(Kommunikationsgemeinschaft) (ibid.); the public discourse expresses the collective will. This is in contrast with 
Foucault’s concept of discourse, which is rather structurally determined and not consciously influenced by actors, 
thus lacking agency and directed at exclusion of unwanted knowledge and facts (Foucault 2008). For the role of 
language see Schütz and Luckmann (2003: 659ff) and Luckmann (2007: 13, 19f). 
98 Much in distinction to Husserl (1950, 1954), Schütz speaks of several worlds with own ‘provinces of meaning’. 
Besides the ones mentioned in the next sentence he also added the worlds of science and art (Eickelpasch 1994: 
131). However, it remains unclear to what extent there are not significant overlaps with the notion of everyday 
life-worlds. It is plausible, though, that an individual’s life-world is formed by the inter-subjectively constituted 
social world and multiple realms of reality beyond the scope of everydayness.  
99 Welter (1986: 185), pondering about the question which use the label ‘Lebenswelt’ potentially has in 
distinction to ‘Alltagswelt’ (everyday life-sphere) – admittedly a German discussion – concludes that it can only 
be seen in the life-world’s potential totality of penetration of human action arenas. Nevertheless he holds the label 
to be unfit and states it is just a popular phrase connected to an underlying primary association with the 
unspectacular normalness of everyday-life in the sense of Alltagswelt (ibid.: 205). Similarly Grathoff (1995, 
1978) sees a close link between everyday life and life-world, proposing to treat both as a unitary issue in 
phenomenological social theory (Grathoff 1995: 93ff). The German sociological school, which focuses on 
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(ibid.: 132). Moreover, I assume the Alltagswelt to contain several fields depending on the 
societal context, such as the fields of science, production, resource management and so on. 
Moreover, I add another connotation: I locate my understanding of life-worlds in the 
framework of the world of mundane practices and everyday life where inhabitants are ‘forced 
to act if they want to live’ (ibid.: 447). Subsequently, the everydayness I am interested in 
focuses on the conduct and perspective of life and lifestyles of the average person, that is, the 
ordinary man and woman. Central to my approach is the perspective of individuals as agents 
and participants in the social world surrounding them, which both enables and constrains, and 
structures and reproduces them. It is thus plausible that everyday life-worlds contain spheres 
and fields of action for which every individual is competent as agent (Hammerich and Klein 
1978: 12). Every person disposes of different field-specific experiences that are subjective in 
nature but derived from the social, that is intersubjective, action and which are consequently 
also shared inter-subjectively. The introduction to Chapter 6 connects the life-world concept to 
the sphere of natural resource management. I will argue that the highly environmental 
resource-dependent context in which my study population lives, frames the scope of everyday 
livelihood and survival practices and moralities, and consequently shapes these rural dwellers’ 
life-worlds (see Chapter 6).    
 
2.4 Local governance in societies 
 
This subchapter will elaborate the concept of governance and the relation of what I hold to 
encompass local governance with the notion of life-worlds (2.4.1). A subsequent section will 
distinguish the notion of local governance from that of local government (2.4.2). First, 
however, I want to introduce my understanding and use of the term ‘society’ in this thesis. I 
alluded to it in 2.2.2 in my discussion of the different levels of interdependencies underpinned 
by power relations. By defining these terms at this point, I also hope to preclude confusion 
regarding the distinctions among the three terms: life-worlds, local governance, and society. 
By ‘society’ I mean ‘rural society’ and the inhabitants of the rural countryside in my study 
region of northeastern Afghanistan. By employing the term in this way, I follow Mann’s 
criticism of the unitary understanding of society in the sociological mainstream, according to 
which society is viewed and analyzed from a system perspective. As such, it is self-sufficient 
and carries the attributes of a closed entity (Mann 1990: 32ff, 58).100 The conventional usage 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
research related to everyday-lives, has its root in the phenomenology of Husserl and Schütz, but expanded its 
scope to the investigation of everyday phenomena on the micro-societal level. Against this background, a debate 
about proper not only labeling, but also contents has arisen from the 1970s. A product of this debate is the special 
edition of the journal Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie and Sozialpsychologie in 1978 which provided ‘materials 
for a sociology of everyday-life’ with the same title (see Hammerich and Klein 1978). The positions differ on 
how a sociology of everyday life (Soziologie des Alltags) can actually be conceptualized and which dimensions 
can be attributed to it. See also Elias, who questions the universal applicability of a narrow notion of Alltag in 
other cultural contexts (Elias 1978: 29). 
100 Similarly, the political philosophers Laclau and Mouffe (2006: 130) argue in their ‘radical democracy 
program’ against conceptualizing ‘society’ as evolving totality of its sub-processes (als fundierende Totalität 
ihrer Teilprozesse) and suggest instead to acknowledge the openness of ‘the social’ as constituting existence. 
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of this understanding of society equates society with the population of a nation-state. In 
contrast, Mann argued that society could be more usefully conceptualized as consisting of 
multiple overlapping interaction networks of people that share manifold linkages giving it a 
‘confederal’ character.101 Thus, it is appropriate to not only think of societies in the plural and 
assume that they exist and operate in specific geographic and spatial frames (‘scales’) of 
interaction (ibid.: 58), which share the same characteristics, but also to imagine these societies 
as traversed by multiple social fields. Subsequently, it is essential to break up the conventional 
nation-state society construct into smaller units that more closely resemble interaction 
networks in different socio-spatial scales. The latter do not necessarily have to divide along 
classic lines of social and spatial organization, but can be formed by identity and their 
belonging to different user communities that commonly establish intersubjectivity and thus 
also frame life-worlds (see Chapter 5).  
Thus, my use of the term society refers to the rural society (which is assumed to be traversed 
along many social lines; see above) of northeastern Afghanistan. In this study, rural society 
includes not only the population of the countryside, but also of the towns and municipalities in 
the three sample provinces (Baghlān, Kunduz, and Takhar) because their lifestyle102 is largely 
characterized by agricultural and subsistence production, rural income, and consequent 
lifestyle patterns. Although the mundane practices of bazaar traders versus peasants or nomads 
differ, they are subjected to the same structural influences and moralities. In that sense, I speak 
of rural Afghans and rural Afghan or local society.103 As its complementing counterparts, 
camp society in camps of internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees, Kabul ‘high’ society 
(e.g., new rich or intellectuals), religious society (religious authorities) or emigrant societies in 
the diasporas, among many others, could be distinguished if necessary. With regard to 
investigations into social differentiations, which form a main thread throughout this thesis, I 
use the notion of life-worlds to refer to groups of people who live in different localities and 
practice a certain occupation or share other field-specific commonalities. This frame makes it 
possible for a person to relate and activate different life-worlds against the background of his 
or her greater societal belonging. According to Popitz, human beings live in a plurality of 
imagined belongings and are able to accommodate all resulting diversities, possible 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Their radical stance encompasses that ‘the social’ rather manifests in a symbolic than essentialist order, 
constituted through discourse alone. For my however slightly different elaborations on ‘the social’ (see 2.2.1 
above), I see discursive and materialist dimensions linked to the social. However, I share Laclau and Mouffe’s 
skepticism regarding the fragmentariness and incompletion of presumably ‘totalitarian’ concepts which involve 
social units. 
101 Despite of the view of societies as nets of multi-dimensionally overlapping social networks which are never 
fully or even sufficiently institutionalized, Mann assigned such ‘figurations’ (actually he suggested abandoning 
the term ‘society’ altogether) relatively fixed spatial boundaries (Mann 1990: 15). 
102 Weber already spoke of visible differences in the everyday lifestyles (Alltag) of groups of people. See Weber 
(2005: 309).   
103 However, I do not intend to claim to speak for the whole rural population of Afghanistan, but limit myself to 
my empirical field sites in northeastern Afghanistan, that is, in particular the Kunduz oasis and the 
Pamir/Karakoram foothills. On the specific characteristic and socio-geographic and economic background of 
northeast Afghanistan see Chapter 5.  
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contradictions and discrepancies (Popitz 1980: 83, 86). However, it is important to emphasize 
that Lebenswelt does not at all resemble a reductionist version of society. Instead, it is 
necessary that I integrate the notion of life-world into my conceptual framework because it 
allows me to capture subjective, everyday perspectives on mundane activities in specific fields 
of social action arenas, particularly the significance agents attach to certain dimensions of 
action, symbols, and meanings in addition to observable events.104   
 
2.4.1 Governance as the exercise of power in specific social action arenas 
Based on the previous discussion, I am now able to deduce a rather ample understanding of 
governance. At its base, it is constituted by the assumption of the ever-present circumstance in 
social settings that one individual or group influences on the lives of another or others, which 
always then involves the exercise of power. As suggested on a more abstract level regarding 
power and social order, governance is not restricted to selected, separate spheres of social life, 
such as politics or the economy. Instead, it is inherent in human bodies (Foucault 2005c) as 
well as in mundane practices of everyday conduct, whether in harsh conditions where survival 
is always at stake, or in peaceful, economically prosperous societies. It is constituted and 
constantly reproduced by social practices and moralities and is to great extent synonymous 
with what Foucault termed conduite (Foucault 2005b: 256). The ambiguity of the term 
conduite should be seen as strength here because it extends from conduct to leadership to 
governing, and further encompasses notions of self-control, supervision, steering and 
regulation, and management. Thus, it encompasses the potential to integrate different subjects 
and objects or subordinated at the same time. It can not only entail force and coercion but also 
refer to agents’ self-conduct as a result of cognitive factors (ibid.) and discourses, in the 
presence or absence of a central authority.     
Governance as the activity of governing or the way something or somebody is being governed 
in the sense of being directed, guided, or – depending on the perspective, even – controlled, is 
a manifestation of power relations, that is, of the exercise of power. Consequently, in any 
governance analysis, the broad question is how power is being exercised (ibid.: 251).105 
Moreover, governance carries with it a strong process dimension.  
At this point, I feel it necessary to stress that in my view, governance also entails 
subjectivation which objectifies the subject and processes of subjection and subjugation, that 
is, how subjects govern themselves and others, are at the same time subjugated and evolve as 
selves (see 2.3.2; Dean 1999: 12). These processes can underlie voluntarism or enforcement 
by coercion and be brought about from the inside or externally, conscious or unconsciously. 
Hence, they are a disciplining element that provides for the organizational and ordering 
dimensions of governance. The orientation of conduct is guided by moralities; it results in the 
                                                             
104 According to Sayer (2010: x). See the methodology chapter for further elaborations.  
105 Yet again, if power is assumed ubiquitous, the methodological challenge of how to grasp power arises. For a 
discussion of this issue see the methodological remarks in Ch. 3. 
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situational definition of what is right and wrong or good or bad and translates into certain 
configurations and characteristics of social order. Whereas in my view, social order 
encompasses all sorts of meaningful behavior, governance is limited to social actions that 
organize the collective coexistence of communities and societies, thereby aiming (or claiming 
to aim) at the organization of collective wellbeing in and among societies. The dimension of 
collective well-being refers to the organization and decision-making processes related to the 
provision of collective goods, such as safety and security, dispute resolution, and joint usage 
of resources, that is, their allocation, distribution, and access. Whom the collective includes in 
a particular context is an empirical question. It is not bound to a totalitarian entity of society 
(whatever its scale even on the sub-national level), but it might refer to socially stratified 
groups and communities within any society (see Ch. 5.3).  
This definition also implies that governance is always bound to specific social fields (2.2.2) or 
action arenas.106 Accordingly, in an analysis of governance, the particular arena of social 
action has to be specified, that is, in addition to ‘how’, it is useful to ask ‘governance of 
what’? However, a sole concentration on the arena question of (governance of) ‘what?’ is 
never sufficient, because it potentially ignores the interstitial characteristics of interaction 
networks and their working logic (Mann 1990: 56).107 As Mann pointed out, this interstitial 
and difficult characteristic can be traced to the fact that the origins of many interaction 
networks can only be located between the sources of power and between institutionalized 
power structures (ibid.). A look at either one and even both concurrently remains insufficient 
in so far as it does not take into account the dynamics that a) preclude the shaping of both and 
b) arise as the result of the multiple rationalities underlying social interactions. Similarly, 
Kraemer proposed that social practice evolves based on the reciprocal mutuality of symbolic 
and material societal conditions, which he termed ‘materiality of practice’ and to which he 
assigned an inherently societal character (Kraemer 1994: 179). In line with Bourdieu, he 
suggested that social facts are not merely ‘things’, but are located in individual forms of 
practices (ibid.). Long (1989b: 228f) spoke of the importance of ‘emergent structures’ in this 
regard. Accordingly, unintended consequences of interactions and some properties of social 
institutions cannot be grasped and described by simply following micro-events by observation, 
descriptions or by drawing facile conclusions. 
Applied to the local level, governance thus means the governing (in the sense described 
above) of all affairs concerning a certain social action arena within a bounded socio-spatial 
scale – that is at the meso-level of local social organization (beyond the core family), which is 
                                                             
106 Following Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2003) I will use the metaphor of ‘arena’ throughout this study to 
capture a great number of interactions between agents of various statuses, heterogeneous resources, and 
dissimilar goals. For how my own usage of the concept of ‘arena’ differs from Olivier de Sardan’s and 
Bierschenk’s explorations will be illustrated in Ch. 5 where the level of analysis for this research is discussed. 
See Chs. 5.2 and 5.3. 
107 In this study the empirical investigation of governance arenas as environmental resource user communities 
(see Chs. 5 and 6) is taken as useful starting point, though cross-cutting issues like conflict mediation etc. are not 
confined to such social action arenas but traverse them. For this reason the inter-linkages of action arenas will be 
taken into account. 
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defined according to situation. In Chapter 5, I will elaborate the relevant indigenous socio-
spatial empirical categories and the understandings of ‘local’ that I explored in my research 
area. ‘Affairs to be governed’ relate to the collective behavior of social groups and the 
provision of collective goods at the community level. Several spheres can be distinguished, 
such as the management (usage, access, and distribution) of common property resources, the 
organization of security, and the negotiation of disputes.108 At this point, I merely want to 
stress the connection with social life-worlds for two reasons: First, it renders the distinction of 
public versus private – which is not clear cut and indeed rather is a misconception in my study 
area – irrelevant. In conjunction with the concept of life-world, I use the term ‘community’ to 
signify that its members share a joint reality of experienced daily interactions in a specific 
arena of action (life-world). Second, it is important to keep in mind that life-worlds differ from 
local governance in ontological content. Wheras life-worlds are constituted by the individual’s 
subjective experience of mundane interactions, local governance transverses these 
experiences. In particular, it is a notion imposed from the outside to grasp the processes of 
decision-making and enforcement of the collective good in certain social action arenas or 
fields (see Ch. 6.1). In my understanding, local governance mechanisms – the exercise of 
power for the purpose of organizing communal coexistence by aiming at the organization of 
collective well-being – in a to-be-detected social field or arena constitute the unit of analysis 
for this thesis. Hence, the social fields governed concern everyday issues in interaction with 
the local environment, and can thus be called ordinary and mundane.109  
Moreover, by using a perspective on the local in the sense of relatively clear socio-spatial 
boundedness, power can be assumed to be exercised in less institutionalized forms, that is 
beneath the level of full-scale rule (Herrschaft). Following Popitz (1992: 238f), of the three 
preliminary stages of power exertion below the threshold of institutionalized authority, the 
first stage encompasses the sporadic exercise of power, which is limited to one or few 
occasions without being repeated regularly. In these singular cases, opportunity provides that 
somebody in the situation has immediate access to resources to determine the conduct of 
others in a specific moment. The second stage, the norm-setting exercise of power, is reached 
when power can be exercised such that the behavior of dependents is successfully 
standardized. This requires the general availability of power resources, their regular 
application, and the ability to enforce compliance and to limit the mobility to increase the 
dependence of the subjected (ibid. 237f). This type of power exercise ensures that some degree 
of certainty about mutual expectations develops. The third stage marks the de-coupling of the 
norm-setting power exercise from a specific person (that is, de-personalization). Instead, the 
exercise of power is tied to a position, such as an office, within which the normative effects 
solidify (ibid.: 255). These differentiations serve to introduce the next section, in which I 
                                                             
108 In line with fn. 107, the latter type of collective good mentioned here, i.e. conflict mediation, is not a clearly 
distinguishable governance arena of its own right, but rather a cross-cutting issue permeating all other governance 
efforts in the various fields (governance of livelihood or environmental resources [see Chs. 6 and 7], aid 
governance [see Ch. 8] and so on).  
109 For the selection of action arenas for this study see Ch. 6.1. 
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attempt to distinguish governance from government because the latter is more often than not 
used as a synonym for state or at least is closely linked to its institutions, practices and agents.    
 
2.4.2 Local governance is more than local government 
Due to the widespread synonymous usage of governance, government, and the latter’s popular 
signification of sovereign national politics (that is, state-related processes, institutions and 
agents), I hold that the distinction and clarification of both terms is necessary, not least to 
demonstrate the integrative dimension of local governance and its usefulness as an analytical 
lens in this thesis.110 Particularly when focussing the discussion on the local level, the 
distinction between local governance and local government is commonly blurred. ‘Local 
governance’ has emerged as a dazzling term that is widely used by social scientists and policy 
makers alike, but without a clear definition. It has become an almost empty signifier. Because 
of its popular usage, the contents of the term are heterogeneous, and in most cases local 
governance is viewed in narrow terms as connected with a state’s penetration of the sub-
national levels of government, often in the context of ‘decentralization’.  
In the following, I briefly review the popular understandings of local governance in order to 
determine the surplus and value of my own definition. The existing literature on local 
governance can be divided loosely into three broad strands:111  
a. Political science analyses concerning aspects of political steerage in Western 
(European) contexts, especially the European Union;  
b. Social-science cum policy analyses of transition processes and social change in non-
Western (post-colonial, post-communist, and post-authoritarian) settings, and very 
closely related to the latter, 
c. A narrow understanding of governance in development, which is propagated for 
example as ‘good governance’ with related dimensions implicitly attached (see also 
Ch. 8). At the local level, it is understood as community governance or community-
driven development by international financial and development institutions, such as the 
                                                             
110 My argument and the way I conceptualize governance crosses the terrain of few authors, who deduce the 
meaning of ‘government’ from its etymological roots, the Latin ‘gubernare’ and thus come up with definitions 
closer to that of Foucault’s conduit. Mitchell Dean, in her homage to Foucault’s thinking, accordingly defined 
government after the phrase ‘conduct of conduct’ (Dean 1999: 10). Her thus defined understanding of 
‘government’ (ibid.: 11) largely complies with what I understand to be encompassed by ‘governance’. What I call 
‘arenas of social interaction’ or ’social fields’ overlaps with her ‘regimes of practices’. For example, for 
contemporary liberal-democratic societies, she mentions regimes of practices of punishing, of curing, of relieving 
poverty, of treating mental illness and maintaining mental health, etc. “These regimes involve and link up 
particular institutions so that we can talk of a ‘criminal justice system’, a ‘health system’, a ‘social welfare 
system’ and so on. However, such regimes are never identical with a particular institution or even system.” (ibid.: 
21).  
111 I do not sharply distinguish academic or theoretic from policy considerations of governance because, as 
Chibba (2009: 104) found, theory does to some extent underlie all aspects: metrics, advocacy, research and 
analysis.   
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World Bank and other multi- and bilateral stakeholders that comprise the international 
‘development’ community (Chibba 2009: 85). 
The strands are detailed in brief in the following paragraphs:  
(a) The discussion on local governance refers to modes of decentralization of central 
government functions in European states by which political decision making is 
transferred to lower level government administration and offices (Lindner 2004; 
Kjellberg 1995). The reallocation of competencies upwards, downwards and sideways 
from central states has become commonplace and centers around a discussion of the 
organization of multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003; Scharpf 2000a, 
2001). Fiscal or administrative decentralization processes that assign certain 
responsibilities to subordinate entities in the administrative hierarchy are believed to 
enhance democratic participation. The term ‘local governance’ is used because of the 
inclusion of local societal actors in these multi-level governance processes. These are, 
for example, municipal administrations or community representatives, and in the same 
context, organized societal interest groups, social movements, and so on. Thus, in this 
reading, local governance nevertheless deals mainly with administrations, political 
agents and bureaucratic aspects of government. 
 
(b) Particularly in non-Western, developing and transition countries, the democracy and 
institution-building imperative implies that local governance institutions are seen as 
vestiges of the past ascribed to colonial, communist, or generally authoritarian settings. 
The rationale then is that these have to be replaced or at least modified with democratic 
institutions of governance (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Brinkerhoff 2005). 
Because of this emphasis on the ought-to-be nature of institutions as democratic, 
inclusive, equitable, and just, already existing local, that is, traditional institutions are 
in most cases rendered unfit and thus are ignored outright. The assumption of 
institutional and power vacuums in such settings, particularly in post-conflict 
countries, explains the resulting dominant logic that governance can only be achieved 
by the delegation of competencies from the top down. Thus, for example, Lister (2005) 
analysed local governance structures in Afghanistan from the perspective of 
decentralization and distinguished different forms, including (i) de-concentration as an 
administrative type of decentralization, (ii) devolution, which carries a political and 
fiscal dimension sometimes manifesting in federalism and a democratic dimension 
through involving elected bodies at the local level, and (iii) delegation of competencies 
to non-state actors.112 In these interpretations, the modern state serves as a precondition 
for governance. Empirical research suggests, however, that local realities differ 
substantially from the assumptions of institutional vacuums in post-conflict (Hohe 
2002) and post-colonial states (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2002, 2003). Several 
authors described the role of traditional structures in local contexts (Lutz and Lindner 
                                                             
112 For a review of how local governance has been conceptualized in ‘Afghanistan studies’ see Ch. 4.3.    
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2004; Nixon 2006; West and Kloeck-Jenson 1999) and their influence on 
decentralization, democratization, development, and state-building processes. Others at 
least acknowledged that ‘context’ matters (Grindle 2004; Chibba 2009: 104). 
 
(c) Partly as an effect of these empirical insights and previous reforms of the initially 
dominating development policies, with an emphasis on economic growth, agendas of 
international institutions, such as the Washington Consensus of the World Bank, which 
showed mixed results at best (F. v. Benda-Beckmann 1994), the so-called Post-
Washington Consensus focused on good governance and administrative and fiscal 
decentralization. In its framework, communities were assigned central responsibilities 
for their own development (Shah and Shah 2006). The labels ‘empowerment’ and 
‘participatory development’ came to embody norm, such as equity, voice and 
inclusion. They also introduced respective tools to apprehend local needs, for example 
through participatory rural appraisal techniques, and implemented effective measures 
to meet them, for example, the set-up of community development organizations. 
Nevertheless, the critiques of such approaches indicate that despite the inclusive 
rhetoric and emphasis on the dynamics of bottom-up development, programs and 
logical frameworks rarely allow the actual participation of local actors and the 
realization of local needs (Cooke and Kothari 2001, 2001a; Cooke 2001; Cooke 2003; 
Hickey and Mohan 2004). Instead, they follow formalized top-down templates and 
development thus remains a technicist illusion (Leftwich 1994: 364). Hence, this 
policy understanding of ‘good’ local governance also includes mainstream political 
and governmental bureaucratic techniques, such as community-budgeting and the local 
administration of projects (Ch. 8) as well as the set-up of local organizing structures. 
In summary, the way the term governance, particularly local governance, is commonly used in 
political science and development studies is largely connected to the content and meaning 
policy-makers ascribe to it.113 Even when it is defined in a presumably open and neutral 
manner, such as “the way decisions are made and implemented by or on behalf of people in a 
local area” including “the allocation of authority to decision makers” and as exercised by “a 
variety of civil society institutions” (Helling et al. 2005: 6), it carries a technicist notion of 
effectiveness. Hence, it is first and foremost concerned with aspects of formalized government 
that is concerned with outcomes, accountability, agents, and templates for implementation. 
Thus, despite the fact that even the World Bank not long ago realized that local governance is 
more than local government (ibid.), the discursive scientification of such insights only leads to 
status descriptions of the obvious, in contrast to grasping what is formed in the interstices of 
the observable. Local interests, preferences, cultural scripts, the broader socio-geographical 
context underlying the formation of individual preference, political bargaining processes, and 
so on are usually not considered in the mainstream understanding of what is termed local 
                                                             
113 Because much of academia largely tries to describe and model politics and related processes and is less 
creative and pro-active to provide policy-advice on own initiative or preceding policy interventions, especially 
not in the field of ‘development’. For a discussion of the concept of ‘development’ see Thomas (2000, 2000a). 
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governance. Hence, the popular notion of local governance actually implies and can be 
reduced to signify local government. Consequently, I argue that the understanding of local 
governance that I outlined above has the advantage of embodying a more inclusive approach; 
it is not limited to merely spatially defined communities, aspects of local government and 
conventional mainstream aspects of local governance depicted above.  
By using three examples from the realms of environmental resource governance and by 
synthesizing two cross-cutting fields of aid governance and conflict mediation, I will show 
(Chs. 6-8) that governance can be traced in certain modalities and entails state as well as 
community actions to regulate the access to, distribution of, and usage of all kinds of 
resources. Without forestalling the analysis and considerations of the methodological section 
(Ch. 3), it is safe to state here that it is actually often at the interface of state and local 
interactions (Long 1989a: 5) where empirical analyses for understanding governance prove 
very fruitful. 
 
2.5 Summary and guiding research theses 
In this chapter, I have developed the initial concept of social order as proposed by Mielke et 
al. (2011) and suggested using a different terminology, replacing ‘institutions’ with ‘social 
practices’ and ‘worldview’ with ‘moralities’. The main reason is the finding that the concepts 
of institutions and worldview were not delimited clearly and thus overlapped to large extent. 
Elements incorporated in the concept of worldview were usually assigned to represent 
informal institutions or everything below a certain but not clearly defined degree of 
institutionalization. Consequently, status descriptions of institutions (formal versus informal) 
were mingled with stages of institutionalization. The hint that both concepts – worldview and 
institutions – can only be distinguished analytically served auxiliary purposes.114 With the 
now proposed, likewise analytical, distinction of social practices and moralities, these 
difficulties can be overcome while the idea of institutionalizing practices and norms is 
maintained. That means, I can make use of the idea of institutionalization without having to 
employ institutional theories.115 Consequently, in the previous sections, I tried to fit the 
analytical dimension of the social order concept to the needs of empirical research in order to 
elaborate guiding theses for the subsequent empirical analysis (see below). 
The modified conceptualization of social order as combining social practices and moralities is 
less ambiguous because practices include regular social actions, the rules of which are shared 
by the members of a specific community (see Ch. 5) and they are relatively stable with regard 
                                                             
114 In the previous publication Mielke et al. (2011) did not elaborate in detail on the dual face of institutions as 
proposed by neo-institutional economics and explicitly North (1993, 1998). Due to lack of a solution, the authors 
stuck to the concept of ‘institutions’ and avoided further explanations.  
115 Besides what has already been highlighted against an institutional approach, in my understanding it always 
carried unease because it is associated with effectiveness, efficiency and performance, thus implying a very 
functionalist and problem-solving focus.  
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to mutual expectations and duration. Communication is assumed a type of social action (see 
Chs. 2.3 and 3). Social practices relate to material as well as immaterial ‘doings’, such as 
thinking, feeling, acting, or refraining from action in a certain way. An additional advantage 
compared to the view of institutions is that social practices are constituted by institutionalized 
as well as non-institutionalized practices and thus constitute actions following the entire range 
of institutionalized and non-institutionalized rules. Moreover, moralities provide the normative 
underpinning of all social action, just as moralities provide legitimation. As I have argued 
above, moralities encompass the entire normative framework at the agents’ disposal. Social 
norms116 (here synonymous with moralities) have the effect that conflicts, which have been 
proposed to be a universal feature in any society, remain latent and are largely prevented from 
surfacing or escalating. Hence, given previous conceptualizations of local governance, an 
adequate analysis of social order and local governance cannot be limited to obvious or open 
conflicts but must take into account that most contestations of interests and preferences are 
hidden from direct view. Following mainly the ideas of Lukes, Bourdieu and Foucault, I have 
sketched several ways in which power works to reproduce itself and the social practices and 
moralities by which it is constituted. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that even 
practices of deviance and resistance as documented by Scott and described by Pfohl normally 
take place within the framework of existing power relations and hence do not challenge them. 
Using the example of deviance, I have highlighted the factor of agency and its importance for 
understanding social order on any scale because it is underpinned by power relations that can 
have enabling as well as constraining effects, and thus escapes the perspective of sole 
domination.117 
However, several challenges are connected with this approach. The difficulties are at least 
two-fold: First, as Alber (2003) pointed out, the assumption of ubiquitous power makes it hard 
to locate it between the continuum of violence and open conflict on the one hand and power 
merged and embodied in the social structure on the other hand. Secondly, most applicable to 
the latter is the challenge of tracing covert social action. I have introduced the concept of local 
governance to pin down social order in an empirically investigable manner. Accordingly, local 
governance patterns embody social order on a micro scale in a community that disposes of 
socio-spatial boundaries. However, because local governance is field-specific, it relates to the 
regulation or ordering of something manifest in arenas of social interaction. Thus, the concept 
of local governance embodies the external, that is, the researcher’s perspective on multiple and 
individually experienced social interaction processes in everyday life inscribed with particular 
                                                             
116 Similar to his view on power, Popitz distinguishes institutionalized norms (Rechtsnormen versus 
Sittennormen) differently based on institutionalization processes in which regulations for the setting and 
enforcement of norms take shape, eventually by association with already existent permanent social arrangements 
(Popitz 1980: 31). Accordingly, legal rules are associated with the state and customary norms prevail in less 
institutionalized environments. For the purpose of this thesis, I adopt the idea of different degrees of 
institutionalization of norms, but do not share the binary vision of legal versus customary rules. Instead, further 
differentiations must apply. 
117 The power as domination-perspective largely complies with Foucault’s analytics of power. Critics have 
referred to this obviously limited – because normative – idea as ‘Foucault’s hole’, for example Dowding (2006: 
141). 
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meanings, which in the minds and inter-subjective contexts of members of a certain 
community constitute what I call life-worlds. By focusing on the moralities aspect of social 
order and consequently local governance, I am able to include life-worlds in the analysis. I 
believe that this is necessary because the notion of life-world allows me to capture the 
significance that individual members of a specific community attach to particular types of 
actions. It accounts for the emergent structures (Long), interstitial characteristics of interaction 
networks (Mann), and materiality of practice (Kraemer), which are neither institutionalized 
nor obvious in any way, but weighty and determinant of social interaction, local governance, 
and thus the characteristics of a specific local order. 
I am aware that these elaborations are quite abstract and exclusively theoretical.118 However, 
given that this thesis is first an empirical study and follows an inductive119 analytical 
approach, the purpose was to formulate a very open conceptual framework that nevertheless 
would inform the reader about basic underlying assumptions of the researcher’s approach 
towards comprehending and analyzing aspects of the experienced (by agents as individual life-
worlds) and observed120 (by the researcher as local governance mechanisms) realities.121 
Accordingly, for the present study, I refined the concept of social order as elaborated 
previously (Mielke et al. 2011). In addition, I located the notion of local governance within its 
framework to make it empirically operative for my research interest. Thus, I am now able to 
formulate the following theses122 (T1-T6) which will guide the data collection and subsequent 
analysis, and the review of the relevant literature:123  
                                                             
118 The notion of theory (‘theoretical’) alludes to the realist perspective’s sense and usage here, according to 
which not cause-effect relationships  are in the foreground and guide analysis but mechanisms as ways of acting 
(Sayer 2010: 104f).  
119 Inductive here refers to not conducting theory-led/’deductive’ research, but possibly contributing to theory-
building, here through a hermeneutic case-study approach.  
120 Observation is understood here in its commonsense meaning as “an insight or piece of information recorded 
by the researcher about a specific feature of the phenomenon or process being studied.” (Collier et al. 2004: 250). 
See also section 3.1 for a further specification on the methodological aspects. 
121 Behind this lies the conviction that no matter how open and neutral a scientist wants to approach a topic of 
research, he or she always carries assumptions (a worldview) due to socialization processes as an individual 
during childhood and as an academic throughout training (disciplinary and interest-driven). The conceptual 
framework thus indicates how I perceive reality, which relationships I think are important and against which 
background assumptions I collected and analyzed the empirical data. 
122 The concluding ‘guiding theses’ are by no means hypotheses in the narrow sense because they do not entail if-
then causal statements. See Mielke et al. (2011: 6) where it was specified that a ‘social order approach’ could 
provide guiding theses about how ‘the world’ is structured. Ideally, these guiding theses help the researcher to 
deduce questions that can be empirically investigated by consulting other, existing social science theories and 
concepts. I deducted several consequences for my methodological approach, that is, the selection of methods for 
data analysis and data gathering (see Ch. 3).   
123 The social order analytical framework evolved in the course of research conduction through constant re-
adjustment of my initial assumptions about how to investigate local social order phenomena with a state-distant 
bias. By deducting such guiding theses at this concluding point, I acknowledge that my conceptual framework in 
a sense is theory-laden (Sayer 2010: 83) which – as I would like to stress following Sayer (ibid.) – is distinct from 
being theory-determined and, naturally, from being theory-neutral or void of any theory. Nevertheless, the 
surplus of this conceptual approach as I see it is that it allows for inductive inference (Ch. 3) and does pre-empt 
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T1  Some type of social order of whatever kind and at whatever scale always exists, such 
as social practices that are predictable and known to the agents who interact in 
different local arenas and who share the same set of moralities. Power relations guide 
these interactions. Rationalities are bounded by underlying flexible moralities that 
legitimize certain actions. However, given the problematic nature of double 
hermeneutics,124 the attempt to understand and research governance processes in a 
culturally distinct social order setting requires a high degree of reflection about 
potential cultural biases inherent in the research design (and the researcher’s mind) and 
encountered by the subjects investigated in the field (that is, their perception of power 
differences). I propose that these requirements call for the elaboration of a different 
epistemology of local governance: ways of knowing and reflecting on its mechanisms 
in specific arenas of action. Theses T2-T6 present initial ideas about how this 
epistemology could be eventually constituted in the future and further explain T1 and 
social order as an analytical approach as well as its postential usage as an 
epistemological category. 
T2  The idea that disorder, power vacuums, chaos, and so on do not exist, implies that 
ordering practices and moralities can be detected in any social setting. Accordingly, I 
propose to allude to the entangled social logic approach introduced by Olivier de 
Sardan (2005) in addition to Esser’s notion of complexity (2000). According to the 
former, bare of all romanticism and ideological underpinnings, the embeddedness of 
social logic is assumed to require analysis. Thus, not only the mere interaction but also 
its integration in and generation of structural contexts are essential to consider. These 
mechanisms can best be traced in particular action arenas. A multiplicity of 
rationalities and legitimizing patterns of reasoning are assumed available. Put 
differently, this research does not aim to reduce complexity, but to acknowledge and 
address it as best as possible. Complexity refers to the multiplicity and variability of 
action alternatives and action results as well as their associated risks and uncertainty 
(Esser 2000: 5). It is assumed that bounded rationality enables the actor to survive, that 
is, to manage his or her life by relying on fuzzy logic in situations that usually 
comprise multiple dimensions, non-transparency, and a certain degree of blindness. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
any requirement or need for deduction. It is along these lines of thought why I do not label the chapter 
‘theoretical approach’, but – more openly – ‘conceptual framework’. In the conclusion of this empirics-based 
study, the usefulness of the concept will be revisited, see Ch. 9. 
124 I adopt Giddens’ idea of double hermeneutics. According to him every social science research entails a 
cultural-anthropological aspect, which refers to the actors’ repertoires of daily knowledge and interaction that is 
already endowed with meaning (first order). Any scientific observer entering a research locale carries his own 
backpack of meaning-construction, i.e. concepts of second order. Giddens suggests that the ‘hermeneutic’ 
character of any interaction between researcher and subject lies in the chance that the former adopts second order 
concepts into first order concepts through ‘translation’ processes of interpretation while sharing first order life-
worlds. The double-aspect of hermeneutics derives from the fact that the social scientist then (after understanding 
first order concepts) needs to ‘translate’ first order concepts back into meaning-categories and frameworks of 
sociological theory. See Giddens (1997: 338, 429f). 
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Consequently, following the social order approach, cause-effect relationships and 
classic causalities are not at the heart of scientific inference here. Instead, 
understanding of and reflection about a society are underpinned by distinct social 
order(s) and context settings. The analysis of local governance patterns in a given 
society in social action arenas enable the understanding of the meaning that agents 
attach to their everyday actions and activities. The social analysis is generated from the 
thick description of individual (as group or society members) and group actions. By 
closely following of emic concepts, multiple transversal logic of action should become 
detectable and understandable without the need to assign its agents the status of 
victims or pity them (Bourdieu 2005a: 13). However, in relation to T1 – that a new 
epistemology might be necessary – the aforementioned description must make use of 
indigenous concepts. It is possibly that the notion of power would not exist as such in 
the society under investigation, which is a strand this research intends to clarify. 
However, as explicated in Chapters 2 and 2.2 with reference to Uphoff (1989), power 
is not used as an explanatory concept, but merely as a descriptive one that aids the 
larger understanding of societal dynamics and processes connected to authority and 
rule. Accordingly, to make sense of the current situation and conflict in the study 
region of northeastern Afghanistan, an analysis with previously determined actor 
categories and ordering concepts would not yield innovative heuristic value. Instead, 
the intrinsic ordering ideas, structures, modalities of power of these rural societies, and 
the mechanisms of the formers’ conversion (Alber 2003: 160f) must be identified, 
understood and reflected upon.   
T3  The perspective of governance as conduct enables a bottom-up horizontal view of 
ordering processes of social organization and thus qualifies the role of the state as 
primary form and ordering force of social organization. By conceptualizing 
governance as the ordering and organization of various facets of everyday life, it can 
encompass all regulative action and intervention in social interaction processes 
between individual and/or collective actors and organizations. With regard to defined 
action arenas at the local level, governance includes all processes of binding and thus 
legitimate decision-making and enforcement via mechanisms and routines of all 
stakeholders involved. In these processes, a certain dynamic of negotiation processes 
among agency-endowed individuals is assumed to play a role in determining decisions, 
outcomes, and their enforcement. 
T4  All social action is assumed meaningful and carried out according to particular 
(consciously or unconsciously) prevailing motives that are determined by moralities. In 
this interpretation, social order is always reproduced by social interactions. Power 
constitutes the fundamental tenet underlying social order and determines the working 
mechanisms of governance and legitimacy. Social inequalities and resources inequity 
can be traced back to differential power relations and appear rational.   
T5 The attempt to conduct non-partisan research without bias for a dominant perspective 
of what constitutes the state (that is, methodological nationalism) requires a high 
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degree of reflection on the part of the researcher. Cultural biases and power imbalances 
need to be documented in the research design as elements of a power-reflective 
approach. It would be an illusion to assume that the researcher can rid herself of her 
cultural ‘backpack’ because it contains specific moralities by default and – as 
elaborated in 2.3 – these are likely to remain in the subconscious. Attempting to trace 
emic moralities requires innovative methods of data collection and the posing of new 
and different questions to the already collected material in the field (i.e., interviews and 
observations) in order to analyze the data from a new angle.  
T6 The unit of analysis for a study on local governance in a framework of social order is 
constituted by local arena-specific and crosscutting governance processes. The level of 
analysis is in accordance with the particular social action communities that share 
everyday experiences and particular life-worlds. In this study, environmental resource 
governance in three fields and crosscutting aid and conflict governance will be 
investigated in resource user communities of rural northeastern Afghanistan (see Ch. 
5). The local actor-perspective implies that the community of average rural dwellers 
and their everyday activities is at the center of analytical inquiry. The mundane life-
world is the cognitive and practical context of all social action and interaction. 
Consequently, individual community members can be assumed the most competent in 
their daily lives (in this case environmental resource management) and thus offer 
informed accounts. Hence, they are interviewees of special value for the researcher.  
The framework described above is very ambitious, and I do not claim to be able to apply it to 
the fullest extent. Hence, this framework is used only partially and for selected elements of 
specific action arenas. Nevertheless, I propose that the endeavor of elaborating this framework 
was worthwhile because if it is found applicable and proves useful, a starting point for the 
elaboration of social order as an epistemological category can be provided. I hope to 
contribute a bottom-up, life-world analysis of rural Afghan society based on my empirical 
insights collected and analysed according to this conceptual framework. In so doing, the 
present research will contribute to the recognition of emic realities that are traceable in social 
practices and intrinsic moralities, which so far have been disregarded in analyses of 
contemporary Afghanistan and related diagnoses of state failure, dysfunctional institution-
building, and what is currently perceived as under-development. Hence, the sub-title of the 
thesis, “…‘rewriting’ rural Afghans’ Lebenswelten into recent development and state-making 
processes” refers to my objective of shedding light on how local rural life-worlds are 
constituted and the aim of raising readers’ awareness of why these are important.  
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          „Es gibt Freunde und Feinde. Und es gibt Fremde.“  
Zygmunt Bauman (1992: 23) 
3 – Methodology 
 
In this chapter, I will give an overview of how I approached the topic of local governance 
methodologically. It is guided by the epistemological assumption that the way I investigate 
social order and local governance will affect my findings. I explained above that I 
modified the initial institution-centric perspective after I gained first insights from 
fieldwork (see Chapter 2, fn. 123). Because the initially planned mapping exercises of 
institutions and actors became entangled and resulted in somewhat confused preliminary 
findings (see section 3.3), I have adopted the post-institutional approach described in the 
previous chapter. This entailed several implications: One was the abandonment of the 
distinction of formal versus informal institutions. Another was the constant reformulation 
of my sub-questions during the fieldwork, including the extension of my initial focus from 
state-society relations (a distinction that I later abandoned as well125) to moralities and 
cognitive aspects that reflect and shape rural dwellers’ life-worlds.  
The research was concerned with two main tasks: first, generate basic data for analysis, 
evaluation, and, second, contextualize the findings in the overall framework of research.126 
Given the obstacles to carrying out research during most of the roughly 25 years prior to 
my own fieldwork from 2006 onwards, a lack of knowledge persisted regarding local 
social structures, their dynamics, the mechanisms of local politics, and the changes they 
underwent throughout the period of violent conflict. Afghanistan has been caught up in 
wars since the late 1970s, first in broad-based resistance fighting against the Soviet 
intervention from 1979, a civil war and unfolding ethnic factionalism in the years after the 
Soviet withdrawal in 1989, in violence connected to the advance of the Taliban and their 
large-scale rule from 1996,127 and the intervention of NATO-forces to help overthrow the 
Taliban regime in late 2001. By early 2006, when I entered the field, four years had passed 
after relative peace had set in in most parts of the country following the ousting of the 
Taliban. However, academic engagement and social science research resumed slowly. 
Consequently, knowledge about local conditions remained minimal (see Ch. 4). Thus, 
                                                             
125 My initial orientation hypotheses and assumption had been different from what I now elaborated for 2.5. 
Thus, already the conceptual framework is an outcome of insights from the field. In particular, this entailed 
the abandonment of the formal-informal divide, of the neo-economics-driven institutional approach, of the 
state-society and society-individual distinction, and the subsequent favoring of a post-institutional approach, 
that is, the view that both, society and individuals, are embedded and emergent part of the other and the state.  
126 Based the design of the comparative research project ‘Local Governance and Statehood in the Amu Darya 
Borderlands’, my PhD-research was projected as a single case study for the northern region of Afghanistan 
due to be put into context with topic-wise similar case studies for southern Tajikistan and southern 
Uzbekistan.   
127 With their seizure of Kabul in 1996, the Taliban formed a government and established formal statehood as 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Their territorial rule expanded north and by 1998 covered almost the entire 
territory of Afghanistan, except the northeast where the Northern Alliance resisted the Taliban’s onslaught 
successfully. See Ch. 5 for further background information.  
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comprehensive data collection, mapping, and accumulation of evidence were the main 
purpose of fieldwork in the early stage. 
The attributes of the conceptual framework outlined in the previous chapter led to an array 
of methodological consequences, mainly concerning the process of data analysis (see 3.3).  
The shift towards moralities and cognitive factors required an analysis of the interviews, 
observations, and collected documentation from an additional angle. Another consequence 
of the concept I adopted in my practical research design was the choice of a qualitative 
approach that relied mainly on inductive anthropological fieldwork methods in order to 
comprehend and depict the intrinsic perspective of local politics in northeast Afghanistan’s 
rural society (Bierschenk 2003: 5). The underlying assumption was that changing power 
relations and dynamics of decision-making processes and related mechanisms cannot be 
grasped using quantitative methods because of the sensitivity of the topic. Moreover, as 
was reconfirmed during the fieldwork, the distrust and suspicion of the sample population 
would cause interviewees to give wrong numbers in household surveys and questionnaire-
style collected data sets, for fear of being taxed, fined, or otherwise harassed by authorities 
in the future (see also Ch. 8.3.1).128     
I also assumed that a qualitative research design generates data that can fruitfully 
contribute to understanding the mechanisms of rural society and to enable an analys of the 
working mechanisms of local governance, instead of detecting singled-out cause-effect 
relationships between variables (Sayer 2010: 104f). The assumption of bounded rationality, 
for example, requires a third way to bridge both methodological individualism (that is, the 
idea that every actor is fully informed and able to establish a preference ranking and act 
accordingly) and methodological collectivism (that is, the assumption of structures 
determining individual choices of action depriving the latter of agency) to understand 
social action in a specific society. The notion of life-world emphasizes the challenge of 
placing individuals and social groups in the foreground of action analysis; otherwise, no 
account of life-world realities is possible.129 I concluded that for the investigation of the 
perceptions of individuals and groups, which play a significant role in understanding 
considerations, meaning-giving and aspirations, the anthropological distinction between 
emic and etic viewpoints offers a useful entry points into a prudent and sensitive 
methodological procedure. Whereas the emic perspective focuses on words, distinctions 
and intrinsic cultural labels used by members of the society under investigation and what 
these mean in the respective societal context, the etic perspective entails the disciplinary 
background of the individual researchers and enables them to share their insights with 
other academics. However, the etic concepts usually neither have a vernacular equivalent 
nor are they known by the people of the society under investigation. Accordingly, from the 
                                                             
128 Furthermore, the emic concepts of household possessions and especially income usually do not 
correspond with the categories employed in surveys and questionnaires, because non-monetary ‘income’ is 
not viewed as income by the surveyed population. Similarly, employment is not regarded as such if the 
labouring is reimbursed in kind, i.e. not in cash. 
129 According to Vierhaus (1995: 11f) the comprehension of life-world realities involves also taking into 
account the perceptions and experiences of those involved in events and its ramifications. The idea of 
reconstructing single events from mere facts by assuming that events bundle circumstances, motivations for 
social action, coincidences, and impacts, would thus be insufficient. Instead, an analysis of the conditions of 
possibilities to understand realities and their meanings around an event is needful.    
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outset my research aimed at detecting emic concepts and ideas related to governance, 
which I assumed would be different in terms of content and meaning from the ones that are 
familiar, that is, popular Western and etic social scientific understandings of concepts, such 
as poverty, gender, democracy, power, widows, aid, projects, and so on. For data analysis, 
the translation of emic into etic understandings by interpreting meanings posed the main 
challenge.  
Following Sayer, who pointed out that concepts in any society “must be explained at their 
‘own level’ (…) their meaning must be understood” (ibid.: 135), the underlying motivation 
for tracing moralities was to understand the intrinsic, emic meaning of observed and 
reported social practices. Consequently and naturally, ideas, beliefs, perceptions and 
reasons were assigned the role of explaining ways of acting and other mechanisms, which 
in my case were governance processes from a local perspective. They enabled 
understanding and reflections on concrete events, experiences and practices, even though 
these may have been conditional and situated. Consequently, lived experiences and their 
firsthand accounts on the one hand, and interpretation of particular ways of acting and 
reflecting on the other hand were inseparable for weaving the analytical narrative (Robben 
and Nordstrom 1995:4) of this study (see Ch. 3.3). I therefore relied on thick descriptions 
of emic ideas, concepts and resulting practices and a theoretically informed interpretation 
of emic concepts based on the guiding theses of the conceptual framework (Ch. 2).  
The understanding of entangled social logic as outlined above (Ch. 2) required that the 
analysis and its methodology use multidisciplinary sources. The problem-oriented research 
topic of local governance, the aim of qualitatively explaining social phenomena in the 
realist sense of understanding, and my own academic inclinations demanded that the 
researcher be a political sociologist in outlook, an area specialist, historian, ethnographer 
and critical development researcher in approach, and a modern anthropologist in method. 
The reader may conclude that my thesis does not perform these roles satisfactorily. 
However, I compromised with the intention to offer an insightful, informed, 
interdisciplinary account of local governance mechanisms in my study region of 
northeastern Afghanistan. However, the steps towards achieving this aim represent 
conventional description followed by an analysis of the empirical data, which I hoped 
would enable me to relate the empirical results to the conceptual framework and to reflect 
on its fruitfulness. The underlying motivation was the intention to show how my 
empirically based analytical approach – the development of categories and ‘causal’ links 
from my interviews and other collected primary data – could contribute to theory-
building.130  
If successful, this study could be the first step towards establishing a different 
epistemology131 of governance and local politics. Taking the concept of social order as the 
point of departure, I attempt to develop a tentative analytical grammar (Goodale 2009: 
                                                             
130 Often qualitative case-study methods are seen as vehicle for generating valid theory, because they allow a 
stronger empirical grounding. The underlying rationale is that more comprehensive and more detailed contact 
with concrete instances of the events and behavior about which we wish to generalize helps sharpen 
distinctions, stimulates fresh concepts, typologies, and hypotheses. This way the contribution to theory-
building is most often constituted by refining already existing theoretical approaches.  
131 Understood as ‚way of knowing‘, and consequently enabling understanding. 
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198) that would facilitate describing social practices and moralities as local governance 
phenomena embedded in social order(s) with some degree of precision. This goal is 
ambitious, and I am not sure that I will be able to accommodate all aspirations, given that 
the mere description is already complex. It stretches over distinct levels of scales of action 
from the individual actor, collective actors and social groups to communities bound to 
distinct social action arenas, rural society, and overlapping societal groups that are 
generated by and constitute social order simultaneously. Nevertheless, I believe it is worth 
trying to complete the exercise and to start developing complementary epistemological 
categories as embodied in the social order framework. Newly gained insights might serve 
as a point of departure for future studies in a similar vein. Finally, I should mention that I 
am well aware that every attempt at comprehending social situations or orders, even those 
aimed at alternative or analytically inductive ordering resembles a process of ordering 
nevertheless.  
In the following, I will explicate my approach to the design of the data collection method 
and its adjustment to local circumstances after I entered the field (3.1). Section 3.2 reflects 
on the consequences for the practical fieldwork of the increasingly deteriorating security 
situation in my study region from summer 2006. Finally, the last subchapter will provide 
information on the methods I used for analyzing the collected data.    
 
3.1 Approach to data collection and modifications in the process 
The fieldwork for this study was carried out over a period of 14 months between March 
2006 and November 2007 in Afghanistan. Two short-term visits were made to the field in 
2008 and 2009. Because my home institution (ZEF) was concerned about my safety, my 
entry into the field was facilitated through a second research project that was a joint 
undertaking by ZEF and German Agro Action132, a German humanitarian relief and 
development organization active in agriculture-related rehabilitation efforts in Afghanistan. 
Welthungerhilfe was one of four international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
that had been granted a working package within the framework of the newly launched 
Kunduz River Basin Program (KRBP)133 funded by the European Commission. The 
specific sub-project foresaw the implementation of new water management structures in 
several local irrigation systems in the three provinces: Takhār, Baghlān and Kunduz. The 
project was titled Social Management of Water in Afghanistan (SMWA). My home 
institution was asked to carry out complementary research on the design and performance 
of the local irrigation systems, local livelihoods and governance patterns. The academic 
project members were invited to attend the implementation process of irrigation 
management reforms in a study on the local governance dimension.134 While two Master’s 
                                                             
132 At the time I started this research, German Agro Action (GAA) was the name used by the German NGO 
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V. outside of Germany. However, since lately the label has been corrected and 
the organization presents itself globally as ‘(Deutsche) Welthungerhilfe’, I will use the short name 
Welthungerhilfe in the subsequent chapters of this study when mentioning the organization.  
133 For the objectives and significance of KRBP see section 6.1.3-b and Ch. 8.2 below. 
134 A second collaboration with Concern Worldwide and Welthungerhilfe on a research component ‘Power, 
Governance and Conflict’ in two upper catchment districts of the Kunduz river basin had also been fixed 
prior to my entering the field in this area in September 2006.  
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degree students conducted the research in the first two topics, I was expected to contribute 
results on local governance. I participated in this project for two reasons: One, Bonn 
University allowed me to undertake fieldwork in Afghanistan only on the condition that I 
would be incorporated under the security umbrella of Welthungerhilfe. Secondly, because 
of my open-minded conceptual framework, I did not have a fixed predetermined research 
plan in the narrow sense and thus entered the field with the idea that particular threads 
worth following more closely would arise in the process of the fieldwork. Thus, my 
approach strategically incorporated the idea of ‘accidental anthropology’ (Robben and 
Nordstrom 1995: 16). From the beginning, I did not intend to limit my data collection to 
particular questions, such as the study of the competencies and functions of local water 
managers. I wanted to be alert to the wider socio-economic, cultural and political context 
of observed social interactions as a precondition for inductive understanding. 
Consequently, at the outset I viewed the opportunity to start my fieldwork within the 
SMWA-project as a welcome opportunity to enter the field and come into close contact 
with rural society in northeastern Afghanistan.   
My approach was to allow issues related to local governance to arise inductively from 
observations and interviews with members of the rural society, which would give me 
insight into their subjective views and perceptions of what was significant and meaningful 
and what was not. In hindsight, the approach worked well. The arguments are developed 
processually throughout the empirical analysis (Chs. 5-8) and the conclusion (Ch. 9). I call 
this approach Franzosenzopf-Ansatz (‘French braid’ approach), because just as a particular 
type of plait is braided by adding in every step of braiding more hair from the entire mass 
of hair available, so every chapter and subchapter gains in complexity by the subsequent 
introduction of more dimensions and additional analytical pre-findings. Just as French 
braiding results in a beautiful braid (plait), my approach to integrating complexity into the 
local governance mix led to a deep understanding of local governance in the particular 
areas I investigated in this thesis. Moreover, as every plait thins out in the end, I 
determined with a few well-arranged threads that point to a conclusion. Because every 
research project is a process, it was necessary to take account of this process dimension. 
Nevertheless, generalizations from my findings must be undertaken with reservations 
because, of course, what I present is my own interpretation of an already (by the 
interviewees) constructed reality. Thus a kind of second-order construction or re-
construction was inherently part of the research. Given the theory-laden nature of 
observation (Sayer 2010: 83) and my cognitive biases, this reconstruction is to some extent 
subjectively biased and thus uncertain; its general validity has to be scrutinized by follow-
up research in a similar vein.135 
In practical research terms, at the beginning of my fieldwork I moved in uncertain, 
unfamiliar, and undetermined thematic territory. However, by being part of the SMWA-
project and participating in the rural field site visits with the other two researchers during 
the initial period of my stay ensured that I encountered the local and I was able to record a 
                                                             
135 Given that I proposed a new approach to study local governance processes, the results were very much 
uncertain. However, King et al. (1994: 6) have stressed that this kind of studies can be very useful, as long as 
the uncertainty in outcomes is honestly acknowledged and reported about.  
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vast amount of data.136 Naturally, I started trying to grasp the organizational structure of 
water management as an entry point for digging deeper into local governance issues. 
Admittedly, at that early stage of my research, I was still unsure of what would constitute 
data for my particular research topic. Subsequently, I tried to record as many observations 
and oral accounts of the people I talked to as I could. In addition, the other two researchers 
and I daily exchanged and discussed field notes from our visits at different locations along 
the irrigation canals. I used mainly anthropological methods of narrative and semi-
structured interviews, participant observation, field notes, participatory rapid appraisal-
exercises, and focus group discussions. In retrospect, I consider the first two months of my 
field research as a period of settling in and familiarizing myself with local rural society. In 
this period, I went to the three different irrigation systems in Kunduz province almost 
every day. It might not have been very professional and possibly unfair with regard to the 
people I met and interviewed during this period; however, these two months also 
resembled a trial and error approach to my field research, which is best captured in the 
phrase ‘learning by doing’. This early fieldwork included the attempt to clarify relevant 
data, where to look for it, what sorts of questions to ask, how to behave and represent 
myself (as a female), who to ask, how to react in unexpected situations, how to evaluate 
respondents’ answers, how to record and store data, how to find and work with a research 
assistant, and so on. At the same time, I encountered a vast range of unexpected ethical 
dilemmas that were crucial at this early stage and led to important consequences for the 
remaining fieldwork.   
Admittedly, I might have been, and probably was, quite naïve when I started research that 
was integrated in an NGO framework with all its technocratic and modernization-inspired 
attitudes towards development. The NGO’s internal politics purposely exploited power 
differences between expatriate managers and locally employed staff, the power imbalances 
between NGO-staff and local rural target groups, and the NGO’s reasoning pro and contra 
certain development measures that were dominated by putative security considerations. In 
the view of local rural dwellers, I was one of the expatriate NGO managers visiting their 
settlement when I embarked from a hired car that displayed the NGO logo in the 
windshield in areas where perhaps one family in hundreds possessed a car. My appearance 
signaled to the locals that they would have to push the right buttons to convince me to fund 
their irrigation infrastructure or any other development scheme they would claim to be in 
dire need of. Although this reception was understandable and my fault as a naïve 
researcher, my PhD-project in general and the collaboration with Welthungerhilfe in 
particular would lead to more serious consequences in the form of existential dilemmas of 
conscience.  
My location for field research, northeastern Afghanistan was my first encounter with a 
post-war ‘third world’ country and the development and aid business. I had no choice but 
to grapple with perceptions of me being perceived as part of the latter, but I also had the 
opportunity to observe for the first time its mechanisms and logic from halfway inside, that 
is, witnessing a reality that is usually denied to aid workers because of their narrow 
professional perspective. I arrived there with a backpack full of reports and analyses and 
                                                             
136 I recorded field notes in serial diary notebooks, interviews were taped with a voice recorder.  
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training in critical development studies at ZEF. I then faced locals approaching me with 
needs and requests from their families and communities, but I was tasked to function as a 
researcher who was ideally impartial, neutral and objective.137 At best, I wondered what I 
was doing there. I scrutinized the potential value of my particular research interest in local 
governance, and I came to doubt my role and objectives as a researcher in many ways. On 
the one hand, it was clear that my research would not immediately help any of the persons 
I had met, who were willing and patient to share their views and discuss and answer all my 
questions. Although in a different context, Smith observed “Taking apart the story, 
revealing underlying texts, and giving voice to things that are often known intuitively does 
not help people to improve their current conditions. It provides words, perhaps, an insight 
that explains certain experiences – but it does not prevent someone from dying” (Smith 
1999: 3). I realized that it was one thing to read the phrase ‘research is a social practice’ 
and another to understand fully its practical meaning: research can never be neutral in any 
sense, that it is not an innocent exercise, but an activity that has something at stake and 
occurs in social fields structured by multiple power relations (see Ch. 2). I found myself 
caught in the middle of varying interests – those of the NGO manager and his logical 
framework, the rural populace, the rural elites, and my own. My attempt to do justice to 
these diverse interests not only became impracticable and contradictory but also resulted in 
my inner conflict.  
My intended neutrality was compromised by my association with the NGO and the fact 
that I was conducting investigations as part of a research component in an aid-
infrastructure project. The NGO manager was keen to learn about local power relations at 
the tail and the head end of the irrigation canals. I was asked to identify agents of 
development and spoilers, get numbers on land and animal property, and personified 
patterns of local rule and authority. Such requests naturally clashed with my ethics as a 
researcher. I intended to build trustful relationships with my interviewees and revisit them 
regularly throughout the duration of the fieldwork; I ensured them anonymity. At the 
beginning of each meeting, I introduced myself and explained that my primary motivations 
were academic and scientific. I tried to explain to the project manager that I would be able 
to clarify de-personified mechanisms of local irrigation management and governance, but 
that I would never mention people’s names or cite concrete sources. However, he did not 
accept my point about protecting respondents and disliked my request to keep them 
anonymous. Neither was there understanding with regard to my concerns about handling 
data, that is, it should be done with care since data relating to power-relationships and 
shifting power structures are highly sensitive. I was ignored at best after a series of 
discussions about these points. I was not taken seriously as a researcher and the 
practitioners’ attitude towards my research was that it should play merely an 
accommodating role. The risk that my research would merely be considered if it was found 
to support the project implementers’ agenda, and thus constitute drudgery and window 
dressing, gave me twinges of conscience. At the same time, I became aware of the 
                                                             
137 See Foley and Valenuela (2008: 288) for a discussion of objectivity and critical ethnography. They argue, 
“… Because all standpoints represent particular interests and positions in a hierarchical society, they are 
‘ideological’ in the sense that they are partial. Once an ethnographer abandons the positivist fallacy that 
research techniques can produce a detached, objective standpoint, it makes little sense to ignore more 
intuitive or subjective ways of knowing.” 
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dilemma the project manager faced; he had to meet deadlines and write monthly, quarterly 
and semi-annual progress reports to his head office in Kabul, the management in Bonn, 
Germany, and the European Commission, which was the main donor.  
Furthermore, explaining to my counterparts and interviewees the future benefits of 
research – even if indirect – posed another challenge. One of my key informants grasped 
the heart of the dilemma, which was that the current injustices experienced by local 
communities would not be eliminated by my research. He stated, “You can write a book 
about it, but they will continue to steal water” (see 6.1.1). I usually introduced myself at 
the beginning of each interview stating that I was a PhD-student and not an NGO worker 
even if the car that brought me was sometimes also used by an NGO; that I did not have a 
monthly salary; that I would not be able to build a bridge, school or clinic or have it built. 
Although I repeated these statements several times during the interviews, people kept 
asking why I asked the kinds of questions I did and why I did not focus on what I could do 
for them. The concept of what research is and how it could benefit average rural dwellers, 
which constituted my main discussant group, was unknown among respondents. However, 
how could I blame people for not grasping the benefits of research and academia given that 
I even had many doubts, which constantly reappeared, sometimes stronger and sometimes 
weaker? Some had heard about universities and internships in the last year of study for 
field investigations in order to collect data for a thesis. Some even had sons or relatives 
seeking education at a university abroad, although such cases were an exception. The 
confrontation with an outsider coming into their community and not having an aid agenda, 
that is, not having money to distribute via projects was new to the communities and 
individuals I approached. Suspicion was a constant companion during my field research; 
my mere presence frequently raised it, although rarely openly.  
I have never really determined whether their kindness, friendliness and hospitality made 
my Afghan respondents appear to understand what I said in the beginning of a meeting. 
Obviously, further questions in the course of the conversations showed that they were not 
convinced buying my explanations. They sometimes became impatient waiting for me to 
lift the veil and uncover the hidden agenda they suspected me to have. Why would 
anybody want to come to the remotest areas and ask people what they were thinking about, 
what had happened to them in the past, enquire about their difficulties, offer the 
opportunity to set the interview agenda, ask about what was on their minds, give them a 
voice – even if only for a couple of hours and while a PhD-student recorded what they said 
in a field diary? My own doubts surfaced regularly. Even though I tried to explain my 
objectives, I could not deny that research often seemed a selfish undertaking to earn a 
degree. The questions of how I would benefit the people I met and what my contribution 
could be to ease their situation remained unanswered in most cases because all I could do 
was refer to some future job and the book I was going to write, which would offer other 
academics and practitioners my insights so that others could gain a better understanding of 
local life-worlds without having to spend as much time in the field as I did.138 I was not 
able to give the requested help and aid in terms of concrete actions or money although I did 
offer to get somebody to a clinic or doctor using the car I had hired. 
                                                             
138 This objective was one of the main reasons why I decided to represent the material in such detail in Ch. 6. 
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I encountered further conflicts with the NGO manager because in his view, I had 
undermined his authority among the staff by talking to them regularly and at length, which 
he had never done. After listening to their worries and thoughts, I occasionally supported 
staff members in private matters, who then got into trouble and were forbidden any contact 
with me. In one case, I agreed to teach somebody German, which was not approved by the 
project manager although the lessons were not during working hours. This resulted in 
several discussions with him until finally the lessons were taught in secret. After two 
months, I decided to act on what I had learned from these initial experiences and to detach 
myself from the NGO. I employed my own car and driver as well as a research assistant 
and began to move around independently. Coincidentally, I made this decision at the time 
when the first serious worsening of the security situation occurred. The same NGO then 
started receiving serious threats and was advised to stop its work in the Qarayatim and Sofi 
irrigation systems of Chārdara district in late May 2006. As a result of several single 
incidences, the collaboration with ZEF was frozen for some time, and the two students 
were sent home. I successfully argued to stay in the field and remained detached and 
independent after I had used the first months to establish my own security (see 3.2). 
Throughout the last weeks with the NGO in May 2006, I had actually felt more unsafe and 
more insecure than I felt on my own. 
I have described my practical entry to the field139 at some length here to encourage other 
researchers not to shy away from seemingly overwhelming challenges when planning to 
conduct fieldwork in difficult environments. I also wanted to demonstrate the learning 
process I underwent in a very short time. That is not to say that after the initial two to three 
months, I carried out ideal fieldwork, but I built on the special insights from the intense 
and conflictive first experiences. Hence, I was able to avoid many mistakes when I 
engaged with another NGO, Concern Worldwide,140 in two districts of Takhār province in 
a later stage of my research. Besides this interaction, which had been arranged prior to my 
leaving Germany in March 2006, I did not actively seek, but instead in many instances 
actively avoided any affiliation and contact with international organizations working in my 
study region. I had realized that the normative assumptions these organizations carried and 
the organizational frameworks they embodied potentially distorted my own approach 
towards research and thus would likely affect my findings and results.  
With regard to my research topic, after I had started working in irrigation systems, the 
second project with Concern Worldwide linked me to mountainous upper catchment areas 
where the management of pasture land played a significant role in the subsistence lives of 
local community members. Towards the end of my field research period in late summer 
2007, I chose to add a third case of natural resource management to investigate patterns of 
                                                             
139 The immediate entry into local communities and guesthouses was facilitated by the generous hospitality I 
was treated with throughout my stay. Cultural codes demanded respondents to greet me as a guest (mehmān) 
and ‘traveller’ requiring the support of the respective host. As often as possible I tried to repay the hospitality 
with photographs I took, printed in Kunduz and brought again on a next visit, which in turn provided me 
even further access.  
140 Concern Worldwide and Welthungerhilfe jointly carried out the project Integrated Development, 
Environment And Sustainability (IDEAS) as both organizations are partners in Alliance 2015 – a network of 
European development NGOs with a special code of ethics – however, Concern Worldwide took the lead in 
this project and recruited the project management. Welthungerhilfe recruited the deputy. 
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access and use of fuel wood in two upper catchment districts of Baghlān and Takhār 
province.141 In short, I started fieldwork with a focus on state-society relations, 
concentrating on the role of the state, that is, its agents and representations in the daily 
existence of rural dwellers. The research assumption then was that state-local relations 
provided a fruitful entry point for tracing and observing governance processes, such as the 
negotiation between statutory and local law in legal affairs. Moreover, I wanted to trace 
power relations in indigenous rule enforcement and conflict mediation mechanisms and by 
observing decision-making processes. I gradually recognized that the state and its legal 
regulations, material evidence and representatives that rotated among duty positions were 
not the most relevant for tracing local governance processes. Instead, I saw that ordinary 
people’s imaginings about the state, its assumed sanctioning and control capacities, and its 
wished-for security provision affected the life-worlds of local community members –
besides the actual practices carried out by local government employees and position 
holders (see Ch. 7). 
                 
Map M2: Field sites overview in seven districts 
 
Even after I had chosen to carry out field research independently, I did not decide to live in 
single settlements for long periods (as an anthropologist likely would have done). Instead, I 
revisited the settlements regularly and spent an average of one to three days with each 
community.142 In order to collect data on pasture access and use, I accompanied herders to 
                                                             
141 The entry into the field in Burka and Eshkamesh was facilitated by Mercy Corps’ Catchment 
Development Program (CDP) project that sought assistance in conducting a study on fuel wood usage in its 
project districts. 
142 In support of my approach I refer to Herzfeld (2000: 225) who argues after Gupta and Ferguson (1997) 
that social intimacy acquired through new, but intense forms of ethnographic fieldwork may well replace 
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to different pasture areas and stayed several days with their families. A longer stay that I 
had planned in a settlement cluster near a downstream irrigation canal was forestalled by 
an abduction threat I faced in late summer 2007 (see 3.2). Throughout the field work, I 
conducted more than 100 interviews and conversations, which I recorded. The interview 
situations were rarely classical one to one interviews; I often encountered interview 
situations where I had to handle several male adults of equal status at the same time. The 
coming and going of listeners in and the curious were very common and often required me 
to introduce myself several times if the late arrivers were respected persons or people of 
importance. I always worked with a research assistant who was both a translator and male 
guide (mahram).143 As an unmarried woman, my reputation and status would have suffered 
immensely if I had decided to move around and approach male interviewees on my own. 
Equipped with several years of university Uzbeki, in addition to Tajik and Dari language 
skills, I could follow conversations quite well. However, making myself understood 
without a translator was a different matter because of my accent and the unfamiliar local 
dialect. Throughout the duration of the field research, I improved my vocabulary and my 
ability to speak Dari. However, since most interviewees, especially elderly males who 
constituted my preferred interlocutors were more comfortable communicating with me 
through my male assistant, my language skills did not improve as much as they could have 
if I had been forced to conduct the interviews on my own. I learned to appreciate the 
company of a male research assistant, and he became an important source of knowledge 
and its facilitation, not the least of which was the value of discussing and reflecting upon 
daily insights gained from the joint interaction with individuals and local communities. 
Just as the interviewees whom I recurrently revisited or the groups of people with whom I 
spoke wanted to have some benefit of me bothering them, my assistant supposedly learned 
as much as I did from our work and his professional interaction with me.144  
Although in his early twenties – thus quite young in a society that values seniority – I 
persisted in the collaboration with this research assistant because he was an offspring of an 
average family, a part of which lived in a village not far from Kunduz, and still made a 
living from agriculture. At the time I employed him in May 2006, he was living with the 
other part of the family and was busy in retail shop keeping in the Kunduz bazaar. In my 
view, his motivation to learn, his treatment with respect of the people we encountered in 
the field, his ability to accept criticism, and his patience certainly made up for his 
comparatively young age. If he was not competent to discuss some of the interview topics, 
he was always ready to make new contacts and ask informed persons. Moreover, his ethnic 
identity as Uzbek did not pose a special problem in encountering unknown persons in, for 
example, Pashtun-dominated communities, although it might have been the case the other 
way around. His command of Uzbeki, Turkmani, Dari, and basic Pashto was in most cases 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
conventional fieldwork requirements of bounded residence. Moreover, the deteriorating security situation did 
not allow me extensive stays in local communities, see 3.2.  
143 See Cooke (2004) for a discussion of the research assistant’s role in generating data.   
144 The research assistant has benefitted from a wide array of capacity-enhancing skills he learned during the 
research and follow-up projects. For example, besides English-tutorials, research skills teaching, and a 
visiting scholarship at ZEF/Bonn, he received the opportunity to co-publish several papers. Inspired by 
learning, he subsequently took up studies at Kunduz University and has since been working with 
international organizations in Kunduz.  
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more than sufficient to facilitate conversations and to translate in interviews. Thus, when I 
mentioned interpretations of a second order, or re-constructions above, these were co-
facilitated by my working with an assistant. Although some readers might interpret this as 
a further distortion of the experienced reality of local persons in the sense of potentially 
adding a third order dimension to the interpretation, in my opinion, it instead helped my 
second-order view to come as close as possible to first-order interpretations.145  
To trace indigenous concepts and values, I employed several other strategies connected 
with interviewing, two of which I want to highlight here. First, I applied a life-history 
approach (Hammerich and Klein 1978: 16), which connects oral history with biographical 
interviewing. My intention was to learn about local history from individual perspectives 
and at the same time find out how the respondents positioned themselves in the course of 
events and among other members of their local society. Especially given the gap in 
research and of understanding about local socio-political dynamics throughout the war 
decades in Afghanistan, I reckoned that biographical interviews could shed light on how 
affected individuals handled and reflected upon the events and how they made sense of and 
perceived the complexities.146 In line with the assumption of my life-world approach that 
everybody is an expert on his own life, I targeted primarily interlocutors of old age. The 
second group of interlocutors selected for the narrative biographical interviews consisted 
of informed elders and local leaders that I assumed would have a qualitatively different 
degree of reflection regarding local events and their own position in them. I hoped that 
their subjective viewpoints would thus enable the emic classification of events, people, and 
their interrelationships.  
Second, the way in which I asked questions and conducted interviews (both semi-
structured and narrative) was intended to establish social relationships in which I 
positioned myself as learner and listener, thus placing the interlocutor in the role of an 
expert of his own life, livelihood-making, and everyday social affairs. I entered 
communities and interview situations by introducing myself as a student and explaining 
my interest in learning about the history of a place and individuals’ biographies, current 
issues in a community and so on. By emphasizing that I was not an NGO worker or 
government representative and thus not a stakeholder in the development business, I tried 
to offset the inequalities in power that usually underlie situational encounters between 
insiders, that is, local community members and outsiders in the Afghan context. I was 
conscious of the fact that every interview situation inevitably constitutes a social 
relationship that affects the information collected by the interviewer (Bourdieu 2005b: 
394). I was therefore keen to prevent my own biases from dominating or even structuring 
the conversation. For example, to avoid classifications from the beginning, I preferred 
                                                             
145 See on double hermeneutics Ch. 2.5. A first order construction is that of locals’, the second order 
construction that of the researcher, yet the research assistant can help mitigate the distance of the second from 
the first order construction in the process of anthropological research. For insights on the ‘re-translation’ of 
first order accounts to second order sociological concepts see Ch. 3.3  
146 I remain vague here with my language, e.g. speaking of complexities and not spelling out ‘two and a half 
decades of fighting and war’ instead because this is exactly the question I intended to look into – how the war 
was subjectively perceived and made sense of and how exactly the big picture ‘war’ (which I as outsider and 
non-stakeholder read about in history books) trickled down in personal lives (loss of family members, land, 
flight, refuge, encounters with occupiers, crime) and the meaning it subsequently occupied. 
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narrative interviews, which gave the interlocutors the opportunity to speak about what they 
wanted to tell me. After they had done so and pondered whether that was actually what I 
was interested in, they were suspicious that I had patiently listened and asked a few 
questions to follow their line of argumentation. I then started asking other purposeful 
questions with the effect that what had started out as narrative interview was modified in 
the process to a semi-structured interview.  
However, aware of the relativity of my own knowledge and categories, I asked questions 
from a position of artificial ignorance (Hitzler 1997: 17) in order to be told about 
processes, such as the appointments of local water managers, events, such as the 
occupation of a settlement by the Taliban, or the factionalism that dominated refugee 
camps in Peshawar throughout the 1980s. Similarly, I enquired about moral reasoning in 
behavioral conduct in order to learn how individuals, groups, and communities justified 
particular decisions; my objective was to learn what might constitute moral dilemmas. This 
attitude of artificial brutishness was put into practice by asking vaguely phrased questions 
that sought both facts and opinions and allowed the interlocutor to determine what and 
whom he wanted to talk about, such as his own situation or that of a third party. 
Sometimes, especially on first encounters, interviewees were obviously unsure about 
deciding which version of a story they should tell me, and they either tried to remain vague 
in their answers or stated that they were unsure that they could give me a correct answer. In 
such situations, I tried to build trust and confidence by emphasizing that I was not looking 
for the truth and that there was no such thing as right or wrong answers, but that I wanted 
to know how they, from their own perspective or that of the community, had experienced a 
certain situation or event. When I told them about my academic objectives and my aim to 
understand constraints in the local environment, the argument from diverse truths usually 
prevailed and stimulated further talk and discussion.  
Finally, another strategy to build trust and stimulate talk, which I had no choice but to 
apply, was the entering into a reciprocal relationship by offering something to my 
interview counterparts in return for their tolerance, time, and information. This exceeded 
my role as patient on-listener of individual and collective grievances, anger, perceptions of 
injustice and deprivation, in addition to my display of moral support and 
acknowledgements. Beyond that, I acted as a resource person for insights regarding all 
aspects of life in the West in general and Germany in particular. In contrast, my 
interviewees asked very concrete questions (for example, ‘How much is a salary/car in 
Germany?’, ‘How much do you(r parents) earn?’) and expected concrete answers, an 
expectation I would often shatter with differentiated explanations and insights into the 
diversity of situations. I also became a source of information regarding the mechanisms of 
aid projects and NGO development work. Here, too, while their questions were very 
concrete and reflected the encounter of local communities with an aid organization or even 
somebody’s experiences of being employed by one, I was often the first person to inform 
them about the wider picture of international aid and its mechanisms. Some of the most 
commonly discussed topics were ‘what a project is’ and ‘where the aid money comes 
from’. As an informant, a source of moral support, a listener and diverter of frustration and 
for some of the anger that surfaced in our talks, I represented a kind of entertainment for 
my counterparts, not the least because of my gender. In this regard, too, the people I spoke 
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to were interested in me personally and often expressed that I must really have vital 
reasons to visit them and ask the questions I ask, because in their eyes I was to be pitied for 
being so far away from my family and dependent upon the goodwill of strangers. 
Perceiving me as a kind of third sex, they tolerated me as a woman speaking to men and 
their respected authorities. I was not a woman in their view because I did not comply with 
the Afghan idea of womanhood and related concepts of honor. My frank behavior entailing 
talking with, sitting among, and eating with men; voicing opinions and representing myself 
as informed, knowledgeable person for my own life-world, was also visible in my dress. I 
did not wear a burka-type face veil but just covered my head with a headscarf as only old 
women or young girls are allowed to do. Hence, my in-between gender position enabled 
me to socialize with both men and women. 
My respondents in the resource use arenas I selected for this study were almost exclusively 
men. Because they are members of resource user communities, women’s voices are also 
acknowledged throughout this study. However, women’s status within households and 
decision-making units at the family or community level is subordinate to that of men; they 
do not irrigate or decide on the pasture sequences within one season or collect wood 
without the permission of men. Given these structural conditions, most interviewees were 
male respondents of all ages. In anticipation of feminist critiques, I would like to stress that 
my interest in the subjectivities of local dwellers of necessity did not incorporate gender as 
a determining dimension in their lives (Daulatzai 2008: 428). Thus, my study means both 
men and women when referring to effects of specific modes of local governance of rural 
society.147  
The research topic focused on subjective everyday experiences of average rural dwellers 
and thus emphasized cognitive factors, such as perceptions and resulting motivations for 
social action. The focus included questions about the validity of data, representativeness, 
and to what extent the triangulation of data is a relevant issue.148 I argue that both data 
validity and representativeness can be achieved by a large number of interviews and 
complementing primary accounts, such as conversations149 and observed practices by 
process-tracing150 (Benetton and George 1997; Varshney 2002) in different locations and 
action arenas. The underlying assumption is that relevant data sets emerge from 
commonalities in behavioral discursive and non-discursive patterns, moral reasoning and 
the significance attributed to certain acts, ideas and symbols, all of which are observed and 
                                                             
147 Nevertheless, the male pronoun is used throughout this thesis for reasons of simplicity.  
148 See Steinke (2003: 324ff) for a discussion of quality factors in qualitative research. She stresses that 
quantitative criteria for ‘good science’ like objectivity and confirmability of qualitative studies, reliability and 
auditability, internal validity and credibility, utilitarian aspect and applicability are inadequate to assess 
qualitative research. Instead, alternative criteria have to be in line with the character, the goals, science-
theoretical and methodological assumptions of qualitative designs. For an inter-subjective comprehension of 
research results, traceability of the research process should be warranted through documentation (of 
assumptions, methods of data collection and analysis, context of data collection, rules of transcribing data, 
data documentation), member checks and the use of codified scientific-methodological procedures (e.g., 
semi-structured, narrative interviews).  
149 For how interviews and conversations are analyzed from a critical discourse perspective see Ch. 3.3. 
150 Process tracing involves the case-specific tracing of chronologies with the aim of trying to establish why 
conflicts took particular trajectories, and to examine how different actors (villagers, facilitators, local leaders) 
together negotiated or failed to negotiate different types of conflicts in diverse settings. 
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recorded in different situations and in different locations. During my field research, these 
patterns, that is, the interconnected arenas of natural resource management, conflict 
mediation and aid intervention, were subsequently investigated in detail over time. A 
coherent account of the life-worlds of members of rural society can only be deduced (that 
is, [re-]constructed) from the combined analysis of cognitive, discursive, and performative 
action elements. Their consideration provides for an innovative type of triangulation (Van 
Dijk 2006: 359f; see 3.3). Nevertheless, all attempts at reconstructing and tracing meaning 
are interpretative and must convince the audience by the plausibility of arguments and, in 
writing, the persuasiveness of rhetoric.  
 
3.2 Fieldwork in increasingly insecure environments 
My methodological approach, the selection of locations for fieldwork, and subsequently 
the focus on topics that were relevant in the study area and not elsewhere, all resulted from 
the constraints of increasing insecurity in northeastern Afghanistan beginning in mid-2006. 
I briefly want to describe the effects of these constraints on my fieldwork and how I dealt 
with this situation.  
I had always felt safe in Afghanistan in my fieldwork and travel there. However, a 
difference must be assumed between feeling safe and actually being safe. I had to 
acknowledge this difference on 18 August 2007 when I learned about plans to abduct me 
in one of my study sites in Takhār, four hours away from Kunduz city. Even though I was 
unable to verify this threat, it was too serious a matter to ignore, because I was responsible 
for the safety of my driver and research assistant. Consequently, my perception of security 
changed from one day to another. When I first went to northeastern Afghanistan in early 
2006, it was relatively peaceful and secure although all-out war was being carried out in 
the southern parts of the country, and several dozens of people were killed weekly in 
interactions between different warring factions, including NATO forces and so-called 
Taliban fighters.  
During my initial connection with Welthungerhilfe for security reasons, I had felt 
increasingly uncomfortable moving around in NGO cars.151 My impression was that 
designation as an NGO does not minimize the risk of being targeted, but instead 
heightened it, which was an effect of the negative sentiments that had developed 
throughout Afghanistan during recent years. The situation worsened with the realization 
that aid efficiency and actual benefits of the intervention on the ground in local 
communities was limited. People learned from radio broadcasts how much money had 
been pledged to the Afghan government by different donor countries at several big donor 
conferences that took place in OECD capitals, such as Tokyo and London. Thus, arriving 
in a village in an NGO car raised expectations and destroyed most of the generalized trust 
                                                             
151 The security provisions foresaw traveling in NGO-cars, even if it was not the classical white land cruiser 
but hired four-wheel drive cars. A4-size stickers with the NGO-logo were put in the windshield, sometimes 
complemented with a German ensign. At that point of time, some people in the official aid community took 
the view that German organizations or their staff and vehicles would not face trouble, on the contrary, that 
the flag would be helpful winning people’s support when needed. 
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that might have been there from the outset. The security regulations of the NGO foresaw 
that I would not be allowed to stay overnight in villages, which otherwise would have 
provided an excellent opportunity to establish deep relationships with interviewees and 
entire village populations. I would have been able to learn more about their lives and gain 
their trust in order to discuss with them sensitive topics related to my research interest. 
Although NGO representatives claimed that we researchers would sometimes create 
security risks, during my field research under the NGO umbrella I perceived the situation 
as opposite, that is, I was at risk because of NGO patronage. This issue surfaced when the 
security situation in the command area of the Sofi-Qarayatim irrigation canals worsened. 
The local big man (qomāndān) Rahmat Bāy claimed that he would no longer be able to 
guarantee the security of any foreigner in this particular district. At that time, military 
vehicles of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) moving in the area were 
attacked on different occasions and nobody was sure about the extent to which attacks 
would exclusively target the military or possibly be directed at humanitarian agencies and 
their field staff.    
I already mentioned that I gained independence from the NGO and its security framework 
after two months. After becoming acquainted with the research sites and intensive 
fieldwork, I had gained a good impression of how information flows were transmitted, and 
who would possibly have a special agenda in channeling some information and 
withholding other information. My direct, regular contact with locals, my first moves to 
build trust relationships with communities, my proactive stance on distancing myself from 
foreign and local security units, intelligence services, NGOs and armed groups, my style of 
dress and the seemingly non-political nature of my research all contributed to my particular 
position and my exemption from harm. Although in hindsight, it may seem that I was 
overly confident, my perception must be understood in the context of the process of 
settling in, in which these big questions were broken down to immediate daily needs and 
security considerations, and thus seemed manageable. Of course, for security reasons, I 
also undertook cautious measures such as not disclosing daily travel plans, switching travel 
patterns and movements in irregular fashion, and not establishing routines.   
Prior to leaving Germany for the field research in Afghanistan, I had the opportunity to 
take part in a three-day security course for foreign aid workers, which provided an 
overview of situations and taught certain behavioral patterns, such as how to behave at 
checkpoints, how to act in minefield areas, and so on. I was somewhat disappointed in the 
course outcome because no panacea had been offered, and I had to accept that the security 
issue would not be dealt with by attending a course that served no more than to raise my 
awareness of security risks. I perceived as inconvenient and disturbing that there would be 
no way to avoid every security threat by behaving in a certain way because of the 
arbitrariness of terrorist attacks. However, I also thought that unforeseen disasters would 
always pose a threat whether I stayed in Germany or worked in Afghanistan. I had the 
impression that my home institution viewed my participation in the course as a 
consciousness-soothing remedy, which would prove beneficial during my field research in 
the case of serious harm. Nevertheless, I felt uneasy and all too aware that measures to 
ameliorate the potential security risks in Afghanistan were merely window dressing. 
However, because I was the first person in my department to have had security training, 
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and because aid workders enjoyed the same treatment, I told myself that nothing more 
could be done before my departure. I admit that I too was influenced by the news accounts 
in the international press about the situation in Afghanistan. Though well informed and 
prepared, I could not know what the situation on the ground in my research area would be 
like when I arrived and how it would develop. Thus, I first went to Afghanistan ready to 
retreat in any case of substantial danger. Conscious of the potential threat that the security 
situation could become volatile, especially during the first few months, I hastened to 
complete my fieldwork and constantly thought about how to organize my research in order 
to collect enough data as soon as possible in case I would have to leave and would not be 
able to return for security reasons. 
However, during the first months of my field research, I was constrained less by the actual 
security situation than by its perception abroad. Given the negative media-coverage of 
events in Afghanistan without differentiation regarding the conditions in different parts of 
the country, the supervisors and colleagues at my home institution in Bonn were very 
worried about my wellbeing. Any incident with considerable civilian and military 
casualties, no matter where in Afghanistan, made it into the international news and 
contributed to the renewed scrutiny by ZEF regarding research done in this part of the 
world. In November 2006, after another news scandal regarding a series of incidents in 
which German soldiers were involved, I was finally pulled out by the director after eight 
months and only allowed to continue the field research the following year (2007) without a 
scholarship, the deprivation of which relieved ZEF from legal responsibility for my stay in 
Afghanistan. The advantage of this solution was that regarding security issues, I was no 
longer held accountable by anyone regarding where I went, with whom, and for how long. 
For the remaining period of field research, I made decisions according to my own 
assessment of the security situation, while consulting with other people, especially my 
research assistant, driver and other local persons. However, because I was responsible not 
only for myself but for my staff, I never consciously took risks or wittingly brought us into 
any situation that would have endangered our lives. 
After the abduction threat was disclosed to me by representatives of the German foreign 
office in Kunduz,152 I did not travel to the suspected area again. I provisionally stayed in 
Kunduz city, but even there I did not feel safe anymore, as I noticed for the first time that I 
was followed by different people in the bazaar while I shopped. At that time, in the second 
half of August 2007, NGO foreigners no longer visited the bazaar. In May 2007, a suicide 
attack had killed several German soldiers in the bazaar. This incident had also changed 
local attitudes so that some foreigners were advised to stay away from their shops because 
they felt endangered by the foreigners’ presence. I personally did not receive this warning, 
possibly because I was on foot and dressed like a local, so I did not draw nearly as much 
attention as did foreigners in NGO cars and accompanying staff driving at pedestrian speed 
through the crowded alleyways of the bazaar. 
I left Afghanistan on 8 September 2007 after another five and a half months of research 
and returned on 24 October the same year for another month. My six-week absence was an 
effective break and helped me to refocus and reflect on the circumstances. Fortunately, 
                                                             
152 The circumstances cannot be detailed here, only that clear and convincing evidence was not furnished.  
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after my return I experienced no uncomfortable encounters in public, and I never again had 
the feeling of being followed. I returned a fourth time to Afghanistan in spring 2009, 
including to the study region where I putatively was about to be abducted two years earlier. 
It was a strong indicator of the worsening security situation that when I visited a local 
buzkashi game in Farkhār on the second day of the new year festival Nawroz in 2009, for 
the first time ever some individuals told me to my face that I probably should leave 
because I would only attract the attention of possible suicide attackers and thus endanger 
them all. In the following years, it became more and more impossible to revisit my field 
sites in the northeast because of the large-scale dwindling of mutual trust among 
community members and even neighbors. I have revisited Kabul again in 2010. 
Interlocutors in my study region who I used to stay with for several days and had 
established trust-based relations with, as well as my research assistant and driver, 
discouraged me from coming to see them because it would be too dangerous. ‘You cannot 
trust anybody anymore’, was the common reply to my inquiries. They were unsure of who 
would possibly tell anti-government forces of my presence.     
In summary, when I had just selected my field study sites according to the peacefulness of 
the local environment and pursued various strategies to build trust and establish my own 
security among the different stakeholders, deteriorating security conditions linked to 
international military intervention and growing resistance from anti-government and anti-
foreign forces overrode all my attempts to neutralize these influences. In the end, I saw no 
other option but to leave in order to ensure the security of my assistant, my driver, my 
interlocutors – who would be suspected by certain anti-government groups of collaborating 
with foreigners when they learned about my visiting them – and myself, of course.  
 
3.3 Data analysis 
Part of the analysis was done during the fieldwork but was constantly extended through 
new questions I brought to the data collection. Against the backdrop of my special entry 
into the field (3.1) and subsequently deteriorating security conditions (3.2), the most 
feasible way to examine local governance patterns was through an investigation of 
environmental resources governance (see the introduction of Ch. 6 for details). This 
approach did not seem political. Because of the way in which the people viewed me, it did 
not put me under heightened suspicion and offered a way of studying power relations 
without enquiring directly about local political leaders. Neither did it require that I 
investigate their power bases in forms of alliances, sources of violence, followership, 
histories of political and violent events, and so on. Hence, I gave no one reasons to suspect 
that I was in the service of foreign military or was an intelligence agent153 – which would 
not only have endangered myself, my assistant and other contacts, but also would have 
influenced the conversations. Interlocutors would have been less likely to express their 
views, instead offering some artificial and distorted facts and opinions. Second, the focus 
on ordinary natural resources complied with my aim to examine every day social action 
                                                             
153 Such common suspicions by the population are not unfounded since many anthropologists have enlisted in 
the U.S. army’s so-called human terrain teams in Afghanistan. See Peterson (2007) and Whitehead (2009). 
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patterns because in the socio-economic context of northeastern Afghanistan (see Ch. 5), 
livelihoods are mostly subsistence-based and thus highly dependent on available natural 
resources in the immediate environment. The management of natural resources – 
particularly access patterns – determines the positioning of individuals, social groups and 
communities in social fields at the micro-scale of human interaction. I conducted fieldwork 
in rural areas of northeastern Afghanistan that rely on distinct sources of income. In the 
Kunduz oasis, irrigation water linked to agricultural land was the main resource used for 
livelihoods and further marketing of agricultural produce. In the remote mountainous areas 
of Warsaj district and Farkhār district of Takhār province, livestock constitutes the main 
asset for producing income and is dependent on access to rangelands. In Burka district 
(Takhār province) and Eshkamesh district (Baghlān province), livestock was more 
important than crop cultivation. However, in the absence of considerable income 
opportunities in both districts, I focused on fuel wood which was actively marketed and 
obviously represented the main source of income for the majority of families in the 
particular valleys that served as my research sites.  
Preliminary research findings on observable mechanisms of resource access to irrigation 
water, pasture land and fuel wood were partly published previously in working papers and 
contributions to joint articles with colleagues in edited volumes.154 In addition, I have used 
selected data from my fieldwork as topics for workshop and lecture presentations, 
including conference papers, on different occasions throughout the past several years. 
However, these early publications did not offer a comparative view of natural resource 
governance patterns and the findings were superficial and partial, because I took only a 
small amount of the collected data into account. In addition, the moralities dimension was 
not analyzed previously. To grasp its content, in the quest of the non-obvious, the same 
collected data had to be analyzed from a distinct perspective and complemented by oral 
history accounts included in biographical interviews and conversations with local leaders 
and elders (see below). 
I assumed that differences in local stakeholders’ perceptions and attitudes would most 
likely show in cases of conflict and encounters with different or new propositions for 
ordering or regulating local resource distribution. In the data analysis, I identified local 
conflict mediation and aid intervention as two further foci, which – although closely 
intertwined with environmental resources governance – yielded valuable insights, 
particularly in the moralities dimension. From an ontological point of view, the 
introduction of the two fields, conflict mediation and intervention, added the perspectives 
of two moral orders. First, the indigenous perspective focused on issues around which 
conflict evolved in communities untouched by intervention measures from outsiders. The 
second perspective focused on effects of the confrontation with the interventionist (moral) 
aid order by examining conflicts in communities selected for the implementation of aid 
projects. Observed practices and recorded, focused conversations and discussions 
constitute the type of data that allow tracing individuals’ values and the norms they apply 
in certain situations by analyzing the opinions and views uttered in these instances.  
                                                             
154 See Mielke et al. (2007), Mielke (2007), Mollinga et al. (2009), Mielke et al. (2010), Yarash et al. (2010). 
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To detect the underlying motivations and normative concepts (that is, moralities) in the 
production of meaning and social action in rural dwellers’ everyday lives relative to local 
governance (as conceptualized in Ch. 2), I have established my own discursive155 
analytical approach and applied it to interview fragments. This procedure partly relies on 
elements of critical discourse studies.156 It also follows the assumption that local 
governance has a discursive dimension, which – in addition to an analysis of the actors and 
social processes on the one hand and the inclusion of situations and context in the analysis 
on the other hand – comprises a third core issue of the triangulation structure proposed 
above (see 3.1). Thus, from a methodological point of view, the tracing of social practices 
is closely interlinked to events and discursive patterns, which resemble a repository field 
for data generation. With regard to my research, discursive patterns could be found in 
speech, that is, fragments of interviews and conversations, because oral communication 
dominates the everyday lives of Afghan citizens. Even agreements in writing are usually 
not attributed higher value and recognition given their general voidability because of legal 
pluralism (see Ch. 7.4).  
The procedure I used for the critical analysis of text fragments comprised the identification 
of crucial terms, phrases (metaphors), typical narrative patterns, classifications and 
expressions that are linked to power and dependency discourse and reflect the 
embeddedness of actions, the self, and societal structures. According to Howell (1997: 13), 
moralities can be traced in speech acts, attitudes, and a range of orally transmitted 
exemplars of good behavior that individuals choose and recapitulate. Examples are sayings 
of famous personages or “identifying simple sentences that both capture indigenous norms 
and universal concerns and which lay bare the clear dominant social values of a group” 
(ibid.). With the focus on moralities, the identification was to some extent theory-driven 
(according to my guiding theses T3-4 in the conceptual framework, see Ch. 2) and focused 
on fragments that occurred regularly in the audio files of my interviews. I have made 
partial, topic-focused transcriptions of the interviews because of time constraints, the 
extensiveness of the interviews (durations of 3-4 hours were no exception), and for the 
reason that I never intended to do a narrow conversational analysis with linguistic interest. 
Instead, my concern was to pay attention to the concepts and verbatim wording of my 
interlocutors and thus integrate the emic dimension through terms and connected meanings 
into the broader investigation on local governance processes.    
                                                             
155 I understand ‘discourse’ as institutionalized language use regarding statements that claim some form of 
validity. Discourse analysis potentially discloses emic accounts which can be made part of the appraisal of 
other forms of data presentation (context and background, process tracing, biographical interviews, etc.) 
while they are at the same time generated by the latter. Discourse is language use and social practice 
(Foucault 2008a) at the same time. Context and discourse are dialectically linked with the result that 
discourse is structuring and being structured by social context and society on a more general level (Keller 
2004: 28). According to Fairclough (1992: 64), discourse is “a practice not just of representing the world, but 
of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning.”   
156 The reference to critical discourse studies instead of only critical discourse ‘analysis’ purposefully follows 
Van Dijk in his argument that a critical approach “not only involves critical analysis, but also critical theory, 
as well as critical applications” (Van Dijk 2009: 62).  
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In the next step, I selected single interview fragments that I thought were significant and 
representative in their use and in their embeddness in context157 for detailed analysis and 
subsequent representation in the text. Moreover, interview fragments were complemented 
with notes from my field diaries to substantiate the context (that is, who said what when, 
how, and where for which audience) and to extract relevant notes. I was not able to record 
all interviews and conversations, so the number of notes I considered as original texts of 
the interview and oral account analysis was quite substantial. This process was followed by 
interpretation and interpretative reconstruction (Luckmann 2007: 306). Ways to validate 
the interpretation were included in the triangulation of data and subsequent analysis. 
Giddens’ caution regarding double hermeneutics nevertheless applies (Giddens 1997). 
Social researchers are always challenged to mediate between their own frames of meaning 
and those of the subjects of the study (Van Maanen 1988: 138). Hence, first-order 
interpretations can rarely be fully grasped. In the last analytical step, selected fragments 
and data samples were integrated in the final text of the dissertation as examples enriching 
other sequences of storytelling and narratives.158 In line with Scott (1985: xviii) that “an 
example is not only the most successful way of embodying a generalization, but also has 
the advantage of always being richer and more complex than the principles that are drawn 
from it”, I thereby aim to provide a sound basis for the reader’s understanding of local 
governance in northeastern Afghanistan (see Chs. 5-6) or, more precisely, my 
interpretation of it (Vierhaus 1995: 11).   
In conclusion, I hope to have demonstrated that the data collection, analysis, interpretation 
and representation are closely intertwined and that the conceptual approach and the 
methodological consequences elaborated above showed that I tried to reflect upon this 
nexus (after Spivak 1988, cited in Robben and Nordstrom 1995: 6).  
                                                             
157 According to Luckmann, the methodology of interpretative reconstruction defines context as context of 
agents’ construction of meaning (Sinnzuschreibungen der Handelnden) or the contextual knowledge which 
allows comprehension of the text (Luckmann  2007: 307). Not contradicting Luckmann, in Van Dijk’s view 
the context of discourse is constituted by the cognitive and social dimensions (Van Dijk 2009: 65). The 
production of meaning is always closely interrelated with the local context, that is, in terms of place, time, 
and involved persons. “Local meanings are a function of the selection made by speakers/writers in their 
mental models of events or their more general knowledge and ideologies.” (ibid.: 69). See also Van Dijk 
(1996) on discourse, power and access.       
158 Narratives do not necessarily resemble facts (Poovey 1998), but interpretations and perceptions the 
particularity of which risks to get lost once it is written (Young 1992). The trickiness of narratives is 
compounded by the already mentioned issues of authenticity and veracity.  
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„In our history books it says we shall not reach the year 1400 [A.H.]. Shortly before it is due, 
the end of time will arrive. The mullahs can’t agree… they are no use, and we have no sheikhs 
or prophets now to guide us. Those we do have are not straight; they say one thing but have 
another in their hearts. God knows what is in their hearts. The world is coming to an end. … 
Our books say that at the end of time, truth will be lies, people will abandon right and do 
wrong, brothers and fathers and sons will fight together. That is the way things will be, they 
say – but look around now! Not one person in ten prays. The world is coming to an end.”  
(Statement of a Durrani village headman 1972 [quoted in Tapper 1984: 245])  
   
4 – Local governance in northeastern Afghanistan: State of research 
 
This chapter reviews the literature relevant to the study of local governance processes as 
conceptualized in Chapter 2. Thereby, I consider publications available at the time of my 
entry into the field (March 2006) and those that had been published by the end of 2007. 
Because my own data collection took place in the three provinces of Kunduz, Takhār and 
Baghlān, I will concentrate mainly on the literature available for these parts of northeastern 
Afghanistan (that is, the historical Qataghan, see Ch. 5). A few exceptions focus on north 
central and north western Afghanistan as well as Badakhshān.159 In addition, for depictions 
of pre-flight, that is, pre-war social relations (4.1) and the war period after the Soviet 
invasion (4.2), I also rely on articles written on the basis of fieldwork conducted in 
Pakistani refugee camps with persons originating from these provinces (Rasuly-Paleczek 
1994, 1994a, 1996, 1998; Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 2000). Sources from the 
period since 2001 vary in their approach regarding the local level, the type of source (e.g., 
consultancy type versus research paper on macro state-building or micro local decision-
making) and data usage, that is primary versus secondary data. Hence, the literature 
considered for the latest period in a few cases also goes beyond the limits of the three 
provinces (4.3). I deliberated whether I should offer a thematic review without including 
the periodization of events or provide a chronological review. I chose a version with bias 
towards the latter for two reasons: First, from a scientific point of view, it is interesting to 
relate certain types of research questions to different time periods. I propose that research 
questions and approaches mirror disciplinary trends (see also 4.4) in the social sciences. 
Second, since the late 1960s, indeed since the end of World War II, events in Afghanistan 
have been closely interlinked with world politics160 and have tremendously affected the 
country’s population. For these reasons, I chose to base the literature review on topics with 
a rough periodization of the available literature into these three phases: pre-1978, 1978-
2001, and post-2001.  
                                                             
159 Though I did not carry out field work in Badakhshān proper (that is, in the far northeast province of 
Afghanistan, see Map M1), my field sites in Takhār (Farkhār and Warsaj district) bordered Badakhshān, 
displayed very similar natural-geographic and livelihood features, and – more importantly even – were under 
the political control of Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud and his forces throughout the period until 2001. Against this 
backdrop, the comparatively large amount of research about Badakhshān is fully included in this review. 
160 The creation of Afghanistan as a state in 1880 can be interpreted to be the result of international 
(geo)political dynamics, that is, the Great Game between Czarist Russia and British India. See Ch. 5. 
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In my review, I will not summarize each single publication. Instead I will attempt to 
identify and summarize the main points that align with my own interest in the topic of local 
governance. The relevant themes include state-local society relations, emic perspectives of 
social relations and perceptions of social change, Lebenswelten, politics, the government 
administration, moralities as can be deducted in values and normative frameworks, 
community governance and power relations, social group cohesion, questions of legitimacy 
of rule and decision-making, social stratification, intra- and inter-group solidarity, and so 
on. I will refer to the relevant literature throughout the subsequent analytical chapters. An 
introduction to regional history and geographical features will be provided at the beginning 
of Chapter 5 before a brief summary of the research-related state of the art is presented in 
subchapter 4.4.   
 
4.1 Governance-related academic writing accounting for the period before 1978 
Broadly, the state of research that can be depicted from the pre-war161 literature in most 
cases resembles multi-faceted descriptions of single aspects of social relations in the 
societies of northeastern Afghanistan. The tribal society (Barth 1959, 1969; Steul 1981) 
and nomadic pastoralism (Jentsch 1973; Jettmar 1969; Glatzer 1977) constituted the main 
topics of interest among anthropologists, ethnographers and geographers. Regarding the 
northern areas, the analyses of ethnic groups (Orywal 1986; Centlivres 1975; R. Tapper 
1984; Shalinsky 1986; Barfield 1981; Shahrani 2002 [1979]), marriage and kinship 
relations (Christensen 1982; Ferdinand 1982; Rasuly-Paleczek 1990s; Tapper, R. u. N. 
1982; Olesen 1982; Anderson 1982), and to a lesser extent rural communities (Davydov 
1963; Anderson 1978; Centlivres 1981) stand out.162 Most previous research comprises 
single case studies163 that focus on little (ethnic or tribal) communities (Redfield 1989).  
In addition, German geographers in different specializations, such as development 
economists and human geographers have worked extensively on Afghanistan. The results 
                                                             
161 ‘War’ is a relative term and dependent upon definition as I was able to reconfirm through experience 
during fieldwork. While in peace and conflict studies different models exist according to which a certain 
number of casualties resulting from violent fighting define war, local respondents had different views as to 
when ‘fighting’ started. Some dated the outbreak of turmoil back to 1974 (Daud’s coup d’état), others to the 
1978 Sawr-revolution (enqelāb) – the incident of the coup d’état or rather when they became infringed by its 
impact in their daily lives (as a rule, only months after the 27 April 1978 coup). Given this perception, this 
subchapter’s focus is on local affairs during the three decades preceding the ‘revolutionary’ events and its 
impacts. My intention is not to trace historical trajectories of domestic politics since Afghanistan’s 
foundation as a nation state under Abd’ur Rahmān in 1880. Brief historical background information will be 
provided at the beginning of Ch. 5. For a discussion of the actual non-adequacy of the common translation of 
enqelāb with ‘revolution’ see Grevemeyer 1980: 155. The majority of my interlocutors used the term enqelāb 
synonymously with (resistance) fighting and war, see Ch. 5.1. Thus, in locals’ perceptions the popular 
Western reading of the start of war in Afghanistan – with the Soviet invasion on Christmas 1979 – turned out 
to be contested. Accordingly, I speak of ‘before the war’ for the period until roughly end of April 1978 which 
was characterized by ‘peace’ in absence of large-scale turmoil and fighting. 
162 Afghan social scientists are not known to have conducted local-level research on related topics. With the 
exception of long durée historical overviews, local scholars’ writings are not available and thus could not be 
included in this review. 
163 Given that the anthropological research of the pre-war years dealt with phenomena that were considered to 
be ‘exotic’ in a way that they were not to be found in the researchers’ home societies, one might claim that 
academic research tended to be caught up in some kind of ‘othering’, not to say ‘orientalism’ at that time. 
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were published as a series of books called Afghanische Studien starting in 1963.164 Their 
activities must be seen in close connection to the German development and bilateral aid 
projects in different economic spheres during the 1960s and 1970s165 and a conflated 
general interest in development issues in the Afghan state. Some representative topics in 
this series were industrial workers (Büscher 1969), spread of forests in east Afghanistan 
(Fischer 1970), academic elites (Sawitzki 1972), increase in agricultural production and 
processing (Kraus ed. 1972), the influence of transport investments for economic 
development (Fitter 1973), state revenues and their impact on economic development 
(Glaubitt et al. 1975), development and structure of Afghanistan’s industry (Stilz 1974), 
settlement policy in Helmand and Baghlān (Kraus 1975), role of energy resources 
development (Arens 1974), and problems of regional development and urban geography 
(Grötzbach 1976). However, although not primarily concerned with economics in the 
narrow sense, Jentsch’s work on the economic and livelihood situation of nomads in 
Afghanistan (Jentsch 1973), Knabe’s analysis of women’s emancipation (Knabe 1977), 
and Grötzbach’s findings on cultural-geographic change in northeastern Afghanistan since 
the 19th century (Grötzbach 1972) were also part of the series.166 Mechanisms of local 
representation at the national level have been described by Centlivres and Centlivres-
Demont 1981; Shahrani 1987, 1998; Barfield 1984, 2004, and Rathjens 1990. 
Without deep conceptual embedding of the research design and its results, which is 
characteristic of the approach of social anthropologists and ethnographers, several case 
studies entailed important material and findings regarding local power relations, social 
organization at the local level and the nature of administrative control. With regard to both 
social practices and moralities (see 2.3.1), the analyses of Azoy (1982), Shahrani (1978, 
1984), Grevemeyer (1990), Tapper R. (1984), Tapper N. (1991), and Olesen (1982) were 
particularly instructive. Representative of findings regarding power structures in 
Afghanistan was Barfield (1984). Based on his extensive fieldwork between 1975 and 
1976 in Kunduz and Emām Sāheb on adaptation of the Arab pastoralist lifestyle to 
changing economic circumstances (Barfield 1977, 1981), he identified local government 
administration and regionally indigenous tribal or village structures as distinct sets of 
parallel existing power structures (Barfield 1984: 170f).  
In this literature review, I have tried to trace the mechanisms of how power relations 
manifested and shaped local governance processes through what I conceptualize as social 
practices and moralities in the pre-war period. As a result of my review, I identified the 
following topics: the notion of qawm and multiple social identities (4.1.1), the diagnosis of 
dependency structures fuelling patron-client relations (4.1.2), and the influence of Islam in 
legitimizing power relations (4.1.3). 
                                                             
164 The series was edited by Fischer, Jettmar, König, Kraus, and Rathjens; in total 18 books were published in 
the series. 
165 Then in charge of German-Afghan joint projects was West Germany’s Federal Agency for Development 
Assistance (BfE) headquartered in Frankfurt. One of the prestigious projects included reforestation measures 
in Paktiya by the Grop-e jangalāt Afghānistān (German forestry group Paktia), see BfE 1972. 
166 I will refer to the latter quite frequently in the subsequent chapters because Grötzbach collected his field 
data in some of the same valleys in Warsaj (Takhār province) where my research was located. Once during 
dinner with selected male guests in a local elder’s guesthouse, one of my interlocutors even referred to 
Grötzbach and remembered him staying in his village (Emund).     
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4.1.1 Multiple social identities and qawm versus ethnicity 
Pre-war studies of local adaptation processes have provided insights into the multiple 
perspectives of local rural society. These include the commercialization of pastoralim as in 
the case of the Arab nomads from Emām Sāheb (Barfield 1981), changing socio-ecological 
conditions as with the Kyrgyz in the Wakhan Corridor and in Pakistan after 1978 (Shahrani 
2002 [1979]), 20th century state-led development policies throughout Afghanistan 
(Grevemeyer 1990 [1987]) and especially its northeast (Grötzbach 1972), technological 
innovations, such as the introduction of agricultural machinery as described by Anderson 
(1978) for Ghazni, and the acculturation of Durrani (Pashtun) women in Uzbek-dominated 
Jawzjān province (N. Tapper 1983). Hence, assumptions about conflict, ethnic diversity, 
and identities based on clan and tribal belongings featured among the elements to which 
the greatest research attention was paid. Shahrani’s conclusion regarding a discussion on 
ethnic relations and access to resources in the Wakhan in northeastern Badakhshān is 
indicative: He stated that local politics and socio-economic relations have been 
traditionally determined by ethnic and tribal conflicts and the resulting competition for 
power, privilege and access to strategic resources (Shahrani 1978: 25). Particularly in the 
area around Kunduz, the so-called internal colonization of Pashtun settlers from eastern 
and southern regions of Afghanistan167 caused many researchers to investigate ethnic 
differences of macro-ethnic groups (Roy 1992: 75), thus interpreting conflict and local 
tensions primarily through the essentialization of ethnic differences and identities (N. 
Tapper 1983; Barfield 1984; Grötzbach 1972; R. Tapper 1984; Centlivres and Centlivres-
Demont 1988 [1981]; Shalinsky 1982; Pierre Centlivres in Bourdieu and Centlivres M.&P. 
1982: 24, 27).168  
Interestingly, however, Shalinsky and Nancy Tapper, among others, also stressed the 
relative fluidity and shifting (Shalinsky 1986: 294) of identities, which is a plausible 
observation given the effort required for adaptation. Consequently, the usage of self-
imposed identity labels shifts according to the assumed or known social belonging of the 
interlocutor and thus depends on case-specific social contexts (ibid.: 299). Over a longer 
period of time, marriage arrangements and the control or non-control of women affect the 
sustenance of a man’s or even a family clan’s identity in a positive or negative way (N. 
Tapper 1983: 41). For women, identity ‘switches’ were normal: they were married into and 
subsequently entered the household and family (khānawāda) of an ethnically distinct 
husband (ibid.: xvi).169 The diverse sources of identity formation and shifts derive not only 
from northeastern Afghanistan’s ethnic identity but also from linguistic and religious 
heterogeneity. Canfield associated social identities,  
                                                             
167 For the context and reasons, see the brief introduction to the history of the region in Ch. 5.  
168 Shalinsky (1982, 1986), in her work on the muhājerin (literally: refugees), Uzbek and Tajik families 
which fled Soviet repressions in the decade between 1928-38 and settled down in and around Kunduz, 
showed that these groups were unlikely to support the Marxist government of Taraki or his khalq-wing of the 
NDPA due to the domination of Pashtuns and the perception and experience of being discriminated against 
by them (e.g. regarding land distribution).          
169 Similarly, Rasuly-Paleczek (1998) observed changes in identity construction and self-representation of the 
Chechka-Uzbeks, an ethnic sub-group with a strong and previously fixed identity, which – after the Uzbeks’ 
decisive contribution to the victory of the mujahedin to capture Kabul in 1992 – overstepped their narrow 
clan-identity by using the term qawm to group together as Uzbeks versus Tajiks or Hazara, Pashtuns etc.  
(ibid.: 221).     
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… with several kinds of ideal groupings: with territorial groupings suggested in the word for 
homeland, watan; with kinship groupings of varying scales suggested in the word for 
patrilineal kinship group, qawm; with Islamic sect affiliation suggested in the word for 
doctrinal tradition, mazhab; and with the followers of a ‘saint’ who call themselves hampir 
in some contexts or tariqat members in others (Canfield 1988: 186, cited in Rasuly-Paleczek 
1999: 183).  
Because of widely practiced bilingualism among the inhabitants of north and northeastern 
Afghanistan, the significance of language as a marker of ethnic identity should be 
qualified. Instead, locality, residence and territorial ties were found to be more critical 
(Tapper 1984: 239f) and could be claimed to have added to the multitude of identity 
prescriptions available to individuals, which was mentioned by Canfield. In everyday life, 
these identities fused within one person beyond single, ideal identity markers and ethnic 
categories (Schetter 2003).    
The affiliation with a certain qawm is typical in the northeast of Afghanistan and crosses 
various social identities, particularly from a historical perspective with regard to the 
patchwork-style settlement patterns (see Ch. 5). Although some authors who worked in 
northern Afghanistan assigned it the limited meaning of ethnic and tribal identity (see 
Canfield 1988 above), Roy (1992) pointed out that unlike strictly tribal societies, such as 
the Pashtuns of southern Afghanistan where the term qawm is used to designate a real or 
believed common descent of tribe members, in the north, it means group solidarity. The 
group “could be an extended family, a clan, an occupational group, a village etc. Qawm is 
based on kinship and client/patron relationships… qawm affiliation is the rule of the 
political game at the grassroots level” (ibid.: 75, 77). Roy’s statement that “Qawm, and not 
ethnic affiliations, explain local politics,” (ibid.: 76) must be considered, while keeping in 
mind the timely observation of firm resistance of Afghan citizens of all ethnic groups 
united against the Soviet occupants throughout the 1980s. The significance of ethnicity as a 
primary determinant of domestic and local politics intermittently lost explanatory power 
and in hindsight allowed the concept of qawm to gain more attention, even though qawm 
had always been a firm point of reference in analyses of pre-war local politics and social 
relations (Shalinsky 1986: 296; Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 1981, 1988; Rasuly-
Paleczek 1990). 
Given the obvious significance of ethnic and kinship relations (Dupree 1970 [1966]: 377), 
qawmi ties, and social networks in northern Afghanistan and their instrumental role in 
political relations against the background of evolving statehood and the central 
government’s attempt at penetrating all layers of society, pre-war researchers were 
occupied with various study interests. This led to a bias towards analyzing the political 
elites in local tribes or other social groups and the strategies they used to adapt to changing 
circumstances, maintain power, and retain as much autonomy from state interference as 
possible.170  
 
                                                             
170 The striving for (the preservation of) local autonomy throughout the pre-war decades was pointed out by 
Grevemeyer (1980) and Rasuly-Paleczek (1996, 1998) for northeastern Afghanistan in particular. Here 
insufficient traffic and transport infrastructure, the natural-geographic conditions and late attempts at political 
centralization favored the stability of traditional vertical dependency structures in rural communities 
(Grevemeyer 1980: 158, 163) as opposed to other, less remote areas like the countryside in the proximity of 
Herat in northwest Afghanistan (ibid.: 167).  
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4.1.2 Dependency and patron-client relations versus class  
In this regard, strategies included the double role of local elites in the state. They occupied 
political functions while preserving the interests of their local clientele, that is, rural 
society. However, local elites included two groups: religious leaders (pir, mullā, sayed, 
khoja, eshān) and secular oriented elites, both of which were chosen by the residents of a 
social community and confirmed by the government administration or some kind of 
‘natural’ middlemen (latter: khān bāy, bēk, muysafēd, rishsafēd, āqsaqāl; former: arbāb, 
malek, muysafēd-e qawm).171 Commonly, the former religious establishment was ascribed 
divine authority for the spiritual and cultural dimensions of commoners’ lives. The 
legitimation of the authority of both groups rested on charismatic leadership traits, abilities 
in conflict resolution, and personal integrity. Azoy (1982) pointed out the significance of 
individual reputation (concepts of hisiyat, e’tebār) for local, regional and national level 
politics prior to 1978. In his interpretation “the Afghan form of authority resided neither in 
permanent corporations nor in formal statuses, but in individual men…” (Azoy 1982: 25). 
The secular elite took on mediator and middlemen positions in the hierarchical structure of 
government rule as they served both as patrons of their populace and as clients of the 
central government in facilitating interactions between the local government administration 
at the provincial and district levels on the one hand and rural communities on the other 
hand (Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 1981; Grevemeyer 1980).172  
Adding to the significance of personal relationships and social support networks, marriage 
relations were described as driven by strategic motives (Rasuly-Paleczek 1994, 1994a; N. 
Tapper 1991). They established political alliances to build and extend networks in order to 
maintain and enlarge a clan leader’s power base, which would be constituted by a growing 
number of followers (qawmi’at).173 Olesen (1982) demonstrated the significance of 
                                                             
171 Barfield describes how two role models, that of traditional versus government-recognized middleman 
(intermédiaires obliges, Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 1988: 242) could quite often be found to vary 
with individual office holders. For example, an arbāb who acts as intermediary between the community and 
the government administration might derive legitimacy from holding the office of arbāb and use his position 
to make money. This model is contrasted by the bāy-type arbāb whose legitimacy originates in his traditional 
noblesse that obliges him to help handle affairs of his local community. In this case, the title of arbāb links 
the bai to dubious practices and he usually abstains from calling himself arbāb (Barfield 1981: 151f). 
Muysafēd, rishsafēd and rishsafēd-/muysafēd-e qawm are self-evolved leaders of local communities deriving 
their recognition mostly from seniority, which is associated with experience, wisdom and knowledge and 
necessary asset for dispute resolution, mediation of community affairs and decision-making. Furthermore, 
they dispose of the material means to host guests (food provision, guest house), have relationships with other 
elders and government officials, dispose of rhetorical skills and the ability of persuasion.  
172 According to Grevemeyer (1990: 64) the central government’s reliance on middlemen and members of the 
traditional nobility decreased significantly between 1949 and 1978 through the capacity-building and 
employment of new bureaucratic elites in administration and army. However, Rasuly-Paleczek’s (1994a) and 
Centlivres & Centlivres-Demont’s (1981, 1988) research indicate high levels of influence of middlemen in 
local administrative affairs that enabled local tribes like the Chechka-Uzbeks even to preserve some kind of 
quasi-autonomy from government interference in pre-war north Afghanistan. 
173 Contrary to some earlier published analyses, such as of Rasuly-Paleczek, Andreas Wilde (forthcoming) 
suggests that the utilitarian dimension of marriage exchanges is a rather new phenomenon that correlated 
with the government’s attempt at penetrating the northeast and establishing government offices in Kunduz 
which offered the prospect of gaining additional resources for members of local elite families. With the 
example of the Arzbegi clan from Kunduz, Wilde shows the salient wedding matches of the sons to daughters 
of governmental office holders (e.g., the provincial water manager) and arbāb. His analysis is impressive as 
he gives other examples of the marriage networks of the mir of Bangi and Farkhār. These obviously followed 
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aspired-to socio-economic security as a motive for marriage alliances, particularly from the 
women’s perspective.174 The literature suggests that patron-client relations, middlemen, 
strategic marriages and kinship were used instrumentally because the socio-political and 
economic environment beyond the realm of the family was perceived as volatile, 
particularly in situations when resources were distributed, redistributed or defended against 
others’ claims. 
However, despite the sensitivity of researchers regarding the segregation of local rural 
society into a small stratum of elites versus a seemingly large stratum of ill-defined others, 
the analysis of social differentiations within one fragment of society, such as a clan, tribe, 
or village, were rare and only partially conducted. Researchers started to consider the non-
elites, that is, ordinary people, as social bases of potential support groups only after the so-
called Sawr-revolution in 1978.175 With its binary emphasis on class, Marxist scholarship 
offered an obvious analytical lens for this endeavor. Richard Tapper (1984) was the first of 
the pre-war generation of Afghanistan researchers to analyze his and others’ empirical 
material with the premise that class divisions cut across ethnic boundaries. He described 
the emergence of a fourfold class structure as the result of population growth since the 
beginning of the 1970s, consisting of: 
… a traditional elite of land owners, tribal chiefs, wealthy merchants, and other regional 
leaders; a ‘bourgeoisie’ of independent propertied tribesmen and peasants and established 
traders and artisans; a propertyless and dependent rural and urban ‘proletariat’; and a new 
‘intelligentsia’ of young, educated townspeople, especially teachers and some officials (ibid: 
238).  
However, corresponding local perceptions, that is, class consciousness or feelings and 
expressions of class unity rarely surfaced. As Tapper states, in the 1960s and 1970s the “… 
qawmi mode of association and of conducting political business was contrasted with the 
rasmi (official) mode. ‘Class’ as a concept was not explicitly recognized except by newly 
educated urban youth.” (ibid.: 244). Accordingly, one could conclude that before the 
outbreak of war, solidarity rested primarily with qawm and family-clan-tribal members 
based on joint identities in particular situations. The transverse solidarity of poor or 
ordinary folk versus rich elites was not particularly evident.176 According to the sources, 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
more traditional customary motivations. However, these also aimed at broadening a clan leader’s or 
influential figure’s qawmiyat as political support base. 
174 Based on fieldwork in Khulm/Tashqurghan, Olesen’s study is remarkable because she gives evidence of 
women’s agency by describing how women establish networks and alliances through extra-marital affairs in 
their local community, to secure their own (family’s) economic survival and socially-situated well-being 
(status). Her findings qualify writings that take purdah norms to reason women cannot be independent social 
actors in local cultural settings and thus put the asset function of daughters/women and their value as 
symbolic capital (in Bourdieu’s sense, see Rasuly-Paleczek 1994: 210) in the foreground. Nancy Tapper’s 
analysis (1991) of Maduzai Durrani marriages and women’s perspectives can be read to confirm both 
dimensions: One, the aspect of exchange which includes a view of women as one in a pool of available 
resources that contribute to survival but at the same time also oblige the possessor to efforts of control (in the 
case of women for the sake of honor). Two, a degree of agency of women wed into weak and vulnerable 
households who then engage in creating own ties through illicit relationships with wealthier and more 
powerful men (Tapper 1991: 289). 
175 The event points to the coup d’état on 27 April 1978 in the Afghan month of Sawr (21 April-20 May). 
176 See the anecdotal evidence given by an Uzbek as recorded by Jarring (1939: 79): “… if a rich man is rich, 
he is considered a man (adam). If he is a poor wretch, he is not considered a man. In some cases, they 
consider him equal with dogs, donkeys or other animals. … if they prepare a wedding, they only call for the 
bāy and give them fine dishes to eat. But for the poor there is nothing to eat at these occasions. … if a poor 
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mobilization against oppression took shape selectively and was locally bounded. It was not 
clear which social status groups were involved and to what extent small acts of resistance 
were successful in countering inherent social differences among individuals in the group of 
participants.177 Rubin (2002: 43) argued that because of specific patterns of qawm-based 
patronage, peasant rebellion against landlords did not occur despite growing social 
inequalities, which apparently were not perceived as such by the majority of the rural 
population. 
Not only hierarchical social relations among different ethnic and kinship groups but also 
hierarchical social stratification (that is, horizontal inequality) among members of these 
individual groups was fueled by dependency and patron-client relations. The latter appear 
to be pivotal ordering principles for pre-war rural society in northern and northeastern 
Afghanistan. Regarding social stratification within tribal178 and kinship groups, one thread 
in the literature links resource scarcity and population growth with rising material 
inequality and an ever-increasing need for the dependent poor to seek multiple exchange 
relations with those who were better off. Based on research on the Chechka-Uzbeks in 
northeastern Afghanistan, Rasuly-Paleczek (2004: 12 [unpublished script]) pointed out that 
the leaders of rurally based social groups managed to transform themselves into an 
economical entrepreneur-like stratum through credit operations and the monopolization of 
bazaar trade, which fostered patron-client ties and deepened dependency over time. 
Regarding the 1950s and 1960s, Hahn (1970, 1972) identified increasing trends of 
pauperization among the vulnerable majority of the rural population, indicators being 
landlessness, rain-fed sharecropping, and the fragmentation of land property as result of 
Islamic inheritance law. The pauperization was caused by rising prices for goods and 
food179, the lack of income sources, and subsequent spiraling mutual indebtedness. Among 
non-proprietor leaseholders of agricultural land, more than 70 percent were with an 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
man dies, some four or five men will take him away and bury him. They say that no one knew that this man 
died. But if a rich man should die, many people gather and read prayers over the corpse. But before them the 
mullahs have gathered at the corpse and perform the ceremonial which is customary at this occasion.” I chose 
to quote the Uzbek’s view here at some length because the described behavior, especially at funerals and 
weddings, creates a contrast to religious and cultural norms of solidarity (see below).  
177 Tapper mentions wulus [‘people’, crowd, followers (Turkic origin)] as example for a concept of solidary 
community action among Pashtuns. It was especially used to describe resistance against khān and 
government actions (Tapper 1984: 244). 
178 The common descent of members of a tribe and thus the construct of ‘tribe’ as agnatic patrilineal kinship 
group was scrutinized by Davydov (1979, following Kosven) early on with the notion of patronymic. For a 
discussion see Gaweçki (1988: 16f).  
179 Afghanistan regularly experienced droughts that caused grain shortfalls and severe losses of livestock, 
e.g., in 1969-72 (Dupree 1997: 665; Emadi 1996: 207). However, for the period discussed (1950s-1970s), the 
extent of land reclamation, in the northeast in particular, can be assumed to outweigh a) losses caused by 
floods or water scarcity in some years, b) rising needs due to the rapid population growth, and c) the 
extension of non-food cash crop cultivation (cotton and sugar beet) versus grain (Grötzbach 1972: 158). 
Rather, because to inflation and lacking government revenues from taxes – for example land taxes amounted 
to 1.2 percent of total domestic revenues in 1970/71 (Glaubitt et al. 1975: 218) – effective levying was 
impeded because of a large-scale absence of land statistics and registers (ibid: 97, see also section 5.2.1 
below). Despite investments and the introduction of five-year plans in 1956/57 to jump-start the Afghan 
economy, the development of taxes retrogressed between 1962/63 and 1970/71 (ibid.: 215) and the economy 
was heavily dependent on foreign borrowings and grants while at the same time it had to serve continuously 
rising debt payments. For a concise overview of Afghanistan’s agricultural policies in the period 1953-78 see 
Grevemeyer (1990 [1987]: 99-118). 
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average of 11.300 Afs in debt, which was equal to the value of about two tonnes of wheat 
at that time. More than 50 percent of peasant families who cultivated their own fields had 
accumulated average debts of 15.200 Afs (ibid.: 230). According to two village surveys, 53 
percent (1971 Baghlān) and 57 percent (1968-69 Kunduz) of all families had incurred 
debts (Toepfer 1976: 71). Families in the irrigated areas tended to have fewer debts than in 
rain-fed regions (ibid: 72).  
In his political history of Badakhshān180 until the incorporation of this far north eastern 
region into the newly established state of Afghanistan in 1883, Grevemeyer (1982) 
identified mutual assistance (Gegenseitigkeit) as the key principle in any reproduction 
process and social life in local communities. Throughout history, and with no less validity 
in the decades prior to the governmental takeover of the People’s Democratic Party 
(PDPA) in 1978, this assistance (kumak, ‘ushr, zakāt, khairāt)181 was granted and 
reciprocated on bases of kinship and patron-client ties and legitimated by the social 
imperatives of Islam (Grevemeyer 1980, 158ff). Leaseholds (geraw) and loans (qarz) 
constituted crucial social practices that established the particular socio-economic 
interdependency among different rural strata, such as shopkeepers, landholders, landless 
and smallholder peasants, and religious authorities (ibid.). However, ambivalent features 
can be detected in the framing of the high levels of indebtedness mentioned above as 
granting and receiving of assistance (kumak). Despite evidence of the increasing 
pauperization of the rural population in the pre-war decades and a widening gap between 
the socio-economic status of elites and their populace, the relative remoteness and the lack 
of economically stimulating outside interference allowed for a relative equilibrium of 
economic and social dependencies in which no particular dimension was dominant 
(Grevemeyer 1980: 158).182  
Outside the few big cities, such as Kabul, Kandahar, Herāt and Mazār-e Sharif, 
Afghanistan’s social landscape was characterized by a rural lifestyle, which – especially 
after Muhamad Dāod became Prime Minister in 1953 – was increasingly exposed to new 
influences. Following reforms, such as pro-women’s rights and modernization attempts in 
the economic sector (e.g., foreign economic engagement in forms of grants, loans and 
advisors), the traditional urban-rural divide widened. There is evidence of a widely 
perceived abasement of traditional values, including religious piety, social group 
solidarity,183 and traditional leadership among the rural population (Tapper 1984: 245; 
Grevemeyer 1990: 252ff). Famously, Dupree (1997 [1973]: 248ff) attributed to 
                                                             
180 Historically, Badakhshān included the territories of today’s eastern Takhār Province and the Gorno-
Badakhshān Autonomous Oblast’ of the Republic of Tajikistan.  
181 ‘Ushr, zakāt and khairāt embody Islamic notions of voluntary assistance to community members; ‘ushr 
refers to levies by some political or religious authority, imposed on income from agricultural produce (‘land’ 
tax). 
182 Due to the existence of this balance, the interpretation of the local rural order as ‘feudal’ is not appropriate 
(Bourdieu and Centlivres M.&P. 1982: 27). It is reductionist as it focuses on the economic dimension of local 
society and ignores the social. Soviet scholars – both, because of personal persuasion and for political reasons 
– applied the ‘feudalism’ lens. Its limited explanatory value became visible in the aftermath of the reforms 
introduced by the newly established PDPA-government in 1978, when it turned out that the loyalties of the 
landless and poor who the reform was aimed at, remained with their landlords for fear of losing everything in 
an uncertain future. See Beattie (1984), Barfield (1984: 180).  
183 Tapper mentions the breakup of families and declining religiosity (Tapper 1984: 245).  
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Afghanistan the label of an inward-looking society because non-literacy was predominate, 
over 90 percent of the population were mainly engaged in basic food production, and there 
was an obvious lack of occupational, political and social mobility (albeit he acknowledged 
the existence of limited economic, geographic and social mobility).184 According to this 
logic, government officials are described as an outward-looking group (ibid.: 251). They 
were mostly Pashtuns from other Afghan regions and were perceived as alien by the rural 
inhabitants of northern Afghanistan, who were of mainly Turkic and Tajik origins 
(Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 1981: 518; Barfield 1981: 151, 1984: 174; Shalinsky 
1982: 80).185  
 
4.1.3 Traditional political culture and folk Islam versus ideology 
Until it was challenged by the Soviet invasion, Islam did not play a crucial role in local 
politics (Naby 1987: 127). In the rural areas, it was usually restricted to the cultural-
spiritual sphere186 and a way of life in which Islamic concepts were embodied in everyday 
practices and lifestyles traditional Islam.187 In this sense, Islam has always been 
fundamental (Roy 1985: 29). Through a certain moral appeal that could legitimately 
demand a person to act against self-interest, and by using it as a means for coping with 
personal distress (efficacy), Islam pervaded all social life and structured individual 
behaviour (Canfield 1985: 67). According to Canfield, “Islamic concepts of authority, 
responsibility, and status are implicit in notions of kinship and tribe, household and 
community, leader and follower” (ibid.: 57f), endowed with accompanying normative 
notions of piety, but in Olesen’s view also “local customs, superstition and the worship of 
holy men” (1995: 219). Mystic elements and Sufi brotherhoods (tariqa) led by pir and 
eshān played an important role in local Islam (ibid.: 162, Wieland-Karimi 1998).188 In 
northeastern Afghanistan, traditional families of landholding elites often traced their 
genealogical lineage from the Prophet and conflated an elite figure and religious authority 
in one person or family, such as the sayed, eshān, pir, and mir. However, local 
communities were nevertheless served by at least one mullah (mullā [emām]), who was a 
prayer leader, mosque warden, advisor for ordinary dwellers in everyday affairs and 
instructor of Koran lessons for children. He could potentially influence public opinion and 
                                                             
184 Dupree contrasts the meaning of ‚inward-looking society‘ as a „society into which a man is born into a set 
of answers“ with „’an outward-looking society‘, or a set of questions” and links this dichotomy to the 
distinction of developing versus developed societies (Dupree 1997 [1973]: 250).  
185 The dislike of official office holders and rural populace was mutual, just like the latter viewed the former 
as alien, overbearing and corrupt, the former considered the rural population backward (Barfield 1984: 173). 
For an overview of the different population groups settling in northeastern Afghanistan see Ch. 5.1. 
186 Canfield (1985) distinguishes between traditional and progressive Islam. According to him, the former 
was practiced by the great majority of Afghans, especially in the rural areas; the latter variant was an 
exclusively urban phenomenon. Because of the problematic connotation of the term ‘traditional’, I will use 
‘folk Islam’ in this thesis.   
187 All family and daily affairs were influenced by Islam: “In Imam Sahib nothing was ever completely 
secular: slaughtering a sheep, praying to finalize a contract, or giving money in thanks for good fortune – all 
had some religious overtone.” (Barfield 1984: 181).  
188 Even though this type of folk Islam always included pre-Islamic and non-Islamic practices, local 
knowledge of Islam was transmitted as a body of rules through popular Islamic texts and accompanying 
social discourse related to questions of justice, liberty, ethics and humanity (Shahrani 1991: 181f). 
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drew his legitimacy from varying degrees of religious knowledge obtained by special 
education and, if he was of sayed descent, from family ties (Gawęcki 1988: 29).189 Mullahs 
were often hired from outside the community and were highly dependent on the local elites 
for their salary and housing. Hence, some authors suggested they merely served as a tool in 
the local hierarchy of economic dependencies and that they were used to endow their 
patrons with an aura of piety (Azoy 1982: 29) because their power was limited to the 
immediate locality and the populace they served (Grevemeyer 1980: 171).  
According to Roy (1985: 35), the term shari’at is used rhetorically in everyday affairs. In 
Muslim law, however, it provides the general frameworks of common and penal law. Rural 
people seek justice according to a complex universe of ethical beliefs and understanding:  
Islam conveys an ideal of social justice, but it does not, in itself, have a blueprint for a state 
to rival the state which actually exists. It does not promise a utopia that involves upsetting 
society, for the peasant is not revolutionary; neither does he present a political programme of 
the kind espoused by the Islamists, because the peasant regards the reform of personal 
behaviour as being more important than the transformation of social structures. … It little 
matters that very few people who exercise power act justly. What is important is that the 
peasant should be able to judge, and, even when he is defeated, refuse to approve of 
injustice. Thus, when the peasant appeals for justice it is on ethical grounds. He has little 
knowledge of the intricacies of the shari’at and they do not interest him; for him it is 
sufficient that a concern with justice should characterise the ‘Muslim’. (ibid.: 28f).      
Remote from urban influences, such as the university, the press, and parliament, which 
increasingly criticized Islam as it was traditionally practiced for its irrelevance (by arising 
leftist movements) or its impurity and corruption (by the Islamic movement), and the 
spiritual universe in the rural northeast remained quite stable. Throughout the 1960s and 
1970s folk Islam was the only non-ideological resource in the absence of other ideological 
influences and politicization tendencies.  
To some extent, contrary evidence was observed in Badakhshān. Shahrani (1984) argued 
that after the introduction of government schools in the province, the attitudes of many 
members of the traditional elites shifted, and education was firmly embraced, including 
graduation from institutions of higher education in Kabul with the effect that by “… the 
early 1960s there were several hundred students, teachers, professors, and bureaucrats from 
Badakhshān living in Kabul. Many of them became actively involved in the national 
political movements of the 1960s and 1970s, and soon political ideologies and 
organizations were taken into the province.” (ibid.: 154). This development occurred in 
coincidence with the political and ideological crisis (Olesen 1995: 216) among the 
educated urban population in the aftermath of Dāod’s (1950) reform attempts, which had 
devalued democracy and resulted in the rise of a dogmatic confrontation between leftist 
and Islamist groups.190 However, to what extent these ideological trends gained 
                                                             
189 Believed to be linear descendants of the Prophet, sayed (Pl. sadāt) were thought to be equipped with 
barakat – an extraordinary blessing that provides strong defence skills against evil influences and ensures 
that their prayers are heard by Allah (Gawęcki 1988: 30).    
190 Besides Islamism and an Afghan version of Marxism-Leninism, Olesen mentions Pashtun nationalism as 
third major ideological trend gaining in influence among urban dwellers since the 1960s (Olesen 1995: 217 
after Barry 1980). This is informative with regard to the Pashtun newcomers holding government offices 
versus traditional domiciled groups of Turkic, Tajik and other non-Pashtun origin in the northeast mentioned 
above, because a) it seems to support the view of occurring tensions based on ethnic identities; and b) it 
undergirds why Setam-e Melli as anti-Pashtun party possessed a considerable followership in Badakhshān. 
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prominence among the rural population of Badakhshān is uncertain and rather doubtful, 
given Azoy’s appraisal of the khān-centered local social order (Azoy 1982: 22-42). 
According to this logic, ideological influences affected mainly members of the elite, but to 
a limited extent. Nevertheless, the adherence to the elite by commoners ensured that the 
rural population could be mobilized on the basis of qawm-related sentiments of kinship, 
friendship, residence, ethnicity and religious-sectarian alliances (Shahrani 1984: 166).191  
According to Azoy (1982: 35), local power relations and authority rested with individual 
reputation (expressed as nām and qawmiyat), which was constituted by normative notions 
of e’tibār (credit or respect) and hisiyat (character) that alluded to piety, generosity, 
credibility and wisdom. Based on the control of economic, that is, the mainly agricultural 
resources of water, lands, livestock and women (ibid.: 34), a reputation provided the means 
to ensure compliance and attain or widen influence. Indeed, “In the absence of institutions 
which specify authority, this critical element is vested instead in individuals who cast 
themselves as leaders and bolster their claims by acquisition of followers.” (ibid.: 30). 
Traditional political culture combined codes of honour (nang) and local understandings of 
sharia rules, kinship norms, language, and religious-sectarian distinctions (Shahrani 1998: 
5). In the local context, the notion of honour is widely associated with the maintenance of 
autonomy and integrity among all social groups of rural Afghanistan. Therefore, it 
encompasses autonomy not only from the state but also in relation to other members of the 
local community (Christensen 1988: 146). Whereas the former mode of autonomy-seeking 
brings about unity, the latter discloses local rivalries for influence, leadership and control 
over resources. With the example of Pashtun society, but not limiting his argument to 
Pashtun-inhabited areas, Christensen explained this ambiguity, stating that despite the 
widely advocated norm of solidarity, interests primarily determine the relations between 
supposed equals (ibid.), thus causing rivalries and resulting in a factional mode of politics 
(ibid.: 147). He concluded, “… the dilemma of choice posed by the notion of honour 
generates factional rivalry, which in turn provides a social setting which admits of various 
solutions to the ideological inconsistencies to function as alternatives. Viewed from this 
perspective, Pakhtun culture in the sense of a unified, consistent, and shared system of 
meaning does not exist.” (ibid.: 153).192 Again, this finding would also hold valid for non-
Pashtun population groups inhabiting Afghanistan.   
                                                             
191 It can be assumed that mobilization for the resistance followed these same rules. See, for example, Roy 
(1992: 81ff). For an example of sectarian differences, see von Moos and Huwyler (1983) on the Ismaili of 
Munjān in Badakhshān.  
192 Christensen goes on to conclude: „Culture and ideology instead have to be understood as heterogeneous 
systems of meaning which contain inherent contradictions, ambiguities, and dilemmas, all of which are 
resolved in different ways by the members of the society in question. Moreover, such alternative ideological 
versions are always associated with and defined by specific interests, which they in turn serve to legitimate.” 
(Christensen 1988: 153f). Though not spelled out as such, this finding nicely deconstructs the idea of culture 
and it determining everyday life and social interaction. Hence, it introduces considerations of bounded 
rationality (see Ch. 2.3.1).  
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4.2 Interpretations of the ‘revolution’, war and development(s) until 2001 
The regime change introduced by the Marxist coup d’état that came to be called the Sawr-
revolution (enqelāb),193 the subsequent socio-economic impact of the reforms that began in 
summer 1978, the initial (not eminently negative) reactions to it and their later large-scale 
rejection received less attention in academic writing than did the following invasion of 
Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the ensuing resistance, and macro-political developments. 
Shahrani and Canfield’s volume on the causes and early consequences of the ‘revolutions 
and rebellions in Afghanistan’ is an exception in this regard (Shahrani and Canfield 
1984).194 However, although this volume relies to large extent on data collected before 
April 1978, the data is either analyzed in the context of the 1978 coup, such as Barfield’s 
contribution on the northeast (Barfield 1984), or it is complemented by interviews 
conducted with mujahedin who hailed from Badakhshān staying in Peshawar and Gilgit 
during the summer of 1980 (Shahrani 1984: 139). In contrast, only Beattie (1984) reported 
first-hand accounts because he witnessed the implementation of reforms in Nahrin 
(Baghlān) during the late summer and autumn of 1978.  
 
4.2.1 Initial mobilization at local level and ensuing militarization of rural society 
All accounts of the 1978/79 events in Afghanistan concur in their observation that the 
initial coup d’état on 27 April 1978 raised little reaction among the majority of the Afghan 
population. However, the onset of the implementation of the economic and social reforms, 
which began in the northeast in spring 1979, was perceived as extraordinarily intense and 
rapid and thus as threatening the existence of the rural population (Grevemeyer 1990: 129; 
Beattie 1984: 203).  
The Revolutionary Council’s initial thirty-point programme of reform included measures 
that upset traditional rural culture and norms, for example, Decree No. 6: the regulation of 
debt obligations (credits and mortgage on land); Decree No. 7: the abolition of bride prices 
and the encouragement of freedom of choice in marriage; and Decree No. 8: the 
confiscation and redistribution of land. Several other reform policies were not part of any 
formal decree but nevertheless encouraged by the new government, such as female 
education, the abolition of arbāb as middlemen, the introduction of price controls in the 
bazaars, the fight against corruption. All of these measures built on previous reform 
attempts by the regimes of Dāod (1973-1978), Amanullah (1919-1928) and Amir Abd’ur 
Rahmān Khān (1880-1901), dating back as early as the end of the 19th century (Beattie 
1984: 196, Grevemeyer 1990 [1987]: 120ff). Besides the severity and speed of the 
government’s interference in people’s lives by attempts to implement the reforms, several 
authors connected the start and origin of the rural rebellion in summer 1979 to questions of 
Islam and legitimacy, purges of traditional local elites (mir, ‘ulama, khān), and 
simultaneous efforts at population census by the government (ibid.: 203; Roy 1985: 96; 
                                                             
193 For a brief introduction into emic periodization of events, see 5.1. The heading of this section refers to the 
‘time of the revolution’ – a period according to locals’ understanding from 1978 until the withdrawal of the 
Soviet forces in 1989. 
194 The volume actually dates from a symposium of the American Anthropological Association held in 1980, 
see Tapper and Canfield (1984: ix). 
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Shahrani 1984: 161). The reforms were interpreted as an attack against Islam because they 
questioned the local social structure, particularly with regard to the position of women in 
society and bride price (Beattie 1984: 203).195 Given the mental and spatial distance of the 
government from the rural population and its resulting weak enforcement capacity 
(Barfield 1984: 182; Glatzer 1995, 2002: 109), its legitimacy was subordinate to local 
ideas structured by folk Islam. The battle for social control in the countryside (Rubin 2002: 
115) revolved around the government’s intention to replace the traditional elites and 
middlemen and to redistribute land to establish its own power bases. However, since this 
intention was grounded in the assumption that traditional power structures lacked local 
legitimacy because they were interpreted by the Marxist elites in Kabul as feudal, unjust, 
and oppressive, local realities were completely misconceived (Barfield 1984; Roy 1985: 
88; Braun/Ziem 1988: 136). Consequently, the rebellion surged because peasants joined 
ranks with their putative oppressors (Grevemeyer 1990: 127). In Badakhshān, the first 
armed attack on an army post took place as a direct reaction to the purges of opponents of 
the dominating Khalq regime and resulted in unprecedented retaliation measures by the 
army ranging from imprisonment and torture to the systematic murder of local elites 
(Shahrani 1984: 161; Dorronsoro 2005 [2000]: 96).196 This initial resistance against 
government-proposed reforms had a unifying effect: it bridged not only horizontal 
cleavages between the traditional religious and anti-Khalq sections of the new educated 
elite, but also social differences between ordinary peasants and local elites. However, 
specific to Badakhshān, Shahrani noted that the battle lines also followed linguistic-
sectarian alliances. The Ismaili population and Wakhi in the Wakhan corridor did not 
revolt against the new government, and the Kyrgyz simply escaped to Pakistan in 
anticipation of oppression. At the same time, Tajiks and Uzbeks197 were mobilized and 
took up the fight against the implementation of new government reforms (ibid.: 162). 
Similarly, the Tajiks initiated resistance activities in Takhār in August 1979. Local Uzbeks 
reportedly sympathized with the new regime (Giustozzi 2000: 15). In contrast, Kunduz was 
not affected by resistance activities until the Soviet invasion (Roy 1985: 101).198  
The invasion of Soviet forces, which began on 27 December 1979, marks a significant 
break in the line of events considered in this literature review. In its aftermath, local 
society changed markedly for the first time. Before the renewed coup d’état in January 
                                                             
195 Emadi (1996: 209) also mentions cases where peasants burned their certificates of land ownership issued 
by the new regime because they perceived the redistribution of land as illegitimate and expected that the 
seizure of others’ property – though mediated by the state – would be sanctioned by religious norms as a sin.     
196 The scope of systematic murder became visible when the Amin-government in November 1979 published 
lists with 12,000 names of people who had fallen victim to the purges since April 1978 (Dorronsoro 2005 
[2000]: 96). 
197 While Roy (1985) argues that the Uzbeks of Takhār were less inclined to resist the new order, Shahrani 
(1984: 167) mentions that the domination of the NDPA’s Khalq and Parcham factions by Pashtuns, though of 
different tribal background, was the main guarantor for non-participation and lack of sympathy from most 
parts of the population in Badakhshān. Accordingly, in Takhār it was particularly the Tajiks and Uzbeks who 
were reluctant towards the pro-communist government and its coup labelled ‘Sawr-revolution’. In the past 
their families had fled the first wave of Soviet repression in Bukhārā in the 1910s and in a second wave they 
escaped collectivization efforts by the local Soviet administration north of the Āmu Daryā between 1928 and 
1938, (Shalinsky 1982: 81). 
198 According to Giustozzi (2000: 6), “By autumn 1979 rebel formations were active in twenty-five provinces 
out of twenty-eight, while at the end of the year seventeen provinces were basically under mujahidin control, 
as well as more than half of the district centres and most of the villages.” 
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1980, which replaced Hafizullah Amin with Babrak Karmal as Soviet-backed head of state, 
the resistance was directed against central government authority and aimed at the 
preservation of the status quo of traditional rural power relations (Grevemeyer 1985: 119). 
The Soviet intervention provided the grounds for the large-scale political mobilization of 
the entire population. The mobilization centered on the claim that the occupation 
threatened Islamic values, people’s honor (nang), and for the first time, the notion of 
homeland (Christensen 1988; Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 2000). Thus, the invasion 
also paved the grounds for the increasing significance of ideological factors. Before the 
invasion, the support and popularity of Jam’iat-e Islāmi and Setam-e Melli in Badakhshān, 
for example, had resulted from the insensitive treatment of the population by khalqi forces, 
not because the parties had a convincing program or offered a vision for ordinary citizens 
(Shahrani 1984: 160). Consequently, researchers were able to observe the rise in 
importance of local ‘ulama (Roy 1985: 48, 150) and rebellion not only in the name of 
jihad199 (Dorronsoro 2005 [2000]: 354) but also as part of the counter-ideologization by 
the PDPA regime by exploiting progressive clerics (Giustozzi 2000: 61).  
The initial mobilization and resistance to Soviet and Afghan forces under the Karmal 
government took shape locally in social communities led by religious figures and extended 
to valleys and social entities, that is, tribes and solidarity networks on tariqa- and qawm-
basis. These moves were soon overtaken by the militarization of rural society in the first 
half of the 1980s that also concerned its traditional hierarchies and leadership.200  
The thus newly evolving societal stratum of commanders (qomāndān, amir) possessed 
various assets with regard to their social origins. They either originated from the traditional 
or educated religious milieu or belonged to traditional secular elites (khān, muysafēd-e 
qawm) and the secularly educated groups of society (Dorronsoro 2005 [2000]: 111). Some 
authors interpreted the increasing significance and professionalization201 of the military 
traits of the resistance movement to have bridged fragmented qawm-loyalties (Shahrani 
1984: 164), others argued that this had not reduced intra-factional differences within the 
resistance movement (Roy 1985: 172), but had actually increased the reliance on primary 
social networks (Rubin 2002: 188). Both accounts seem true. In different periods, qawm 
networks enabled mobilization for causes that were superior to their own solidarity group. 
Grevemeyer provided the insight that the village, valley and manteqa were not the main 
issue of contestation; the state, homeland, watan, and society at a whole, were threatened 
(1985: 127).202 At the same time, social entities built on qawm always carried the risk of 
                                                             
199 Giustozzi (2007: 1) distinguishes between the grassroots notion and an ideologized notion of jihad. While 
the former was initially widespread, perceived in a non-ideological way because it merely embodied the 
meaning of ‘just war’, the latter was proposed by the Islamists and associated with the struggle for an Islamic 
state.   
200 Reportedly, the government also relied on women militias, for example in Badakhshān’s Kurān-u Munjān 
area, a female unit fought against Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud’s troops in 1987 (Giustozzi 2000: 21).  
201 See Dorronsoro (2005 [2000]: 124) for a discussion of two models (patrimonial versus institutional) of 
military organizations headed by commanders in Afghanistan. Despite the professionalization attempts as 
depicted in the institutional model, traces of patrimonalism remained and constituted important compromise 
factors in interactions with the local rural population (e.g. through use of charisma, cult of personality, 
propaganda of a moral code) (ibid.: 128f).  
202 Grevemeyer (1990 [1987]: 129) speaks of de-villagization (Aufbrechen der Verdörflichung) in this regard, 
that is, a breakup of the fragmentation of action arenas into very small localized spaces as has been common 
since the 19th century for all parts of Afghanistan. 
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fragmentation along basic qawm identities, which remained the essential baseline along 
which mobilization occurred (Rasuly-Paleczek 1996: 187). This is linked to the finding 
that neither in the initial uprising nor in the time after 1979, local commanders were 
controlled or even influenced by the different parties’ headquarters in Peshawar 
(Dorronsoro 2005 [2000]: 123; Rubin 2002: 189).203 Thus, ideological factors other than 
Islam played an inferior role in the resistance. Similarly, Christensen (1988: 143) found 
that although the concepts of Islam, honor, and homeland motivated the resistance, they 
also explained the disunity of its constituent groups and the political fragmentation. He 
ascribed the reason to a lack of consistency in all three notions, which he argued do not 
embody a commonly agreed ideology or system of meaning (ibid.: 153; Centlivres and 
Centlivres-Demont 2000: 424). Based on the dialectics of unifying and fragmentizing 
trends within the resistance, Grevemeyer (1985: 115) suggested speaking of resistances in 
the plural against the backdrop that the cleavages between different resistance groups have 
proven to be more significant for the political situation in Afghanistan than their efforts 
against foreign occupiers.   
Local military resistance units (jabha) usually consisted of 20 to 60 men (Rubin 2002: 188) 
and aimed at liberating their local areas. They were constituted by solidarity networks in 
the first place. However, intensive fighting did not occur all the time and for this reason, 
military mobilization varied, depending on the locality. Where permanent mobilization or 
the organization of weapons and food supply was necessary, bases were established 
adjacent to settlement areas (ibid.: 229). These bases fulfilled rudimentary administrative 
functions that either covered several villages or – in cases where more than one base 
existed in a settlement – the population of the qawm or members of the party the head of 
the base belonged to (Roy 1985: 160f). The supply of the bases with food, fuel and fighters 
had to be ensured by the populace of the adjacent area (Dorronsoro 1999: 140f).204 
Because military leaders relied on a discursive recourse to Islam, they depended on 
religious authorities and ‘ulama to legitimize their actions (ibid.: 232f).  
After 1981, the government gradually revoked all major reform attempts because of the 
limited outreach at the local level, the lack of support for government policies, and the 
resistance activities against government programs and institutions, such as previously 
established cooperatives (Giustozzi 2000: 18, 24-32). In the years that followed, a strategic 
switch to an incentive-style land distribution205 for willing followers of government 
policies took place (Grevemeyer 1990 [1987]: 128). However, between 1982 and 1986 the 
regime engaged in an economic war against rural communities (Majrooh n.d.: 152).206 
                                                             
203 Of the minimum 6,000 mujahedin commanders in Afghanistan in the mid-1980s, about one third did not 
have any affiliation with any of the Peshawar parties; most of the remaining two thirds maintained only loose 
links (Giustozzi 2000: 242) . 
204 At the stage of initial mobilization for jihad and years into the resistance against Soviet forces, these 
supplies were granted voluntarily, partly as zakāt and ‘ushr. The local commanders were heavily dependent 
on it until the mid-1980s when external assistance – cash, military as well as food aid – from the parties’ 
headquarters in Peshawar became more significant in the northeast. After the Soviet withdrawal, the 
population was often forced to ensure supplies of daily necessities through taxes that undermined the 
legitimacy of local commanders and their superiors (amir).  
205 For a detailed overview of the different stages of land reforms in Afghanistan see Braun and Ziem (1988: 
138-146) and Grevemeyer (1990: 118-128). 
206 For the non-armed activities in this economic war see Giustozzi (2000: 129). 
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Fields, irrigation systems, orchards, houses and animal herds were systematically damaged 
and destroyed. The result was a massive wave of refugees into camps in Pakistan and 
Iran207 and a complete breakdown of the national economy. Economic assets other than 
mineral resources in the command area of a certain commander (lapis lazuli mines in the 
northeast) thus dwindled. When the regime changed from Karmal to Najib (later 
Najibullah) in 1986, the land reform and other attempts to transform the countryside were 
simply laid to rest.208 Subsequently, a renewed reliance on loyalty set in, which was based 
on patronage and brokerage fueled by assets provided by the government and its patron, 
the Soviet Union (Rubin 2002: 172; Giustozzi 2000: 172). 
In parallel with this policy shift to pacification (ibid.:  Ch. 12), in 1987 the PDPA regime 
started to form rural militias and set them against the resistance forces with the objective of 
expanding its influence in the countryside (Giustozzi 2003: 5, 2000: 48ff). This counter-
insurgency measure yielded significant consequences for ordinary people. They were 
caught between mujahedin and government-formed militias who fought each other. Hence, 
local self-defense groups were established. There is evidence that as early as 1988, 3,000 
village militias existed, which neither supported the government nor the mujahedin, but 
simply protected villagers’ property in the immediate locale (Giustozzi 2000: 218). 
Upgraded to the status of regular army units, several of the government-initiated militias 
evolved as significant players in the initial period after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces 
(1989) and helped the Najibullah government to stay in power for another two years 
despite reduced Soviet subsidies (ibid.; Barfield 2004: 284) and their final cut off in 
January 1992.209 The shifting of alliances of roving commanders, who depended on access 
to assets for redistribution among their clients and followers, was a common feature during 
this period (Barfield 2004: 283). Thus, it is not surprising that a local leader would possess 
the membership cards of various parties (Glatzer 1995: 2).  
 
4.2.2 Social transformation within the realms of an evolving war economy until 1992 
A deep social transformation of northeastern Afghanistan’s rural countryside took place 
during the 1980s. In the early years, many representatives of the traditional elite had been 
murdered or imprisoned; others became military commanders. Nevertheless, these new 
military authorities had to cope with a shifting asset structure during the ensuing period. A 
leader’s legitimacy was now determined not by the control of agricultural resources but by 
the extent of access to external supplies (ibid.: 229). This explains why the significance of 
leaders with a traditional secular-economic power base and political significance (e.g., 
khān) declined sharply if they did not become local commanders. In comparison, leaders 
who had been locally appointed (arbāb) reportedly maintained their roles as village 
                                                             
207 Braun and Ziem (1988: 136) mentions the number of 4.5 million refugees in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 
1988.  
208 Giustozzi (2000: 192) shows that provinces were affected by this policy at different times, e.g., 
Badakhshān from 1983-1988, Kunduz from 1987-1988, Takhār from 1987-1991, and Baghlan in 1987. The 
intensity of the ‘pacification’ process varied and in some places it only after the announcement that the 
Soviet troops would withdraw at the end of 1987 (ibid.: 178).  
209 Najibullah’s regime was finally overthrown on 28 April 1992 and succeeded by mujahedin groups that 
competed for central state control.  
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community representatives. Their political significance was limited and their position was 
not endangered by the take-overs by religious figures (Roy 1985: 150).       
From the mid-1980s, legitimate leadership at the local level became more and more based 
on the ability to overthrow a predecessor and to provide peace, security and material 
resources within the territory of a commander’s rule. Consequently, stability and 
temporary peace relied fully on the charisma and ability of individual military leaders to 
deter competitors (Glatzer 1995: 2). However, the proportion of and extent to which 
weapons and the threat of armed intervention confirmed legitimacy of rule at village level 
versus traditional leadership traits, such as abilities in peaceful dispute resolution, personal 
integrity, and rhetorical skills, was not investigated. There is evidence of growing arbitrary 
violence carried out by militias, such as in Baghlān as early as 1987 (Giustozzi 1992: 227). 
Generally, the literature base regarding local-level processes is very thin regarding the 
period from the mid-1980s until the ousting of the Taliban regime. In addition to 
geopolitical analyses, academic attention refocused on national-level politics, the role and 
politics of the opposition parties in Peshawar, the analysis of Soviet-Afghan relations and 
situational assessments of resistance activities and their meaning for national-level 
politics.210 Assessments of social transformations during the war years are largely 
inconsistent. For example, the finding that in 1984 the massive flight of Pashtuns from 
north Afghanistan, who had constituted the 1920s settler generation, restored the balance 
between different population groups (Roy 1985: 169) became simply outdated by the 
events: First was the initial massive return of Pashtun refugees from Pakistan after the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces.211 Second was the Taliban’s advance from 1994 onwards. 
Their ranks comprised mainly Pashtun tribesmen.212 Similarly, the conclusion that the 
militarization of rural society reduced social inequality (ibid: 169) seems too general; 
evidence for it remains unclear.  
Giustozzi’s analysis of Soviet archival material provides a rich source for understanding 
the success and failures of the PDPA governments between 1978 and 1992 (Giustozzi 
2000). Giustozzi gives a strong impression that the dichotomous image of resistance and 
unquestioned support of the population for the mujahedin against the occupiers, the PDPA 
regime and Sovietization is too superficial to grasp the social dynamics of that time. For 
example, the report that the mujahedin assassinated a group of village headmen on their 
way to the commander of the Soviet Afghan forces in order to force a cease fire so crops 
                                                             
210 Dorronsoro’s book (2005) is indicative for the issues which focused attention and were analyzed with 
reference to the war period between 1991 and 2001 in Afghanistan: the formation and typologies of jihadi 
parties (also among refugees), the nature of the Kabul regimes under Karmal and Najibullah, guerilla 
dynamics (mujahedin rivalries and inter-party cooperation), and the Soviet withdrawal. First-hand sources 
were confined to journalistic accounts and reports from foreigners who had worked in Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, publications of resistance groups, which were produced in Iran and Pakistan, provided limited 
information (Grevemeyer 1985: 127). 
211 Reportedly, about 2 million refugees of all ethnic groups returned from Pakistan and Iran to Afghanistan 
after 1992 (Dorronsoro 1999: 125).  
212 Many refugees followed the Taliban movement from Pakistan into Afghanistan simply because they 
wanted to return home by any (logistical) means. The majority of refugees in Pakistan were Pashtuns due to 
the language-affiliation and the settlement area of Pashtuns along the Afghanistan border in Pakistan (North-
West Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas). At large, the Taliban movement was 
ethnically heterogeneous. Particularly in the northeast, the majority of local Taliban-followers comprised 
Tajiks and Uzbeks. 
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could be harvested, shows the blurring of ‘front lines’ between putative factions (ibid.: 
152).  
Given the militarization of rural society, the large-scale loss of productive infrastructure 
and the absence of any kind of regular or licit asset base throughout the 1980s, rural 
society and local level dynamics in general had become highly dependent on external 
factors, such as the provision of resources from party headquarters in Peshawar or 
government payments. Thus, with the withdrawal of Soviet forces, military aid from both 
sides ceased; Western and Soviet subsidies were no longer paid after 1990. In addition, a 
food crisis had already begun in 1989 and resulted in a famine in 1991 because the Soviet 
Union did not supply the amounts of wheat it had previously granted on an annual basis.213 
These conditions of overall scarcity favored the economization and criminalization of local 
and regional military structures and the continued reliance on patron-client relations in 
military hierarchies. A famous example is the desertion of large numbers of the 55th 
Division of the government’s army in Takhār to Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud’s forces in 1991 
after they had not been paid for months by the government (Giustozzi 1992: 233). That 
Mas’ud could provide pay and food to his units was because he controlled the lapis lazuli 
mines within his sphere of influence in Badakhshān.214  
 
4.2.3 Dwindling knowledge about local dynamics in the context of civil war and 
Taliban rule 
The unfolding civil war in Afghanistan can be explained by a market model,215 which 
interprets the competition of strong, vested interests in the various war factions as the 
driving factors behind the continuing violent warfare and the expanding war economy216 
(Glatzer 2003, 2005; Goodhand 2000; Schetter 2002). Commanders on every scale of 
influence, whether it is the localized qawm or manteqa, a party (sub-)faction, or a 
regionally established sphere of influence are seen as entrepreneurs who seek personal 
material gains and the maintenance or extension of their influence in various socio-spatial 
networks. According to Glatzer (2003: 4), the market rationale assigns irrational factors, 
such as tradition, religion, or ethnicity, a secondary role in motivating violence. These 
factors are only relevant when they are strategically mobilized through politicization by the 
different entrepreneurs of violence.  
                                                             
213 From the mid-1980s, annual wheat imports from the Soviet Union had accounted for an average of 
250,000 tonnes (Giustozzi 1992: 233). 
214 It was estimated that Mas’ud generated up to US$200 million annually from lapis lazuli trade in the 1990s 
(Schetter 2002: 117).  
215 Common metaphors used in this regard were Elwert’s markets of violence (Elwert 1999) or ‘bazaar 
economy’ by Schetter (2002). 
216 Defined as illicit economic practices and carried out by all members of a society under conditions of war 
(Schetter 2002: 110). However, an important characteristic of the Afghan war economy was its increasing 
interwovenness in global networks of illicit trade.  
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The 1990s saw a clear politicization of local affairs,217 in which a person or social group 
was forced to take sides. This manifested in the identified ethnicization of conflict (i.e., 
from ideological to ethnic conflict)218 during the civil war period. Moreover, the meaning 
of qawm had obviously shifted. By the mid-1990s it was used in ethnic terms (ibid.: 110). 
However, Rasuly-Paleczek (1996: 187), using the example of the Chechka Uzbeks, pointed 
out that even in areas where different qawm had united and taken joint action as an ethnic 
group, these formations disintegrated again by the early 1990s. This was apparent in the 
fluctuation of loyalties when Jam’iat-e Islāmi and Hezb-e Islāmi (Gulb’udin Hekmatyār) 
followers joined Rashid Dostum’s forces, thus qualifying the ethnic factor. In contrast to 
ethnicity, Islam was no longer important in politicization given the weakness of the 
Islamists’ organization (Giustozzi 2007).219 Kunduz, Takhār and Badakhshān witnessed 
the increasingly evolving direct correspondence between ethnic identity and political 
affiliation. Nevertheless, material interests prevailed over ideological ones, as the constant 
shifting of loyalties demonstrated, particularly between Hezb-e Islāmi Gulb’udin and 
Jam’iat-e Islāmi on the one hand and Dostum’s Junbesh-forces and Mas’ud’s Shurā-ye 
Nazār220 on the other hand.  
Authors’ accounts of the livelihood bases of average people seem somewhat contradictory 
for the civil war period (1992-1996). The dominant narrative is that of an expanding war 
economy with further destruction of infrastructure, continuing erosion of social norms, and 
predatory behavior of local commanders’ units (Glatzer 2005: 12) because of the over-
supply of young men with no other possibility for employment and an abundance of 
weapons.221 However, there is also evidence of large-scale development activities after 
Western aid agencies moved into the country following the withdrawal of Soviet forces 
(Noelle-Karimi 2006: 8; Dorronsoro 1999: 134f).222 The seeming contradiction in these 
narratives dissolves if it is considered that often NGOs were instrumentalized by local 
                                                             
217 Partial evidence of politicization existed already in the 1980s, for example Grevemeyer (1990 [1987]) 
noted that the dominance of political, religious and ethnic cleavages within the resistance was already 
apparent in 1986. 
218 Hence, the formerly ideologic underpinning of the conflict came to be dominated by ethnic factors. 
Dorronsoro remarks that such interpretation of the civil war in Afghanistan as ethnic conflict as done by Roy 
is itself an ideological perspective (Dorronsoro 2005 [2000]: 15).   
219 Similar to what has been said above regarding the role of patrimonial style of organization that even 
rooted in professional military units, Giustozzi (2007: 17) ascribes patronage politics the main role for the 
weakening of the jihadi movement and the subsequent failure to oust the PDPA-regimes. He concludes, “A 
strong and shared ideological worldview within the jihadi ranks was the missing ingredient in the recipe for 
polity building” (ibid.). Interestingly, the same applied to the Marxist ideology of the PDPA in the early 
1980s during the attempt to build up a social support base: “…whatever expansion the party was achieving in 
the countryside, it was based on recruitment for patronage rather than ideology” (Giustozzi 2000: 47, also 52f 
on the role of patronage for party-organization in the countryside).   
220 Shurā-ye Nazār (literally: ‘Advisory/Supervisory Council’ is used brief for Shurā-ye Nazār-e Shamāli 
(Supervisory Council of the North). 
221 According to Giustozzi (2000: 245) around 2 million weapons circulated inside Afghanistan in the early 
1990s, including thousands of heavy weapons. 
222 After development aid had been replaced by emergency relief in 1980, the initial situation in the 1990s 
caused several donors to fund again development-oriented projects, for example measures to return large 
swaths of land for renewed cultivation to enhance food security (Dorronsoro 1999: 135). Through the 
regional mechanization of agriculture and the introduction of improved seed varieties, Afghanistan regained 
the ability to support itself for a variety of agricultural produce and even started exporting rice to Pakistan 
(ibid.: 124).  
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commanders and thus merged with the war economy (ibid.). Aid came to be an important 
resource of the unfolding war economy. Commanders not only taxed local production but 
also ran NGOs or NGO-outlets like private businesses, for example by recruiting several 
family members of a commander as executives and assistance staff and by exploiting the 
security argument in their favor (ibid.). Other resources were directly provided to 
influential commanders and military factions from neighboring states, partly based on 
ethnic solidarity (Iran, Uzbekistan, Pakistan), or by other international stakeholders to the 
conflict, such as Russia, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. For example, the Uzbek 
Dostum and his locally established administration in north-central Afghanistan on the 
border with Uzbekistan were supported by the Uzbek government and the Russians. 
Mas’ud, an ethnic Tajik, received assistance from Russia and Tajikistan. Because a high 
degree of strategic external control of the various factions in the Afghan civil war did not 
exist, this aid was utilized to furnish the temporary individual goals of the commanders. In 
addition, local resources, such as gem stone mining and poppy cultivation provided the 
asset base of commanders for redistribution to their clients. Particularly in Badakhshān, 
poppy cultivation and the opium trade gained extraordinary significance during this period 
(Goodhand 2000: 272). 
Caused by the civil war and regional fragmentation, two main spheres of influence evolved 
in north-central and northeastern Afghanistan: General Dostum’s regime based in Mazār-e 
Sharif and Masud’s administration headquartered in the Panjshir and Tāluqān. For local 
communities in the northeast, the confrontation between both leaders meant constant 
fighting and forced conscriptions of ordinary boys and men into their military units. These 
practices increased after the Taliban seized Kabul in 1996 and advanced further into north 
Afghanistan  
It is plausible to assume that beginning in late April 1992, the role of pre-war middlemen 
who had been occupying the intermediate position between the central government and 
local constituencies had lost relevance in the contestation of the large mujahedin groups for 
the central government in Kabul (Rasuly-Paleczek 1996: 199). Many middlemen were 
commanders that became regional warlords and politicians, such as Ismael Khān in the 
northwest, Abdul Rashid Dostum in the central north and Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud in the 
northeast. However, the role of middlemen and mediators in the newly emerged sub-
national spheres of influence remain unclear. For example, what their role was in the 
administrative organizations at local government level, in local communities, and in 
conflict mediation. Dorronsoro emphasized the role of ‘ulama and Islamist commanders 
among the new elite. They replaced traditional notables in the sphere of conflict resolution 
and at the same time noted that political authorities did not always respect their might and 
edicts (Dorronsoro 1999: 126). Other available narratives related to local governance 
processes during this period vary in their content. Glatzer (1995, 2002) discussed the 
emergence of alleged pre-state structures in a situation of turmoil and diagnosed a 
breakdown of political and social institutions (ibid. 2002: 110). However, in the same 
article he admits that such pre-state structures had never actually lost importance (ibid.: 
114) even before the outbreak of conflict. According to Schetter (2002: 122), the emerging 
Kalashnikov culture resulted in the collapse of traditional social structures, their 
replacement by warlords, and the brutalization of Afghan society. 
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Goodhand (2000) provided the only empirical insights regarding the effects of the war on 
the socio-economic situation of local communities in the northeast. Based on first-hand 
fieldwork in one village in Badakhshān, his findings contradict the common argument of 
eroding social structures. He observed a still functioning traditional leadership. It was 
constituted by village elders and other community representatives who effectively 
mediated between the local community and the outside world (ibid.: 274). In comparison, 
the local military leadership was said to be accorded less respect because of its perceived 
lack of accountability and reciprocity in the eyes of average rural dwellers (ibid.: 275). 
Competencies of the traditional leadership at that time included tax collection, recruitment 
for the local jabha (military unit), dispute resolution, and the facilitation of public works in 
the community, such as road construction. With regard to the family level, Goodhand 
observed traditional strategies to spread risk. Not only did different individuals possess 
various party memberships, but also economic diversification was apparent in the 
distribution of the occupations of family members. For example, one family member might 
have been a migrant, a second the member of a local military unit and thus eligible to a 
regular salary, a third might have been a farmer growing poppy (ibid.: 272, 275).  
Social differentiations had surfaced amidst the tensions. Examples were 1) the inter-
generational conflict, manifest in increasing confrontation between old and young men 
(fathers and sons); 2) decreasing solidarity that was tangible in the decline of mutual self-
help activities (hashar) within the community; and 3) in the breakdown of traditional rules. 
The latter was related to the similarly observed degradation of common property resources, 
such as grazing land, and subsequent contestations of access for usage (ibid.).223 
Environmental pressures,224 population growth, and ensuing scarcity form a common 
narrative that implies a chain of effects, leading to intense competition for resources and 
hence the breakdown of traditional resource management regulations in the civil war 
context (ibid.: 272). In areas where Pashtuns had received land by the government in the 
first half of the twentieth century, the land was re-appropriated by former owners or others, 
mostly non-Pashtuns, who thought the Pashtuns’ possession of the land unjust (Dorronsoro 
1999: 126). Furthermore, shifts in political power at the local level often resulted in the 
arbitrary appropriations and redistributions of land plots and homesteads by local 
commanders (Schetter 2002: 122). 
There is an absence of literature on the effect on social dynamics of the occupation of north 
and northeastern Afghanistan (except for some areas of Takhār and Badakhshān) by the 
Taliban forces. The lack of timely empirical research performed inside Afghanistan marks 
a return to macro-categories of explanation for the second half of the 1990s. Hence, the 
ethnic lens (Roy 1985) regained popularity, as did state-centric narratives in a regional 
fragmentation perspective (Rubin1995, 2000 [1995]). Local-level dynamics during Taliban 
                                                             
223 Goodhand also described how the exposure of local communities to outside contacts had impacted on 
locals’ attitudes and behavior in a way that they turned to become ‘more religious’ (Goodhand 2000: 275). 
Yet, it is not quite clear what is meant here by ‘religious’ in the first place, whether it is the bethinking of 
‘true Islam’ versus folk Islam, or some other dynamic. Labor migration to countries, such as Iran, Pakistan 
and the Gulf nations, has yielded similar impacts since the 1960s.  
224 Environmental stress was regularly enhanced by natural disasters, for example, the long drought period 
from 1997 until 2001 (Baldauf 2005: 13; Schetter 2002: 125).  
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rule have remained largely unknown.225 For example, there is no conclusive explanation of 
how Mullā Umār enforced the poppy growing ban throughout the country in the 2000-
2001 cultivation season.  
 
4.3 Focus on state-building and governance in the post-Taliban period 
The 23 years of continuous war in Afghanistan resulted in more than two million fatalities, 
the exodus of more than one quarter of the population, the devastation of settlements and 
economic infrastructure, the arbitrary proliferation of 10 million land mines across the 
country (Schetter 2002: 111), and an unknown quantum of millions of arms in the 
possession of both militias and ordinary people. In the immediate aftermath of the 
overthrow of the Taliban regime, about 20,000 Pashtuns were forced to flee northern 
Afghanistan because of the ethnic cleansing in February 2002 (Dorronsoro 2005: 342). In 
addition to these quantifiable outcomes, several socio-economic consequences can be 
listed:  
 The spread of the opium economy 
 Enhanced aid dependency 
 Outsourcing of public services to NGOs (education, training, occupation,   
agriculture, irrigation) (Schetter 2002: 111) 
 The existence of strong regional identities through formation of regional power 
centers with local strongmen at different levels that resulted in a ‘localization’ of 
politics (Allan 2003: 201) 
 Increasing competition for scarce resources and subsequent conflicts because of the 
arrival of 2 million returnees in 2002 (Goodhand 2003: 11) 
In the context of these indicators, it was widely assumed that a complete breakdown of 
infrastructure, social structures, and political institutions had occurred in the period 1978-
2001 (Giustozzi 2007a: 84). The remedy proposed was the building of the state and 
institutions from scratch. Consequently, in the framework of state-building efforts that 
were supported by international political and military interventions, the following years 
witnessed the implementation of multiple projects, including the launching of the 
Disarmament Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR) program in 2002 and its 
successor, the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG). The first post-war national 
elections were held in 2004, and several comprehensive programs were launched, such as 
the Interim Afghan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) and the Afghanistan 
Compact in 2006. New road-maps for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development 
process followed after several international donor conferences (Schetter and Mielke 2008).   
With the onset of peace in northeastern Afghanistan in the post-2001 period, the 
possibilities for empirical research re-emerged. Nevertheless, until 2007, academic 
                                                             
225 The common narrative explaining the Taliban’s initial success and prominence in the different regions of 
Afghanistan is traced back to the war-weariness of the population and a general desire for stability and peace, 
which seemed palpable with their monopolization of the security in the areas occupied by them. Furthermore, 
the Taliban’s claim of superior morale transported by their radical Islamic worldview and speedy justice 
provision based on sharia was decisive. See Glatzer (2005: 7). 
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accounts based on fieldwork remained insignificant.226 Instead, field-based studies became 
the hallmark of the primarily policy-oriented Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit 
(AREU) in Kabul that had been founded in 2002. The variety of governance-related studies 
included working papers on land rights (Wily 2004), assessments of local administrations 
(‘governance’ structures) (Lister 2005; Lister and Wilder 2005), and reports on the 
implementation of development programs (Boesen 2004; Kakar 2005).227 A third field in 
which considerable data was generated was the consulting sector. It produced reports for 
individual international governmental and non-governmental development organizations in 
the framework of particular sector programs and projects.228 However, the outputs in this 
field constitute grey literature and were not compiled in accordance with academic 
standards.  
The mainstay of the available literature is closely connected to the political events of the 
post-Taliban period. It tried to grasp the essence of these events and contextualize them for 
the interested Western audience.229 A division according to topic can be made between 
publications that documented and investigated the Afghan government’s attempts to 
overhaul local governance structures in order to establish local government institutions on 
the one hand and those which focused on impediments to effective state-building at the 
local level. I will now briefly summarize both types of writing with regard to the local 
level and my research area.     
The premise that all social and political structures had broken down focused the attention 
of researchers on reconstruction processes that were initiated externally by either 
international organizations or the Afghan government. For example, Article 140 of the 
Constitution of Afghanistan (2004) stipulated the formation of councils at village, district 
and provincial levels through free, direct and secret elections as a major tool of citizens’ 
participation in the political process. These councils would provide a way for the 
centralized government in Kabul to reach out to its people.230 A major program to achieve 
this outreach, the National Solidarity Program (NSP), was launched in 2003. It foresaw the 
establishment of democratically elected Community Development Councils (CDCs) as 
new decision-making bodies that were supposed to replace customary structures of local-
level governance (shurā and jirga) as well as ‘existing structures of politics, power and 
dependency’ (Boesen 2004: 58). Measured against highly normative democratic standards, 
these customary power and dependency structures were assessed as examples of bad 
                                                             
226 The publications of Giustozzi (2003, 2004); Noelle-Karimi (2006) and Baldauf (2005) constitute few 
exceptions. However, longer-term anthropological field research at community-level was not carried out.   
227 For an overview of AREU‘s activities and publications see the website: http://www.areu.org.af  
228 In this review, I do not include consultancy studies except three studies produced by USAID’s 
Afghanistan Rule of Law Project (ARoLP) under the lead of Thomas Barfield (Barfield 2003, 2006, USAID 
2005). I refer to few other consultancy studies in the empirical part (Chs. 5-8) of this thesis. 
229 In stark contrast to the previous decades, developments in Afghanistan received wide attention since 2001 
because of the international intervention and the presence of international troops. 
230 Full quote of Article 140: “Councils shall be established to organize activities as well as attain active 
participation of the people in provincial administrations in districts and in villages, in accordance with the 
provisions of the law. Local residents shall elect members of these councils for three years through free, 
general, secret as well as direct elections. Participation of nomads in these local councils shall be regulated in 
accordance with the provisions of the law.” However, according to Article 136 the ‘local administrative unit’ 
is the (not so local) province. See http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/constitution.html 
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governance.231 Research completed in connection with the NSP did not generate broad-
based data on actual local level governance processes, but merely assessed the success and 
problems of the NSP’s implementation processes (Boesen 2004; Kakar 2005). However, 
an investigation into the perceived problems of the implementation process drew 
conclusions about local-level conditions in the period from 2003 to 2005.232 Accordingly, 
local strongmen exerted their influence on many communities. Their intimidation caused 
eligible voters to decline participation in the program, vote for the candidate favored by the 
commander, or spend funds granted for development measures in ways that would benefit 
only certain members of the community (Boesen 2004: 60). Kakar (2005: 40f) similarly 
identified traditional power holders as potential impediments to successful program 
implementation. She distinguished local stakeholders, that is, those “who genuinely are 
working to integrate into peacetime leadership roles as opposed to those who are seeking to 
abuse the system for their own benefit” and recommended to integrate the former as 
program advisors (ibid.).  
The literature is contradictory regarding elections of the new village institutions and their 
potential suitability to Western administrative concepts. Although Boesen (2004: 61) 
admitted that “an election with universal voting rights and secret voting is a new and 
Western-based concept”, she found that “it seems to go well with traditional Afghan values 
and norms, and by and large the rural Afghan communities have taken to democracy ‘like 
ducks to water’”. In contrast, Noelle-Karimi (2006: 9) noted that the Western concept of 
majority as an inherent component of any election is “entirely alien to the consensus 
embodied in traditional councils”. Such contradictory findings automatically call for close 
examination of the legitimacy of the CDCs. However, the optimistic accounts given in the 
available literature would tend to override skepticism and thus compromise any view that 
customary structures233 might have simply been turned into NSP councils,234 the members 
of which then would potentially ‘learn democracy’ (Boesen 2004: 62). Nevertheless, both 
Boesen and Noelle-Karimi noted an increasing acceptance of local government institutions 
and even a demand for them, possibly because of the arbitrary rule of commanders, whose 
frequent reliance on force was perceived as unjust. However, these discussions fail to 
consider previous experience with the establishment and the use of local councils by 
international aid agencies since the 1990s. Noelle-Karimi (2006: 8) emphasized that, 
following a United Nations (UN) directive of 1990, which decreed that all aid should be 
                                                             
231 Including the foreseen participation of women in decision-making and elections, this posed a challenge for 
gender norms of rural Afghan society (Boesen 2004: 62). For a more detailed discussion of the NSP against 
the backdrop of my own research findings see Ch. 8.  
232 NSP was supposed to last three years and to be completed in 2006/07. However, due to the ever 
deteriorating security in different parts of Afghanistan the program has not been completed up to the time of 
writing (December 2010). The limitation to the period 2003-05 here is because this review considers 
publications up until the end of 2007 (the empirical data for which dates most often from not later than 
2005/06).     
233 As opposed to ‘existing structures of politics, power and dependency’, see above (Boesen 2004: 58). 
234 The terms CDCs and NSP councils or NSP-shurā are used synonymously throughout this thesis. The Dari 
expression for CDC is shurā-ye ‘enkeshāf-e dehāt (literally: assembly or council for the development of 
villages/rural settlements). For the etymological origins of the term shurā (incl. versus jirga and related 
terms) and its historical significance see Noelle-Karimi (2006) and Wardak (2004). For practice-rooted 
definitions, the experience with and view of local councils in the context of development programs during the 
Soviet intervention see Carter and Connor (1989). 
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disbursed through local councils (shurā) throughout Afghanistan, councils often were 
created for the purpose of accessing prospective aid. In an example, Noelle-Karimi (ibid.) 
mentions the case of a local commander in Baghlān who had ordered the establishment of 
several local councils in his area in order to tap local aid flows.235  
The review also found incoherent accounts regarding the operational concept of 
community in implementation processes of various aid programs. Boesen (2004: 61) 
pointed out that the NSP definition of community (that is, CDCs comprising 20-300 
houses) would reflect locals’ perceptions of social organization and accommodate concepts 
such as qawm and manteqa. In Favre’s perspective, the NSP process foiled previously 
established shurā-structures that followed the larger territorial unit of manteqa (Favre 
2005: 9; see Ch. 5.2.3). In the manteqa model, the established main council (shurā-ye 
manteqa) comprised a number of smaller satellite shurā in each village or settlement that 
had a stake in the central council by delegating individual members to take part in 
manteqa-council assemblies.236 The idea of the NSP was similar to the model described by 
Favre, with the exception that according to the constitutional Article 140, the NSP foresaw 
the creation of councils according to the envisaged future administrative organization of 
the country. This implied a to-be-established sub-national hierarchy of CDCs, District 
Development Councils (DDCs), and Provincial Development Councils (PDCs) for the 
future. It did not ascribe significance to the manteqa as an administrative entity.  
Because of their policy orientation (Kakar 2005; Boesen 2004), AREU reports were often 
written from a perspective that did not question the form or content of any element of the 
project interventions introduced in Afghanistan. Feasibility and commensurability are 
taken for granted. Accordingly, the vision of a nation-state organized around a centralized 
government demands investigations of how and against what odds sub-national 
administration could be strengthened. In their analysis of the implementation of the Public 
Administration Reform (PAR), Lister and Wilder (2005) identified ‘warlordism’ 
(Giustozzi 2003, 2004, 2005; Schetter et al. 2006) as a major drawback in implementing 
the reform package over the long term. Because of the persistently strong military and 
economic positions of many warlords and their partial transformation into politicians (e.g., 
Dāod Dāod or Dostum237 in my research region), Lister and Wilder speak of the 
commanders’ increasing de facto and de jure influence and control in their former and 
current areas of authority as of 2002-03  (Lister and Wilder 2005: 41f). Control manifests 
                                                             
235 From the perspective of the international actors, these shurā assumed fixed characteristics resembling 
those noted by Elphinstone (1972[1815]) for the jirga almost two centuries earlier. They were perceived as 
quasi-governmental bodies arranged in a hierarchy based on districts and provinces. Some observers even 
endowed them with the ability to take on rehabilitation projects (Carter and Connor 1989: 4). Equally 
problematic was the equation of the local councils with democracy. While international observers tended to 
view shurā as an expression of the inherently egalitarian nature of Afghan society, the Afghans themselves 
did not share this optimistic assessment. In view of the war-time origins of these councils and the power 
exercised by the commanders, there was a strong sentiment that the different shurā merely reflected and 
served the clientelistic networks generated by the military elite (ibid., Nölle-Karimi 2006). 
236 Apparently, the manteqa model was implemented by World Food Program (WFP) in cooperation with 
Afghan NGOs in the 1990s. It is unclear which areas were covered by this model and thus how relevant 
Favre’s demur regarding NSP-council establishment is. 
237 Takhār became dominated by Dostum’s Junbesh in summer 2003 after alliances of several influential 
commanders had shifted newly (Baldauf 2005: 13).  
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in the abilities of strongmen to influence and manipulate the appointment system such that 
loyal followers obtain crucial offices, for example, CoP, head of intelligence, and other 
civil-administrative positions at the province and district levels. Viewed from below, local 
commanders were most likely eager to strengthen their patron-client ties in order to benefit 
from the resource flows available through office positions. However, because of the weak 
financial position of sub-national administrations, their administrators were primarily 
connected to prestigious power positions, such as in the police, security and intelligence 
organs, and to development-related positions in NGOs. The latter administered foreign aid 
projects or aid money at the local level. The close collaboration of commanders at different 
levels with NGOs represents a win-win situation for both the NGO and the commander 
while the sidelined government agency suffered in prestige (ibid.: 43).238 The DDR and 
DIAG programs provided commanders and militia leaders the opportunity to legitimize 
their armed followers as army or police units, which subsequently increased a 
commander’s clout. These loyalties did not shift even if weapons and basic salaries were 
now provided by the government.  
The literature on ‘warlordism’ is rich although there is a strong concentration on the big 
warlords who had been anti-Taliban commanders before 2001 and controlled large 
territories in Afghanistan’s central and northern areas. After the ousting of the Taliban 
regime, they had become the main partners of not only the international community and its 
forces but also the government of Afghanistan. Their mission was to maintain peace, 
establish security and build the state. The ensuing debate about warlords gathered currency 
among academics because it soon turned out that the warlords were also the main spoilers 
in the post-war state-building process (ibid.: 46; Giustozzi 2004: 6).239 Regarding the pre-
war period, Glatzer (2005: 4) compared them with the traditional khān, who acted as 
mediators between the central government and the local population. Giustozzi (2007a: 78f) 
investigated the integration of war economy actors into the peace economy after 2001. The 
local resource bases of the warlords continued to be derived largely from the drug 
economy, custom duties, mining (e.g., lapis lazuli and salt), and unofficial taxing of 
diverse activities (Lister and Wilder 2005: 45). The evolving patterns equaled mafia 
networks (Giustozzi 2007a: 83f) and undermined the peace process. In a context where 
official income sources were limited, the shift from a war economy to a shadow, coping 
economy was not surprising (Goodhand 2003). New sources of revenues included the 
government administration, international reconstruction projects, NGOs, and provisions of 
the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), which integrated 
former militias.   
Little attention has been paid to micro-level dynamics in northeastern Afghanistan. 
Schetter et al. (2006) pointed out the diversity of local security arrangements and forms of 
individual leadership. Research conducted in Kunduz in 2005 showed highly fragmented 
                                                             
238 Allan (2003: 200) noted the role of international aid agencies in this process and stated that a 
regionalization of foreign aid became apparent in Afghanistan’s north in late 2002. Accordingly, Dāod (in 
Kunduz and Khānābād) and Dostum (Mazār-e Sharif) received support from Russia at that time. 
239 Several distinctions have been proposed in the debate: For example, Giustozzi (2007: 2, 2005, 2003: 2) 
elaborated a typology of warlords (warlords, strongmen, commanders) with different asset bases and patterns 
of legitimacy and proposed to reserve the definition of warlords for legitimate military leaders (Giustozzi 
2005: 17). 
110 
 
power structures; every village had preserved a big man and consequently the rules of the 
game appeared localized (ibid.: 6). Giustozzi (2004: 16) observed that traditional elites in 
Nahrin (Baghlān) were eager to reclaim the authority they once possessed, and they tried to 
control the activities of local authorities and appointment procedures. In one case, they 
objected the local CoP and were able to mobilize support for their aim of removing him 
from office. From 2006, as observers’ sensitivity towards local dynamics grew and more 
fieldwork was conducted, some analyses found that customary structures seemed to regain 
ground. For example, Nixon (2006: 12) noted that apparently strong non-state structures 
could take on local government functions because they embodied ‘enough representation, 
responsiveness, accountability and effectiveness’ in the face of a general weakness of the 
administration at the local level.  
Regarding dispute resolution and the provision of security in particular, a possible reliance 
on non-state structures entered policy-oriented popular thinking (ibid.: 16). The literature 
review yielded related research on informal versus formal justice of the US-financed 
Afghanistan Rule of Law Project from 2003-2009 (e.g., USAID 2005) and the Rule of Law 
Program of the US Institute of Peace (Barfield 2003, 2006; Barfield et al. 2006; USIP 
2006). For example, based on data collected during a short field trip to Balkh, Kunduz and 
Takhār provinces, Barfield found that the formal and informal justice systems were deeply 
interwoven (Barfield 2006: 3) and concluded that the principles of customary and state law 
in principle did not contradict each other because of their similar referrals to sharia norms 
(ibid.: 11). This was confirmed by the observation that court officials would send cases to a 
local shurā (ibid: 3).240 Finally, in addition to warlordism und the underlying patron-client 
relations and shadow economic activities, systemic corruption at all levels of state and 
society became recognized as the third major impediment to successful state-building 
(Lister 2007: 4), including the creation of a new, post-war justice system. Consequently, by 
2007 local government reforms were seen to have failed because of ‘complex and 
contradictory local processes’ and the mode of involvement of the international community 
(ibid.: 15). Instead of successful state- and institution-building, a further fragmentation of 
power with fewer capabilities to enforce order and the subsequent continuous deterioration 
of local security was observed (Baldauf 2005: 14).  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The literature review shows that the available knowledge on local governance in 
northeastern Afghanistan is neither consistent nor coherent. Trends in disciplinary research 
in the manner of the descriptive social anthropological approach of the 1960s and 1970s 
provided partial insights into local politics although power relations and politics were 
rarely objectives of inquiry (Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 1981, 1988).241 Instead, 
                                                             
240 Similar findings were reported from the USAID-survey (2005: 11) carried out in Kabul, Nangahar, Herāt, 
Jawzjān and Logar. However, according to Carter and Connor (1989: 7) among Uzbeks and Turkmens it used 
to be common in the past to refer with legal issues first to the government for resolution because in non-
Pashtun areas the government exerted more influence.   
241 A good impression for how detached research was from conceptual underpinnings that reflected on the 
political and related research to contemporary questions of politics and society provides the discussion 
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human-geographic studies on socio-economic change in this area focused on the exotic, 
that is, little communities, such as nomadic groups, small-town inhabitants, tribal women, 
bazaars, and so on. Not until political changes imposed by the government on the local 
ground in the wake of the regime change in 1978 a mobilization and politicization of the 
population set in, which in turn sparked research interest. However, because of the 
mounting insecurity during the war period, no in-depth research on the micro-level was 
possible. Instead, scholarly analyses focused on macro-categories at nation-state or 
international levels. Moreover, because of the ideological bifurcation imposed by the cold 
war political situation, research was politicized in the 1980s, as were the evidence-
generating aid workers who often constituted the only source of information on local-level 
processes in the 1990s. When I entered the field in 2006, research had not reemerged in the 
style of socio-scientific and anthropological studies at the local level; instead, need-based 
assessments of local conditions for development organizations and policy-oriented 
appraisals were given priority.242 These analyses provided anecdotal evidence of local 
affairs. In addition, within the framework of the intervention, the interest in development 
projects in Afghanistan was and still is closely connected to the local deployment of 
international military forces.  
The contrast between pre-war with post-war knowledge regarding local governance 
processes shows that the war changed local politics and society; however, the 
consequences are unclear. The following lists the incoherencies in the literature published 
during the period after 2001:  
 The role of traditional versus new elites that were still partly militarized 
 The liveliness of local decision-making bodies243 and the roles of their members  
 The relationship of the state (that is, central government agencies at different 
administrative levels) with rural society 
 The legitimacy of the new state- and institution-building efforts by the international 
community and the government of Afghanistan among different groups of rural 
society 
 The significance of qawm and patron-client networks in the everyday ‘coping’ 
economy 
 The characteristics of the rural coping economy and livelihood-making 
 The degree of politicization and meaning of ideological factors, such as ethnic 
nationalism and differing interpretations of Islam  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
between Pierre Bourdieu and Pierre and Micheline Centlivres (1982): P. Centlivres admits that contemporary 
anthropologists’ analyses are often highly normative and seek to display some type of equilibrium of social 
forces – an interpretation subsequently failing to explain sudden disruptions or crises (ibid.: 22). 
242 The deployment of anthropologists with armed troops, especially in the U.S. army’s so-called human 
terrain systems has sparked a debate about scientific ethics. See Whitehead (2009), Price (2011), and the 
contributions of Mitchell and Kelly, Griffin, González, Price, and Fosher in Kelly et al. (2010). 
243 Glatzer (2005: 16), for example, states that manifold and efficient political institutions in Afghanistan’s 
rural areas enabled the survival of the population during the war decades and keep on to exist. This 
contradicts the common narrative of breakdown of social institutions.   
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Thus, by taking into account the diversity of actors and the dynamics of Afghanistan’s 
recent history of war, my main research interest aimed at understanding how the war had 
changed social relationships, which are assumed to be inherently power-laden (see Ch. 2), 
at the local level and subsequently focused on the following research questions:  
 What drives local politics?  
 How is social life at the local level regulated? 
 By which mechanisms are interactions being negotiated for communal ‘good’, such 
as peace and welfare, in specific action arenas? 
 What are the underlying principles of local decision-making and implementation? 
 What exactly is the role of the state?   
  
 
 
 
 
Part III: Empirical Analysis 
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 “As soon as our attention turns from a community as a body of 
houses and tools and institutions to the states of mind of particular people, 
we are turning to the exploration of something immensely complex and 
difficult to know. But it is humanity in its inner and more private form; it 
is, in the most demanding sense, the stuff of community.”  
(Redfield 1989: 59) 
 
5 – Where is the locale? – Seeking units and levels of observation  
 
By reconnecting to the conceptual framework (Ch. 2) and theoretical attempts of its 
operationalization (Ch. 3), this chapter will pave the way for the empirical analysis of local 
governance in the remaining part of the thesis (Chs. 6-8) and will clarify the locale244 of 
research. Two tasks are involved: First, although Chapter 4 provided an area-based 
historiographical overview of local governance structures to outline the state of research on 
this topic, an introduction to the geographic-ecological, historic-demographic, and social 
context conditions of northeastern Afghanistan is required, which subchapter 5.1 will 
provide. Second, the units and levels of observation and analysis in the local governance 
research (Chs. 6-8) need to be elaborated according to the outline of the social order 
approach (Ch. 2). Thus, in order to locate social order and my local governance analysis, a 
clarification of the concepts of community, place, space, and arena from within and outside 
‘the local/e’ is indispensable (see Ch. 5.2). 
In line with the proposed entangled social logic approach outlined in Chapter 2, which 
involves local governance mechanisms (in to-be-detected social fields or action arenas) as 
units of analysis, the spatial concept of community or the reference to an ecological system 
are not acceptable. Instead, the social dimension, including moralities, historical path 
dependencies, ethos, and personal-biographic aspects of members in these respective 
communities and their life-worlds should be taken into account (Redfield 1989 [1960]).245 
Subsequently, after introducing the discussion of place and locality versus community and 
its relevance to local governance research (5.2), local concepts of place and place-bound 
community in northeastern Afghanistan are reviewed (5.2.1). The argumentation will 
highlight the fluidity of place-based notions of locality. This again requires an examination 
of the history of Afghanistan and its governmental attempts at territorializing the 
                                                             
244 Locale in this context is chosen as a neutral term to define the place where something happens, both in 
territorial terms and as social action arena. Because notions of place do not necessarily correspond to social 
action arenas, this chapter aims to explore emic concepts of space in order to determine the adequate level 
and unit of analysis for the empirical investigation of local governance dynamics.   
245 Similarly, Redfield (1989 [1960]), one of the last proponents of socio-anthropological community studies 
before the demise of this approach in sociology during the 1960s (Day and Murdoch 1993: 83), neatly argued 
for a holistic comprehension of community. He conceives it as constituted by an ecological system, social 
structure, “the way men and women enter and pass through a social structure” keeping in mind their 
biographical life-experience (ibid.: 52), the reflections about ‘insideness’ (ibid.: 64) and ‘outsideness’, and 
“how, in general, men do think and feel” (ibid.) and what they hold desirable (ethos). Added to all these 
dimensions is the conception of human settlements as subjects of history (ibid.: 96). Despite his exclusive 
focus on ‘little communities’ he acknowledged aspects of difference and distance, similar to the concepts of 
we-groups and out-groups that are common in anthropology and sociology.     
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countryside (5.2.2). I explored these issues at the outset of my fieldwork because, given the 
many unknown variables determining my study, one main question concerned what would 
comprise my data, that is, the unit and level of observation. Initial inquiries showed that 
using a classical anthropological village study would lead to the fallacy of space, an idea 
that I subsequently abandoned, but which calls for detailed elaboration because of its 
originality in the Afghanistan research context (5.2.3).246 In conclusion (5.3), I will define 
why and how I employed the concept of environmental resource user communities. The 
discussions in this subchapter are based on a combination of primary field research data 
and a review of the secondary literature.  
 
5.1 Background of the research area 
The research sites are located in today’s Kunduz, Takhār and Baghlān provinces (see Map 
M1, M2), which formerly belonged to Afghan (lesser) Turkestan (Qataghan) and the 
Kingdom of Badakhshān. Until the 1860s, the region had not been subjugated by the rulers 
of Kabul. Bordered by the Emirate of Bukhārā in the north and the Kingdom of Kabul on 
its southern fringes, the territories of Turkestan and Badakhshān were subject to constant 
contestation among the local khanates and small chiefdoms, which were highly flexible in 
spatial outreach and did not have any fixed or demarcated borders at that time.247 As 
Shahrani (1978: 17) noted, “… no single defeat was seen as final. The various khanates of 
Turkestan all lacked a centrally organized administrative structure.”  
A centralized territorial entity called Afghanistan was established in 1880 as result of the 
delimitation of fixed zones of influence by the neighboring empires of British-India and 
Czarist Russia. The first government of Amir Abd’ur Rahmān Khān refrained from using 
the term Turkestan and instead used manāteq-e shamāl (literally: manteqa (Pl.) of the 
north; that is, northern regions and areas) to designate the vast space of what today is 
called northern248 and northeastern249 Afghanistan.250 In the course of subsequent efforts at 
state formation, the northeast was administratively conjoined with the dual province 
Qataghan-Badakhshān in 1881 (Adamec 1972). However, the central government did not 
manage to gain full control of the northeast until 1888. Amir Abd’ur Rahmān Khān had to 
                                                             
246 Initial findings from research sites in Kunduz Province alone were published as Mielke (2007) and Mielke 
and Schetter (2007), the latter under the programmatic title “Where is the village?”.  
247 For a historical read several editions of primary sources from the 19th and early 20th centuries (Adamec 
1972), and travellers’ (Elphinstone 1815, Wood 1872) as well as early researchers’ accounts (Jarring 1939)  
and historical monographs that focus on that time period (Noelle 1995, Holzwarth 1990, Grevemeyer 1982) 
are available. 
248 In administrative terms, north Afghanistan includes the provinces Balkh, Faryāb, Jawzjān, Samangān, and 
Sar-e Pul. 
249 The four provinces Kunduz, Takhār, Baghlān, and Badakhshān designate the northeast.  
250 These circumstances how Afghanistan acquired de jure statehood are reflected in Allan (2001: 545f), who 
asserts that “Afghanistan is a space, not a place…” or nation-state. Related, from a political scientists’ 
viewpoint, Jackson’s concept of quasi-states holds the idea that juridical statehood merely provides negative 
sovereignty without empirical statehood which he suggests is derived from a monopoly of violence that 
needs to be achieved in contrast to juridical statehood that is given. See Jackson (1993). 
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quell a revolt by his governor in northern Afghanistan whose rebellion was aided by 
several local notables from among the Qataghan-Uzbeks (Rasuly-Paleczek 2004: 22).251  
In the following decades, the administrative boundaries in the northeast changed several 
times according to new shifts in the state’s development and administrative policies. For 
example, provincial government structures were assigned various names over time 
(Shahrani 1978: 20), and different degrees of districts (‘alāqadarī) were introduced and 
then abandoned.252 In Qataghan-Badakhshān, the dual province-status was abrogated in 
1963, and by 1970 Qataghan was split into the three provinces Kunduz, Baghlān and 
Takhār.   
The discussion of the spatial and social characteristics of the research area in the following 
subchapters follows an important note on local periodization during the last 30 to 35 years. 
My research showed that the local perception of major events leads to an emic 
periodization that consists of four main phases:  
 1978-1989 revolution period 
The ‘revolution’ period (waqt-e ‘enqelāb), which marked the episode from the coup 
d’état in April 1978 and the period of the Soviet intervention until the withdrawal 
of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 
 1989-1997/98 mujahedin period 
The mujahedin period (waqt-e mujāhedin), which designated the civil war period 
(popularly labeled jang-e barādar [literally: war of brothers] in emic terms) from 
1989 or 1990 until the Taliban appeared as an ordering force in the northeast, and 
many of the mujahedin commanders defected from previous party affiliations to the 
Taliban (depending on location in 1997/1998) 
 1997/98-2001 Taliban period 
The Taliban period (waqt-e tālebā/n) from 1997 to 98 until late 2001 
 Since 2001 Karzai government 
The Karzai period (huqumat-e Karzai), which encompassed the provisional 
administration and the first two terms in office of the Karzai government since 
2001 
This emic periodization contradicts the common Western perspective of the Afghan 
conflict, which first tends to blanket the period from 1979 until 1989 as ‘Soviet 
occupation’. Second, if not the former, the outside view attributes significance to the 
Najibullah government until 1992 and places the civil war in the period between 1992 and 
1996. This view, third, homogenizes the historic experience of the civil war period and 
disregards regional differences.  
I have adopted the emic periodization throughout the thesis because the design of my 
research (see Chs. 2 and 3) determines that I mainly rely on locals’ accounts and 
narratives, which are closely entangled with their temporal positionality. Hence, I use 
‘revolution period’ and ‘mujahedin period’ instead of Soviet occupation or civil war.   
                                                             
251 All of them fled north across the Āmu Daryā river to take refuge in Bukhārā (Rasuly-Paleczek 2004: 22). 
252 For a comprehensive overview of administrative categories until the 1960s, see Dupree (1973: 158).  
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5.1.1 Geographic characteristics253  
Kunduz province lies at the fringes of the northern foothills of the Hindukush and 
comprises fertile lowland stretches along the Kunduz (Surkhāb) and Āmu Daryā rivers and 
semi-deserts (dasht) The latter belong to Turkestan plains that stretch south of the Āmu 
Daryā from Andkhoy in the west to the foothills of the Pamir in Badakhshān and east 
Takhār. The region around Kunduz was known as a malaria swamp; a common saying 
went, ‘If you want to die, go to Kunduz’.  
The research sites in the mountainous districts of Takhār and Baghlān and the plains of 
Kunduz’ oasis landscape are characterized by a long-lived dialectic between the people 
inhabiting the lowland river valleys of historical Qataghan and the highland Badakhshān 
mountains, all of which constitute today’s northeastern Afghanistan. The three Takhār 
districts investigated in the fieldwork and the Burka district in Baghlān are part of the 
landscape climbing from the foothills of the Afghan Turkestan plains into the Hindukush, 
with several side valleys leading into Badakhshān, Panjshir, and Chitral in Pakistan. 
Remote areas were traditionally governed differently than were the plains, which were 
much more vulnerable to shifting power holders and their rule. Interactions between the 
inhabitants of both regions took place in the form of frequent political strife among the 
local Uzbek and Tajik khān and mir families of Turkestan and Badakhshān as well as raids 
of Turkmen slave traders. Consequently, during the 19th and early 20th centuries slave 
raids and the malaria pandemic on the plains of the region of what is Kunduz province 
today largely depopulated the area (Adamec 1972; Kushkeki 1926: 19; Alekseenkov 1933: 
24 quoted after Grötzbach 1972: 71).  
Given the prevailing geographical conditions, two major categories of livelihood reflected 
the dialectical difference in lifestyles found in the northeast: the mostly semi-sedentary 
lifestyle of the residents in the foothills and the mainly nomadic pattern of the population 
inhabiting the plains. In the past, the former made a living from livestock tending, dry-land 
farming, fruit tree cultivation, and handicrafts. In contrast, the latter lived exclusively on 
animal husbandry in qeshlāq254 in the plains during the winter months when the danger of 
epidemics was minimal. They moved up to the high pastures in Badakhshān for the 
summer. The relative fertility of the northeast turned the region into an economic 
hinterland (Rasuly-Paleczek 2004: 23), which the central government became successively 
interested in because of its potential agricultural development in cotton plantations and as a 
source of tax income and foreign cash earnings.255 In the subsequent decades, Kunduz 
became the center of cotton growing in Afghanistan; Khānābād became the major rice-
producing area. This agro-industry required massive investments in irrigation and resulted 
in an ecological transformation, the effects of which are still visible today (see Ch. 6).  
 
                                                             
253 For a detailed characterization of the research sites, see the introductory parts of each subchapter in Ch. 6, 
that is, sections 6.1.1-a, 6.2.1, and 6.2.2.  
254 Barfield (1978: 27) gives an account on how refugees from the Emirate of Bukhārā took advantage of the 
sparsely populated swamp and steppe land of Qataghan to establish winter quarters (qeshlāq) where they 
pleased. 
255 Export products from the north of Afghanistan then included natural gas, carpets, karakul, skins, cotton, 
lapis lazuli and melons. 
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5.1.2 Population and settlement history 
At the end of the 19th century, the main population groups of Qataghan consisted of 
Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Arab (Barfield 1978: 28). Because of the ecological characteristics of 
the landscape, sedentary village settlement patterns run in linear lines along major rivers or 
are clustered around market places.256 With regard to my research sites, although this is 
truly the case for Farkhār and Warsaj, Kunduz displays features of relatively recent 
settlement, which set in at a broader scale at the end of the 19th century. However, it 
accelerated in the early 20th century in the wake of governmental development efforts, 
particularly after the building of the first motor highway across the Salang pass in the 
1930s. Development measures in Qataghan included the expansion of cultivable land by 
draining the swamps and initiating the construction of irrigation canals in order to increase 
production of cotton, wheat, and other crops (see Ch. 6.1).  
These processes were connected to a considerable influx of population from other parts of 
Afghanistan. In the 19th century, the low population density and high fertility of the river 
valleys of Qataghan had already given rise to voluntary immigration from neighboring 
regions as well as attempts by local rulers at the forced settlement of mountain people. 
However, with the establishment of the Afghan state, a more organized settlement policy 
set in. Because of its scope and effect, a far greater degree of ethnic heterogeneity followed 
the large influx of mainly Pashtun tribesmen from the southern provinces. This migration 
is most often referred to as internal colonization or even ‘Pashtunization’ (Barfield 1978). 
In the last decades of the 19th century and during the subsequent thirty years, larger 
numbers of Ghilzai Pashtuns, Moghol,257 other Pashtun groups, and Pashto-speaking 
Baluch herders258 reached the Kunduz area. However, the biggest wave of settlement 
started in the 1930s in parallel with the government’s development efforts. Different waves 
of refugees from the former Emirate of Bukhārā who were Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, and 
Arab added to the ethnic patchwork of settlers south of the Āmu Daryā. However, their 
arrival was unplanned and their movements were not regulated by Afghan government 
policy.259  
The government’s motives for setting incentives for large-scale population changes within 
Afghanistan, mostly from south to north, were manifold: In addition to low population 
density and rich soil, which could potentially be turned into a breadbasket for the whole 
country, defense considerations of securing the northern border towards the Soviet Union 
played a role. Moreover, the large-scale land allocations have been interpreted by many 
authors as part of the state’s attempt to provide a counterweight to the Turkic population in 
                                                             
256 Dupree (1975: 399) distinguishes linear and nuclear patterns of sedentary settlement and claims, “The 
nucleated pattern is dominant in Afghanistan.” 
257 According to Grötzbach (1972: 79), Governor Shēr Khān invited 2,000 Moghol households to settle in 
Qataghan province, in the vicinities of Kunduz and Baghlān town.  
258 See Shahrani (1978: 18). According to the same source, Pashtun colonies already existed at the turn of the 
20th century, hosting military and administrative personnel of the new state administration throughout 
Turkestan (ibid.).  
259 However, Kraus (1975) described in detail a land reclamation and settlement project in Baghlān, which 
benefitted landless Afghan farmers and Uzbek and Kazakh immigrants who had fled the Soviet Union during 
the 1930s (ibid.: 30f). 
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the northern areas. Hence, the monarchical government hoped to expand the control of the 
royal family, which is traditionally Pashtun, and thus construct and consolidate the Afghan 
state on the basis of kin and tribal affiliations.  
After the establishment of the Spinzar cotton company in Kunduz (1933-1936/37) 
(Grötzbach 1972: 69), Pashtun settlers started cultivating the river valleys, which had been 
left fallow (Schetter 2003: 298). Irrigation canals were constructed to exploit fertile lands 
to the largest extent possible. These expanded in the subsequent decades until the early 
1970s. Examples are the main Chārdara canal and the canals studied in the research for this 
dissertation, that is, the Asqalān canal in Kunduz Markaz (central) disrict, the Sofi-
Qarayatim irrigation network in Chārdara district, and the Qal’a-ye Zāl structure in Qal’a-
ye Zāl district. According to one informant in the Department of Land Affairs in Kunduz, 
land allocations for settlers were tied to their commitment to drain large land plots and 
construct irrigation systems.260 As a rule, conditions for land sales and allocations were 
quite favorable and included reduced prices per jerib261 land, credit schemes for deferred 
payments over a period of five to twenty years, cash loans for the relocation and set-up of 
homes, and exemptions from taxes and military service (Grötzbach 1972: 66). 
Consequently, the population in former Qataghan increased substantially; between 1921 
and 1965 the number of people doubled (ibid.: 79) and even tripled in the lowlands 
(Barfield 1978: 29). Northern Qataghan experienced the biggest influx of Pashtuns in the 
20 years before the revolution (1978), which led to extensive ethnic heterogeneity around 
Kunduz. The formerly dominant Uzbek population clearly gave way to the Pashtuns as 
result of the settlement incentives put forward by the Afghan government. Accordingly, at 
the end of the 1970s, 65 percent of the cultivable land was owned by Pashtuns (Khan 1992: 
58). Although in Kunduz and Khānābād, the Pashtun population quickly constituted large 
populations in some places, Uzbeks remained the majority in Tāluqān, which had not been 
part of the reclamation project of the 1930s. Moreover, ownership structures varied in the 
districts of Kunduz. In Chārdara, for example, 12 percent of all landowners owned plots 
larger than 10 hectares, whereas in Kunduz Markaz district and Khānābād district, small 
plots dominated; only 2 percent of the landowners possessed 10 hectares or more (Töpfer 
1972).262  
As I will show in Chapter 6, the course of the irrigation canals investigated mirror the 
settlement history and ethnic composition. For example, throughout the Asqalān irrigation 
network, Tajiks and Turkic people (Uzbeks/Laqai and Turkmen/Qongherāt)263 are 
predominant, with some Pashtun and Aymāq in the upstream area. Exclusively, Pashtuns 
                                                             
260 According to this government policy, settlers had to agree to live on and cultivate the allocated land plots 
for 20 years and only afterwards would receive a valid ownership document. Thus, settlers who did not 
accomplish the 20 year-period before the onset of the revolution period do not dispose of any ownership 
documents and face difficulties claiming ‘their land’ today (Interview in the Kunduz Department of Land 
Affairs, 29 November 2006).  
261 Local measurement area for land: 1 jerib is equal to 0.2 hectare, that is 2,000 qm, at present. Until 1992 
(1371) it was calculated with one jerib amounting to 1,936 qm. 
262 For an overview of spatial stratification of landownership in Takhār and Baghlān see Grötzbach (1972: 
231f). According to the shift in population structure, most large landowners in Takhār were Uzbeks, whereas 
in Kunduz also many Pashtuns were among the largest possessors of agricultural land.  
263 Laqai constitute a sub-tribe of an Uzbek clan, Qongherāt a sub-tribe of a Turkmen clan. 
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live downstream towards the tail end of the canal in Tobrakash Manteqa. The names of 
mosques in Tobrakash are taken from the names of important elders who live in the area. 
Thus, this may be an indicator of very recent settlement because the names of mosques in 
upstream Asqalān are not those of contemporary elders in the area. It can be assumed that 
the mosques’ founders passed away and the names of new elders came to designate the 
settlements. 
However, the history of settlement in the area does not explain current communal patterns. 
Moreover, population reshuffles, major exodus and return movements, and the destruction 
of many villages and settlement clusters since the onset of the revolution period in 1978 
partially explain the present situation. Following the invasion of Russian planes, tanks and 
other war material across the Āmu Daryā, the settlements in Kunduz province suffered 
from large-scale destruction. They were not only often depopulated but also abandoned 
and devastated. According to Majrooh, in 1984 over one third of the villages of Kunduz 
province were in ruins or seriously damaged by military operations. By the end of the same 
year, over 10,000 inhabitants of Kunduz province had been killed, and many more had left 
the area (Majrooh n.d.: 57).  
The extent of this migration and subsequent population growth can not be determined 
because government agencies have always had only limited administrative capacities to 
measure population dynamics. Before the onset of fighting, new settlers were registered 
only if they bought government land. Those who settled on privately owned land that 
belonged to larger landowners or companies avoided registration. It can be assumed that 
the settlement clusters that formed because of unregistered settlement have gone unnoticed 
in official records as well. Village lists were compiled in the late 1960s and 1970s but were 
rarely updated after 1979.  
In Farkhār and Warsaj, changes in settlement dynamics were only partly registered by the 
government even after the initial village lists264 had been set up. This happened mainly in 
cases of natural disasters when the government provided assistance to the affected local 
area. Other occasions for village registration involved NGO projects and surveys and 
villagers’ requests for official notification of a new settlement. Compared to Kunduz and 
other districts of Takhār and Baghlān, Farkhār and Warsaj were less affected by 
destruction and devastation during the war years. Taliban and Soviet forces only briefly 
entered the area of Farkhār, and most intra-district violence took place among different 
civil war factions after the retreat of Soviet forces.265 
In the middle of the last decade, the population of Takhār and Kunduz was estimated at 
approximately one million inhabitants per province. However, the available official figures 
for Kunduz from 2004 were lower, tabulating a total population of 772,635 people 
(Larsson 2004: 8).266 
                                                             
264 Based on these lists, the administration reportedly began to disseminate identity documents (tazkera) in 
1354 (1975/76) (Interview NSP-head of office for Concern Worldwide, Farkhār, 8 March 2007).  
265 In the wake of the ousting of the Taliban, local Tajiks expelled Pashtuns and Gujars from villages. See Ch. 
6.2. 
266 Larsson received the tabulated data from the Central Statistics Office; the reliability of the numbers must 
be questioned.  
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5.2 Locating social order: the fuzziness of place   
When discussing community or ‘the local’267, the conventional distinction is always one 
between territorial-based and social interaction-based spaces, that is, in old-fashioned 
parlance, the emphasis on locality versus community. The former was commonly 
associated with a primarily geographic-spatial meaning before it became conflated with the 
term community (Day and Murdoch 1993: 85). Community has been and is popularly 
associated with spaces of social action shared by several members of a community, thereby 
alluding to the wholeness of social life and the significance of place. An entire school of 
community studies emerged in sociology in the first half of the 20th century268 but was 
abandoned in the 1960s. The defeat was caused mainly by one-sided criticism that accused 
community scholarship of romanticizing community because it neglected social realities, 
such as social fragmentation and mobile lives. Community maintained the idea of 
homogeneous social groups in which conflict did not occur, autarkic life was possible, and 
each community was unique and separate, which rendered scientific comparison useless 
(ibid.: 83). Because of the insinuated close link of community to a fixed territory, the 
whole concept appeared static, ‘traditional, pre-modern’ and unscientific (ibid.) and was 
subsequently abandoned and not replaced. 
Classical village ethnography, the boom in studying peasant societies (Scott 1976; Wade 
1988; Corbridge 2005; Popkin 1980) and the preoccupation of researchers with communal 
solidarity, collective action, and possible resistance circumvented the conventional 
community concept somewhat, but could not offer a better alternative for conceiving of 
certain unique qualities of social relationships instilled by place. Even if community is 
conceptualized as ‘networked’, community members need to be based in a certain place or 
several places at different times. Thus, if the unique territorial fixation of place is removed, 
actors can be imagined as interacting within manifold networks – social, political or 
economic – across different socio-spatial scales (Day and Murdoch 1993: 109). Several 
authors, particularly in the field of development anthropology, developed the arena 
metaphor to both follow the logic of interaction networks and escape the fallacy of space 
(Bierschenk 1988; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2003; Olivier de Sardan 2005). 
Distinct phenomena, such as single social events, a village, and local development can be 
analyzed in the context of the arena concept. In each case, the arena in local space revolves 
around a contestation of resources269 among its members, who are grouped in social units 
that are flexible in regrouping by negotiation and/or confrontation, as well as the forging of 
new alliances and loyalties, depending on what is at stake. Agents who are involved in 
                                                             
267 In the following I operationalize local space as a concept of ‘intermediate’ scale above the household with 
its actual scope depending on its physical extension. See also section 5.3. 
268 Tönnies (1922) with his famous pamphlet on Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft (community versus 
society) can be assumed to have been one of the pioneers of this branch of sociology. According to him, 
community constitutes the familiar, the organic co-living within the family from birth until death, based on 
harmony, tradition (Sitte) and religion (ibid.: 247). 
269 Resources, here, refers to material and immaterial stakes the appropriation of which is being contested 
among community members. Olivier de Sardan (2005: 190) also states that “Village power is an arena”. 
However, because of my previous elaborations on the concept of power and its non-dispositional character 
(Ch. 2.2), I cannot agree with this view. Instead, I suggest that the village itself and power resources can be 
analyzed as arena.    
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particular social interactions that take place in certain sites form the corner stones of a 
particular arena. Thus, in the arena concept, it is paramount to consider that, depending on 
the issue being negotiated or the object of mutual acknowledgement and recognition, every 
actor can be part of manifold arenas that transverse each other.270 
Seen from this perspective, for example, a village does not correspond to the idea of a 
community united by tradition, cemented by consensus, and organized around a worldview 
held in common and governed by a shared culture. On the contrary, it is perceived as a 
heterogeneous settlement with a socially stratified population with divergent interests, 
outlooks on the world, and social relationships in addition to different degrees of influence 
by outside factors and exposure to environmental and cultural difference. Thus, although 
the village might be commonly understood as the smallest administrative entity in a 
governmental hierarchy, the village community designates something else.   
In the following section, I present an overview of local concepts from the research area. 
Many examples serve to illustrate the overlap, fluidity, and subsequently arising 
complexity of existing emic notions of place and community.  
 
5.2.1 Empirical evidence of place-based locales in the research region 
A variety of concepts can be used to designate the socio-spatial loci of rural community 
life in Afghanistan. The most common are qarya, qeshlāq, manteqa and kelay (Dupree 
1973; Favre 2005).271 These concepts have usually been indiscriminately translated into 
English as ‘village’. During the field research in the northeast, I encountered only the first 
three terms, which were usually used interchangeably. Kelay is the Pashto word for village, 
but although there are significant numbers of Pashtuns, particularly in Kunduz province, I 
never heard an interviewee use the term kelay. Another term, deh, also means rural 
settlement and is translated as ‘village’, but it is commonly used as proper noun to specify 
a place, such as ‘Deh Ta’, the name of a settlement in Warsaj.272  
Interviewees in Kunduz province used qarya, qeshlāq and manteqa interchangeably to 
designate their place of residence. The context is decisive, however, because local 
identities are always situational: the choice of terminology very much depends on the 
setting and the person who asks. If an outsider asks, respondents will reply with the wider 
area they are from, whereas they will be more exact if they are talking to a person from 
their own region or when questioned for details by a researcher. 
                                                             
270 The idea is similar to Norbert Elias’ concept of figuration. See Elias (1997, 2006). However, the arena is 
situated within local space, whereas figurations as entanbled networks of human agents can stretch 
unbounded and ramify.   
271 Further categories include for instance mahalla (neighborhood) and gozar, which designates a watering 
place for animals in the rural areas within and outside of settlements (information recorded in Asqalān and 
Tarboz Guzar). According to Stanfield (2007: 3) municipal districts are constituted by several gozar, which 
can best be conceived of as municipal neighborhoods. 
272 According to Makhmadshoyev (2001: 109) deh is the ancient Tajik name for rural settlement, 
etymologically sharing the same root with dehqān (farmer, ruralist). In contrast, qarya is an Arabic term that 
initially designated any settlement with a mosque. Only in the 8th century has the term become 
synonymously used with deh (ibid.).    
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The notion of manteqa is very prominent among the people and hints at the fact that their 
local social identity is tightly bound to this unit of spatial cognition (Allan 2001: 554). 
However, in empirical terms, no concrete indicator of self-enforced institutionalization of 
the manteqa beyond the mental image could be found. The research found no 
institutionalized shurā-ye manteqa or even musafēd(hā-y)e manteqa distinct from, for 
example, shurā-ye qarya or musafēd(hā-y)e qeshlāq.273 In many cases, the term manteqa is 
used to designate the wider region or place-based communal cluster of belonging.274 For 
example, people living in the Sofi-Qarayatim area275 of Kunduz province in Chārdara 
district (see Map M6) claim either Chārdara as their manteqa or Qarayatim/Sofi. However, 
Madrasa/Umarkhēl, a ‘village’ in Qarayatim that goes by both names, is also called 
manteqa as well as qarya and/or qeshlāq. A similar situation was found in the Asqalān 
canal area (see Map M5).276 The Asqalān irrigation network consists of two parts with a 
different person in charge of water management in each: one oversees the upstream area 
called Asqalān, which is inhabited by Tajiks, Pashtuns, Uzbek, Laqai, Aymāq, Qongherāt, 
and Turkmen; the second is responsible for the downstream, which is comprised of 
Pashtun settlements. However, respondents in both areas called Asqalān their manteqa. On 
other occasions, people from downstream would say their manteqa was Tobrakash, and 
people from upstream said they belonged not to Tobrakash, but to Asqalān manteqa. 
Another example for differentiation is Wulus, a settlement located in the middle of the 
Asqalān canal where Turkic-speaking people live (Uzbeks, Laqai, Qongherāt, and 
Turkmen). It has also – among other settlements along the canal – been labeled manteqa. 
In another example, the area around Ālchin bridge, located between Asqalān and Kunduz 
city was described as manteqa that is subdivided into three, more or less clearly delimited 
parts. Individually, these three parts can also be called manteqa, for example, one part is 
named after one of the local elders and interchangeably designated as Qeshlāq-e Mullā 
Sardā or Manteqa-ye Mullā Sardā. It was also reported that these individual manteqa 
consist of several qarya. The same holds true for designations in Burka’s Fulol valley. The 
valley is viewed as a larger-scale manteqa, but Upper (Fulol Bālā) and Lower Fulol (Fulol 
Pāyin) are referred to as villages (qarya) as well as manteqa (see section 6.2.2-a and map 
M11). 
Compared with manteqa, the terms qarya and qeshlāq designate more compact settlement 
patterns. In an administrator’s office, I was offered the following explanation: ten families, 
that is, one or two mosques, would make one qeshlāq; one qarya then would comprise ten 
qeshlāq.277 This information should be received with caution because other respondents, 
                                                             
273 Favre (2005: 6) claims that communal structures, such as schools and bazaars exist only at manteqa level. 
My own research, which included a review of the emic usage of the term, does not support this claim.  
274 According to Allan (2001: 554, 2003: 196) the notion of manteqa is not unique to Afghanistan, but 
designates an idea of shared space – a conflated image of neighborhood, landscape and cultural uniformity – 
throughout the Muslim world.  
275 Sofi-Qarayatim area encompasses the territory that is irrigated from Sofi-Qarayatim canal system 
consisting of two more or less independent smaller systems (Sofi and Qarayatim) which share intake and a 
diversion structure. Qarayatim canal (also called Umarkhēl canal) is further divided in two sub-canals – 
Nahr-e Madrasa and Nahr-e Surkhak (see Ch. 6.1.2) 
276 Asqalān designates the territory irrigated from the canal of the same name in Kunduz Markaz district.  
277 Interview in Land Affairs Department of Chārdara, 10 May 2006. 
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among them also government officials, would use qeshlāq and qarya synonymously. 
According to another interpretation, in which the source did not differentiate between 
qarya and qeshlāq, one manteqa consisted of ten qarya/qeshlāq. My initial idea that 
because qeshlāq is an Uzbek term and it would therefore be used mainly by Uzbeks or 
Turkic-language speakers also did not prove valid. Fārsiwān (Tajik, Aymāq et al.) and 
Pashtuns also refer to settlements as qeshlāq. Because Afghan society has been largely 
nomadic and semi-pastoral, it is appropriate to investigate interpretations of the word 
qeshlāq, which originally means ‘winter quarters’ as opposed to aylāq, which denotes 
summer quarters on the pastures. An aylāq can be two hours away from the ‘village’, 
which is in Kunduz and Takhār the permanent settlement of at least a part of every family 
occupied in animal husbandry. At the other extreme, an aylāq can also be located high up 
in remote mountain areas that can be reached only after several months of meandering 
climb.   
In addition, to complement people’s perception of the notion of village it must be 
mentioned that no matter what a certain settlement area is labeled in terms of manteqa, 
qarya and/or qeshlāq, the same village can have different names. One of the most 
prominent examples I encountered is a settlement called ‘Madrasa’ in the Qarayatim canal 
area. It is also known as ‘Umarkhēl’ and ‘Qarayatim’. Several possible explanations come 
to mind: 1) the name Umarkhēl was attributed by non-Umarkhēl from surrounding places 
because Umarkhēl278 tribesmen built the canal and subsequently settled there. Thus, 
neighbors of other ethnic origin, such as Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Aymāq might have used the 
designation ‘Umarkhēl’ in an effort to dissociate themselves from the other community, 
although the Umarkhēl had given the settlement the name ‘Madrasa’. 2) The designation 
‘Madrasa’ was possibly chosen by the Pashtun settlers because it was the place where they 
built a madrasa or a mosque. 3) Before the construction of a mosque, that is, in the early 
stage of settlement, the place might have been called Qarayatim, which literally means 
‘village/settlement of orphans’. With every step in the settlement process and because 
attributions of place by others merged with self-attributions of place, the usage of three 
names for the same place can have plausibly formed a habit. Understanding the origins of 
this nomenclature is of minor importance and may well remain subject to speculation. 
However, these place names demonstrate a high degree of fluidity of local notions of place 
and attendant concepts at the time of fieldwork. Names and concepts of rural settlement 
clusters are not only used interchangeably by their inhabitants, they also reflect the extent 
of identification with a local space of social interaction in contrast to mere territorial limits.  
Temporally changing designations of qarya/qeshlāq/manteqa adds another dimension to 
this fluidity and multiple names of settlements. It is very common that a village is named 
after an important elder, arbāb, mullah, local commander and so on. In most cases, over 
time the village ceases to carry the name of the famous person after his death and takes on 
a new name. It can either be the name of the son of the dead elder or the name of the 
successor in the position of the deceased, that is, of the newly appointed arbāb or mullah. 
If a settlement is named after a very famous commander who originated from a particular 
                                                             
278 Umarkhēl is the name of a Ghilzai Pashtun sub-tribe. 
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village, the name tends to remain in use also after his demise, such as 
(qarya/manteqa/qeshlāq) Qalij Āghā279 in Asqalān.  
Asqalān is the name of not only (1) the irrigation canal and (2) the socio-economic space 
that includes the entire command area of the canal, as expressed in the discursive 
formation ‘Asqalān manteqa is famous for its melons throughout Afghanistan’. Asqalān 
also designates (3) settlements proper, known as Asqalān I and Asqalān II. However, as 
mentioned above, if Asqalān refers to the irrigation network, the canal area can be sub-
divided into two manteqa: (4) Asqalān upstream and Tobrakash downstream. These names 
can also be found in the cadastral register in Kunduz; smaller settlement units and those 
which were established later are not listed. Thus, in order to find a person living in the 
settlement Wulus in Asqalān manteqa, the cadaster clerk looks through the entire cadastral 
register of the Asqalān entry. In the Land Affairs (mudiryat-e emlāk)280 and Cadaster 
Departments (mudiryat-e ‘umumi kādestar), all landowners of a certain area are listed as 
belonging to the respective area designation. It largely corresponds with the notion of 
manteqa and thus does not correspond with local positionalities of belonging to a place 
because settlements have split up and multiplied.  
In contrast to the research sites in Kunduz, which are concentrated along irrigation canals, 
Warsaj and Farkhār (see maps M8 and M9) are mountainous districts in the remote 
southeast of neighboring Takhār province. Eshkamesh also lies in Takhār towards the 
southwest and north of Baghlān’s Burka district. These sites form part of the transitory 
landscape, which climbs from the plains of southern Turkestan to the high mountains of 
Badakhshān. Ecological conditions have constrained sprawling settlement patterns, but 
have not prevented population growth. The amount of arable land is limited. Advanced 
natural resource degradation – caused by traditional overpopulation and wartime fighting 
during recent decades – puts severe pressure on local livelihoods (see section 6.2.1-a).  
Because of fixed territorial delimitations that can be explained by geographical conditions 
(see section 5.1.1), the spatial forms of villages or rural settlements are not contested to the 
extent observed in Kunduz province. In Farkhār and Warsaj, one manteqa comprises 
several side valleys that are located along one local road which leads to a main road and 
eventually the district and provincial centers. For example, the settlement cluster Mashtān 
in Farkhār consists of five qarya scattered in five sub-valleys that are accessible by a single 
road from the main roadway along the Farkhār/Warsaj river. The five qarya have two 
Friday-praying mosques and one NSP council. Compared to research sites in Kunduz, the 
situation in the mountainous districts of Takhār was amenable to finding locations and 
asking people about whereabouts, which made the orientation much easier.  
                                                             
279 Qalich Āghā ranks as most reputed and famous leader of the resistance against the Soviet occupation from 
Asqalān. He was provincial-level commander and switched from Hezb-e Islāmi to Junbesh in the 1990s 
before he was reportedly murdered by Aref Khān (himself Hezb-e Islāmi) when the Taliban took over 
Kunduz.  
280 At the time of fieldwork, the Land Affairs or ‘Properties’ Department (short: emlāk) at district and 
provincial levels was part of the Ministry of Agriculture. Operating according to the valid Land Act of 1935 
(1316), it was in charge of registering changes in landownership by sale or inheritance to establish a data 
base for future tax collection. For this purpose, the department keeps copies of cadastral records, particularly 
hand-drawn maps. Landownership is recorded according to the category of land (1-3), not the exact physical 
location. For a review of the history of rural land administration and the role of the Land Affairs Department 
see Stanfield et al. (2008: 9-15). 
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The research in Warsaj revealed the prominence of the concept of hawza281 as locally used 
term for village clusters, comparable to the usage of manteqa in the research sites in 
Kunduz province. However, the term hawza is used twofold: on a meso-scale to designate 
a village cluster and on a macro-scale to designate official police precincts. As a former, it 
refers to a semi-administrative territorial unit that comprises several qarya/qeshlāq. In 
some areas, hawza reportedly represents the level at which people from several villages 
share a Friday-praying mosque and appoint different governance institutions, such as road 
keeper, wheat keeper, and forest guard, all of which are officially registered with the 
district administration. For example, the five villages of hawza-ye Rubata-Enjin-Yawand-e 
Sēbdara-Mulkik share one school, a road keeper to maintain the main roadway leading out 
of the remoteness of the valley, a wheat warden, and a forest guard (Ch. 8.2.2). In official 
terms, the district of Warsaj is subdivided into four hawza (police precincts) according to 
local geographic conditions, that is, each of the three larger valleys (Taresht, Miyānshahr, 
Qawnduz) and the district center Khānaqāh from one hawza. In the past, when each village 
cluster in Warsaj was organized as hawza and headed by a commander, strict boundaries 
were created.282 During the mujahedin period, hawza boundaries grew even more rigid 
because different warring factions appointed local commanders according to hawza-
units.283  
In summary, the differences in how the rural areas are structured in the research sites in 
Kunduz province and in the upper catchment districts of Farkhār, Warsaj, Burka and 
Eshkamesh are significant. In Kunduz, the concept of village is fluid and contested. The 
notion of bounded rural settlement is transparent in Farkhār, Burka and Eshkamesh and 
even more so in Warsaj. Although in the latter districts, competing concepts of locality 
exist simultaneously, they are not mixed to the extent as in Kunduz’ irrigation areas. As a 
rule, they do not bear different names and name changes; in short, village labels are more 
stable. Natural geographic conditions can be assumed to ensure compact and stable 
settlement and identity patterns in the foothill sites. Here, out-migration is the rule, and in-
migration does not occur. In contrast, Kunduz’ oasis landscape is a place of relatively 
recent settlement that attracted decade-long, large-scale population migration from other 
parts of Afghanistan, which resulted in fast-growing settlement clusters along irrigation 
canals and an ethnically mixed population.  
                                                             
281 Hawza literally means ‘zone’ and has been used initially in Afghanistan’s urban areas to designate police 
precincts. 
282 Reportedly, though, the number of hawza varied according to the population figures, which at times 
reached a low of only 5,000 people in the entire Warsaj district. It remains open for investigation, to what 
extent the militarily organized resistance against the Soviet forces and later on local commanders who 
belonged to different warring factions actually operated from a territorially fixed base where they exercised 
authority over a supporting population or people from whom they extracted taxes and supplies. 
283 The following anecdote seems to support this point: When I revisited Mulkik another time, I talked to a 
young respondent who did not experience the war years in his home area. He claimed that there are no hawza 
on smaller scale than the three side-valleys, such as Taresht. His opinion corresponded to the official view of 
the district administration. However, hawza-ye Rubata-Enjin-Yawand-e Sēbdara-Mulkik had taken shape as 
zone of influence of one former commander and persisted as such in the minds of people. This can be 
counted as another indicator of fluidity on the one hand and of the close entanglement of personal and 
relational factors with the surrounding social and administrative environment on the other hand. The 
examples show how local spatial categorizations of identity, notions of space, and one-time labels might 
change, whereas the social space persists unaffected (Interview, Mulkik, 11 April 2007).   
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The next section sheds light on heterogeneous local situations and the government’s 
attempts at territorializing the rural areas before the outbreak of large-scale violence after 
the coup d’état in April 1978.  
 
5.2.2 Previous attempts at territorializing Afghanistan’s rural areas 
The rationale for governments to territorialize space corresponds with the aim to govern by 
administering people in ‘national’ space. The concepts of nation state, national citizenship, 
refugees, and tax revenues are ample evidence of biopolitics and governmentality 
(Foucault 2006). In Western contexts, the village is often the smallest unit of governmental 
administration as well as an entity of communal identity and local self-government. With 
regard to Afghanistan, the Provincial Gazetteer of 1975 recounted the definition of village 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation as  
The smallest administrative unit with human habitations in one or more ‘qala’ (fortified 
house) as well as isolated houses served by one or more headmen. It was found that often 
several villages were under the jurisdiction of one headman, and conversely that some 
individual villages had more than one headman. The association of scattered dwellings and 
villages was a difficult problem, because on occasion even the inhabitants could not make 
the identification. (cited in Favre 2005: 16).284 
However, the authors of the article in the Gazetteer, although charged with defining 
districts and listing all villages, failed in this attempt because they recognized the flaws of 
the village census in systematizing and delimiting the boundaries of rural units.285 In 
Article 136, the 2004 (1382) constitution specifies, “the local administrative unit is a 
province”. Thus, officially, the country has a two-tier governmental system consisting of 
national and provincial administrations. Lower-level government bodies are specified in 
by-laws and include the district level as a third administrative tier (wuluswāli). These sub-
provinces usually, but not necessarily, comprise one district center or rural municipality 
(shārwāli, wuluswāli), where a main bazaar and adjoining settlements are situated. Rural 
and provincial municipalities are legally recognized elements in the formal administrative 
system. Beyond the district level, however, an administrative territorial penetration of the 
entire rural space by the government has not taken place since the inception of the Afghan 
state. At the time of writing, villages did not constitute legally recognized units of sub-
national administration in Afghanistan. 
The only previous attempt at territorializing the rural areas of Afghanistan took place in the 
late 1960s but was discontinued with the coup d’état in 1978. As a result of the 
implementation of the National Demographic Survey Project, the Afghan government 
began publication of the Provisional Gazetteer of Afghanistan in 1975 (Favre 2005: 15), 
which for the first time included all districts of Afghanistan as well as a basic mapping of 
respective village (qarya) lists. The validity of this original information must be seriously 
questioned however. Apparently, village lists were established according to data held by 
ministries, and not on the basis of actual surveys in which officials would go out into the 
                                                             
284 In this limited sense that villages were equated with their respective headman who had ties with the 
government, the villages could be seen as ‘administrative’ entities.  
285 The village census was carried out as part of the National Demographic Survey Project, see below. 
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countryside to take stock of the number, names, and population of the settlements in each 
district. Ministries probably relied on data collected in village surveys during the early 
1960s by government and international agencies prior to the reorganization of 
administrative districts and provinces. According to Dupree (1973: 144), the Population 
and Agriculture Survey of 500 Villages in 1963 (1342) listed 1,417 villages in Qataghan 
province.286 Dupree assumed the data was reliable because random cross checks in the 
course of his own fieldwork more or less confirmed the survey results.  
Administrative reforms prior to the National Demographic Survey Project established a 
new provincial system in 1964, sub-dividing the former 14 provinces into 28. Successive 
territorial changes have led to the establishment of 34 provinces to date. The number of 
districts is still constantly changing because district borders are being re-negotiated 
according to powerful local interests and preferences regarding representation. Thus, at the 
outset of my research, no up-to-date information regarding villages and local population 
patterns was available. The only available demographic survey had been collected from 
two thirds of the population in the sole attempt at a census in Afghanistan in 1979 and 
recent surveys connected with voter registration (pre-poll census and voter’s registry) for 
the 2005 parliamentary elections. A scheduled census for 2006 was rescheduled to 2008 
but could not be implemented to date. 
Previous attempts at administering the rural areas of Afghanistan involved, first, efforts to 
survey and register landholdings as well as determining the number, population and 
location of rural settlements. Until the early 1960s, systematic information about land 
ownership structures, village borders, and rural areas in general was broadly lacking 
because the government did not have qualified staff, techniques, or know how about how 
to conduct large-scale land surveys. Consequently, the government and its local 
administrations were deprived of the possibility of effective resource allocation in the form 
of taxation. In the past, land had been allocated to people according to estimates. Exact, 
uniform measurements of use areas could not be carried out. Thus, the taxes paid by 
landowners were based on the amount of land stated in his ownership document, although 
in most cases, the taxpaying landowner had much more land under cultivation. As long as 
the Land Affairs Department was sub-ordinated to the Finance Ministry (until 1978), the 
organizing pattern it applied to rural space was that of ‘tax-units’, “which in many cases 
corresponded with what local people called a village” (Stanfield 2007: 2).  
The introduction of survey techniques and a training facility run by USAID and the Afghan 
government in Kandahar enabled large-scale training of surveyors and knowledge transfer 
regarding the equipment utilization and map making. Furthermore, a National Cadaster 
office was set up in Kabul in 1963 (1342). Sub-departments of the central office were 
established at regional levels. The one in Kunduz was reportedly in charge of land surveys 
in all four northeastern provinces until the early 1980s.287 According to McEwen and 
Whitty (2006: 51f), the Land Survey and Statistics Law of 1965 prompted a nation-wide 
cadastral survey. However, because the progress in clarifying property rights was slow, an 
additional land inventory project was launched in 1967 (Glaubitt et al. 1975: 97). 
                                                             
286 Qataghan was split up into the three smaller provinces of Kunduz, Baghlān and Takhār in 1970.  
287 The information is derived from own interview data. The Kunduz cadaster office was still formally 
responsible for Baghlān and Kunduz provinces at the time of this fieldwork (2006-07). 
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Between 1963 and 1978, cadaster department staff managed to survey 35 percent of 
Afghanistan’s territory. In this exercise, the new survey techniques enabled the 
government to verify landholdings and to assign everybody the amount of land that was 
stated in the land document. Excess land was re-assigned to the government and returned 
to the state’s pool of land reserves. In Kunduz province, the surveyed land amounts to 
923,233 jerib or 184,647 hectares.288 This represented the larger part of the arable land at 
that time and is equivalent to about 23 percent of the total area of today’s Kunduz province 
(804,000 hectares). After 1979, land surveys and the determination of village locations and 
borders stopped because of decreasing security. The cadastral register has not been updated 
since 1976 (1355), although the Land Affairs Department has kept a record of officially 
notified property changes throughout the years of turmoil.289 Reportedly, the largest 
deficits regarding the amount of surveyed land exist in Emām Sāheb district, which shares 
a border with Tajikistan along the Āmu Daryā river. By 1978, only 10 out of 159 villages 
had been covered and their land holdings registered. Similarly, rain-fed areas and 
settlements in Khānābād had not been surveyed entirely.  
It cannot be assessed whether the information given and recorded during the limited 
surveying activities until 1978 was correct. What holds true for all figures and statistics 
regarding Afghanistan is that they need to be treated with skepticism (see Ch. 3). 
Nevertheless, the numbers and landholdings registered based on the surveys have become 
official and thus have shaped social reality, as exemplified by the re-assignment of land the 
government had previously appropriated from rural dwellers to reward loyal figures. The 
recordings in the cadaster book are the only ones available to date.290 In the course of the 
40 years that have passed since the initial surveys,291 local environments, including 
agricultural and settlement patterns have changed considerably. Wartime destruction, 
population dynamics of flight, return, and general population growth left its marks on the 
physical and social landscape. At the time of this field research, the most pressing concerns 
were illegal land seizures by local commanders and intra-family disputes about land that 
had been occupied by members of the family who had not emigrated to Pakistan or Iran 
and who refused to yield the land plots to initial owners returning from abroad. However, 
the capacity of government departments to mitigate these conflicts and administer land 
efficiently is limited at best.292 In addition, confronted with the challenge of local 
development projects, the inability of the cadastral and land registration departments to 
                                                             
288 Interview with the head of the cadastre department in Kunduz, 16 May 2006.  
289 The cadaster data serves mainly as reference point for land disputes. In this context the manteqa maps that 
have been drawn based on land surveys that were conducted in the ten years between 1966 (1345) and 1976 
(1355) are of special value.   
290 The Rural Land Administration Project (RALP), carried out in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2007, 
attempted to introduce community administration of property records that would be assisted but not guided 
by the government. Measures included the documentation of local ownership rights, the delineation of 
privately owned parcel boundaries with the help of satellite images, getting community approval, and 
registration with the cadaster office. See Stanfield et al. (2008). To date this project did not have any impact 
beyond the selected trial communities. 
291 According to an interviewee in the Kunduz cadaster office, the determination of village borders set in after 
1966 (1345) (Interview, 16 May 2006). 
292 As I will show below (Chs. 6 and 7), the high degree of venality of government employees is one of the 
main factors inhibiting administrative efficiency. 
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provide information regarding villages, public land and local settlers has had a significant 
impact on reconstruction projects because they rely on spatial approaches.293 
Consequently, the absence of updated village lists and the myriad of local spatial concepts 
have led to growing confusion about what constitutes local intervention units for aid 
practitioners. At the time of this field research, it seemed that the implementation of the 
NSP program had been a measure towards resolving this dilemma.  
 
5.2.3 Villagization in the framework of NSP implementation  
The National Solidarity Program (NSP) was launched as a nation-wide development 
program in 2003 for an initial three years with the vision of reaching every single ‘village’ 
in Afghanistan, the number of which was estimated to approximate 20,000. By May 2005, 
the NSP was working in approximately 8,100 communities (AREU 2005: 49). Run by the 
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and funded by a group of 
bilateral and multilateral donors (see Ch. 8.1), the program aimed to bridge the gap of sub-
national governance between the population and the central government through the 
community-based provision of services and local grassroots democratization. The 
objectives were two-fold, but interrelated:  
 NSP sought to promote local-level reconstruction, development, and capacity-
building in order to improve the living conditions of the population and thereby 
enhance the legitimacy of the central government. Considerable funds were made 
available for this purpose via block grants to communities.  
 
 The planning and implementation of projects was intended to be undertaken in a 
participatory manner by the communities themselves. To facilitate this process, 
representative decision-making bodies (CDCs) that involved both male and female 
community members were supposed to be democratically elected at the community 
level. The elected CDCs were designed as tools to overhaul ‘traditional’ 
community governance structures in the medium to long terms. 
When reviewing the implementation and progress of the NSP, it is important to take 
account of its process dimension and to distinguish the initial ambitious visions from 
incremental modifications of the program outline.294 As just one example,295 if at the outset 
of the program in 2003, the existence of approximately 20,000 villages served as the basis 
for planning, the NSP Manual of 2006 stated that by December 2005 the number of rural 
settlements was estimated at 38,000 (MRRD 2006: viii). The NSP Manual further stated, 
                                                             
293 Most public sector and development assistance institutions organize their work in sectors. In contrast,  the 
complex demands in an intervention context (where “everything is connected to everything else”; Helling et 
al. 2005: 10) require participatory approaches which can best be achieved by spatially limited interventions.     
294 This section cannot give a full review of or assess the NSP. Also, not all dimensions of the program and 
its details can be depicted here because of space constraints. For an excellent overview over the program’s 
components, how it unfolded, and first evaluations see Wenzel (2008).  
295 Other examples refer to the timely prolongations of the Program. By the end of December 2011, NSP had 
reportedly covered 75 percent of the rural population (the program is not introduced in urban settings), after it 
had been extended twice (NSP I was extended until March 2007, followed by NSP II from April 2007 until 
September 2011). See AREU (2012: 62). According to the same source, NSP III (2010-2015) was designed 
to cover the approximately 16,000 communities that had not benefitted from either NSP I or II (ibid.)  
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“No accurate census data is available and it is unclear if consensus has been reached on a 
working definition of ‘village’.” (ibid.).  
Despite the explicit aim of overhauling ‘bad’ local governance structures through the 
creation of CDC communities with participatory decision-making structures, it has not 
been an NSP priority to revamp local administration completely. It is unlikely that 
government personnel were even aware of the complexity of spatial local structures (see 
Ch. 5.2.1) or of their consequences. Instead, every program document as well as strategy 
papers from the MRRD, the Afghan government, facilitating partners (FPs)296, 
international consultants, and the World Bank assumed quite naturally the existence of 
clear-cut ‘villages’ as a basic form of social organization and administration at the local 
level that could serve as adequate spatial units for the establishment of CDCs and CDC-
communities.  
In the NSP-framework, the term ‘community’ was used for a unit of at least 25 families297 
who were eligible for a block grant calculated at US$200 per family. In the process of 
NSP-implementation, the inhabitants of rural settlements with more than 25 families were 
asked to form clusters (hawza)298 of 10-30 families (Karmacharya 2007: 219), who then 
selected one representative for the CDC, which was to be held accountable by its ‘village’ 
constituency. Because US$60,000 was the maximum amount that would be allocated to a 
single community, the maximum number of families in any community was to be 300. 
Settlement clusters that contained less than 25 families were asked to combine neighboring 
communities to establish a joint CDC. If a locality was large and exceeded 300 families, 
more than one CDC community could be formed.  
This shows that the council formation and NSP-community set-up has been designed as a 
technical process that is instituted from above and does not take into account local identity 
patterns of qarya, qeshlāq, manteqa, and so on. In addition to the guidelines and 
definitions in the NSP operational manual, implementing agencies have been confronted 
with the task of making sense of local conditions and environments and to fit those to the 
guidelines. In the course of NSP implementation at the time of fieldwork, FP staff 
members were usually provided with 30- to 40-year-old village lists from the respective 
MRRD line ministry at province level or the district administrations. However, because of 
the changes occurred in the rural areas over the last forty years, the use of these lists turned 
out to be highly limited. Thus, FP community mobilizers eventually had to search for the 
villages on the lists, only to discover that they either no longer existed, had a new name, 
had formed several sub-villages and new settlement clusters, or never actually existed by 
the name on the list. As a consequence, it was up to the community mobilizers to ‘find’ 
actual villages for which they had no definition. This process closely resembled an outright 
                                                             
296 Twenty five FPs were contracted to implement NSP I. At the time of this fieldwork, the FPs in Kunduz 
province were the French NGO ACTED, which covered the two districts of Emām Sāheb and Dasht-e Archi, 
and GRSP (Ghazni Rural Support Program), an Afghan NGO in charge of the rest of the province. The FP in 
Farkhār and Warsaj was Concern Worldwide. ACTED covered also Burka and Eshkamesh. 
297 At the start of the NSP in 2003, block grants were allocated to ‘villages’of over 50 families (MRRD 2003: 
6). 
298 Thus, the term hawza has also been newly introduced in the course of NSP implementation, now as a 
household cluster several of which underlie a larger NSP-community. In the following, when referring to this 
secondary meaning of hawza, I use NSP-hawza (see Table 2). 
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invention of villages and communities that was forced upon the FPs by the guidelines. As a 
result of this policy, newly-registered local communities of 25 to 300 families and 
represented by a single CDC appeared. The elected council members were asked to agree 
on and register a name for their CDC community at the provincial MRRD department. A 
subsequent approval letter would symbolize the formalization of a village for NSP 
purposes. Because NSP – according to its official mandate – sought to establish links 
between CDCs and other government offices, in particular the departments of the Central 
Statistics Office, information about the newly established NSP communities was passed on 
to different government departments with the potential to establish a systematic database in 
the future. In the local context, it led to the creation of a new type of community with 
village features. These communities materialized by means of a particular name in record 
books.  
In cases where CDC communities do not conform to local entities and imagined identities 
in the sense of belonging to a certain manteqa, qarya, qeshlāq, and so on, a new name was 
often found and added to existing local designations in another example of relabeling (see 
Ch. 5.2.1). Where a village comprised one or more CDCs depending on population size, or 
shared a CDC with a neighboring community, the name of the newly-registered CDC-
community does not necessarily match the previous name/s of the rural settlement. For 
example, NSP councils in Chārdara, where the NSP implementation was nearly completed 
by the end of 2006, are most often named after respected mujahedin commanders (see Ch. 
7.3), important elders, the NSP head, or the CDC’s geographical location (‘upper’, ‘lower’, 
‘center’, etc.), compounding the confusion over names and labels. In Qarayatim, the 
newly-formed NSP community ‘Lower Qarayatim’ (Qarayatim-e Suflā) comprised the 
settlements of Usmān Khēl, Zābudin Khēl, and Esā Khēl. In the two Takhār districts of 
Farkhār and Warsaj, the NSP implementation process was nearly complete at the end of 
2006, and almost every qarya or qeshlāq had formed a separate NSP-community, the name 
of which in these cases naturally matched the existing village names. Because of the 
communities’ reasonably fixed delimitations and its high settlement concentration there 
was no need to split up or pool several clusters together and subsequently invent new 
names for the CDC communities. Reportedly, in Warsaj, 72 NSP communities were 
sufficient to cover the entire district population that inhabits the districts 94 ‘villages’.299  
Hence, although CDC communities are set up by FPs, they are officially registered with 
the government and constitute the first data-base on local communities after the attempts to 
conduct broad-based village surveys in the 1960s and 1970s. Local perceptions, 
positionalities, and identity units are not always taken into account when CDC 
communities are established. It remains to be seen how effectively these new structures 
will administer qarya, qeshlāq, and manteqa units and whether overlapping notions 
dissolve into a fourth administrative tier consisting of an official ‘village’ that is the CDC 
                                                             
299 Interview with the FP’s head of office in Farkhār, 8 March 2007. In an earlier interview with FP staff, 
slightly different figures were given, according to which 74 CDCs in 98 settlements (qarya) have been 
established. The minor variation might be the researcher’s fault of recording or due to inaccuracy of the 
community mobilizers at an earlier stage of project completion. However, it could also be an indicator of the 
fact that there is at least a certain amount of uncertainty surrounding the concept of ‘village’ in this region as 
well and that there is scope for the FPs and community mobilizers to influence the process of CDC 
establishment in terms of which village clusters unite or split up and which do not.   
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community. When this fieldwork was carried out, there was no coherent view among 
donors, policy makers, and aid practitioners as to what roles CDC communities should 
play in the years to come, especially how they would mesh with the central government 
administration and myriad newly-elected bodies of different scopes and the traditional 
governance bodies (Lister 2005: 6f;  Nixon 2008, 2008a). In 2006-07, the MRRD proposed 
transforming CDCs into sustainable, self-sustaining structures by pooling them into newly-
established Community-Led Development Departments (CLDD) at the district level under 
the supervision of the provincial MRRD’s Social Development Departments (MRRD 
2007). This particular idea was never implemented, but similar ones did come to fruition 
(see Ch. 8.2.1). Moreover, a CDC by-law was issued in January 2007 (MRRD 2006a), 
giving CDCs “formal organizational existence over and above their relationship with NSP. 
In terms of this law, CDCs may receive funds from a variety of sources, have planning, 
allocation and project implementation powers for their areas, and are given some 
administrative responsibilities in areas such as births and deaths registration.” (World Bank 
2007: 24).300  
In theory, the process of establishing NSP-communities and CDCs could be read as first 
step in efforts at creating a top-down administrative hierarchy that would reach the local 
level (household clusters of minimum 25 families) and be able to incorporate local bodies 
into the government structure. The sustainability of newly-established CDCs will foretell 
how successfully central government organisms penetrate the rural areas and administer 
them in the future. One side effect of NSP implementation is thus a first-time large-scale 
territorialization of rural Afghanistan below the district level. Given the complexity 
depicted above, where the different notions of village – manteqa, qarya, qeshlāq – and 
place are contested locally, the recent process of CDC-community establishment has the 
potential to partly eliminate the confusion, at least in a top-down perspective. If and how 
the creation and organizational upgrading of CDCs affects ordinary people’s perception 
about belonging to a certain qarya, qeshlāq, or manteqa as opposed to an NSP community 
remains to be seen (Bosen 2004: 61).301 
 
5.3 Conclusion: The stance for user communities in local governance arenas 
Each section of subchapter 5.2 has been primarily occupied with place-based notions. I 
have shown that for inhabitants of northeastern Afghanistan’s rural countryside the locale 
includes a spatial-territorial dimension and how newly-established units known as CDC 
communities were envisaged to become the smallest administrative units of government. 
However, what has been left out so far is a social interaction concept which encompasses 
the micro- and meso-scales of social interaction, such as families, households, kinship 
groups, and other social groupings and interaction networks. Their space of social action 
(sozialer Handlungsraum) does not simply replace territorially-fixed boundaries; rather it 
is fluid and changes according to the situation, contextual conditions, and need. Rural 
society in northern Afghanistan is characterized by face-to-face relationships and 
                                                             
300 According to Stanfield (2007: 1) the law also included the registration of marriages.   
301 See Chs. 8.2.2 and 8.3 for my findings in this regard.  
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structured by social networks and community bonds manifest in the notion of qawm (see 
Ch. 4.1.1). I have elaborated in Chapter 4.1.1 that the significance of qawm goes beyond 
the tribal and family lineage and it is not limited in place, but transverses specific 
geographical spaces. As Roy (1985: 25) has pointed out, “The qawm is a network, the 
village a territory, and even though the two are often one and the same (for very frequently, 
but not necessarily, the village corresponds to a qawm), their mode of functioning in 
relation to politics is very different.”302 Consequently the non-territorialized qawm does 
not succumb to governmental subjection; rather, it is precisely the opposite, where the 
“qawm as solidarity group is able to penetrate to the very heart of the state” (ibid.).303 That 
means that solidarity groupings in Afghanistan’s rural society transcend spatial limitations 
and cannot be captured even with the compound notion of the ‘village community’.304  
Table 2 reflects an attempt to summarize the diversity of the different notions of locality 
and community encountered in the field and presented so far in this chapter. The first 
column introduces the analytical distinction of three scales – micro, meso, macro – of what 
constitutes ‘local’. The previously-elaborated fluid notions of ‘village’ in Afghanistan 
extend to all scales, from the nucleus of the family and clan (the micro layer) up to the 
meso and macro scales, which can extend to include several settlements and hundreds or 
even thousands of people, but still might be considered a ‘village’. Examples of these local 
perceptions are listed in the second column, which presents a broad overlap of concepts of 
place-based notions. Furthermore, it shows that manteqa is used by locals for denoting 
bounded space, the boundaries of which are well-known, but invisibly located in between 
the micro-cosmos of daily life and the wider region of origin. In some cases, manteqa 
describes a naturally-bounded system of joint resource use by a group of people, such as an 
irrigation system or common pastures upon which a community depends. Qarya and 
qeshlāq are concepts used primarily for comprehending the micro and meso local levels, 
which can be as small as a single qala, that is, a fortified house or large compound 
surrounded by four walls. If slightly larger, it might match a mosque community or 
something an outsider and sometimes the locals themselves would call a sub-village. On a 
next higher scale – the meso-level – this could also amount to a Friday-praying mosque 
community that comprises several ordinary mosque communities.305 The third column is 
                                                             
302 ‘Village’ here can be equated with manteqa as well as other notions of locality, i.e. qarya, qeshlāq, etc. 
303 I illustrate this point of state-seizure by or via qawm in Ch. 7.3 with two prominent examples of non-
lineage qawmi networks, so-called mujahedin qawmi networks.   
304 The idea of ‘villages’ as solidarity units features prominently in the work of several scholars: Favre 
describes manteqa as “an element shaping identity and solidarity” (Favre 2005: 6); Davydov speaks of 
communes in the Tajik areas of Afghanistan organized along principles of  joint residence and farming and 
undivided land tenure of peasant neighbors in the same village (1963: 121). Canfield (1985: 62) defines 
community bonds as the prevalence of strong common interests backed up by kin and marriage relations 
whereby social unity found expression in public Islamic ritual. For a qualification of this view of villages as 
homogeneous entities, see below. 
305 Note that mosque communities and NSP communities constitute two cross-cutting categories with 
community connotations. NSP communities have been reviewed in depth in Ch. 5.2.3. The religious 
community constitutes of mosque visitors who attend their nearest mosque and one particular Friday-praying 
mosque. However, even in this case the spatial boundedness of the ‘community’ is not fixed: men do not 
seem to always attend the same mosque for Friday prayers and nowhere near all Afghans pray or pray in the 
mosque;  women, for example, do not pray in public. Furthermore, it is unknown if and how people who tend 
to turn to the same mosque for prayers share a sense of belonging to one individual community and based on 
which local scale. 
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concerned with perceptions of social action units and networks that are not necessarily 
fixed to a particular place. On the micro-scale, one such unit is the household, family or 
clan, or any small identification-unit resembling qawm-ties, including neighbors and 
hashar-partners. The decreasing validity of these social action units at larger scales is self-
explanatory, but for the natural resource user group. It designates a group of people 
depending on each other for the allocation of the same resource type, such as irrigation 
water or mountain resources (pasture, fuel wood, and so on). The usage and allocation of 
the specific resources requires some type of coordination and collective action (see Ch. 6), 
such as annual agreements on a rotation schedule for times of water scarcity, contributions 
to irrigation infrastructure maintenance, or adherence to temporal access restrictions in 
areas of rangeland overuse.  
Table 2: Overview of the different notions of locality and community in rural settings 
Local 
Scale  
Perceptions of Locality Perceptions of Social Action Units and 
Networks 
Macro Manteqa, hawza, Friday-praying 
mosque community, local NSP 
council area 
Qawm, natural resource user group 
Meso Qarya, qeshlāq, manteqa, hawza, 
local NSP council area, mosque 
community, Friday-praying mosque 
community 
Qawm, clan, natural resource user 
group, hashar-partners or neighborhood 
Micro  qarya, qeshlāq, manteqa, sub-village, 
qeshlāq, local NSP council area, 
NSP-hawza, mosque community, 
qala 
Khānawāda, qawm, clan, family, 
hashar-partner or neighborhood 
 
Although the resource user group in the narrow sense includes only the individual farmers, 
livestock herders, or wood collectors, these men allocate and use resources as heads of 
families and even clans. Thus, to describe and analyze local governance mechanisms, I 
propose to take user communities of natural or environmental resources as point of 
reference that include the inhabitants of a resource catchment area, that is, those who are 
dependent on the particular resource for their livelihoods. Consequently, varying local 
scales of social interaction of natural resource user communities constitute my level of 
analysis, whereas the unit of analysis is made up by the ‘stuff of community, the 
interactions within and its governance mechanisms (see Chs. 2 and 7). 
Thus, I return to the concept of community. I have demonstrated the heterogeneity and 
complexity of both indigenous notions of locality and community. Aware of the limitations 
of both dimensions and that a middle ground is necessary to investigate social action and 
local governance ‘somewhere’, I assume that belonging to a particular physical location is 
an important aspect of rural dwellers’ everyday experiences. This implies that actors 
perceive resources and constraints from their local ‘bases’, especially in the subsistence 
livelihoods framework that the majority of northeastern Afghanistan’s rural population is 
caught in. Moreover, the criticism raised against ‘community-studies’ of the 1960s can be 
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rebutted entirely if the conceptual framework of Chapter 2 is considered. Consequently, I 
assume communities to be conflictual, heterogeneous social spaces, the ‘members’ of 
which are socially differentiated and belong to many other communities, because they are 
mobile and multiply stratified. With this understanding of community, I also comply with 
the branch of community-based natural resource management studies in development 
research. This domain’s primary critique has been the neglect of power relations, conflict, 
and differential access and social stratification in the study of common property resources 
and their corresponding natural resource user communities (Mehta et al. 1999: 34; Kumar 
2005: 279). The advantage of the concept of resource-user community over that of the 
village community lies in the collective action focus regarding the management of 
presumably contested resources. It can serve as a magnifier to understand local power 
relations that transcend different governance arenas, places, and communities. 
Consequently, I conceive the resource-user community as a group of individuals who – 
through their interdependences in a socio-environmental and economic space – constitute a 
local governance ‘arena’ (see Chs. 2 & 5.2).  
Throughout the study I use the term ‘settlements’ to designate the physical base of 
members of resource user communities. In Chapter 7, once I conclude the focus on 
resource user communities (Chs. 7.2-7.5), I employ the term ‘communities’ the more 
general social spaces that actors share. This is based on the assumption that beyond the 
narrow subsistence livelihood realm multiple types of communities exist which intersect in 
certain places through individuals’ belonging to different identity or user groups. Among 
those, resource user communities form only one type.  
  
136 
 
6 – The scope of resource-governed rural life-worlds 
 
In this chapter I present the empirical data I collected in seven districts of northeastern 
Afghanistan (see Map M2). Based on the elaborations in Chs. 2 and 5, local governance is 
operationalized as governance processes, defined as the exercise of power that manifests in 
the ordinary practices through which access to environmental resources within resource 
user communities is regulated. The presentation of the data in subsequent sections of 
Chapter 6 focuses on the empirical questions: Who obtains what, and how do they do so? 
Chapter 7 completes the analysis by investigating why those outcomes are what they are.  
Why this thesis focuses the analysis of local governance on rural dwellers’ ability to 
benefit from somewhat ordinary environmental resources can be summarized in three 
points: First, there are no other crucial resources in the research sites that could be 
controlled for allocation, distribution, redistribution or exploited as resources for wealth 
and power. As elaborated in the previous chapter, the three provinces of Baghlān, Kunduz, 
and Takhār are mainly agricultural provinces with minor sectors of trade and negligible 
industry.306 The majority of the population lives from subsistence agricultural activities, 
laboring at home, or work migration in urban centers and abroad. Thus, unlike areas rich in 
natural resources like Africa, where a political economy of resource exploitation (oil, 
diamonds, coltan, timber, etc.) offers a unique study perspective (Duffield 2000; Keen 
2000; Reno 1998), my research region is instead characterized by opportunities for rent-
seeking through the aid and military agencies active in all three provinces, and for profit-
seeking from illicit activities such as the opium poppy and heroin trade, secret poppy 
cultivation307 and smuggling of all sorts of consumer items, money, and weapons to and 
from Tajikistan. Against this backdrop, the second reason for focusing on everyday 
livelihood resources – feasibility – is self-evident. Given the post-war context in 
northeastern Afghanistan in early 2006, the dearth of clarity about armed groups’ activities, 
their aims and goals, not to mention the level of insecurity and danger a field researcher 
would face, I chose not to inquire into matters of illicit trade, the drug economy, and the 
dynamics of armed groups and power struggles of local warlords or even village-level 
commanders directly.308 Thirdly, in the context of general asset deprivation after a decade-
long war and assumed high levels of poverty,309 as well as the paucity of other economic 
                                                             
306 Baghlān province has a coal mine near and a sugar factory in Pul-e Khumri. However, in terms of 
economic output and employment creation, they are not significant resources for individuals. 
307 Officially, Kunduz province was declared poppy-free in 2007 (UNODC 2007: 6). Nevertheless, in various 
hidden locations, i.e., far from the main road and any district or administrative center, poppy was still grown 
(as it was in the other two provinces) throughout the 2006-2009 period of fieldwork. 
308 See Ch. 3.2 for a discussion on security measures during fieldwork.  
309 The overall level of poverty – apart from the fact that the concept of poverty as such is problematic – in 
Afghanistan is deemed among the highest worldwide. However, detailed, systematically-collected, and 
representative data are largely missing. The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Report 2007/08 
established the national average poverty line at 1,255 Afs, i.e., US$25 in annual income, equal to the cost of 
2,100 calories per person per day and some basic non-food items (see Icon-Institute 2009: xix). According to 
the report, household size and the number of children are among the main factors that correlate with poverty. 
With the national Gini index at 29, the population is likely to possess an overall low level of asset 
disposability. Substantial inequalities are however presumed to exist in shares of consumption (ibid.: 57). 
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assets available to the members of rural society at large, environmental resources are 
unquestionably key livelihood resources around which everyday activities, such as 
production, allocation, contestation, consumption, and alteration unfold. Consequently, for 
understanding everyday governance processes, politics and the nature of local life-worlds, 
the distribution, control and overall management of environmental livelihood resources 
provides a revealing window onto the broader situation.  
In the course of fieldwork three topical case studies, each relying on a different component 
of the natural environment, that is, irrigation water, pasture land and fuel wood, were 
conducted at different locations in a multi-sited approach for each resource. These natural 
resource cases represent different degrees of subsistence and thus dependence on the 
natural environment, in the most extreme circumstances for simple survival. In the case of 
irrigation water, the users are ultimately landowners engaging in agricultural production 
for profit. They conduct all farming activities either as self-employed or employers for 
sharecroppers, laborers, relatives, and so on. Unfortunate climatic conditions and pests 
might diminish their yield, but in most cases the land is an asset and the ultimate survival 
of the entire family in one year does not depend on the outcomes of one harvest. While 
agricultural plots are privately held, rangeland areas represent common pool resources that 
are jointly used by members of the same community of herders, livestock owners and fuel 
collectors. Pasture usage and livestock breeding are income strategies that are being 
pursued in the absence of opportunities for profitable farming based on irrigation (see the 
introduction of Ch. 6.2, and also section 6.2.1). Thus, the dependence of the bulk of the 
local population in mountainous locations on access to pastures for livelihood-making is 
higher than that of settlers in the Kunduz oasis to irrigation. Finally, the de facto 
dependence of every household in rural areas on fuel wood and consequent access to 
rangelands (see Ch. 6.2), or a bazaar,310 implies that everyday practices of access 
regulation for fuel collection are likely to reveal different dynamics. Pastures face 
increasing pressure from trends of overgrazing caused by the peace dividend of increased 
livestock herding (see Ch. 6.2.1). The availability of fuel wood is limited because of large-
scale deforestation during the war years, a lack of alternative fuels, and increasing demand, 
which is partially also a consequence of peace after 2001.  
Chs. 6.1 and 6.2 reveal that paucity-enhancing factors such as natural disasters, 
overgrazing and logging because of unchecked demand create contestations and a 
politicization of access to these everyday livelihood resources. Such conflicts provide the 
researcher a magnifying lens for closer investigation because conflict situations reveal 
dynamics which are otherwise invisible to the outsider or even the long-time local 
observer. Moreover, the insights thus generated are not limited to the contested issue per se 
but help to identify dynamics and mechanisms of authority and power which can be 
generalized as underpinnings of the functioning of rural society on a larger scale, going 
beyond specific resource user communities (see Chs. 7.2-7.5).  
                                                             
310 Purchase of fuel wood at a local bazaar requires money that most of the families either do not have or do 
not want to spend for wood given the availability of biomass at nearby collection sites. For bazaar-fuel wood 
supply relations in the area of study see Yarash et al. (2010).   
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In line with the overall logic of this study with its two-fold aim of contributing to empirical 
knowledge generation on aspects of local governance, everyday politics and power in 
subsistence economic contexts in Afghanistan, and testing the assumptions of the social 
order framework by using empirical case studies – Chapter 6 ventures deep into the 
complexities of local life-worlds and everyday resource struggles. It first describes the 
settings and social relations prevalent in the resource user communities. Section 6.1.1-a 
details the results of oral history interviews and local perceptions regarding the genesis of 
the Asqalān irrigation network and settlement patterns, because it is representative of the 
historical dynamics in other water user communities of the northern region. Moreover, 
given this study’s methodological assumptions (see Ch. 3) and what the ‘(French) braiding 
approach’ detailed above, merely descriptive data presentation soon gives way to analytical 
considerations in the course of each of the subsequent sections of each case study. This 
technique enhances the complexity of reading and representing the data, while detailing the 
steps of inductive inference and analytical abstractions from the thick description offered 
beforehand. Besides focusing on the practices and moralities dimensions in the case 
studies, the sections on the preliminary differentiation of elders (section 6.1.2-c), on the 
travails of water management reforms (section 6.1.3-b), on the normative ideas as opposed 
to observed practices of rangeland use (section 6.2.2-b), and the summary in Chapter 6.2.3 
combine to pave the way for the analysis in Chapters 7 and 8 and the concluding remarks 
in Chapter 9. 
 
6.1 Irrigation water and irrigated land in the oasis of Kunduz 
This section presents three case studies of irrigation water governance located in the 
Kunduz oasis (see Maps M3 and M4). The situation in one irrigation network – Asqalān – 
will be described in detail, while the other two – Sofi-Qarayatim and Tarboz-Guzar/Qal’a-
ye Zāl – serve as control cases. They expand the focus on water distribution to take 
account of the water-land rights nexus and consequent conflicts (Ch. 6.1.2) and the 
question of water management reforms (Ch. 6.1.3), which affect all five canals in the three 
irrigation systems studied in this fieldwork.  
The absolute vitality of irrigation water (āb), efficient management, and distribution and 
network maintenance stems from the fact that over 80 percent of the Afghan population is 
dependent on agriculture and 85 percent of all crops need irrigation (Rivière 2006: 42). 
The availability of water at water course level, that is at the farmers’ field sites, where 
crops are grown, depends first of all on precipitation. Eighty percent of Afghanistan’s 
surface water resources are stored as snow in elevations above 2,000 meters (MEW 2007: 
3). In the Kunduz river basin, these are found especially in the high mountain areas of the 
upper catchment districts of Warsaj and Farkhār (see Ch. 6.2). However, due to regularly 
occurring droughts, water availability is limited and depends on the management capacities 
of local user communities. When this study was undertaken, the received wisdom was that 
both irrigation infrastructure and local governance mechanisms had totally broken down as 
result of the decades-long fierce conflict in Afghanistan. However, the research found that, 
first, the infrastructure has always been very primitive in the sense that it comprised mainly 
earthen structures, which were complemented by poles, carpets, sandbags, reed, straw, and 
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mud blocks. Secondly, water allocation at the community level and agricultural production 
did not in fact cease during the war years. 
Map M3: Field study sites in irrigation canal areas of Asqālan, Sofi-Qarayatim, Tarboz Guzar, and 
Qal’a-ye Zāl  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map M4: Kunduz river basin and irrigated areas (Source: Landell Mills Ltd. 2005) 
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6.1.1 Kunduz Markaz: Asqalān canal 
Asqalān311 melons are famous for their sweetness in Kunduz province, the whole northern 
region (samt-e shamāl), and are traded even beyond the Hindu Kush in the bazaars of 
Kabul. Accessible only a few hundred meters behind the gates of Kunduz after passing  
Ālchin bridge on the road to Emām Sāheb and the Tajikistan border post Shēr Khān 
Bandar, the Asqalān canal stretches from its intake at the Kunduz (Surkhāb) river 
northwest towards the direction of Āqtepa in the Qal’a-ye Zāl district (Ch. 6.1.3, see Map 
M3). The genesis of the canal itself and its history of settlement reflect the development of 
Kunduz oasis in an exemplary manner (section a). Moreover, I intend to argue below that 
the way irrigation water has been ‘governed’  in recent years, that is the social practices 
and moralities regulating its access, distribution, and usage reveal the entangled logic of 
social relations that characterize rural society throughout northeastern Afghanistan. I 
would like to draw these complexities out with an empirical analysis of access (section b) 
and a depiction of local life-worlds from the perspective of a downstream water manager 
(mirāb) (section c). 
 
a. Genesis and characteristics of Asqalān 
According to my interviews, the first intake construction of the main Asqalān canal started 
in 1929/30 (1308) and canal digging progressed up to the settlements called Asqalān I 
(awwal/bālā) and Asqalān II (duwum/pāyin) also known as Sāheb Khān until 1935/36 
(1314). By this time Shēr Khān312 had been appointed governor of Qataghan (see Ch. 5.1). 
Both historians and locals ascribe the development of Kunduz in the 1930s to his personal 
efforts. At his initiative the biome, largely forested swamps were turned into arable land, 
and accompanying measures like the foundation of the Da Kabul Bānk/Bānk-e Melli 
Afghān and the consequent establishment of the Sherkat Pomba (later ‘Spinzar’) Cotton 
Company in 1936/37 ignited agro-industrial production. The initial land reclaimants who 
started digging the canal appear to have been members of various quasi-indigenous 
settlement communities around Kunduz. Due to the high volatility of population 
movements in the preceding decades (see Ch. 5.1.2), several Uzbek and Turkmen clans as 
well as Chahār Aymāq313 can be presumed to have made up the indigenous population. 
They were mainly livestock-owning joint families living and tending their herds in the 
                                                             
311 As a place, Asqalān is not an administrative unit, but refers to an area (manteqa) irrigated by one main 
canal by that name. However, the residents of the upstream canal area, beyond the road at Ālchin Bridge, are 
considered to belong to Ālchin manteqa, though they initially used the canal for irrigation (Balochhā, see 
below). Asqalān manteqa is further subdivided into Tobrakash and Asqalān proper. If not otherwise indicated 
I use ‘Asqalān’ to mean the whole canal system and manteqa including both Tobrakash manteqa and Asqalān 
manteqa proper. For the concept of manteqa, see Ch. 5. 
312 Shēr Khān, also known as Shēr Khān Nashir Ghilzai (Kharoti) from Ghazni, was appointed governor of 
Qataghan by Nāder Shāh (1930-1933). He was one of three landmark entrepreneurs who jump-started 
Afghan industrialization in the 1930s. He succeeded Abdul Aziz Londoni as President of the Kunduz Cotton 
Company, after he had enabled the founding of Sherkat Pomba and the large-scale growing of cotton around 
Kunduz. See Dupree (1973: 471-474).  
313 Tribally-structured Tajiks subdivided into four tribal segments, chahār meaning ‘four’ (tribes). 
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dense forested swamps and the steppe north of Kunduz town.314 However, with the Soviet 
advance into Central Asia and the occupation of the Emirate of Bukhārā by Soviet forces 
after the Russian Revolution in 1917, the first wave of refugees from Bukhārā (muhājerin) 
settled south of the Āmu Daryā. They presumably integrated quite well with the local 
population because of kin relations, similar modes of livelihood-making315 and the 
generally low population and consequent availability of pasture resources (fodder) and 
settlement land.316 In the late 1920s and early 1930s, a second wave of ‘Turkmen’ refugees 
from Faridaryā of the former Emirate of Bukhārā and by then incorporated under Soviet 
rule, coincided with Shēr Khān’s land reclamation plans, including the beginning of works 
at Asqalān canal.317  
Thus, by the mid-1930s the succession of settlements along Asqalān from head to then-tail 
– in Wulus, a place near today’s Bēshbāla (Map M5) – included Fārsiwān, such as 
Larghābi-Aymāq and other Tajiks, but the majority belonged to Turkic-speaking groups. 
Among them were Qongherāt, Laqai, and other Turkmen as well as Uzbek tribesmen318 
who had arrived in 1929. The internal colonization policy (see Ch. 5.1), paired with Shēr 
Khān’s vision of Kunduz as the breadbasket for Afghanistan resulted in the further 
allotment of land and settling of Pashtun tribesmen throughout Kunduz oasis.319 Hāji 
Muhamad Sarwar from Maymana320 was reportedly the first elder of subsequent waves of 
Pashtun settlers to appear in Asqalān in the second half of the 1930s.321 He started out 
living among the inhabitants of Wulus and expanded the Asqalān canal from there in the 
decade 1938/39-1948/49 (1317-27). According to the government policy of the time, vast 
plots of land were allotted to whoever would commit to turning these lands into arable 
fields for cash crops, especially government-subsidized cotton. Descendants of the first 
Turkmen settlers reported that their grandfathers were allocated 6,000 jerib of land in 
                                                             
314 At that time the seat of the governor was in Khānābād; the provincial administration was shifted to 
Baghlān in 1938 (Grötzbach 1979: 77). Until the establishment of the new city from 1934, Kunduz was not 
important as town (ibid.: 78). 
315 The refugees from Bukhārā – members of different Turkmen and Uzbek tribes and Farghānachi – were 
offspring of very well-to-do families who had owned large herds in Bukhārā. Alhough the losses of family 
members and livestock during the flight when crossing the Āmu Daryā river were significant, they started 
over with livestock-rearing because they found the area suitable.  
316 However, one interview showed contradictory evidence according to which the Qongherāt from Bukhārā 
had to purchase land from the Turkmen and were initially harassed and rejected by them. These accounts 
referred to the second wave of refugees (Interview in Wulus/Asqalān, June 2007). Today the Qongherāt 
(‘Uzbeks’) settle downstream from the Turkmen.  
317 Hāji Qara, reportedly an ‘Uzbek’, is known to be the founder of Asqalān canal (Interview in 
Wulus/Asqalān, 10 April 2006). 
318 Respondents referred to these ‘other’ early settlers as Turkmen, but it remains unclear whether this view 
accords their self-identification at the time of their arrival south of the Āmu Daryā.  
319 However, the common interpretation that only Pashtuns were settled and treated preferentially is not 
correct. In addition, other population groups like the Moghols (or Mongols) (see Schurmann 1962) or Aymāq 
from Paghmān, as one elder reported, were also given land during that period (Interview, 15 April 2006). 
320 Originally, Hāji Sarwar came from Kandahar, but first headed towards Bādghis where he and his 
followers stayed for a short period before settling down in Maymana. Whenever they moved on, some of 
their relatives decided to stay behind so that they spoke of Musazai relatives in Kandahar, Bādghis, and 
Maymana at the time of fieldwork. 
321 Ethnic differences were reportedly not an issue at that time.  
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Asqalān by the government;322 others remembered that individuals had bought 5-10 jerib. 
Similarly, Hāji Sarwar and his people (Musazai Pashtuns) were allocated between 6,000 
and 10,000 jerib323 of land by Shēr Khān in the adjacent area on condition that they 
successfully reclaim it for agricultural production.324 It is important to stress that 
cultivation of the land was not initially of much significance to these early settlers, 
including the newly-arrived Pashtuns because their dominant mode of life was semi-
pastoral livestock-rearing. Thus, the allocation of land for which taxes had to be paid to the 
government was not as much such a fortune as it might appear in hindsight. In interviews 
this was repeatedly evoked with the saying that ‘we did not know how sweet (shirin) the 
land could be’, meaning that its productive potential was not recognized at that time.  
 
Map M5: Asqalān canal 
 
Nevertheless, Hāji Sarwar with the initial few (100-200) families from Maymana and other 
tribal relatives arriving from Kandahar started to extend the canal from Wulus. According 
to his son, laborers (Arab) from Chārdara, Khānābād, Archi, and other places around 
                                                             
322 Reportedly, Turkmen’s initial ownership documents for 6,000 jerib are dated 1314 (1935/36).  
323 The amount of jerib reported to have been allocated to Hāji Sarwar are somewhat contradictory; for 
example, Hāji Rahmat Khān stated it to be 6,000-7,000 jerib, while Saifudin claimed it had been 10,000 jerib 
(Interviews, 10 April 2006, 15 April 2006, and 8 May 2007). 
324 Ownership titles were only given after successful reclamation. See Ch. 5.  
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Kunduz were hired with Shēr Khān’s help for hashar325 in canal digging.326 As a result, 
after several years of work, Hāji Sarwar reclaimed approximately an area of land roughly 
equal to the original upper part; it consisted of 6,000 jerib split among 14 families who 
registered the land in the name of 120 households.327 The extended canal from Asqalān 
further downstream and the adjacent settlement (manteqa) area came to be known as 
Tobrakash.328 Early ‘settlement’ was in practice confined to the erection of the settlers’ 
tents or straw shelters along the area cleared from forest at the border between steppe and 
irrigable land. Only with the passage of time and the transition towards agricultural crop 
production did permanent homesteads appear and significant population growth begins. 
Subsequently, the Tobrakash settlers concluded a second agreement with the government 
to reclaim another 1,000-2,000 jerib of forested swamps for cultivation. It is unclear 
whether any special bond existed between Shēr Khān and Hāji Muhamad Sarwar, besides 
the fact that they were both Pashtuns and likely referred to a shared qawm-belonging329 as 
opposed to the population groups described above as indigenous and quasi-indigenous. 
Given that the available literature (see Ch. 5.1.2) emphasizes the strategic motivations of 
the government for the internal colonization and settlement of Pashtuns in Afghanistan’s 
northern provinces, the common reading tells that Pashtuns received preferential treatment 
in comparison with the other groups on ethnic grounds.330 This is supported by reports of 
complaints by neighboring groups of adjacent areas about the amount of land Hāji Sarwar 
and his qawm received from Shēr Khān. For example, settlers from Āqtepa (either the 
Turkmen who constitute the majority of the population in Āqtepa today or other non-
Pashtun settlers) and from Jangi Āryq who had actually helped dig the canal demanded 
their share of land from Hāji Sarwar. He rejected the first group’s claims, but gave away 
300-400 jerib to the latter who reportedly had come from Paktiya. Well after Shēr Khān’s 
time as governor of Qataghan, a final influx of Pashtun settlers (nāqel)331 at the tail-end of 
the Asqalān canal (Tobrakash manteqa) is reported as late as 1957-60 (1336-1338).  
                                                             
325 Hashar – usually mutual self-help employment and/or communal work within one residential cluster – 
was forced upon laborers here (Dupree 1973: 474), because they did not receive any adequate payment. Hāji 
Rahmat Khān reported that his father had to host and feed the workers.  
326 Reportedly Shēr Khān himself regularly came to oversee the work from a settee set up above the gully-
works. The area that was worked on was difficult terrain, where water had washed away considerable 
stretches of land before and considerable manpower was necessary to make an impact. The Turkmen of the 
adjacent canal area had previously failed to reclaim the land. In the renewed effort the workers used casks 
(tobra) (see fn. 328) in a line of up to 40 men to pull the soil out from 20-25 meters below. 
327 Interestingly, different interview accounts report that by the time these Pashtun settlers (nāqel) arrived, the 
whole upper Asqalān area had already been cleared of trees and forest, except for one mound where the 
newly arrived Pashtuns first dug a pond to water their livestock.   
328 The designation Tobrakash literally consists of tobra – the type of cask used to pull out soil and carry 
water – and kash from the verb kashidan, to pull something. 
329 One interviewee claimed that Hāji Sarwar’s people (Musazai) were the relatives of Shēr Khān’s uncle 
(Interview Wulus, June 2007). 
330 Because ethnicity was not important at that time, a reassessment in terms of tribal, qawm, and kinship 
terms is more adequate.  
331 The terms nāqel, Pashtun(s), and Kandahari are often used interchangeably by locals, both Pashtun and 
non-Pashtun. Strictly speaking, though, nāqel were those who migrated from southern and eastern 
Afghanistan on invitation of the government and confident of being allotted government land on favorable 
terms.   
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It must be assumed that, over the years, the canal and irrigation command area changed 
shape and appearance due to regular high flooding in summer.332 Moreover, the intake 
(sarband) from the river shifted with its course. High levels of siltation in the secondary 
and tertiary canals add to the reasons why the landscape level has changed significantly 
over the last seven decades. Due to its proximity to the steppe, Asqalān soil is especially 
sandy and only partially loam, as clay dominates. As a result of the described land 
reclamation efforts, Asqalān canal (including both, Asqalān and Tobrakash) extended over 
a length of approximately 20 km.333 In 2006, the area comprised fifty mosque 
communities, more than 6,000 families,334 and a command area of 27,000 jerib of land,335 
not all of which was being cultivated.336   
Population numbers are in constant flux due to the arrival of returning refugees and 
renewed departures from settlements along the main canal and its command area. 
Interviews revealed that during the Soviet intervention, the Soviet forces had a base near 
Tobrakash in Dasht-e Ābdān, and the local population suffered considerable casualties on a 
daily basis. This led most families from Asqalān to flee to Pakistan and/or Iran, with only 
the nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists (kochi) reportedly staying behind initially.337 
After the Soviet withdrawal many families returned but left again during the civil war or 
the Taliban period. For example, one respondent mentioned that 500 families from 
upstream Asqalān had fled the country because of a drought that occurred and the rule of 
commanders who used to enlist people’s sons for their turf wars during the mujahedin 
period.338 Since the establishment of the Karzai government in 2001, people have started to 
                                                             
332 During the interviews, several incidents were mentioned when a number of homesteads had been washed 
away by water in different years.  
333 Different figures for the canal length were recorded by Welthungerhilfe field staff (18 versus 21 
kilometers). Regarding the technical set-up of the canal, 40 offtakes (diverters for secondary canals) and six 
band (dams) in the upper part (Asqalān) and 27 major offtakes plus four band exist in the lower (Tobrakash) 
part. As a rule, the individual names of the offtakes and band match the names of the owner of the adjoining 
land plots and often also change with inherited ownership from father to (mostly the eldest) son (Interview, 
17 April 2006).  
334 Family is defined here as household, i.e. several couples with children and possibly multiple generations 
who live together and use a joint cooking facility. In another document, the number of core families is given 
as more than 9,000 in 3,100 housing units. The contradiction cannot be resolved, but provides ample 
evidence of how carefully all figures have to be treated in Afghanistan. 
335 According to a survey conducted by Welthungerhilfe (internal documentation of Site Selection Cluster 
List, August 23, 2006).  
336 Land which is likely to not get water in a given season is left fallow. That is why the number of irrigable 
versus irrigated jerib at any point of time may vary considerably. For Asqalān and Tobrakash differing 
numbers of jerib were reported, depending on the agenda and knowledge of the interviewee. For example, 
Saifudin stated the cultivated area has increased due to the extensive use of water pumps, which alone would 
irrigate 4,000 jerib (Interview, 2 September 2007). Moreover, he stated that he reported the number of 20,000 
jerib to account for the entire irrigation system to the NGO because he felt this would aid his cause of having 
as much infrastructure as possible overhauled. According to the calculations of Abdullayev et al. (2007), the 
command area of Asqalān canal in 2006-07 (1385-86) was only 14,500 jerib.  
337 According to a different account (from upstream Asqalān, non-Pashtun respondent), approximately 50 
percent of the families left for Pakistan during the time of the Soviet occupation. They stayed three to four 
years in Pakistan and returned during the mujahedin period, only to leave again after the rise of the Taliban. 
Finally, they came back under the new Karzai government. 
338 Interview, 15 April 2006. 
145 
 
return in large numbers.339 According to the Kunduz Provincial Department for Refugee 
Affairs, considerable numbers of people have registered as returnees in Asqalān proper, in 
four sub-communities of Qoy Guzar, and in Tobrakash and Baloch.340 Table 3 gives an 
annual breakdown of returning refugees in Kunduz Markaz District from 2002-2006, a 
total of 43,292 people (UNHCR 2006).341  
Table 3: Number of returning refugees, Kunduz Markaz, 2002-2006 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006342 
Returning 
Refugees 
9,221 6,946 17,094 6.951 3,080 
However, in conversations during 2006 and 2007, it was generally assumed that about 50 
percent of the inhabitants of Tobrakash and Baloch from before the war had not yet 
returned or had returned and found their existence in Afghanistan to have no prospect with 
houses destroyed, land broken and dry, and no support from the government, so that they 
ultimately went back to Pakistan.343  
At the time of fieldwork, the following groups344 inhabited the command area along the 
Asqalān canal: high on the hillside near the intake is a Baloch settlement (named 
‘Baloch’). Asqalān-inhabitants claim that the Baloch are landless, while the Baloch claim 
that they had farmland on the other side of the stream and river, but lost most of it because 
the river changed its course. They are mainly livestock owners, with animals herded year-
round in the steppe (Dasht-e Ābdān) behind the dwellings in the direction of Shēr Khān 
Bandar. Originally, the Baloch emigrated from Mehmani near the Iranian border. Over 
four generations they have lost their Baloch language and speak Pashto and Fārsi today. 
The main road to Shēr Khān Bandar and Emām Sāheb cuts their settlement area off from 
the rest of the Asqalān-canal residential clusters. In the manteqa of Asqalān proper highly 
mixed settlement structures dominate. A second cluster can thus be identified with a mixed 
settlement of Fārsiwān (Tajiks and Uzbek sub-tribes) and Pashtuns. The previously 
mentioned Larghābi-Aymāq and Turkmen sold some of their land to arriving Uzbeks 
                                                             
339 The political situation and instability in the border regions and tribal areas of Pakistan (FATA), where 
most of the refugee camps were originally located, have resulted in return movements. In Waziristan and 
FATA in general all people have left those camps; they either returned to Afghanistan or diffused into 
Pakistan’s urban centers. 
340 Interview with deputy from Provincial Department for Refugees in Kunduz, 1 September 2007. 
341 The number of officially registered returnees in Kunduz Markaz district is higher than in any other district 
of the province partly because of the attraction of the provincial municipality. However, interview accounts 
also indicated that a considerable number of people returned to the rural areas, especially the Asqalān canal 
area. The other Kunduz districts with considerable officially-registered returnee numbers were Khānābād 
with 43,068 returnees, Emām Sāheb with 38,530, Archi with 34,806, Chārdara with 31,342, Aliābād with 
25,968 and Qal’a-ye Zāl with only 6,475 people (data from UNHCR 2006).   
342 As of 30 September 2006. 
343 These are up to 500 families in Pakistan mainly working in construction and other laboring jobs. There is 
significant reluctance to come back to Afghanistan because of fears that Pakistani authorities might deny 
them access back into Pakistan should they need to return. 
344 Self-designation of respondents, presented here in five ethno-social settlement clusters. The cluster 
denomination is simplified for demonstrative purposes: in reality, though, the clusters are not ethnically 
homogeneous. 
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because they initially could not afford to pay the taxes on it.345 This has resulted in a highly 
mixed settlement pattern of Uzbeks (e.g., Qongherāt, Laqai), Aymāq (e.g., Larghābi), and 
members of different Turkmen tribes in the other areas. A third cluster is clearly dominated 
by Turkmen (around ‘Turkmanhā’),346 a fourth by Qongherāt and Uzbek sub-tribes 
(Wulus, Bēshbālā) at the end of upstream Asqalān manteqa. Asqalān manteqa (proper) 
from the road up to Jarāldi is home to approximately 9,600 people.347 Downstream 
Tobrakash manteqa is inhabited exclusively by Pashtuns, numbering approximately 7,800 
people348 at the time of fieldwork. The Pashtuns in Tobrakash belong to five different 
qawm, which are segmented into at least 15 sub-tribes (qabila): Baloch,349 Taraki, Lodin, 
Tonzai, and Watak are the largest in numbers, while others are Pirozai, Shashbār, 
Shimālzai, Babrakazai, Musazai, Umarzai, Delagharmai, Kharoti, Salālzai, and Jalālzai.  
From a livelihood perspective, most of the residents along the canal are presumably 
landless. For example, only 120 families of the estimated 1,500 families inhabiting 
Tobrakash are said to own land, while others are kochi, sharecroppers, or daily laborers. 
The proximity to Kunduz and the bazaar provide opportunities for off-farm work as 
traders, shopkeepers, and wage laboring in the town or other villages. The landless from 
the middle-section of the canal in particular are reported to seek daily laboring jobs in 
Kunduz, Kandahar and Kabul. From Bēshbālā alone, 40 people were said to be in 
Kandahar, where jobs with a daily wage of up to 500 Afs were easily found, whether at 
construction sites like the U.S. airfield in Kandahar, in poppy harvesting, or by joining the 
army (ANA). Livestock is currently more profitable than in the past and a very flexible 
source of income which can be exchanged for cash instantly in an emergency. Cursory 
inquiries into livelihood patterns showed that people who also own considerable land plots 
                                                             
345 The taxes charged by the authorities of the day reportedly forced many families that had received land on 
preferential terms to sell part of it because they were unable to meet the tax demands. This was also the 
reason why Hāji Muhamad Sarwar split up the land among his tribesmen. According to various respondents, 
one jerib of land was sold for one Kabuli Afghāni at the time of Shēr Khān. Taxes amounted to 6-10 cents 
per jerib. If someone failed to pay taxes, soldiers with sticks were sent and “took people like sheep tied in 
ropes.” However, instead of being jailed these people were asked to sell livestock in order to pay the taxes: 
“Cash was not available. It was difficult to pay the taxes. One chārak cooking oil was 1 cent and one kg of 
meat was 3-5 cents. I remember we had taken barley and maize to Kunduz and could not sell it for one cent 
in the bazaar. (…) My father purchased one goat for one Kabuli Afghāni and sold it for two. He sold one 
sheep to Qal’a-ye Zāl for two to three Kabuli Afghāni.” (Interview Wulus, June 2007). 
346 According to locals, four Turkmen villages and mosques are located (Roz Alam, Nazar Bāy/Malakh, 
Awalgēldi/Qyrq, and Muhibullah) around the Roz Alam Friday-praying mosque. Except for the Turkmen 
living in Muhibullah, they all belong to the bigger Khazān tribe which belongs to the Qara Bēka Gul branch 
of Turkmen tribal society. Three Turkmen villages have very close relationships, which find expression in 
intermarriages and coming together for social gatherings and festivities. The Muhibullah Turkmen are 
reportedly excluded from these social rituals because they belong to the Awaltepa tribe, which has 
traditionally had a lower social status among different ethnicities. Both groups of Turkmen have relatives in 
Tarboz Guzar of the Qal’a-ye Zāl district and in Chārdara, with whom they also intermarry. For example, the 
mirāb of Tarboz Guzar, Wahid Mirāb, belongs to the Dali-sub tribe of the Qara Bēka Gul/Khazān branch, as 
do many other Asqalān Turkmen.  
347 Population figures are taken from SMWA-project documentation (Table: Side Selection Cluster with Sub-
Mosques in Asqalān and Tobrakash Villages, 23 August 2006). 
348 Ibid. Tobrakash residents claim to be 3,000 families in 1,000 households, though SMWA-data as well as 
preliminary estimations of GRSP for the implementation of the NSP suggest that there are no more than 
1,500 families.  
349 The Tobrakash Baloch are related to the Baloch, who live near the intake area. They have visiting and 
marriage relations. 
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generally engage in livestock rearing as well. While in upper Asqalān manteqa there is 
hardly evidence for the existence of households that rely solely on animal rearing, in 
Tobrakash entire kochi communities exist which in the past migrated from Dasht-e Ābdān 
to Badakhshān. Most stay in Dasht-e Ābdān because of disputes over pastures and the 
denial of access in Badakhshān and other aylāq destinations. Turkmen women engage in 
carpet weaving, though not to the extent and as professionally as in Qal’a-ye Zāl and 
Tarboz Guzar (see below). Contrasting accounts were recorded regarding remittances 
being sent from Pakistan to Baloch and Tobrakash families. Some stated that their relatives 
in Pakistan are not in a financial position to send money, while others claimed that as much 
as 50 percent of the households in Tobrakash receive remittances.  
In political terms, the local rule of commanders has shaped local relations of power and 
dependency over the course of thirty years. According to some informants, these 
commanders are still feared. The pattern of political influence matches the politicizing and 
ethnicizing influences during the civil war period. For example, one of the most famous 
commanders from Asqalān was Qalich Āghā, a Turkmen who made his name in the 
resistance against Soviet forces as Hezb-e Islāmi commander when Hezb-e Islāmi of 
Gulb’udin Hekmatyār – himself a native of nearby Emām Sāheb – was most prominent and 
embodied the violent resistance.350 During the civil war, Qalich Āghā became the 
commander of Dostum’s rising Junbesh forces in the area, constantly defending Junbesh’s 
influence against Mas’ud’s Jam’iat-e Islāmi and other power seekers. At that time, Qalich 
Āghā was the most influential commander in Kunduz besides Said Hamidullah from 
Harakat and both ruled over the province with the help of local sub-commanders until the 
Taliban came and reportedly killed both men.351 At the time of fieldwork, upstream 
inhabitants claimed that the Pashtuns in Tobrakash had joined the Taliban when they took 
over the government in Kunduz. However, the most influential Taliban commander in 
Asqalān, commander Raof, originated from an upstream community (Bāy Merzā). A 
common discursive framing is, “after he joined the Taliban we appointed him our 
commander.” This account of residents of Bēshbālā, who claim to be Uzbeks, with regard 
to Raof suggests that the local ‘rise to power’ of so-called Taliban did not necessarily 
involve oppression or any kind of subjugation by force or ideological means (see also Ch. 
7.3). For Asqalān it can be summarized that the conflict patterns which evolved over the 
war period (1978-2001) and especially after the Soviet forces’ withdrawal resulted in a 
sharp division of upstream and downstream communities manifested in strong identities of 
Tobrakash (downstream) and Asqalān proper (upstream). 
 
b. Irrigation water governance 
In this section, I use fieldwork data from Asqalān to describe who is able to get water for 
irrigation, when, and how. Therefore, not only events and incidents that could be observed 
                                                             
350 One interviewee reported that Qalich Āghā had been his soldier at one time and told him that Hezb-e 
Islāmi had ordered him to burn down the local school. He followed the order and killed two guards 
(Interview with Qāri Rahmatullah, 17 May 2006). 
351 Qalich Āghā reportedly succeeded Said Hamidullah as provincial commander (amir) until he was killed 
by Aref Khān (see 6.1.2-c). 
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during fieldwork are taken into account, but in addition reported developments in previous 
years are considered.  
1385 turned out to be a water scarce year. At the time I started my fieldwork in the last 
days of March – just days after the Afghan New Year (Nawroz) on 21 March 2006 (1st 
Hamal 1385) – every day approximately 200 laborers came by bicycle and motorbike on 
non-existent roads from as far as the tail end of the canal in Tobrakash to fix its intake at 
the Kunduz river site before the start of irrigation season. The number of workers 
(mardikār) mobilized for intake construction and repair works is directly related to the size 
of cultivated land in the canal system.352 Likewise, the amount of water to be allocated in 
times of scarcity according to a pre-determined irrigation schedule is dependent on the size 
of land to be irrigated. Both aspects are overseen by locally appointed mirāb (water 
manager/s; literally: water lord/s) for the main canal, assisted by several kokbāshi for a 
number of sub-canals and monitoring tasks along the main canal.353 Mirāb and kokbāshi 
embody the customary mechanisms of water management in the absence of enforced 
statutory regulations.354 They are responsible for intake construction, canal maintenance, 
and overall repair works as well as the ‘rightful’ distribution of water in times of scarcity.   
Where usually one mirāb (also called mirāb bāshi, mirāb-e ‘umumi, and mirāb-e kalān) 
would be in charge of water distribution and maintenance for each canal system, 
landowners in Asqalān appointed two mirāb, reflecting the strong division between the 
upstream (Asqalān proper) and downstream (Tobrakash) manteqa. Varying accounts exist 
regarding when this new tradition began and at whose initiative. Interviewees from 
Tobrakash stressed the unjust move by upstream farmers to install their own mirāb during 
the revolution period despite the previous widely recognized practice that the mirāb would 
have to be appointed from downstream. By contrast, farmers from the upper Asqalān 
manteqa claimed that at one point of time not a single elder remained in Tobrakash who 
would have had the ability to supervise water distribution. They argued that since the 
appointment of the mirāb had always followed qualification and competence criteria rather 
than considerations regarding the mirāb’s origin and location of land, a candidate with 
inadequate qualification was not acceptable. Thus, they justified their move to appoint their 
own mirāb, who according to the prior customary regulation could have only served as 
kokbāshi355 for the entire canal because his lands are located upstream. No matter how it 
                                                             
352 When I talk of ‘canal system‘ or ‘irrigation system’, I refer to the main canal with its web of secondary, 
tertiary, and further minor branches, offtakes, dividers, dams, etc., which are used to divert the water to the 
field sites within the canal’s command area.  
353 The main canal itself branches off along dozens of offtakes which give way to secondary streams from 
which tertiary ditches channel water to fields farther away. For a detailed description, see Ter Steege (2006) 
and Abdullayev et al. (2007).  
354 Two Water Acts had previously been decreed in 1981 (1360) and 1991 (1370), see GoA 1981, GoA 1991. 
However, the degree of enforcement remains unclear. Since then, no new national-level Water Law was 
issued until 2009 (see 6.1.3-b).    
355 The kokbāshi is usually thought to be in charge of strictly technical tasks but not decision-making in 
water-provision. However, this division of labor differs in the various irrigation systems, depending on the 
size and the consequent command area that the kokbāshi controls. See especially the case of Qal’a-ye Zāl in 
section 6.1.3-a.   
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began,356 the ongoing intake reconstruction in spring 2006 was supervised by Sofi Ghulām 
Nabi (mirāb bāshi)357 from Asqalān proper – and there assisted by Murad Khān (kokbāshi) 
– and Fazl Jān (mirāb) of Tobrakash with two kokbāshi and several other helpers. Both 
mirāb had been newly appointed approximately half a year earlier.358 Given that their 
predecessors, mirāb Saifudin Mirāb359 in Asqalān and mirāb Ustād Qadir in Tobrakash, 
had served for more than ten and three years respectively, the appointment of two new 
people who had not been mirāb or kokbāshi before, was remarkable and called for an 
inquiry into the motives for this shift in personnel (see further below).  
Over the course of long-term fieldwork, it became clear that intake construction measures 
and canal repair before and during irrigation season (10 to 20 fixes per year) require high 
inputs of manpower and time from the water users’ side, thorough planning when possible, 
and constant monitoring and oversight by the mirāb. At times when water availability is 
limited, the three months of canal digging from 20 February onwards until the time of the 
wheat and sesame harvest at the end of May or early June are followed by the mirāb’s and 
their assistants’ regulating the water flow by damming it with simple straw, wood, or 
carpet constructions that are regularly swept away by the flood from the snowmelt arriving 
in summer.360 Subsequently, new check dams have to be set up and the intake repaired for 
the irrigation of the second crop.361 Often, sandbags are used, which had been requested 
from the provincial government’s Irrigation Department (ID) or purchased with financial 
contributions of water users. The mirāb collect the money from the landowners based on 
the amount of land cultivated by individual owners. Depending on the sum of money 
needed for the purchase of tools, sacks, or – in exceptional cases – machinery rental, the 
mirāb calculate a contribution for qulba-units of 40 jerib. For example, if a farmer 
cultivates 120 jerib of land and the mirāb requests a contribution for intake maintenance 
material (e.g., for sacks) of 100 Afs per qulba (40 jerib),362 the landowner would owe 300 
                                                             
356 During the long drought period in the late 1990s, the Taliban governor of Kunduz, Aref Khān had 
reportedly ordered the Asqalān water users to appoint two mirāb after upstream water users had submitted a 
petition to solve their water conflict. A subsequent assembly (jalsa) of local elders decided on a water 
rotation that gave Tobrakash six days water and Asqalān five, a reasonably equitable solution because the 
water needs about a day to even reach downstream Tobrakash. 
357 The term mirāb bāshi literally means ‘head mirāb’ and is traditionally connoted with a superior position 
of one mirāb over other water managers in the same irrigation network. A synonym in the proper sense of 
meaning is mirāb-e kalān (‘big mirāb’/’elder mirāb). In common parlance both terms, mirāb-e kalān and 
mirāb bāshi are used synonymously with mirāb and that is how I will use it throughout the thesis, i.e. without 
making a distinction if not indicated otherwise.  
358 Sofi Ghulām Nabi was appointed in Mizān 1384 (23 September-22 October 2005), Fazl Jān in the 
following month of Aqrab (23 October-21 November 2005).  
359 A person’s title often merges with his name, especially if a the function designated by the title is carried 
out over a long period of time, e.g. mirāb Saifudin is also called Saifudin Mirāb, but not so mirāb Fazl Jān or 
mirāb Abdul Salam in Tobrakash. Similar cases have been recorded for Wahid Mirāb and – given their 
significance – for different commanders and ‘General’ (the latter titles precede the actual name, e.g. General 
Dostum). Throughout this thesis I adopt locals’ usage of terms, names, and titles.  
360 The Kunduz river tributaries originate in the mountain ranges of the central Afghan Hindu Kush and are 
carrying water from glacial melt and the previous winter’s precipitation in the form of snow.  
361 Typical crops, besides rice, include wheat, melons, grapes, cotton, and vegetables. 
362 Indeed, contributions for maintenance usually amount to two to three Afs per jerib of cultivated land. The 
money is collected by the mirāb according to when he can afford the time. I met Fazl Jān, the Tobrakash 
mirāb, when he walked from house to house collecting the contributions one day. According to him, it takes 
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Afs. If his neighbor only cultivates 10 jerib, he is asked to contribute 25 Afs. Qulba363 is 
also the reference unit for manpower contributions at the intake. Accordingly, one laborer 
per qulba has to be sent by the landowner if he does not participate in the ongoing works 
himself. The 120 jerib-farmer (3 qulba) thus sends three laborers per day for the duration 
of intake works, the 10 jerib-farmer only has to go every fourth day because he cultivates 
only a quarter of a qulba. Throughout Asqalān, the qulba-unit always remains fixed at 40 
jerib. No distinction is made with regard to the land quality and location of irrigated fields. 
Consequently, water users from Tobrakash expressed a high degree of dissatisfaction and 
frustration in April 2006 given that they had not received their rightful share of water in the 
previous two years despite contributing equally to maintenance and repair works.   
The interviews revealed several factors that influenced the disproportionate availability of 
water in the tail-end communities of Tobrakash despite existing and mutually agreed-upon 
rules for allocation in times of scarcity.364 One, as already mentioned, was that the rule for 
mirāb-appointment from the downstream area was changed during the revolution period. 
Several accounts recall that in the early 1990s Asqalān proper alone had as many as seven 
mirāb at the same time, because almost every commander insisted on having an own water 
warden during the mujahedin period. Local commanders were appointed in each village by 
more senior superior commanders, who belonged to different factions of the former 
mujahedin. The ensuing ethnic differentiation of the successive years (see the example of 
Qalich Āghā above) with a further fragmentation of political belonging and regular 
switching or ‘buying’ of political allegiance between Hezb-e Islāmi (Gulb’udin 
Hekmatyār) and Junbesh which both fought Jam’iat-e Islāmi and Harakat, resulted in first-
come, first-served irrigation practices and a neglect of infrastructure maintenance. 
Venality, that is, the purchasability of loyalty, mostly for weapons,365 a growing 
selfishness among members of local rural society, and resultant highly fluctuating personal 
loyalties characterized the mujahedin period. The appointment of mirāb Saifudin, Sofi 
Ghulām Nabi’s predecessor as Asqalān upstream mirāb, dates back to this time. Prior to 
1978, Saifudin had served as kokbāshi under a Tobrakash mirāb, and in the 1990s, he 
evolved into one of the most influential people in all of Asqalān, holding, for example, the 
post of upstream mirāb until mid-2005.366 Given the circumstances described, it is obvious 
that at the time of the mujahedin in the mid-1990s, a person appointed mirāb had to be a 
supporter of the commanders’ interests in (exploitative) local cash crop production.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
him a full week to collect the money. He usually first has to pay out of his own pocket (Interview with Fazl 
Jān, 15 May 2006).   
363 Literally: plough. As area measurement unit for water allocation, the qulba-jerib ratio varies in different 
irrigation networks (e.g., Asqalān versus Qal’a-ye Zāl), depending on the quality of land, etc. In Asqalān and 
most other cases one qulba is fixed at 40 jerib. 
364 ‘Scarcity’ is used here to mean low water level in the canal due to both constraints in actual seasonal 
water supply in the river (caused by late snowmelt, etc.) and management shortcomings in the broadest sense. 
The usual rotation schedule in case of normal water availability (80-90% of expected water flow) envisages 
rotation every eight hours, while in times of low water flow, six hours is the agreed norm and in abundant 
water conditions, 12-hour-turns apply (Mielke et al. 2010: 196).  
365 According to one former commander in Tobrakash, careers could be made at that time by specializing in 
weapons trade. Interview, 17 April 2006.  
366 According to his own accounts, Saifudin (Aymāq) has worked 33 years in local irrigation management, as 
kokbāshi and mirāb.  
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It is unclear how water distribution towards the canal’s tail end was negotiated in times of 
scarcity. Presumably, just as reported for the fieldwork period, the fixed rotation times for 
‘low’ water of six hours would have been observed only after upstream commanders had 
taken sufficient quantities of water for their own crops. In any case, sophisticated 
negotiation between tail-end users and upstream landowners would have been required to 
ensure access to water in times of limited availability. Interestingly, some interview 
accounts suggest that in individual incidents, sub-commanders in Tobrakash and Asqalān 
proper who were subordinate to the same provincial-level commander, that is, of the same 
faction, were more likely to find an agreement for sharing water than members of head-end 
versus tail-end communities in one irrigation network.  
The increased cultivation of rice367 was one feature of the unfolding rural war economy. 
Local rice yielded high prices during the war and thus constituted a valuable source of 
income for local commanders who had the means to enforce water allocation. At the head 
end of Asqalān, rice cultivation expanded considerably at that time, given the favorable 
water situation near the intake and the soil composition368 in this area. The impact of 
extensive rice-growing posed not only a major problem for downstream water users, who 
were deprived of considerable amounts of water needed by the rice-growers. It also caused 
the water table to rise and consequent water-logging so that at the time of fieldwork, no 
other crop would actually grow on this soil but rice. The growth of the rice crop to the 
detriment of others created a situation which again reinforced the pressure on and 
contestation over irrigation water, which might partially explain why the farmers who own 
land closest to the intake in upper Asqalān reject any demands of the downstream water 
users to cut back and cease rice cultivation (which is no longer profitable). An appeal of 
the Tobrakash farmers to the ID to intervene and prevent water-intensive rice cultivation at 
the head end of the canal has been successful in the sense that the government agency 
indeed issued such a decree in spring 2007. However, the upstream landowners argued that 
due to their location at the head end, they naturally have a right to abandon rotation among 
themselves and thus to use more water, even if the downstream water users depend on 
rotation: “Gap-e zur ast, gap-e qānon nēst.”369  
Another aspect stemming from the past that determined access to irrigation water and local 
power relations at the time of fieldwork seemed to be the rice-growing commanders’ 
special relations with and influence in the bazaar of Kunduz. Because of its strategic 
location at the east-west connection from other northern districts of Afghanistan towards 
                                                             
367 Under previous regimes, i.e., during the reign of Zāher Shāh, Muhamad Dāod, and Najibullah, the focus 
on cotton as the primary cash crop did not allow for the possibility of rice cultivation. Whether it was actually 
forbidden, remains unclear from the interviews. 
368 The soil is more saline, less fertile, and more suitable for rice cultivation than for other crops. Neighboring 
cultivators downstream of the rice fields are affected because their soil will also increase in salinity, causing 
crop losses and water-logging over the medium and long term. Thus, at many levels rice-growing results in 
conflicts and decisions to grow rice by a single farmer must be agreed to by the cultivators of the plots 
adjoining his fields in order to prevent conflicts in the long term. Noted down by Shah, Asqalān, 27 June 
2007.  
369 The words of a young farmer in Sāheb Khān of upper Asqalān manteqa, “It is a matter of force, not the 
law.” ibid. Another farmer added the view that since they contributed to canal intake construction and repair 
works, they have the right to grow the crop of their choice, “nahr-e khudemān ast, mā haq dārem” (literally: 
“It’s our stream, we have the right”). 
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Badakhshān and its central position on the north-south axis from the border of Tajikistan 
towards Pul-e Khumri, Chārikār, and Kabul, the Kunduz bazaar was the main trade center. 
Interviewees (from the middle part of the canal) claimed that large landowners from upper 
Asqalān enjoy very good relations with ‘very powerful people’, such as government 
officers, members of the secret service, and police departments, who support rice 
cultivation at the cost of downstream water users.370     
Despite the fact that maintenance and repair works keep a mirāb busy before and 
throughout the entire irrigation season, the significance of his job is most obvious during 
the implementation and enforcement of rotation schedules when limited irrigation water is 
available. In these circumstances, tensions among farmers run high because crops threaten 
to fail and livelihoods are endangered. Water shortages occur for several reasons besides 
the already mentioned rice cultivation and long-term drought: every irrigation season 
carries the risk of late snowmelt, low precipitation, unseasonal heat, or damage at intake 
constructions causing periodic water scarcity in the fields. In such cases, clear rules for 
regulating scarce water resources exist.371 If water is sufficient and flows abundantly in the 
canals, no intervention by the mirāb takes place and no other rules apply to regulate water 
distribution. Nevertheless, the appointment of a mirāb is a strategic decision from the 
perspective of the large landholders, who constitute the most asset-endowed stakeholders 
within any irrigation system. The common narrative about mirāb ‘elections’ in Asqalān 
runs as follows: all the people (kul-e mardum) gather in a big Friday-praying mosque and 
take part in the selection. The decision is taken unanimously, even if more than one 
candidate is proposed. In the end, all people present give their consent and accept the final 
choice by jointly praying for him. The newly appointed mirāb must swear not to take 
bribes.372 A joint meal with food sent by the nearby households completes the event. 
Naturally, the ‘kul-e mardum’ includes only males, but it is also limited to large 
landowners who are at the same time representatives and elders of the different 
communities along the canal. In both Asqalān proper and Tobrakash, approximately ten 
elders are involved in the appointment of the mirāb. Thus, the participatory dimension 
which is suggested by discourse is not present in practice.373 Moreover, the possibility that 
controversial opinions surface or that rival candidates are being advanced in such an 
appointment meeting is preempted by prior negotiations and pre-selection of one or two 
candidates.  
The Asqalān mirāb were appointed in separate meetings (see fn. 358) after prior 
negotiations between landowners, elders, and potential candidates. The incumbent mirāb 
from upper Asqalān, Saifudin Mirāb, had lost support because he was found to have 
                                                             
370 Noted down by Abdullayev in Asqalān, 27 June 2007. 
371 In 2006, a large gathering (jalsa) of the elders of all communities along Asqalān canal took place on 29 
March, where the joint rules for rotation during the 2006 irrigation season were reportedly discussed and 
agreed.  
372 This ‘swearing’ was only mentioned in Asqalān for the particular year. However, in other irrigation 
systems farmers also referred to the criteria that the mirāb should not be a ‘bribe-eater’. See Chs. 6.1.2 and 
6.1.3 for further reference to the criteria a mirāb should fulfill.  
373 From a different angle, this means a man (mard) is only someone with wealth, estate, land, followers 
(nafar), and elder status.  
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misused water users’ money on a grand scale. In local terms, he had been ‘selling 
mardikār’, that is, he had claimed to need an inflated number of laborers at the intake over 
a certain amount of time and reportedly taken 10,000 Afs per laborer from landowners who 
could not spare anybody at the time, ostensibly to hire laborers. According to one account, 
only 30 people actually worked at the intake while Saifudin had received money for 200 
laborers.374 He put the money in his own pocket and did not spend it for hiring laborers or 
for buying materials. It is likely that Saifudin had been practicing this trade in laborers for 
several years – in fact, it appears to be legitimate to some modest extent (see below) – and 
interviews suggested some hidden agreement between landowners and the mirāb 
candidate. Accordingly, a mirāb is sanctioned to pocket money for ten laborers.  
However, in Saifudin’s case the disproportionate trade in laborers coincided with 
unsatisfactory delivery of water in the 2005 irrigation season and neglected maintenance 
measures, but also an increasing politicization of local water management practices with 
the soaring frequency of visits from foreign NGOs in Asqalān. Taken together, these 
factors prompted the elders to choose somebody new for the 2006 season.375 Why they 
selected Sofi Ghulām Nabi – a very shy man and not obviously endowed with many of the 
characteristics crucial for a person who needs to represent water users and who by position 
embodies the interface between farmers and the government and foreign organizations – 
can only be understood by considering his family background and local power relations in 
Asqalān. Sofi Ghulām Nabi’s brother was a famous and likewise important mujahedin 
commander during the 1980s, which brought his family the eminently respectable status it 
still possesses. Sofi Ghulām Nabi succeeded his brother as commander for 12 years. Being 
a Qongherāt (Uzbek subtribe), Sofi hails from Bēshbāla in the middle section of Asqalān 
canal, near where his family also owns land (Wulus).376 He thus fulfills many of the 
criteria of a mirāb: he is a landowner and able to make a good living, he has experience 
with crop cultivation, has reached a certain age (likely his mid-50s), and is literate. 
However, he lacks any noticeable charisma and assertiveness to carry out the obligations 
his position as mirāb demands, such as the mobilization of laborers or the collection of his 
salary at year’s end. According to an account of one of the elders present at the election, 
other elders offered to assist Sofi Ghulām Nabi in dealings with the ID and the like if he 
would agree to do the job. Sofi himself stated that he had not volunteered for the position 
and had to be convinced over several days to become the favored candidate. This suggests 
that he was mainly installed because he is considered a candid person with a good 
reputation (‘Sofi’) who enjoys respect, but usually keeps quiet and does not interfere in 
                                                             
374 Every landowner who can afford it or does not have sons or male relatives in his household to send to the 
intake for construction works and contribute to annual canal repair works can pay a laborer for a whole 
season to work for him under the mirāb. The expense for such a laborer in Asqalān was reported to be around 
10,000 Afs. The mirāb hires the laborer himself, so there is no control whether or not the mirāb employs 
sufficient workers to account for the money he received to hire them. Apparently, Saifudin Mirāb was 
suspected of not having employed adequate amounts of laborers and had the small landowners do all the 
work (Interview in Wulus, 20 July 2006).   
375 One interviewee linked Saifudin’s dismissal to the decreased influence of commanders, stating, “There is 
no power for the commanders anymore. They have no guns anymore; we can even strike the commanders. 
Saifudin was a stealer” (Ibid.).  
376 Sofi himself claimed to own 10-12 jerib of land. Another interviewee said he additionally cultivates 50-60 
jerib of an absentee landowner who lives abroad. The figures are likely nowhere near correct.  
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others’ wrongdoings as long as his immediate environment and benefits are not negatively 
affected. Put differently, he was strategically chosen by the large landowner elders as a 
proxy to act in their interests.377 In their eyes, his decent appearance, the fact that he is not 
interested in self-promotion in front of the government or foreigners and NGOs, and 
neither neither is nor claims to be more influential than other elders of Asqalān, all 
distinguished him from Saifudin. The fact that Murad Khān, the previous kokbāshi, was 
not dismissed with Saifudin Mirāb, only supports this interpretation. Furthermore, Sofi 
Ghulām Nabi was reconfirmed as mirāb at the end of 2006 to serve a second term in the 
2007 irrigation season.   
In the case of Tobrakash, the appointment of Fazl Bāy as mirāb was preceded by serious 
disagreements among the downstream water users. While there seemed to be a consensus 
that his predecessor Mohsen should be dismissed because the tail-end farmers had not 
received water for more than two years, only approximately half of the Tobrakash elders 
backed Fazl Bāy. What arguments his supporters had to enforce their will, given that the 
other faction even sent petitions to the government to prevent Fazl Bāy from becoming 
mirāb, remains unclear. Nevertheless, these incidents preceding Fazl Bāy’s confirmation as 
mirāb highlight the level of discord among the downstream water users. Because of the 
petitions Fazl Jān’s adversaries had sent to the government, the ID became involved and 
followed up the selection procedure. Several respondents suggested that since the 
authorities also were opposing Fazl Bāy, it was finally agreed that Sofi Ghulām Nabi was 
registered378 as mirāb-e ‘umumi, that is mirāb of the whole canal, and Fazl Bāy as 
secondary mirāb (of Tobrakash). However, the established divisions of work and 
competencies between them were continued at the day-to-day level; Sofi Ghulām Nabi was 
responsible for mobilization of Asqalān laborers for the intake, Fazl Bāy for the Tobrakash 
laborers. Other repair works were supervised individually by them within their own area of 
jurisdiction, and Sofi’s salary was to be obtained from the upstream users, Fazl Bāy’s from 
Tobrakash. Both were present when the agreement for the rotation system between 
upstream and downstream users was agreed upon by the elders. However, Fazl Bāy as 
downstream mirāb also has to determine the hierarchy of the irrigation sequence within the 
Tobrakash part of the canal system during the eight-hour rotation when water is sufficient. 
To ensure that all farmers have access to an ideally equal amount of water, this involves 
the opening and closing of offtakes and establishment of check dams according to a 
predetermined scheme agreed upon by the water users of Tobrakash. As reported above, 
the upstream area, that is, Asqalān proper does not apply any special measures when 
sufficient water is available. Farmers open and close their offtakes independently or 
arrange matters among themselves. The interviews provided ample evidence that elders in 
Asqalān take three hours more water than normal farmers without this ‘rule’ being 
contested by anybody. 
                                                             
377 The candidacy of Zāher Pahlawān, a former commander who had been discussed as the other potential 
choice for the mirāb position, was also dropped in favor of Sofi Ghulām Nabi. 
378 The s/election is concluded by the elders issuing a letter about the results to the Kunduz ID. It has to be 
signed by several elders, and the newly appointed mirāb has to carry it to the irrigation department for 
official registration. Then and there, he receives his mirāb-identification card.   
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During the critical period in 2006, when there was not sufficient water in the canal, the 
mirāb’s authority and orders were ignored and many farmers opened offtakes when they 
were not entitled to, because they saw their crops dying. The farmers of Tobrakash lost 
their crops before the water level improved. If during a rotation turn, insufficient amounts 
of water or none at all, reach the downstream area, the mirāb and farmers from the tail-end 
patrol the Asqalān part of the canal to check whether offtakes have been opened and 
absorb water. Quarrels and violent disputes – the hitting of each other with sticks and 
threatening to open or close offtakes at gunpoint – occur regularly during this period, with 
and without the involvement of the mirāb or the kokbāshi. One absentee landowner (living 
in Kunduz with fields cultivated by his son and sharecroppers in an upper Asqalān 
settlement nearest the intake) claimed that it used to be and partly still is common practice 
to position ‘askar (‘soldiers’, actually armed laborers) at the offtakes who demand money 
from farmers if they want to irrigate their fields. This indicates that the mirāb-e ‘umumi is 
hardly respected by any of the large landowners in Asqalān proper, not to mention the 
mirāb of Tobrakash.        
Water-deprived farmers along the Asqalān canal, especially in the tail-end sections of 
Tobrakash, have started to build tube wells to be able to save their crops when insufficient 
water is provided by the canal. However, tube well irrigation without electricity379 is very 
expensive, because diesel generators must be used. Building a tube well that irrigates five 
to ten jerib (depending on the water needs of the crop cultivated) costs 30,000 to 40,000 
Afs. Diesel prices are at around 35 Afs per liter and a generator needs six liters per hour, 
amounting to costs of 210 Afs (approximately US$4.20) for one hour of pumping water. 
This is hardly affordable by any of the farmers. Crop failure due to late water provision 
often means that the farmer loses his entire investments in seeds. Returnees from refugee 
camps in Pakistan reported that they had seeded 60 jerib of wheat annually during recent 
years and worked three to six months at the intake and widening the canal branches 
downstream, but lost the entire crop and thus all the investments they had made in seeds. 
Many families take up loans with other clan members in order to buy seeds fit for rain-fed 
cropping and consequently are afflicted with high debt, upwards of 50,000 Afs in some 
cases. The lack of money and accompanying measures, such as the need to sell other 
assets, put increased pressure on households and undermines their resilience towards 
external ‘shocks’. For the newly-arrived returnees who could not get a foothold on their 
lands because of crop failure for several seasons in a row, returning to Pakistan with the 
whole household was seen as the only option to ensure their families’ survival.  
At the head-end of the canal, the Baloch were entirely excluded from the Asqalān 
irrigation community at the time of fieldwork. They were reportedly denied irrigation 
during the revolution period and have not been able to reestablish their access ever 
since.380 The Asqalān landowners merely allow them to use water pumps or fetch water by 
donkeys for drinking, livestock, and gardening purposes.     
                                                             
379 At the time of fieldwork there was no regular electricity available throughout Asqalān away from the main 
Kunduz-Shēr Khān Bandar road (vicinity of Ālchin bridge). Only few households had a generator and would 
afford generator electricity at times. 
380 It remained unclear whether the Baloch were actively denied their water rights. Evidence from the 
interviews suggests instead that the water rights were lost because the majority of the residents of the village 
had fled to Iran and Pakistan at the beginning of the Soviet occupation and cultivation did not take place. 
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c. Fazl Jān’s life-world 
In the previous section I have tried to portray the setting in Asqalān and to weave different 
aspects into a narrative to provide preliminary evidence for answering the question of ‘who 
is able to get irrigation water, when, and how’. I will now use several in-depth interviews 
with Fazl Jān and others speaking about his activities as mirāb to give an account of the 
everyday (life-world) context in which he acted, the difficulties he faced, and his 
subjective experiences being mirāb of Tobrakash. The conversations with him381 were 
always exhilarating because in a way he was a fresh-faced naïf among the established large 
landowner cum commander cum elder elite of Asqalān. He maintained his opinion in the 
face of pressure from elders, foreign NGO staff, and influential landowners when 
necessary, based on his conviction that he was doing ‘the right thing’, that is, trying to 
ensure that enough water flowed in the canal to reach Tobrakash. Moreover, he openly 
reflected about everything connected to irrigation and his role as a newly-appointed mirāb, 
who eventually was not reconfirmed for a second term in the 2007 irrigation season.  
However, already by late July 2006, after tail-end farmers in Tobrakash had lost the first 
harvest that year, Fazl Jān complained that the mirāb job was wearing him out (delkharāb). 
As much as he had tried to prepare the intake, to clean the canal, and oversee the regulators 
and offtakes during irrigation peak times, he had failed in the end and spoke of his task as 
depressing and being full of difficulties. Four months earlier he had shown a very 
optimistic attitude, displayed a high degree of commitment, and attempted to do everything 
right in his ambition to achieve equitable provision of water to all farmers up- and 
downstream. When I first met him, he hardly had time to speak to me because the 
supervision of laborers at the intake construction site took up all his time, and so he 
suggested fixing another appointment two days later at 8 o’clock in the morning. When I 
arrived 15 minutes late for this appointment due to problems with the car, he was 
extraordinarily upset about the delay and pointed at his wristwatch. In our early 
conversations he reported on the ideal management conditions stressing for example that 
his election as mirāb, despite the initial support of only half of the downstream water users, 
nevertheless gave him a mandate for water regulation during the current year. He 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
After the return of the Baloch at the time of the civil war, the rule of commanders in Asqalān and Tobrakash 
did not allow renewed tapping of the canal. One of the arguments brought forward openly by Asqalān water 
users against the Baloch’s desire to take part in irrigation management is that they belong to Ālchin manteqa, 
presumably because their (former) farmland is registered as belonging to Alchin. A hidden motive for 
excluding the Baloch reportedly surfaced in Najib’s time when – after starting crop irrigation from the canal 
– tail-end water users from Tobrakash fiercely opposed it in fear they their water demands would become 
even more endangered.    
381 To give some background on his personal situation derived from several interviews: in 2006, Fazl Jān was 
in his early forties, a caring father of four children, husband of two wives (one had suffered a stroke, the 
other had just lost a daughter 15 days after her birth when irrigation was at peak time), and elder of five or six 
families. His house was located in Nawābād, one of the tail-end communities of Tobrakash, where he owns 
50 jerib of land and mainly cultivates wheat, almonds, and grapes. At his location, the most beneficial crops 
are fruits, i.e., grapes, but also plums and almonds. He spent 120,000 Afs on a water pump three years earlier, 
with which he is able to irrigate 20 jerib. During the war, he went to Iran and Pakistan, but at times also 
positioned himself as commander of his ‘sub-village’, apparently also during Taliban rule. According to one 
anecdote he told, he was looking for a bank in Iran and asking people for help without recognizing that he 
was standing right in front of the bank he had been looking for. That is why he reasoned he had to educate his 
sons and reportedly sends them to school every day despite elders in his immediate surroundings claiming 
that education would turn the children into non-Muslims.       
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compared his own appointment to that of the President of Afghanistan, who also had been 
agreed upon as a compromise figure despite the fact that not 100 percent of the people 
favored him. The final vote for Fazl Jān can be interpreted as a consequence of desperation 
among the downstream farmers, given that they had not been able to derive benefits from 
their fields the previous years due to insufficient amounts of water reaching their crops at 
the necessary time. In contrast to the previous mirāb, who owned land in both the upstream 
and downstream portions of Asqalān, Fazl Jān has his own land at the very tail end of the 
canal and he himself mentioned that one major reason he was appointed was the fact that 
tail-end farmers trusted that he would not take any bribes from upstream landowners to 
divert water. Before one of our initial meetings, Fazl Jān had worked ten days day and 
nights, assisted by two kokbāshi, without seeing his home and family. In his view, canal 
and offtake repair work382 at the different sites and the daily supervision of intake 
construction demanded his permanent presence. Almost proudly he reported of the joint 
meeting of elders where he and Sofi Ghulām Nabi were the main people in charge of 
facilitating the rotation schedule for the upcoming season.   
A topic notably downplayed in the daily efforts to secure water provision at field-level 
after 21st March was the constant need to attend meetings with government deputies and 
NGO representatives at the office of the Kunduz ID. Already in the preceding month of 
Hot (20 February-20 March), and thus before annual intake works started, weekly briefings 
with the head of the Kunduz ID, Engineer Amir, had taken place after settlers near the 
intake had reported they saw Chinese engineers wandering around the area. According to 
Fazl Jān, the Chinese had promised him to start fixing the intake within two weeks’ time, 
which turned out not to be true. The failure to attract any construction company to cement 
the intake then and throughout 2006 was accounted for by stating that it is too difficult to 
fix the intake and that the Asqalān intake is one of the most complicated in Afghanistan.383 
Similarly, but showing farsightedness, Fazl Jān seemed to show sympathy for palpable 
attempts to overhaul the current irrigation management system as he remarked in reference 
to post-war water scarce conditions: “today not only the whole infrastructure is wrecked, 
but also the institution of the mirāb is completely corrupted.” Often, mirāb would turn a 
blind eye on those removing water from the canal illegally. The notion that Asqalān faces 
the worst difficulties in all Afghanistan was extended to issue and he stated that fixing just 
one side of the complex problem, whether the governmental and institutional side or the 
canal infrastructure, would not suffice as a solution. Instead, it would be necessary to 
overhaul the entire system from the top down, from the government to the mirāb.384 
However, at other times, Fazl Jān referred to the head of the ID as helpful in the way that 
he would make water users aware of whatever resources he could tap and distribute, for 
                                                             
382 The number of offtakes in Asqalān alone is considerable. There is ample evidence that Sofi Ghulām Nabi 
delegated considerable responsibility to Fazl Jān and his own kokbāshi Murad Khān.  
383 The significance of a cement and steel intake construction became obvious in interviews during 2006 with 
Hāji Rahmat Khān, the main elder of Tobrakash. When he complained about depressed earnings because of 
low yields and besides stressed that everything else was missing: schools, a clinic, roads, and bridges; one 
year later, in 2007 he only talked about the intake and how important it would be for Asqalān farmers to have 
it built by a construction company (Interviews 11 April 2006, 8 May 2007). For further analysis with regard 
to outsiders’ intake construction measures see section 6.1.3-b and Ch. 8; for Hāji Rahmat Khān view the 
subchapter on elders in Ch. 7.3.      
384 Interview with Fazl Jān in Nawābād/Tobrakash, 19 April 2006. 
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example, sacks for intake repair or direct NGOs to help locally.385 Confronted with the 
opinions of a Deputy Minister for Irrigation386 who spoke on the occasion of one water 
workshop in Kunduz Hotel on 22 July 2006, Fazl Jān expressed that he had no particular 
expectations of the central or provincial governments and just hoped that they would not 
impose any demands on mirāb (ibid.).      
On a previous occasion during pre-irrigation season, Fazl Jān had reported that his 
authority included the fining of people who took water illegally, that is, at times when the 
water is not assigned to them, in the amount of 5,000 Afs.387 He reported that in such cases 
– which occurred 10 to 15 times annually – the mirāb sends a signed note to the ID in 
Kunduz388 from where it would be forwarded to the Security and Police Department, 
which would then send a policeman to levy the money from the offender and hand the sum 
over to the mirāb. He would keep it in his budget and spend it on building materials, sacks, 
plastics, and rent for machines, if necessary. Similarly, absent intake laborers would be 
fined 500 Afs for each day they missed during intake work. Given that Sofi Ghulām Nabi 
was registered as mirāb bāshi that year, he was entitled to the first right for punishment 
and fining, although the usual procedure would be that each mirāb is responsible for his 
own area of jurisdiction. Despite the existence of these rules, in subsequent conversations 
with Fazl Jān and with former mirāb Saifudin and others, it turned out that neither 
punishment is enforced as described. Instead, deviance and obvious rule-breaking is 
subject to negotiation between rule-violator and mirāb.  
Whereas the missing one day of intake labor contribution is a minor offence – often 
excused with the break-down of the motorbike en route or the urgent need to search for 
missing livestock – and does not occur on a larger scale, water theft is at times strategic 
and can thus be called systematic. The main reason for its being systematic lies in the fact 
that neither mirāb has the final say over ultimate enforcement and, thus, actual punishment 
capacity, in times when the water level is low and offtakes are opened on a regular basis in 
disregard of agreed-upon water turns. A famous saying in Afghanistan that Fazl Jān 
mentioned in one of the later interviews goes, “if your father is mirāb your land should be 
upstream”. He brought it up in the course of a long discussion between him and Sofi 
Ghulām Nabi after the first harvest failed.389 While it signifies the insight of everyday folk 
wisdom expressed in a proverb, the importance of his mentioning it at this point of the 
discussion was the undertone of resignation in his voice and the related information he 
supplied. When he, at the same occasion, reflected on the reasons why he and Sofi Ghulām 
Nabi had been appointed mirāb for the 1385 irrigation season, Fazl Jān gave the following, 
somewhat different account compared with the initial version reported above: “in recent 
years, the people chose mirāb who took their work seriously, but put money into their own 
                                                             
385 Interview with Fazl Jān and Sofi Adbul Hakim in the latter’s house, 25 July 2006.  
386 The relevant ministry is the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW); it is allotted competencies in 
irrigation. See section 6.1.3-b.  
387 Interview with Fazl Jān at the Asqalān canal intake, 12 April 2006.  
388 Asqalān belongs to the Kunduz Markaz district which has no own district administration because of 
overlap of district headquarter and provincial capital in the Kunduz administration. Thus, the provincial ID in 
Kunduz is in charge for Asqalān.  
389 Interview, 25 July 2006. 
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pockets. This year they chose me and Sofi Ghulām Nabi because we are quiet and do not 
have loud voices. People are more powerful than us.” The quote from the interview 
substantiates the mirāb’s dependence on the large landlords and their de facto lack of 
enforcement of irrigation turns against the landowning elite’s desire.  
Both mirāb agreed that they were chosen because landowners assumed they would close 
their eyes and remain silent, “We have to apologise if we want to enforce water turns and 
have no authority in the event people with a beard break offtake seals to take water 
illegally.” Although it is considered un-Islamic to take water by force and steal it from the 
users entitled to it, water theft happened regularly during the first irrigation period in 2006. 
Fazl Jān ascribed this phenomenon to water users’ ignorance of the existing rules and the 
mirāb’s oversight task, which is to ensure equal access for all users. “These people don’t 
know anything. They think the water just comes from the canal, they don’t see how a 
mirāb is involved in the whole process of water delivery and distribution.” Asked how this 
is possible, given that the mirāb is appointed by ‘these people’ he replied: 
The mirāb is elected by maybe ten to twenty elders. How should all the people know about 
it, if only 10 or 20 were present during the selection? When I catch anybody taking water 
illegally and opening offtakes I tell them to stop, if not because of me, then in the name of 
God. We can strike that person, close the offtake, but they do not respect us. As soon as we 
turn our backs, the seals are broken again. People who take water out of turn are not the big 
landlords, they send laborers and sharecroppers, or it’s the small farmers. If a person does 
not have a beard, we can slap him; if he has a beard, we can just ask politely if he is not 
familiar with the rules. I have not been beaten by thieves so far; only at the intake four 
laborers fought back after I had struck them.  
He explained further that some elders expressed disappointment with the mirāb’s work 
because they did not channel irrigation water in favor of the elders: “We did not go to the 
elders asking ‘Hāji Sāheb, are you getting enough water or not?’ Rather, we had to walk 
constantly along the canal and distribute water.” Fazl Jān nevertheless emphasized the 
differences between himself (as ‘independent’) and Sofi Ghulām Nabi whom he accused to 
his face of acting self-interested (‘old person thinks first and foremost of his property, his 
dying crop, and his home’) and consequently avoiding any confrontation with powerful 
figures along the canal. However, when in the discussion several farmers from the 
downstream area opined that Sofi Ghulām Nabi actually stole their water by not enforcing 
the rotation schedule and not stepping up against others who would open and close offtakes 
according to upstream users’ needs, Fazl Jān placated the angry farmers by saying that Sofi 
Ghulām Nabi does not take the water for himself. The incident displayed a hint of fatalism 
on the part of Fazl Jān, demonstrates the relative powerlessness of the mirāb institution, 
and highlights the lack of solidarity between large landowners at the head-end of the canal 
and tail-end water users.390 The latter impression was further supported by reference to 
how a glass of water or tea was shared among all community members at the time of the 
Prophet Muhamad (PBUH) or before the revolution period, whereas “now it is different. 
Everybody only takes for himself.” Accordingly, several people along the canal confronted 
Fazl Jān during his oversight work with the argument that he had to solve their particular 
                                                             
390 The following quote likewise reflects the notion of differential power as experienced by Fazl Jān: “I am 
mirāb, elder of five to six houses, but I cannot take water illegally” (Interview, 25 July 2006). 
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problem and should not worry about the others. He went on to describe his helplessness 
with two more examples:  
These people are ignorant, they don’t use their mind. They don’t have a mind. There were 
incidents where farmers allowed their neighbors’ crop to die because they used all the water 
and did not grant the water turn to the neighbors. Or, there were two plots of land; one of the 
owners had worked a lot at the intake and the other not at all, that one but insisted that I 
allocate all the water to him.391  
The general consensus between both mirāb was that, compared to some distant past, the 
mirāb is no longer respected: 
At the time of our grandfathers, a mirāb received lots of respect [ehterām] from all 
community members. Today people, who grew up during the time of fighting, don’t respect 
the mirāb. Formerly, if a mirāb ordered that an offtake be closed, his orders were followed 
and not questioned (ibid.).       
Asked why they had established the rotation schedule before irrigation season, given that it 
was not observed at the time of water scarcity and how they collaborated, Fazl Jān used the 
image of a man and his son to explain their relationship: when a drowining father saw the 
water rising up to his teeth, he stepped on his son to save himself. Sofi Ghulām Nabi’s 
behavior was thereby framed and legitimatised through the discourse of necessity. Fazl Jān 
stressed that while both mirāb fought verbally with each other during times of insufficient 
water, they worked well together when the water level was normal. The fact that Fazl Jān 
narrated these incidents in Sofi Ghulām Nabi’s presence calmly and almost wearily 
without any visible anger suggests a considerable degree of surrender to the shape of 
dominant local power structures. The sadness of his apparent resignation rests in the 
impression that he had previously made, before the irrigation season started, when he tried 
seriously to challenge existing obstacles but apparently had to realize that ‘good’ intentions 
were not enough to deliver water according to sharia, customary norms, and the objective 
rotation schedules agreed upon among the elders. In the following quotation, he reflects on 
his situation:  
In our country [mulk] all people are depressed. But the mirāb-job is really one of the worst. 
When I had just half the bread I have now and was not mirāb, I was happy, but now I am 
facing many problems. In Afghanistan, they just call themselves Muslims, but they are 
actually not. People are stealing the water, do not use their mind, are ignorant, and illiterate. 
How can you deal with an ignorant? (ibid.).             
Eventually, from Fazl Jān’s perspective even the anticipated salary for the mirāb did not 
compensate for the job’s unpopularity. A preliminary payment of reportedly 50,000 Afs 
after the appointment is augmented with the right of the mirāb to collect 10 sēr wheat per 
qulba after the harvest. Reportedly, Fazl Jān planned to collect 1,200 sēr of wheat, of 
which he would receive 600 sēr and the other 600 sēr would be equally divided among his 
                                                             
391 Interview, 25 July 2006. Adding to that, a conversation with Iskandar Abdullayev of ZEF one year later (2 
August 2007) Fazl Jān is reported as saying: “It is difficult to convince people to not open the offtake if it is 
not their turn. You can write a book but they will continue to do what they want. They could have used guns 
to get water. They never obey anybody’s advice.”  
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two kokbāshi.392 However, he stopped halfway through the attempt to actually collect the 
amount because downstream water users denied him payment.393 
Despite the resignation apparent in Fazl Jān’s reflection on local power structures along the 
Asqalān canal discussed above, he made a strong point about equal treatment of upstream 
and downstream water users in meetings with Welthungerhilfe’s SMWA  project staff.394 
Accordingly, during a discussion regarding construction plans for cross-regulators 
(offtakes) in Asqalān, Fazl Jān resisted the pressure of all elders, deputies of the 
construction company, the irrigation department, and SWMA project members present 
when he demanded an equal amount of cross-regulators to be constructed in the lower 
Tobrakash part of the canal as was planned for the upstream part. He emphasized strongly 
his responsibility towards the water users he represented, stating, “I will not sign the 
agreement because my people would ask me about this problem [the unequal number of 
offtakes proposed by the NGO],” and insisted, “… if your office agrees to implement the 
other 11 cross-regulators in Tobrakash, I will sign the agreement letter as well.” (ibid.). 
This statement derives its significance from the fact that two elders of Tobrakash were also 
present at the meeting and did not oppose the plans to construct fewer offtakes in 
Tobrakash than in Asqalān and subsequently signed. No matter whether fewer or more 
cross-regulators could be justified by any of the stakeholders (which in fact reflects the 
degree of antagonism between Asqalān and Tobrakash), Fazl Jān’s passionate stance for 
equal treatment of both parts of the canal and his emphasis on his accountability towards 
the downstream water users provide a strong account of the sincerity of his efforts as mirāb 
to do his job ‘right’.  
 
6.1.2 Chārdara: Sofi-Qarayatim irrigation system 
Sofi-Qarayatim is the name of the second irrigation system I had the opportunity to study 
closely and use as a control case and for possible comparison with the Asqalān ‘system’. 
The term ‘system’ denotes a physical design of one or more main canals with respective 
secondary and tertiary canals plus minor draining channels at field level, all of which are 
fed by one joint intake. While the Asqalān system embodied one main canal and sub-
streams in its full canal length throughout the command area, the Sofi-Qarayatim system 
includes two main canals – Sofi and Qarayatim – which both share one intake (see details 
below). The Qarayatim canal is sometimes called Madrasa or Umarkhēl, which 
corresponds to the naming practice of the adjacent settlements or manteqa.395 The main 
canal’s command area tends to be equated with the two main settlements (Umarkhēl  I and 
Umarkhēl  II, or Madrasa I and Madrasa II, or Qarayatim I and Qarayatim II) (see Map 
                                                             
392 Interview, 12 April 2006. 
393 Noted by Abdullayev, 2 August 2007. 
394 Minutes of meeting, 11 July 2006. 
395 In this case, Qarayatim manteqa and Sofi manteqa refers to the respective command area and inhabitants, 
that is, all water users of the main canals. However, as described in Ch. 5 and illustrated here, once inside the 
respective manteqa other manteqa connections are distinguished in addition to this ‘meta-frame’. Thus, 
‘Qarayatim I’ and ‘Qarayatim II’, which are also distinguished by locals besides further differentiations, 
present ‘second-order’ manteqa. 
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M6).396 Umarkhēl is the dominant Pashtun (Ghilzai) tribe in both the Sofi and Qarayatim 
command area or manteqa. However, the co-settlement of more than a dozen sub-tribes of 
the Umarkhēl and the prevalence of a large number of other ethnic groups along the Sofi 
canal qualify the initial impression of overall ethno-social homogeneity.  
As part of the Chārdara district, Sofi-Qarayatim is located not too far from Kunduz city 
(parts of the Sofi canal were said to be about nine kilometers away). Before 1978, the 
Chārdara district was the mainstay of Kunduz province’s cotton economy and hosted a 
company branch of the Spinzar Cotton Company.397 Of the ginning and milling facilities 
and the 23 apartment buildings that once existed for the Spinzar staff, nothing but ruins 
remain today.398 However, the cotton economy and the monopoly status of Spinzar as the 
buyer and processor of raw cotton seem to have brought much benefit to local farmers, not 
least due to long-term favorable price guarantees and the provision of fertilizer and 
seeds.399 The importance of cotton was also underlined by the fact that a model farm on the 
outskirt of Kunduz city specialized in the growing of cotton as early as the late 1930s. It 
served the efforts to improve the technical dimension of cotton cultivation, its general 
prominence, and better control of pests and vermin (Grevemeyer 1990 [1987]: 98). 
Interestingly, the nationalization of Spinzar after 1973 coincided with the government’s 
intensified attempts to establish cooperatives (koperātif/hā) which offered farmers seeds, 
fertilizer, machinery in the form of tractors, and sugar, and required them to sell their 
harvest to the government.400 At the time of fieldwork, the Spinzar Company was in the 
                                                             
396 Qarayatim literally means ‘orphan’s village‘. The word’s construction itself is a compound of qarya plus 
yatim (qarya-ye yatim). According to local lore, the first settlement was founded by an orphan sheikh. 
397 See Barfield (1981: 140f) for an account of the significance of Spinzar for the regional cash economy 
before Dāod’s nationalization of the company. Accordingly, since the 1940s, Qataghan (since 1970, Kunduz) 
“was a company province” where Spinzar and its management “acted like a feudal lord” (ibid.: 140). 
398 The Chārdara district center is not de facto a town, but an aggregation of several buildings (the district 
administration and several other district government offices like the police commander, the local cadaster 
office, etc.), on different sides of the manned main intersection. The location’s insignificance is highlighted 
by the fact that nobody lives there and the site does not have a bazaar. The nearest bazaar locations are 
Kunduz (7 km, Monday and Thursday), Chārshanba Bāzār (19 km, Wednesday) and Jum’a Bāzār 
(approximately 13 km, Friday). However, at the time of the 2006 fieldwork, plans for a new city named 
Khoja Kaftar (after the nearby shrine in the desert of that name) had been developed. If realized, the new 
town would stretch over 200 hectares in two kilometers distance from the district office or nine kilometers 
away from Kunduz city and be complemented with a road connection to Mazār-e Sharif, which would 
shorten the travel time from Kunduz to Mazār-e Sharif immensely and replace travel via Pul-e Khumri 
(Conversation with the district governor of Chārdara, 22 May 2006). Meanwhile, the deterioration of the 
security situation in the subsequent months and years, including insurgency and counter-insurgency 
measures, has made any planning obsolete. Chārdara was a Taliban stronghold by 2009, Sofi and Qarayatim 
likewise.  
399 Prices were fixed for a period of three years. According to a former arbāb, the Spinzar Company also 
provided 14 sēr animal fodder, 10 pieces of soap, and 10 kg cooking oil for every tonne of cotton a farmer 
sold to the company (Interview in Mangtepa [Sofi], 26 May 2006). 
400 Local accounts indicate that both options (Spinzar and cooperative) were available and used by farmers. 
Cooperative-farmers were required to register with the cooperative, which involved a small annual monetary 
contribution. Moreover, both supplied farmers in the same shop during NDPA rule under Soviet occupation 
(Interview in Mangtepa, 26 May 2006). Despite the fact that the first cooperatives were established in the 
1950s and then represented a merger of private capital and government subsidies, serious efforts for the 
promotion of cooperatives set in after the Republican government of Dāod decreed the Law on Cooperatives 
in 1974 (Qānon-e koperātifhā 1353). For details, see Grevemeyer (1990 [1987]: 108). According to Wiebe 
(1984: 69), five cooperatives existed in Kunduz province in 1977. The Taraki government (1978) integrated 
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state of being rehabilitated401 at its main production site in Kunduz. At the same time, the 
existence of cooperatives was evident and farmers could again enter agreed-upon 
production and input arrangements for cotton growing with both institutions. From the 
commercialization of agriculture in Chārdara (as compared to Asqalān) and the emphasis 
on the cash crop cotton, combined with the establishment of industrial infrastructure in the 
vicinity, the state’s high interest in local production and thus irrigation efficiency can 
easily be deduced.  
Irrigated land is highly valued. According to one official of the local cadaster office, 
Qarayatim holds the most expensive land in Chārdara with one jerib worth as much as 10 
jerib of land elsewhere.402 However, it was also evident that land conflicts are especially 
prevalent in the district as a whole and in Sofi-Qarayatim in particular. For this reason and 
to recognize the close interrelation of water and land rights, I dedicate the second section 
(b) of this subchapter to elaborating the types and mediation mechanisms of conflicts over 
irrigated land. In the third part (section c), I introduce the perspective of another local 
representative, Hāji Jum’a Khān, a respected elder of the conventional kind,403 who was 
entrusted by water users of both the Sofi and Qarayatim command areas to solve a long-
standing conflict with a third party after a flood in 2005 had moved the riverbed and 
consequently stirred up new conflicts. By narrating the mediation efforts in which Hāji 
Jum’a Khān was involved, I attempt not only to shed light on the dimensions of conflict 
mediation as part of governance, but also on his responsibilities, activities, and experiences 
as an elder404 which, I will argue further below, reflect the life-world of an ‘endangered 
species’ in the local social order. 
 
a. Features of water management along the Sofi and Qarayatim water courses  
Just as in Asqalān, the beginning of fieldwork in Sofi-Qarayatim coincided with the time 
of infrastructure405 reconstruction works in late March 2006. Yet, here the flood of the 
previous year had heavily damaged the area around the intake location because of a shift of 
the riverbed. As a result, it did not make sense to start rehabilitating the previous intake, 
but it was necessary to lay out an entirely new intake and dig a new channel to reconnect it 
to the parts of the previous structure that had not been damaged. Laborers were busy with 
canal digging in the first place because word had spread from the ID that a foreign NGO 
would take over the construction of the intake.406 This prospect mobilized local farmers to 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Dāod’s cooperatives initiative into the wider program on land reforms and credits to overhaul the perceived 
feudal structures, and met fierce resistance (see Ch. 4). 
401 Reportedly, French investors had restarted operations of the Spinzar Company by 2006. 
402 Interview in Chārdara, 10 May 2006. 
403 For the distinction of ‘conventional’ versus ‘new’ elders see the elaborations below in section c and in Ch. 
7.3. 
404 The activities are in total referred to as muysafēdi. See section c. 
405 What is meant by infrastructure here are the basic structures, cuts, and physical shape which are upset 
regularly due to damages from floods and siltation caused by the high amounts of sediment in the water. In 
comparison to Asqalān, Sofi-Qarayatim already consisted of considerably more concrete at the time of field 
work, largely constructed by Welthungerhilfe in another program prior to 2006. See ter Steege 2006: 8.  
406 Noted by ter Steege in Surkhak, 21 May 2006. 
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put efforts into canal construction, because in their view a fixed intake would relieve them 
of regular, highly labor-intensive intake repair work which was usually washed away two 
to three times a year.407 At the time of fieldwork, approximately 250 people were working 
on the canal daily. 
 
Map M6: Sofi-Qarayatim irrigation system 
 
As mentioned above, the physical outline of the Sofi-Qarayatim system is marked by two 
main canals (Nahr-e Sofi and Nahr-e Qarayatim) which share the intake until a diversion 
structure (dubandi) divides the initial canal just under one kilometer from the previous 
intake. Historically, both canals relied on separate intakes from the river as the Sofi was 
established prior to the Qarayatim canal. Even a third canal (Surkhak, also known as Hāji 
Sawz Hassan), which at the time of fieldwork had long become a main branch of Nahr-e 
Qarayatim, originally had its own intake. Surkhak became connected with the Qarayatim 
canal because the intake constantly shifted westwards, given that the riverbed regularly 
changed significantly during peak water flows. The full length of both main canals and the 
adjoining command areas are not as extensive as the Asqalān total. The Qarayatim 
stretches over 8.3 kilometers supplying a command area of approximately 10,200 jerib, 
while the Sofi canal serves 6,800 jerib of land. Nahr-e Qarayatim flows between the Sofi 
canal and the left bank of the Kunduz river (see Map M6). Moreover, the system is 
embedded in a complex web of further irrigation canals, the command areas of which 
partly overlap and partly only border the Sofi-Qarayatim agricultural land. For example, 
the Sofi canal network of secondary and tertiary streams in the west borders an area 
irrigated from the Chārdara main canal (Kanal-e ‘umumi-ye Chārdara)408 and its 
                                                             
407 Myopically, the usefulness of a concrete intake structure in a setting where the river regularly meanders 
and high siltation occurs was not questioned by the water users.     
408 The Chārdara main canal is exceptionally long, with its intake as far away as Aliābād. Under Dāod Khān, 
it was part of a planned large-scale scheme called Gawargān-Chārdara with the aim to claim and irrigate 
several hundred thousand jerib of waste and desert land. The project plan also foresaw building roads on both 
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subbranches. The settlements of the Mangtepa and Qazāqtepa at the tail end of the Sofi 
main canal are connected via tertiary canals with the Chārdara main canal, the intake of 
which is located further upstream of the Kunduz river, that is, to the south in Aliābād 
district. In Mangtepa, farmers irrigate equal amounts of land from different canals: 20 
qulba (á 40 jerib) from Sofi canal and 20 qulba (80 jerib per qulba) from Chārdara. 
Aqueduct (qotarma) constructions add to these kinds of overlap as they respond to the 
landscape’s specificities of high-level fields which are impossible to irrigate from a canal 
by conventional means. The prevalence of aqueducts in Sofi-Qarayatim is quite high, yet 
in most cases they channel water from the Chārdara main canal to fields in the Sofi and 
Qarayatim areas. In times of scarce water, the plots in question are also irrigated by pumps 
from either the Sofi or the Qarayatim main canal.  
The usual upstream-downstream power dynamics in Sofi-Qarayatim are expressed not only 
in terms of location along each of the main canals, but in addition with regard to water 
allocation from the joint intake. Sofi, with an obviously smaller command area to be 
irrigated than Qarayatim, but also with less powerful figures residing in its command area, 
had regularly experienced disadvantages in water allocation since the joint intake was first 
established decades ago.409 The amalgamation of the canal networks into one intake 
structure required an extension of the intake due to larger irrigation needs. Nevertheless, 
between 1986/87 and 1999, Qarayatim’s water users largely denied Sofi-farmers access to 
irrigation water altogether and left the latter with no other choice but to plant rain-fed 
(bārāni) crops, mainly wheat, if they could not rely on other means of irrigation 
(aqueducts, pumps, or links with second and alternative main canal). The conflict over 
water allocation was finally settled after the concrete dubandi diversion structure was built 
as a result of effective interference by Hāji Umar, the district governor (wuluswāl) of the 
local Taliban government.410 Reportedly, no previous regime had been able to appease all 
parties to the conflict in a way that the suggested solution could be enforced and was 
accepted by all. The still acting head of the Chārdara ID, Engineer Abdul Wahid,411 
designed the dual diversion structure at that time, which, since its construction in 1999, 
provides proportional water inflows for Sofi and Qarayatim at a ratio of 2:3. The lands of 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
sides of the stream, and an Indian company was awarded the contract. Reportedly, just when all the 
machinery was already at the site, the coup d’état happened and the revolution period started. Consequently, 
the project was never realized (Interview with assistant of head of district Irrigation Department, Chārdara, 
11 June 2006). Also see Wiebe (1984: 53) for details of the planned project. According to the chief of the 
district ID, the GoA had planned to take up the project anew at the time of fieldwork. This plan is also 
mentioned by MEW (2007: 18).  
409 The uneven power structure between Sofi and Qarayatim is discursively framed as the difference between 
the poor and marginalized and the rich. Reported by Qarayatim elders when asked for the reason of their 
long-standing enmity with Sofi-farmers (Interview in Qarayatim, 7 May 2006).   
410 Hāji Umar was the brother of Aref Khān, the governor during the Taliban period in Kunduz from 1997/98. 
He succeeded his brother as governor after his death in Peshawar in April 2000 (see 6.1.2-c). In 2006, Hāji 
Umar was a Member of Parliament (Interviews, Sofi, 26 April 2006). Another version goes that the Sofi 
farmers appealed to Hāji Rustam, a sub-commander of Aref Khān in Qarayatim, who then sent a note to the 
Governor Aref Khān on the local people’s behalf to get involved in resolving the long-standing conflict 
(Interview, Laghmāni, 27 April 2006). 
411 Engineer here refers to the title of the person. It is assigned independently of whether or not the technical 
degree actually has been awarded. Engineer Abdul Wahid is also known as (Mudir) Abdul Wahid Khān and, 
according to his assistant he has been 20 years in office (Interview with assistant of the district ID, Chārdara, 
11 June 2006). 
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the residents of Kharoti village along the connecting Sofi-Qarayatim canal portion between 
the dubandi diversion structure and the intake (approximately one kilometer) do not benefit 
from the canal because the land is too high. Instead, an aqueduct was put in place to 
provide irrigation water from Chārdara canal (see section b below).  
Within each of the canal networks that unfold after the diversion point dubandi, upstream-
downstream dynamics play a role. However, the outline of the system and the overlaps of 
the command areas of Nahr-e Sofi and Chārdara main canal considerably mitigate water 
shortages at the tail end of Sofi. Nevertheless, the overlaps are not limited to the technical 
and landscape dimension, but are reflected in the responsibilities of different mirāb and 
kokbāshi as well. Practically, this means that a landowner in Mangtepa or Qazāqtepa is 
required to contribute to intake repair and canal maintenance work not only along the Sofi 
canal or at the Sofi-Qarayatim intake, but also along Chārdara main canal and at its intake. 
Likewise, payments have to be made to both mirāb and their respective kokbāshi. The 
Chārdara canal mirāb is also in charge and to be referred to in those cases where water 
users in the Sofi area use water from Chārdara by means of aqueducts. Before going more 
deeply into an analysis of the upstream-downstream dynamics in Sofi and Qarayatim, the 
population and social conditions along both canals are introduced briefly.  
The dominant Umarkhēl are a subunit of the Ghilzai Pashtuns, but divide further into 
several subtribes and clans. Reportedly, a first wave of Umarkhēl arrived in the Kunduz 
area in the early 20th century, when it was a rather inhospitable place given the fens, 
dangerous wildlife, and malaria (see Ch. 5.1.2). Reportedly, due to these reasons, the first 
Umarkhēl migrated with their livestock across the Āmu Daryā into the Emirate of Bukhārā 
from which they returned to Kunduz, seeking refuge during the Basmachi revolt at the time 
of Ebrāhim Bēk. As this coincided with the initial development efforts around Kunduz, the 
drainage works for Sofi canal were started by these early settlers. The subsequent 
settlement history represents itself very similarly to what was described for Asqalān above. 
By contrast to that area, however, Pashtun settlers currently dominate in each case in the 
head and middle sections of all the three formerly separate canals (including the Surkhak). 
Therefore, it is known at least from Qarayatim that when the wave of settlers from 
Maydānshahr412 (who left their home area due to land scarcity and whose descendants 
reside there now) arrived, the land had already been drained and put under cultivation to 
some extent.413 The Surkhak canal was established by members of the Surkhabi tribe of the 
Totakhēl Pashtuns from Paktiya. The fact that their members largely feel dominated by the 
Umarkhēl adds another dimension to the upstream-downstream dynamics. In Sheikhhā, 
located in the upper part of Sofi, another wave of Pashtuns with origins in Paktiya’s Sayed 
Quram district could be identified. Tail-end settlers along the Sofi canal are mainly Arab 
                                                             
412 They originated from villages in Maydān, today’s Wardak Province.  
413 It is unclear how they acquired the land, whether due to an affirmative action government policy that gave 
the Pashtuns preferential treatment over non-Pashtuns or whether the initial settlers who reportedly were 
refugees from Bukhārā indeed left the land because they were eager to return to their previous home area and 
believed advertised offers of land by the government north of the Āmu Daryā. This information was reported 
by an Umarkhēl interviewee. However, accounts of ‘Uzbek’ settlers in two villages named Uzbekhā (I and II) 
at the tail end of Qarayatim seem to confirm the loose attachment of Bukhārā-born early residents with the 
land. According to them, some of their ancestors never bought land because they hoped to return to Bukhārā 
(Interviews, 7 May 2006).     
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(in Mangtepa), Uzbek (in Qazāqtepa), and Chahār Aymāq from Ghor (in Sujāni ‘uliyā) 
who are all Fārsi speakers (fārsiwān) and partly Uzbeki speakers for their first language 
and expression of identity, as opposed to Pashto-speakers. The reality, however, has it that 
all fārsiwān can communicate in Pashto as the Umarkhēl also use Dari when interacting 
with non-Pashtuns. Population numbers are uncertain; according to local accounts, the 
Qarayatim manteqa (without Surkhak) has twelve mosques, Surkhak seven, and Sofi 
between eight and ten.414 
The Sofi downstream communities of Mangtepa, Sujāni ‘uliyā, Sujāni sulfa, and 
Qazāqtepa415 share one rotation schedule for their 40 qulba. This is distinct from water 
distribution in the upper reaches of Nahr-e Sofi (settlements of Sheikhhā, Karkar and Sofi), 
which also irrigate 40 qulba. Conscious of their upstream position, the farmers in the head 
section of Sofi canal do not adhere to agreed-upon rotation schemes between upstream and 
downstream users. Similar to the situation in Asqalān, in Sofi-Qarayatim rice-growing is a 
revealing indicator of local power relations.416 They manifest in the observation that most 
upstream farmers are able to grow rice, though sometimes they have been forced to as their 
fields suffer progressive water-logging; further downstream (in Sujāni) only a few large 
landowners can grow rice crops. The latter are locally labeled as the ‘more powerful’. 
Cotton cultivation is resurging along the Sofi, but despite the fact the water demand for 
cotton is considerably lower than for rice, insufficient water provision provides merely 
modest harvests. A local farmer gave the example that he harvested only one third of the 
usual yield (40 instead of 120 jerib) in 1384. At the time when irrigation would have been 
most needed, the canal in his section did not carry water and he was not in a position to 
afford to rent a water pump. Reportedly, rice is also the most accepted currency for the 
payment of the mirāb and kokbāshi. In Qarayatim, the rationale is that since rice-growing 
is an indicator of water availability which results from successful water management, 
payment in rice – 10 sēr per qulba (20 jerib) – is the highest form of compliment. 
Contradictory accounts regarding alternative payment modes exist. According to one 
version, even if a farmer cultivates only melon and wheat along Qarayatim, he has to give 
the equivalent of the rice payment in cash.417 However, a contrary version has it that where 
                                                             
414 The range in reported figures hints at the dynamics of population and settlement growth (see Ch. 5.2.1).  
415 Note that each community forms a separate manteqa if viewed from its individual residents’ perspective, 
but a joint manteqa if referred to in a rotation regime framework. 
416 In a conversation, the deputy head of the district ID expressed confidence that the government could 
enforce a rice-growing ban with the support of the police. However, this has not happened in the time period 
since 2001 to date. Interestingly, though, local strongmen had previously enforced such a ban at different 
times of scarce water conditions, e.g., commander Rahmat Bāy in 2002. However, in this instance only the 
crops of ‘the poor’ were destroyed by his subordinate large landowners to show effect of his ordered ban. 
During the Taliban rule, which coincided with a long-term drought, rice fields were destroyed as well 
(Interview in Chārdara, 11 June 2006).  
417 The incidents of the previous year, when the rice crop of several farmers suffered in 2005 because of the 
destruction of the intake after the snowmelt had caused large-scale flooding, show that even the so-called 
powerful who can allocate water when it is insufficient for all, always run the risk of crop failure due to 
circumstances they simply cannot influence, such as snow amounts, precipitation, and other climate-related 
factors (e.g., locusts). Furthermore, for the ones regularly getting less water it is no option to grow only 
melon (which is a very lucrative cash crop as well), because melons emaciate the soil and require rotation 
with another crop, preferably rice, in the second year. Fertilizer inputs are also immense and melon would 
only grow well with American fertilizer, which is more expensive than Russian products. Large landowners 
can grow rice and melon the same year and spread risk of water shortage by rotating their plots; small 
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due to soil conditions only cotton can be grown, the mirāb has to be paid in wheat.418 
Along Surkhak, the major subbranch of the Qarayatim main canal, farmers who do not 
grow rice do not pay their mirāb. In Sofi, rice growers pay between 15 and 20 sēr rice to 
the water manager and his assistants, depending on local arrangements with the kokbāshi 
about his own share. 
As opposed to Asqalān, all kokbāshi in Sofi (four)419 and Qarayatim (two)420 are appointed 
by farmers, not by the mirāb, for the simple reason that the kokbāshi are paid by 
landowners along the particular canal branch of which the kokbāshi is in charge. In one 
interview, the respondent argued that if the mirāb wanted to appoint the kokbāshi, the 
mirāb should also pay him.421 This indicates that the mirāb in Sofi and Qarayatim are 
rather detached from their constituency, that is, from the farmers and water users, and that 
the latter inevitably interact closely with and even depend upon the negotiation capacity of 
their local kokbāshi to allocate water. Ideas of legitimate water supply, accountability, and 
illicit water theft are projected upon the figure of the kokbāshi rather than the mirāb. It is 
the kokbāshi who annually determines the rotation schedule jointly with local elders (one 
to two elders from every mosque community using water from the stream in the kokbāshi 
mandate). Moreover, the interviewees emphasized, especially for Sofi, the particular 
qawm-belonging of the local kokbāshi. The role of hierarchy in competence is more 
marked in Sofi-Qarayatim than in Asqalān. First of all, as noted above, the kokbāshi has 
greater importance for water users. This is also reflected in the greater share that local 
water users pay the kokbāshi as opposed to the mirāb.422 Secondly, the quasi-legal 
kokbāshi-mirāb distinction is grounded in different appointment mechanisms: landowners 
along a joint stream appoint ‘their kokbāshi’ whereas the most ‘powerful’ land owners 
residing in the command area of the main canal determine who will serve as the mirāb. 
Thirdly, the mirāb does not have a direct link with the provincial ID in Kunduz, but with 
its subordinate district representative, the head of the district ID in Chārdara (Engineer 
Abdul Wahid) and his deputy. Mirāb appointments are reported to the district ID which 
then notifies the provincial ID in Kunduz for the issuing of a mirāb identification card.            
Likely, due to ‘foreign’ interests in reconstruction efforts in the wider framework of 
national state- and institution-building, 2006 happened to be the first season for which the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
farmers can only grow one crop and rotate melon with wheat and rice (Noted by ter Steege in Sofi 
Miyānkhēl, 29 May 2006).  
418 However, the interviewee mentioned this to be the case in Chārdara in general, including Qarayatim. 
419 The downstream communities of Mangtepa (10 qulba), Qazāqtepa (15 qulba) and Sujāni (15 qulba) have 
one kokbāshi each who cooperate closely in daily interaction. The usual saying goes that ‘every manteqa has 
its own kokbāshi’, while the meaning of manteqa is triple-laden comprising the socio-ethnic composition, the 
offtakes and substreams, and local place names. For example, the name of the kokbāshi of Qazāqtepa is 
Zāher. His place of residence as well as his ‘command area’ and the sub-stream he is responsible for are also 
commonly called Zāher. The upstream command area has just one kokbāshi, who is either the son of the 
mirāb himself or whose helper is a son of the mirāb.  
420 Surkhak does claim its own mirāb due to traditional separation of the stream from Qarayatim. However, 
in practice the mirāb acts as kokbāshi because he is subordinate to the Qarayatim mirāb.  
421 Interview, 11 May 2006.  
422 Accordingly, the kokbāshi receives 10 sēr rice or wheat per qulba. In Laghmāni Payān farmers reported 
paying their kokbāshi 14 sēr rice and the mirāb six sēr because that the mirāb’s command area is much larger 
and so is the amount of overall payments. 
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provincial ID took a stake in the Sofi and Qarayatim’s mirāb elections. The administration 
even organized the elections for the mirāb of the Chārdara main canal, who would be in 
charge of the most complex, largest in size, and thus most strategically important irrigation 
network in the district. Interference in the mirāb elections for Sofi and Qarayatim was 
limited to the provincial ID’s expressing a desire that they take place on the same day and 
that the results be announced on Kunduz television. Traditionally, the elections took place 
in Hot month (between 20 February and 20 March), in most instances on 20 February, the 
first day of Hot.423 However, according to the planned and selectively-publicized reforms 
in Afghanistan’s irrigation management sector (see section 6.1.3-b) mirāb elections were 
shifted to the end of an irrigation season, that is, to take place in the months of Aqrab and 
Qaws (23 October until 21 November). The reforms also entailed the introduction of ballot 
box voting to prevent the influence of commanders and other factions. According to local 
farmers’ accounts, the ID had made an attempt to implement the reform and announced 
mirāb elections in October-November 2005. However, the attempt failed.424  
The acting mirāb at the time of fieldwork – Shāh Abdul Hekmat of Sofi, Mas’ud in 
Qarayatim and, subordinate to him, Surkhak-mirāb Muhamad Rashid – were appointed 
according to tradition in Hot 2006 (20 February-20 March 2006), that is, immediately 
before the start of the new irrigation cycle. Respondents in Sofi-Qarayatim claimed that the 
geographical origin of the mirāb candidate – whether from the head or tail end of the canal 
– is not important. The main criteria for the appointment was said to be competence. 
Nevertheless, quite a few of the respondents were familiar with the custom of appointing 
the mirāb from downstream. Some even claimed that a rotation exists between the tail, 
middle, and head of the canal with regard to mirāb appointments and concluded that 
because Mas’ud had been appointed from the middle section of the canal for 2006 and his 
predecessor was from upstream, it would be appropriate to select the 2007 mirāb from the 
tail section. However, past evidence and accounts from Sofi suggest that, in practice, the 
selection of the mirāb does not follow any particular rotation scheme based on the location 
of a candidate’s land. Shāh Abdul Hekmat had his house and land in Miankhel, in the 
upper part of Sofi. Appointments, as was observed, were clan-based. For example, the 
previous mirāb Abdul Ghafar belonged to the same clan, the Shēr Khān Khel, as 
Mas’ud.425 The Shēr Khān Khel tribe members constitute the dominant faction of the local 
Umarkhēl tribal community. Factionalism is also evident as the mirāb and his ‘friends’ and 
family members are reported to deviate from local rules that are binding on all other water 
users. Accordingly, those who have a ‘good relationship’ with the mirāb are not required to 
take part equally in canal cleaning and intake labor. Their deviation is tolerated without the 
                                                             
423 The traditional agricultural and irrigation cycle timed the mirāb selection to take place on 20 February (1st 
of Hot), followed by the start of canal cleaning until the end of the month of Hot and the subsequent ‘opening 
of the water’ on 21st March (1st Hamal).  
424 For example, one respondent claimed that the election had taken place at the end of the 1384 irrigation 
period and that ballot boxes were used (Interview in Qarayatim, 08 May 2006).    
425 Ibid. 
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usual sanctions, such as a fixed 300 Afs fine for not attending canal cleaning works in 
Qarayatim and 400 Afs in Sofi.426  
As newly appointed mirāb of Sofi, Shāh Abdul Hekmat succeeded his brother. Their father 
had been mirāb for many years in the past and Shāh Abdul Hekmat as his eldest son427 
appeared to be a highly versatile elder. Not only was he mirāb at the time I met him, but 
also NSP chief and a respected elder and representative of the area in general. His 
household’s wealth was conspicuous and showed that he was a well-connected man with 
access to all kinds of local stakeholders, including foreign NGOs in Kunduz and district 
government officials in Chārdara.428 Shāh Abdul Hekmat’s brother, Hāji Tahir, had 
previously served as mirāb for four years and was apparently favored by the downstream 
water users again in the elections for the 2006 season. The reason why his brother was 
appointed instead can partly be traced to rumors and events occurring in the aftermath of 
the intake destruction in 2005, according to which a public announcement over the radio 
discredited the mirāb’s initiative of canal and intake reconstruction. Government officials 
and the radio broadcast stated that an aid project worth US$50,000 would be implemented. 
This raised high expectations among the water users along the Sofi. However, the mirāb 
had started collecting money (400,000 Afs combined from Sofi and Qarayatim) from water 
users before this announcement and partly invested the money into gabion structures that 
later turned out to be impossible to fill with stones because the transportation costs were 
too high. Some farmers suspected him of diverting the money for his own purposes. 
Consequently, one interpretation of why he was not re-elected was because some 
landowners were dissatisfied with his performance in 2005. In addition, my own analysis 
based on interviews with different stakeholders and field observations, suggests that the 
elder brother took over because at the time of the elections for the upcoming 2006 
irrigation season all available information indicated that 2006 would be a decisive year for 
farmers’ future irrigation means. Rumors about foreign involvement with high cash inputs 
solidified, the provincial ID showed increased interest in local water management issues, 
and NSP had started showing benefits in the area. Given these indicators, irrigation water 
management became duly politicized and the takeover of a ‘strategic’ elder429 accounted 
for the rising interests at stake. As a result, Hāji Tahir’s popularity among small 
landholders due to his reputation of being a hard-working and honest character lost its 
                                                             
426 Besides the labor contribution, 50 Afs per jerib were collected from every landowner to finance the 
tracked excavator that was hired from tribal relatives in Khost for two weeks that year. The rent was 2,500 
Afs per day (Interview with mirāb of Sofi at newly built head canal of Sofi-Qarayatim, 28 March 2006). The 
fine for not attending intake construction amounts to 400 Afs. In addition, an amount between 50 and 60 Afs 
per jerib was collected for sandbags near the intake construction site in 2006 whereas traditionally, 100 Afs 
per jerib was requested from landowners with less than 40 jerib, and 50 Afs from landowners with more than 
40 jerib (Interview with Sofi’s mirāb in Sheikhhā, 25 April 2006). 
427 He also ‘inherited’ their father’s land title document from the time that he first settled in the area. 
Although the father divided the land among his eight sons, the document stayed with the eldest (Interview 
with Hāji Tahir, Sofi, 26 April 2006). 
428 Shāh Abdul Hekmat owned two tractors and showed me two large fish ponds behind his house, the 
construction of which had just recently been completed. A fish stock of 32,000 was brought the day before I 
visited him and his family (25 April 2006). For the construction of the ponds, Mercy Corps paid 140,000 Afs 
and Shāh Abdul Hekmat had to invest 60,000 Afs. The agreement is that once the fish can be sold after about 
six months, the benefit would be shared evenly between Mercy Corps and Shāh Abdul Hekmat.  
429 For the discussion on a preliminary distinction of elders see below (section 6.1.1-c). 
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importance under those circumstances. The seniority of his brother and related 
conventional respect due to age added an additional dimension. It remains unclear to what 
extent the interference of civil servant officers from the ID triggered the strategic choice of 
the mirāb. However, given that uninvolved elders from Laghmāni and Mangtepa explained 
Hāji Tahir’s non-reelection by stating that the mirāb was this time nominated by merely 
three people, among whom one was said to belong to the district government,430 
government influence was likely.  
While the above indicates that in Sofi one of the most influential elders and landowners 
took over the position of mirāb himself, the situation in Qarayatim presented itself slightly 
differently, although the same pattern of strategic selection is noticeable. The appointed 
mirāb Mas’ud had not even been one of the initial five or six candidates for the position, 
but was forced through during the appointment process by Ahmad Shāh. Ahmad Shāh was 
an influential figure in Chārdara who resided in the upstream qarya-ye Hāji Nāder Khān, a 
settlement named after his father and situated alongside Surkhak canal. Reportedly, most 
landowners had favored the mirāb Abdul Ghafar from the previous year, and a 
considerable other number of elders supported the candidate Abdul Qayum during the 
appointment meeting in the mosque of Madrasa. Ahmad Shāh himself bragged about 
having ‘made Mas’ud the mirāb’ by ‘commanding the elders’ to agree on his choice.431 He 
was initially supported by just a few influential people, however it took five to six 
instances of praying until all 50 elders present were convinced and joined in and agreed to 
Mas’ud becoming mirāb of Qarayatim that year.432  
 
b. The land-water rights nexus: conflicts over irrigable-land  
  
“Dushmani dāri? – Ne, bacha-ye koko dāri. Bacha-ye koko dushmanat ast.” 
[Whether I have enemies? No, I have cousins. Cousins are the enemy.]   
Interviewee in Madrasa/Qarayatim, 8 May 2006 
In addition to the features of water management stated in the previous section, the research 
in Sofi-Qarayatim shed light on the diversity and flexibility of local water rights 
arrangements. While in Asqalān, the qulba-jerib ratio was fixed with one qulba accounting 
for 40 jerib in the entire command area, the interviews and observations along the Sofi, 
Surkhak, and Qarayatim canals showed that the qulba unit is not only assigned different 
fixed amounts according to the location along each canal, from as much as 80 jerib per 
qulba at the head,433 40 qulba throughout much of the command area’s middle section, and 
                                                             
430 The other two elder-landowners involved were Arbāb Ghayor from Mangtepa and Muhamad Rashid, 
reportedly the second most important person in Sujāni, besides commander Rahmat Bāy (Interview in 
Laghmāni Pāyin, 27 April 2006). 
431 Interview in Hāji Nāder Khān, 7 May 2006. Finding an agreement usually involves a consensual meeting 
at the end of which everybody joins in the sermon to sanction the choice of mirāb. In this case, reportedly 50 
people were present and successfully convinced so that nobody complained after the selection of Mas’ud as 
the new mirāb. After the mirāb (s)election process, the elders sign a paper that has to be taken to the district 
ID. In the past it could only be taken to the provincial ID in Kunduz.  
432 The number of 50 elders taking part in selection was mentioned by Muhamad Rashid Bāy, an important 
elder of Madrasa (Interview in Madrasa, 8 May 2006). 
433 Not observed in Sofi-Qarayatim, but reportedly the case for upstream land in Chārdara main canal area. 
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20 qulba at the tail end.434 The rules and practices of water allocation are much more 
flexible: as indicated previously, it actually depends on the level of the land because the 
difference in the height above the water level determines how much water reaches a 
particular field plot.435 Another, less noted indicator that further determines how much 
water the soil absorbs in different locations is the soil composition and quality. All the 
same, a more complete understanding of the linkage between land and water rights can be 
derived only when the land-labor nexus is factored in. Given the rule that one laborer per 
one qulba of land has to be contributed for daily manpower during intake construction, the 
common perception among water users is that with this contribution, they acquire the right 
to their share of water, no matter which crop they decide to grow in a particular season. As 
one elder from downstream Laghmāni Pāyin put it, “if we appoint the mirāb, work at the 
intake and contribute money, we have the right to get water for irrigating our rice.”436 
Evidence from a Surkhak canal branch where one farmer had his six jerib of land 
registered as one qulba suggests that the qulba-jerib ratio can be defined very individually. 
Consequently, the six jerib plot gets the amount of water a 20 or 40 jerib plot receives 
elsewhere, according to the local rotation scheme.437 The only condition is making the full 
manpower contribution to the intake and canal repair works and any required payments for 
material or machinery.438 
While this shows that generally no conflicts occur over the qulba-jerib ratio including the 
allocation of water ‘rights’ for individual users to irrigate their fields (from a theoretical 
rights perspective), the title to the land itself is often contested.439 In the following, I give 
some examples of how this issue can occur. I already indicated above that the interviews 
suggested the dominant type of land conflict occurs within the extended family network. 
Despite the fact that I did not ask about ownership conflicts in my interviews, I came 
across examples of land conflicts at every turn. While conflict cases were often simply 
narrated to me, at times it also happened that during the interview with an elder someone 
approached with a petition (‘ariza) to ask for advice and mediation for a current problem. 
For example, when I visited the Sofi mirāb Shāh Abdul Hekmat at his home, one farmer, 
                                                             
434 Based on speculation that canals at the tail end are smaller and water is divided according to time, thus to 
irrigate the same amount of land more time is needed at the tail-end section of a canal. Likewise the 
assumption is that in equal time less water reaches the tail end and lands at a higher-level position. However, 
where water needs more time to reach the right height for irrigation, a correction can be introduced by 
decreasing the qulba-jerib ratio (noted by ter Steege, 26 April 2006; see also Mielke et al. [2010: 196]). 
435 Note that the level is subject to change over time given the high occurrence of siltation throughout the 
Sofi-Qarayatim system. 
436 The statement was made in a way of realization and calling into memory the customary rule, despite the 
fact that earlier the conversation broached the issue that farmers in Laghmāni Pāyin do not get enough water 
for rice cropping (Interview in Laghmāni Pāyin, Sofi, 27 April 2006). 
437 In this setting along Surkhak during the 2006 irrigation period, the normal rotation was fixed at two hours 
every three days. In other parts of Surkhak, e.g., in Hāji Nāder Khān village one qulba was usually 20 jerib 
(Interviews Surkhak, Sofi, April and May 2006). 
438 Interview in Nāqelān, Surkhak, 6 May 2006. 
439 Not to mention that of course conflicts about water distribution during rotation, that is, related to timing 
and opening and closing of offtakes are quite common. These are usually labeled ‘water theft’. However, 
since such instances of water theft have been described for Asqalān at length and given that the basic pattern 
does not differ in Sofi-Qarayatim, water distribution conflicts are treated secondarily in this subchapter. 
Nevertheless, the subsequent examples show that land and water conflicts are closely entangled. 
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Hāji Chāri, came up to seek urgent advice in a legal case against his brother.440 This 
dispute was in fact related to the irrigation water supply in the first place. The brother, 
whose six jerib of land were located above Hāji Chāri’s three jerib of land, denied the 
latter water, because he did not want Hāji Chāri to channel the water along the edge of his 
six jerib from the same offtake. This practice had been in place for 40 years. After the 
same conflict had already been mediated by the elders three years ago – at that time the 
mirāb and elders decided that Hāji Chāri’s water should travel over/along the edge of his 
brother’s land – the elders this time reportedly suggested that Hāji Chāri should turn to the 
government first and make the conflict ‘official’. Having done that, Hāji Chāri turned up in 
Shāh Abdul Hekmat’s guesthouse with a letter from the head of the district ID, Engineer 
Abdul Wahid Khān, ordering the Sofi mirāb to solve the dispute and report the solution 
back to the department. Hāji Chāri’s brother demanded that Hāji Chāri build a dam and dig 
his own stream to his three-jerib plot from further down the secondary canal. In contrast, 
the latter argued that his land was too high to be irrigated from a separate stream. His 
brother’s hostility left him perplexed and complaining. 
I would like to add three more examples of intra-family conflict occurrences and two 
between parties that can be described as power actors, to be able to identify some general 
patterns of dispute resolution efforts and the involved actors (see Ch. 7.2). Both types of 
contestation, intra-family conflicts and land disputes between non-family parties, are most 
often related to illegitimate appropriation of land that was temporarily abandoned by its 
owners during different periods of the war years when families sought refuge in Pakistan 
or Iran from violence at home. Although it was a common practice in all areas that the 
head of the family or male family members would at least try to return annually to sow and 
bring in a harvest if possible, in many cases and for different periods the land of these 
families was cultivated either by extended family members who stayed behind (with the 
owners’ approval) or seized by others. Consequently, upon the return of families from 
exile, different modes of (quasi-)appropriation caused tensions and regular disputes of 
different severity, most often within families and clans.441 According to local accounts, 
returnee numbers in Sofi and Qarayatim around the time of fieldwork were considerable. 
The number of registered returnees in Chārdara between 2002 and 2006 amounted to 
31,342 people (UNHCR 2006).   
 
Table 4: Number of returning refugees, Chārdara district, 2002-2006 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006442 
Refugee 
Returnees 
 
14,045 
 
3,038 
 
6,808 
 
5,770 
 
1,681 
      
In one instance, one brother who had fled to Iran and was able to earn some money there 
had asked his older brother at home to buy land for him in his absence. After his return 
from Iran, he found that the brother had not bought any land and that the money was gone. 
The brother offered him some of his land, which was worth much less than the money 
                                                             
440 Interviews during visit at mirāb’s home and at conflict field site in Sheikhhā, 25 April 2006. 
441 Interview with cadaster officials in Chārdara, 28 May 2006. 
442 As of 30 September 2006. 
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would have purchased. So the returnee brother consulted the local elders about the case 
who then made a decision that was not accepted by the older brother as it adjudged the 
younger brother’s claim: they demanded that the elder brother either buy an adequate plot 
of land or return the full money amount plus five sheep as compensation to his sibling. 
Subsequently, the younger brother then approached the district governor who sent a written 
note back to the elders asking them to take care of the case and find a proper solution. This 
time, the elders demanded that the older brother buy land for his returnee brother according 
to the money initially sent from Iran and to give him 10 sheep as compensation. Despite 
the fact that this decision was even more costly to the older brother, he reportedly accepted 
it.443 In a similar case, a person had sold his cousin’s land in the latter’s absence out of 
necessity and was unable to buy it back by the time his cousin returned from Pakistan 
because his financial situation was very tight. He referred to the local elder of the Hāji 
Nāder Khān community, Ahmad Shāh, who accompanied him to the district office without 
consulting with other elders and without sending a petition to the district administration 
first. I met both on their way to the district governor’s office in Chārdara to discuss the 
issue with the parties involved. It was concluded that, given the original owner’s financial 
means, he should buy his former land back. At the same time, the bankrupt cousin was 
committed to repay him continuously in piecemeal style whenever he earned some money. 
Both parties agreed to this settlement.444 
In another example, an inheritance dispute about a large piece of land was solved by the 
single-handed intervention of Arbāb Sofi Muhamad of Mangtepa after an initial mediation 
attempt by the elders and the arbāb was not successful; the conflict had then been 
simmering for about half a year until the district administration became involved. One 
person from the local qawm had asked the sons of his maternal uncle for the inheritance 
rights of his mother.445 The sons of the uncle insisted that the rights had been granted 
previously by their father when he was still alive. However, they could not prove their 
claim with any documentation. On behalf of the government, Sofi Muhamad finally 
managed to convince the brothers that they would not have to split up their land, but 
compensate the cousin by paying him 80,000 Afs. He accepted and both parties exchanged 
documents stating that their rights were determined through this settlement and that they 
would not fight each other in the future. Thus, the conflict was settled. The arbāb sent a 
report about the agreement to the district administration. The brothers paid the taxes which 
were incurred by the sale to the government.446   
                                                             
443 Interview with cadaster officials in Chārdara, 28 May 2006. 
444 Interviews at district administration office, Chārdara, 10 May 2006. 
445 According to Islamic law, the inheritance share of a sister is half the amount of a brother. A widow 
receives one eighth of the bequest. However, in practice, the rights of female family members are not widely 
recognized or granted. Interviews in Department of Land Affairs in Chārdara, 10 May 2006, 25 May 2006. 
See also McEwen and Whitty (2006: 33f). 
446 Interview with Arbāb Sofi Muhamad in Mangtepa, 26 May 2006. Whenever land is officially sold (with 
issuing and registration of shara’i-documents), the government collects a 10 percent fee from 100,000 (one 
lakh) Afs plus taxes, that is plus 1% from one lakh, 5% from five lakh, from 5.5 lakh 6%, etc. (Interviews 
with clerks of Chārdara cadaster office, 10 May 2006; clerk of provincial revenue authority (mustofiyat), 21 
July 2006). 
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Crucial for the understanding of land conflicts and associated mediation efforts – despite a 
lack of legal regulations and given the absence of systematic land documentation as a 
result of the war – is the differentiation between ‘urufi versus shara’i titles. The latter refer 
to registered title deeds with any legal department of the government, the former to the 
realm of everyday practices and de facto ownership, which is not recognized officially and 
thus not binding in the framework of statutory law. However,‘urufi documents, if non-
controversial, are recognized by courts and government offices involved in conflict 
resolution efforts. From an ordinary citizen’s perspective a robust shara’i document would 
only be desired in case of predictable conflicts and contestation of property rights within 
the family, especially among brothers and cousins, or in cases where not agricultural but 
land for commercial purposes is acquired. The process of pursuing official ownership 
documents (waziqa-ye shara’i) is costly due to a government fee of 10 percent per 100,000 
Afs of the value of the land transfer. Furthermore, it requires the testimony of elders from 
the particular locale.447 Against these difficulties, the majority of land and property 
transfers remain ‘urufi arrangements. They rely on documents issued by local elders. The 
disadvantage of ‘urufi-confirmed ownership also lies with the chance that documents can 
get lost and given that, unlike shara’i-documents, no copy in a land register exists, the 
owner may consequently have difficulties in proving his claims. Similarly, when each 
witness passes away, the ‘urufi-document becomes vulnerable to counter-claims.448 
The disputes described in this section so far did not involve deeds of ownership or land 
titles because intra-family issues were concerned.449 Also, they were mostly mediated by 
local elders and in exceptional cases involved the district administration. A second major 
land conflict category, however, concerns disputes between non-family parties over legal 
ownership. Here, the local cadaster office, the Land Affairs Department and the courts at 
different administrative levels can become involved. During one interview in Laghmāni, 
respondents emphasized that contesting claims over land have occurred, especially since 
2003, and pointed towards a plot just opposite from where we were sitting in the shade of 
some mulberry trees. After 2001, Hāji Abdul Jalil, a local strongman and cousin of 
commander Rahmat Bāy, a famous and important mujahedin commander of the area, 
occupied 11 jerib of land which the owners had been cultivating for some 70 years. The 
                                                             
447 Interview, Chārdara, 25 May 2006. 
448 Interview with Chief of the Justice Department in Kunduz, 31 May 2006. 
449 As already noted in one instance above, within joint families, in particular concerning the household of 
one father and his several sons, the land might be divided equally between the sons, but the ownership 
document is usually not changed and is issued in the name of the father or even an ancestor grandfather. 
Modes of production – whether joint or individual – vary from family to family. Often, the inheritance 
progression does not provide all male family members with a sufficient piece of land to earn a living. For this 
reason, one son might be asked to buy his brothers out. In many instances, production and consumption are 
not split up and families cope, for example, by having one son cultivate, a second one work as a laborer in 
Kunduz, and a third one send money from migratory labor in Iran. Against this background, ownership 
documents and the preliminary conclusions one could draw from looking only at the cadaster data give 
merely a partial account of the complex realities of property rights. It is not only that the procedure for 
individuals to change land titles would involve a great deal of bureaucratic interactions (authentication, 
production of witnesses) and a considerable amount of money. It would also mean conceding that, de facto in 
most cases, the property is fragmented and no longer supporting anyone by any substantial means. 
Furthermore, it would enforce the formalization of precarious property situations and in the process demand a 
clarification of which brother should actually hold a title deed. Such a process would likely cause many more 
conflicts to develop and escalate.              
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three aggrieved parties had shara’i land documents issued from the time of Zāher Shāh. 
Nevertheless, they did not dare to challenge the illegal occupation of their land as long as 
Commander Rahmat Bāy had not joined the DDR process. Once it was reported that he 
had handed in his weapons in 2003, the rightful owners consulted with local elders about 
Hāji Abdul Jalil’s illegal appropriation of their land. The dispute resolution process 
involved several meetings with the elders and finally the landowners’ party and Hāji Abdul 
Jalil were asked to appoint a representative (wakil) who would be sent to the government 
and involve the courts. Despite the fact that the title-holders’ deeds were reaffirmed and 
they could again cultivate the land plots, they expressed fear of acts of retaliation by Hāji 
Abdul Jalil at the time of fieldwork, because he had threatened to reignite the conflict on 
the next available occasion.  
In Nāqelān, a substream community of Surkhak, three local commanders had divided up 
the land of all families who had migrated to Pakistan among themselves in the 1990s.450 
Once the households returned, the larger part of these lands was given back to them, with 
the exception of 60 jerib because two elders of Nāqelān had been forced at gunpoint to 
sign sales documents that confirmed the commanders’ lawful appropriation and cultivation 
of these 60 jerib. In the view of the aggrieved, they did not have a chance at court because 
the newly-issued deed would overrule their own document and they did not feel that they 
had good enough contacts and authoritative representatives to support a claim for 
justice.451 In cases when a conflict cannot be solved locally by elders’ consultation and 
consequently the government administration is consulted in land conflicts, the Land Affairs 
Department452 will be approached via a petition. This department usually sends one of its 
staff members with another representative from the law section and one from the attorney’s 
office to the conflict site to see which party holds what kind of document.  
Similarly, in cases when the land use is contested between cultivators and herders,453 the 
district governor is usually notified with a petition letter first, who then passes it on to the 
Land Affairs Department with an order that both parties should furnish their documents. If 
                                                             
450 During the civil war period, the front line between Dostum and Rabāni was near Madrasa manteqa. This 
commonly resulted in a situation where commanders from opposing factions competed with each other for 
‘ushr (land tax). If landowners were away for the long term in Pakistan or Iran without cultivating and 
harvesting crops on their land, local commanders used to occupy the land and rent it out to sharecroppers for 
additional income, plus the ‘ushr. 
451 Interview, Nāqelān, 6 May 2006. 
452 In Chārdara, the Land Affairs Department included actually both the land registration (emlāk) and 
cadastral unit, which stores detailed maps of landholdings, at the time of fieldwork. Changes in locally-
registered land, e.g., as a result of court decisions or inheritance changes, are reported to the provincial Land 
Affairs Department in Kunduz on a regular basis, including the deposit of copies of all land documents 
issued. Thus, should documents have been lost due to wartime events or for some other reason; a copy can be 
requested from Kunduz (Interviews with official of the Kunduz Cadastre Department, 15-16 May 2006; with 
representative in Land Affairs Department, 29-30 November 2006). 
453 Common disputes arise over the marked category of land, whether it is registered as irrigable land for 
cultivation (zamin-e ābi) or malchar (public land not suitable for cultivation, but used as pasture [alafchar]). 
No tax levies apply to the latter. As per the rule, all other land types (allocated, private and nāqel-land) would 
be taxed under one of the three different land categories at an average of 50 Afs per jerib, at least before 
1978. By the time of fieldwork, tax collection attempts had not recovered, and between 2001 and 2006 no 
land taxes were collected. The drought was named as the official reason for this policy (Interview with clerk 
from Kunduz tax department (māliya), Madrasa/Chārdara, 21 July 2006).    
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the officers conclude a case but the person who appealed to the sub-governor does not 
accept the decision, he can refer the matter to the elementary district court in Chārdara. 
The next step in the hierarchy would be the provincial court in Kunduz, followed by the 
Supreme Court in Kabul. Several cases are known where people have appealed to the 
highest court. For example, 10 years ago, a person named Ali Muhamad referred to the 
Chārdara court after the Land Affairs Department adjudged a conflict in favor of Hāji 
Umar, who they concluded had the proper documents. After Ali Muhamad signaled that he 
would not accept the decision of the district court either, his files were sent to the 
provincial court in Kunduz. However, the judges also decided in Hāji Umar’s favor. 
Following this, Ali Muhamad was given 20 days to file a protest. It took another four 
months to address the conflict in Kunduz again. Overall, the conflict was settled after eight 
years of proceedings with Ali Muhamad winning the case, because in the end his 
documents were found to be correct.454 
In the next paragraph I would like to describe one dispute which I have tried to trace 
during the time of my fieldwork in more detail. In my view it is worth detailing because it 
shows how issues of land, water, physical-geographic factors, and local governance 
patterns are interwoven in a complex manner. Furthermore the example takes account of 
events in the past and the way these events determined the attempts at conflict resolution I 
could observe and document.  
With the complete destruction of the Sofi-Qarayatim intake and the shifting of the riverbed 
in 2005, agricultural land had been washed away and remained under water, but the 
meandering river also opened up new land. Both eventualities raised competing claims as 
to who should compensate the losses on the one hand and who owned the re-allocated land 
on the other. As mentioned earlier, the Kharoti aqueduct was also destroyed by the flood. 
Initially it had been built by Sofi-Qarayatim water users as compensation to Kharoti 
farmers, whose fields were cut off when the former constructed their joint intake in 1989-
90 (1368) and the connecting canal until the dubandi diversion structure (see above).455 
Before, the farmers of Kharoti were irrigating from a substream of the Chārdara main 
canal. Once the Sofi-Qarayatim connection canal was built, they were allowed to use water 
from this canal. However, since their lands were so high, both parties agreed on the 
aqueduct to provide water from Chārdara canal.456 The land for the intake and the canal 
(13.5 and 1.5 jerib) were bought by Sofi-Qarayatim representatives from the Kharoti elders 
and one farmer. At that time, the whole area was under the rule of individual commanders 
from different parties457 and the Kharoti landowners had mostly taken refuge in Pakistan. 
                                                             
454 Interviews at Land Affairs Department in Chārdara, 10 and 25 May 2006.  
455 In addition, the aqueduct had been rebuilt twice already by Sofi-Qarayatim in the aftermath of floods 
during the previous 15 years. 
456 Two other aqueducts exist in Kharoti and channel water from Chārdara. The entire irrigation of Kharoti 
lands relies on these three aqueducts. The described dispute revolves around the one which was built by the 
Sofi-Qarayatim farmers in 1989-90. Another concession in the agreement allowed Kharoti farmers to use 
pumps to access water from the Sofi-Qarayatim canal in times of low water in Chārdara. In practice, the 
Qarayatim-mirāb would have to be consulted and for such cases local farmers would need to rent pumps 
from Umarkhēl or Kunduz. 
457 Reportedly, Qarayatim manteqa alone had about 18 commanders (Interview with Hāji Jum’a Khān in 
Madrasa, 4 June 2006). Fifteen commanders signed or put their fingerprints on the letter addressed to all 
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That is why the deal over 13.5 jerib was endorsed by the provincial-level commanders 
(amir) of the different parties. It was agreed that the Sofi-Qarayatim people would pay the 
full amount of money (10 lakh, that is, one million Afs per jerib) to three elders and one 
commander who agreed to disburse the money to the individual owners once they returned 
from Pakistan.458 The remaining 1.5 jerib were paid for with 750,000 Afs by the elder Hāji 
Jum’a Khān on behalf of the Qarayatim farmers in 1990-91. At the time of fieldwork in 
2006 the following claims were raised:  
 One farmer, Najib, from Kharoti who had recently returned from Pakistan and 
whose land had been sold by the commanders back in 1989-90 claimed that he 
never received any compensation for his four jerib of land. He referred the matter 
to the district governor demanding to be compensated;459  
 Representatives of the Kharoti farmers demanded that the Sofi-Qarayatim farmers 
reconstruct the aqueduct in time for the upcoming irrigation season at their own 
cost, referring to the 1989-90 agreement; 
 Moreover, the size of the land sold by the commanders was disputed. None of the 
parties could supply a sales document.460 The only document that was preserved by 
Hāji Jum’a Khān was one dated July 1368, stating that Sofi and Qarayatim laborers 
would be working to create a new intake and dig a canal at the particular site, 
notifying the different sub-commanders about it and requesting them not to harm 
the laborers. The document was signed by the local amir of the area – Besmellah, a 
commander of Hezb-e Islāmi (Gulb’udin Hekmatyār), signed for Kharoti, and Faiz 
Umarkhēl (Etehād-e Islāmi of Sayyaf) as dominant amir of Qarayatim. 
Furthermore, for Harakat commander Rahmatullah was involved and signed.461 
Since an accurate measurement could not be undertaken in 1989-90, the Kharoti 
representatives now claimed that only 10 jerib were sold collectively at that time, 
whereas the Sofi-Qarayatim elders claimed it was 13.5 jerib, or 15 jerib in total. In 
addition, given that two of the three elders who were involved in the settlement 
(besides one local commander) had died in the meantime, one party’s word stood 
against the other;  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
jihadi commanders requesting their followers and subordinates not to interfere in the canal construction 
works in Qarayatim in 1989-90 (1368). See Appendix A1-a for a translation of the letter including a list of 
those who signed.  
458 Apparently, most of the landowners returned during the mujahedin period and were then compensated 
(Interview with Arbāb Ghayor, 22 May 2006). This claim could not be verified in detail. However, in the 
absence of counter-claims, there is no reason to dispute it. According to the Sofi-Qarayatim elders, the 
aqueduct was also reconstructed for 4,000-4,500 lakh Junbeshi in cash during the Rabāni period (1992-1996) 
after it had been washed away. 
459 According to two of the elders charged with mediating the conflict, the land had previously been under 
water and now resurfaced, however washed out (Interviews with Arbāb Ghayor in Mangtepa, 26 May 2006; 
with Hāji Jum’a Khān in Madrasa, 4 June 2006).  
460 Statements about sales documents vary. One version goes that upon the return of the Kharoti landowners 
during the mujahedin period individual sales documents were signed and the agreement about the 
construction of the aqueduct was fixed. These are all ‘urufi-documents.  
461 The process was actually that local commanders assembled and wrote the letter which was then signed 
and stamped by their superior, provincial-level commanders (amir). Other authorities did not exist at that 
time; moreover, nobody seemed to bother about proper documents since the word of the amir was 
authoritative and counted as ‘law’. This might also explain why – unlike the deal about 1.5 jerib made with 
Najib and certified with the issuing of an ‘urufi document – no document may have been issued in the case of 
the 13.5 jerib.  
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 The Sofi-Qarayatim faction was interested in exactly measuring and marking their 
presumed 15 jerib of land. A considerable portion of it had now resurfaced after the 
riverbed shifted with the 2005 flood. The elders of Sofi-Qarayatim, however 
Qarayatim-dominated, sought for legal recognition of their ownership, including 
shara’i documents;  
 A landowner from Kharoti claimed that he lost four jerib of land because of the 
washing away of the intake; 
 In addition, the river’s movement opened up four new jerib of land, the ownership 
of which was unclear. 
The situation demanded urgent clarification and settlement because on 7 May 2006, the 
head of the provincial ID Engineer Amir had called the elders by phone announcing that a 
foreign NGO had committed to constructing a concrete intake and repairing the aqueduct. 
This forced the elders of Sofi and Qarayatim to act quickly and come to an agreement with 
the Kharoti farmers, because for the construction site of the new intake an additional 1.5 
jerib of Kharoti land were needed (in between the new river course and their previously 
acquired 15 jerib). They were willing to purchase it from the Kharoti farmers. 
Following the announcement of foreign NGO involvement in the reconstruction of the 
complete irrigation infrastructure in Sofi-Qarayatim and the prospect of getting a concrete 
intake, a gathering of the Sofi-Qaryateem elders with the district governor took place in the 
latter’s office in Chārdara the very next day. A first site visit was scheduled two days later. 
Hāji Jum’a Khān, a respected elder of the Qarayatim manteqa, was appointed 
representative of the Sofi-Qarayatim water users and – accompanied by other elders – 
charged with the settlement of the issues under dispute with the Kharoti.462 Throughout 
May 2006 he went to the district governor’s office almost every day, oftentimes in vain 
because nobody from Kharoti came. Even though the district governor invited all the 
elders, the consultations had to be postponed several times. It took more than three weeks 
to arrange a meeting with both Kharoti and Sofi-Qarayatim representatives attending. By 
that time the basic position of Sofi-Qarayatim had been discussed several times. Among 
the elders everyone was eager to settle the land conflict and to find a temporary solution 
for the aqueduct issue, so as not to endanger the NGO’s involvement. There were plans to 
collect money from water users in Sofi and Qarayatim (1,000 Afs per qulba) to buy a 
generator for a water pump and a medium-sized tank to provide to the Kharoti farmers. 
Since everybody was assuming that the NGO would construct a permanent aqueduct 
structure in the near future, this was intended as a temporary measure to ensure the Kharoti 
farmers could irrigate their land for the time being.463  
At least two field visits were undertaken to the site where the river had changed its course. 
The second field visit took place in the framework of the larger meeting where deputies of 
all stake-holding factions were present. This time a land surveyor was also taken along to 
actually measure the land plots in question. It turned out that the size of the land bought by 
                                                             
462 On the background, motivation, and life-world of Hāji Jum’a Khān as an elder see the discussion below in 
section c. He had also been one of the elders involved in the buying of the land in 1989-90 and the payment 
of the money to the Kharoti during the mujahedin period. 
463 Estimates suggested that the construction of a permanent intake would take between six to twelve months. 
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the elders of Sofi-Qarayatim in 1368 was only 10 jerib and two biswa, thus approximately 
five jerib less than they had paid for. In contrast, the land Najib had sold them was half a 
jerib bigger than paid for and stated in the ‘urufi document. The land of the Kharoti farmer 
who initially appealed to the district governor turned out to be slightly larger than four 
jerib. The representatives of Sofi-Qarayatim had entered the negotiations stating that they 
would be ready to pay the difference if the land they had acquired was larger than the 15 
jerib that they had paid for. They expected to be compensated by the Kharoti farmers 
should it turn out that they the Sofi-Qarayatim people had actually paid too much. 
Regarding the four jerib of land of that farmer who claimed not to have received 
compensation from the commanders, the Qarayatim elders insisted that this was not their 
issue since they paid the full amount of money to the Kharoti representatives. The Kharoti 
would have to solve this issue among each other and possibly provide a list of those whose 
land was sold and which share of the money each former owner received. After all this 
effort, no agreement other than about the short-term construction of the aqueduct could be 
reached. The Kharoti elders demanded that Sofi-Qarayatim water users should buy the four 
jerib of land that had newly surfaced, which was rejected. Regarding the five jerib Sofi-
Qarayatim had previously overpaid for, Hāji Jum’a Khān (of Qarayatim) offered the 
Kharoti elders to use the money they would have to reimburse Sofi-Qarayatim to settle the 
issue with their own farmer who lost about four jerib. Nevertheless, a settlement about the 
land was not achieved as long as I was able to observe the meetings.464 With regard to the 
aqueduct, it was agreed that Sofi-Qarayatim would build a temporary structure from 
barrels that should last until the NGO could build a permanent one. The mirāb of Sofi and 
Qarayatim (including Surkhak) were ordered to buy the barrels and organize their welding 
(see below).   
Now that I have described the subject of the conflict and the position of the stakeholders, I 
present two excerpts recorded and transcribed during gatherings of the elders with the 
district governor in his office. The transcripts shed light on the mediation process of this 
conflict as they capture the interaction between elders and the district governor.465 Since 
Hāji Jum’a Khān plays an extraordinary role in this undertaking and much of the extracts 
are his articulations, I hope to be able to give an insight into his motivation and scope of 
agency in the conflict and his own perception of it. The fact that Hāji Jum’a Khān was 
charged with leading the negotiations highlights not only his importance but also implies a 
wider recognition and perceived necessity of elders’ work (muysafēdi). Based on his own 
background and impressions from interviews and interactions with him, I discuss his status 
as elder and compare his profile with that of other elders from Sofi-Qarayatim.   
 
                                                             
464 For security reasons, I had to stop traveling to Chārdara and visiting stakeholders in this conflict after 15 
June 2006. A joint hearing was scheduled then, but its outcome remained unknown. According to Hāji Jum’a 
Khān’s son, the conflict remains unsettled until this date (mid-2011) because of the growing insecurity in 
Chārdara that had started in summer 2006. 
465 The interaction between local representatives with government agencies is the topic of a separate 
subchapter on issues of representation in Ch. 7.3. The discursive dimension of the excerpts below is also 
analyzed in Ch. 7. 
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c. Hāji Jum’a Khān’s muysafēdi and a preliminary differentiation of elders 
The following conversation took place at the office of the district governor in Chārdara 
immediately before the first outing to see the site of the contested land near the intake on 
22 May 2006.466 Of the conflicting parties only Hāji Jum’a Khān (HJK) was present at 
around 9 a.m. It was a normal reception day in the district governor’s office, when 
anybody who has an appeal can bring it to the district governor’s attention. Thus, several 
other people were sitting on the sofas at both sides of the room. The name of the district 
governor is Faiz Muhamad, a Turkmen from Qal’a-ye Zāl.467 I had the permission to 
observe the audience session and to ask questions.468 Shortly after the beginning of the 
session a group of elders from both Qarayatim and Sofi arrived. Later on, representatives 
from Kharoti joined in the meeting.  
Katja Mielke (KM): What is happening today? Will the issue with the Kharoti people be 
addressed? 
District governor (DG): Both parties are not present to talk about that issue. Only Hāji Sāheb 
[referring to HJK] has come this morning, nobody else. The Qarayatim people promised to 
erect an aqueduct with barrels this year to enable the Kharoti farmers to irrigate their lands. An 
organization promised to construct a permanent aqueduct structure next year. So once they 
make a concrete aqueduct next year, the problem will be solved finally and the conflict 
between the Nahr-e Sofi and Qarayatim water users and Kharoti farmers will come to an end. 
Isn’t it true, Mawlawi Sāheb [addressing HJK]? An organization promised you the 
construction, right? Here are the elders of Nahr-e Sofi and Qarayatim coming. The elders of 
Kharoti have not come today, they have another problem. 
KM: So without the Kharoti people nothing can be decided today? 
DG: The aqueduct issue has been solved already. I commanded the representatives of Sofi-
Qarayatim to make an aqueduct with barrels this year. 
HJK: Engineer Amir [head of Kunduz ID] invited me three days ago. I went, accompanied by 
three or four elders. An engineer informed us that a tender call has been processed and I… we 
closed a contract to have the canals, our intake, and offtakes and the aqueduct constructed. 
They start, enshā’allah [God willing], when the water level decreases. He assured us.   
DG: Hāji Sāheb, do you have a car at your disposal? Are you ready to go on a visit to see the 
land? 
                                                             
466 As the transcript indicates, the outing was not planned, but rather a spontaneous decision of the district 
governor during the meeting in the morning. The outing was attended by several elders from Sofi-Qarayatim 
and Kharoti, district government staff (deputy head of district ID, assistants), the researcher and her assistant.   
467 Faiz Muhamad was appointed district governor of Chārdara in the first half of March 2005 (end of 1383). 
He was respected and enjoyed high popularity because of his fair and service-minded behavior towards 
everybody without ethnic or other bias and his striving for justice based on very clear moral and transparent 
legal principles. In the past, he had been an important mujahed and Jam’iat commander in his home district 
Qal’a-ye Zāl where he is a legend among fellow Turkmen.  
468 I had met with the district governor previously and asked him if I could join some of his regular reception 
hours in order to get an overview and learn what kind of issues were being discussed, how, which procedures 
applied, and which steps were taken. Faiz Muhamad granted me access without restrictions. Regarding the 
interviewing style, by asking two open questions in the beginning I tried to open the discussion to a broader 
scope. 
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HJK: I am ready anytime, every day, but they are not present. Najib wasn’t here yesterday as 
well and they were not here the day before yesterday.  
DG: We should go to see the site at once.  
HJK: It would be good if Najib was here. He could point out the four limits of his land and 
indicate his neighbors’ land, saying, ‘This is my land, this is Hāji Sāheb’s land…’  
Another elder: Let’s apologize and ask them to wait until the water has gone back, and then 
visit the site. We shouldn’t create additional problems. They are already on the alert and annoy 
us much. 
DG: I am personally distressed that you are exposed to a great deal of annoyances and always 
have to travel forth and back to the district administration. If you think I don’t mind your 
troubles, no, I do. I am very much aware of it because you are respected elders of the qawm. 
When you visit me I feel humbled, face-to-face with you I shrink. I am embarrassed if you do 
not let me see the site, I have the responsibility. Let us go at once to see the location. I am sure 
that we will have good discussions and can find an agreement with the Kharoti people 
afterwards.  
HJK: Look, we have accepted thousands of problems. We agreed to build the aqueduct; we 
have done this and that. Now the only thing we need is the 1.5 jerib of land. We, the owners of 
15,000 jerib are stumped and wonder what to do. If this 1.5 jerib of land would not have been 
under the river at that time, we would have already purchased it back then. Now it lays open 
after the river shifted its course. What have we done wrong? We have accepted to build the 
aqueduct in exchange of the land. We rebuilt it for them after it had been washed away; we 
reconstructed it a second time. We paid money as well. Wuluswāl Sāheb, I swear we are no 
trouble-makers [yāghi]. We deserve fair treatment. We try to behave well with them as much 
as possible, we apologized. We treat them like our qawm and brothers. They are our brothers. 
They all are the light of our eyes. I am in bewilderment about this 1.5 jerib of land. 
At this time, when some representatives from Kharoti entered the room, Hāji Jum’a Khān 
and another Sofi-Qarayatim (SQ) elder suddenly shift the topic saying to the sub-governor 
that they had heard he went to his home in Qal’a-ye Zāl, but found this to be untrue, only 
to believe he had gone to Kabul, which also was not the case. On top of that, they claimed 
to have heard that he had been changed to another position and somebody else had been 
appointed district governor of Chārdara. This was followed by comments of Hāji Jum’a 
Khān on how hard it is to get a (government) job these days and which influential figures 
have not succeeded in it so far.469   
Kharoti farmer: We have no pipe for the water. There is no elder, no arbāb, and no mirāb. 
HJK: We have talked with our mirāb about it. He is in charge of making the aqueduct. He is 
not here now, he went to Kabul.  
Kharoti farmer: The crops will die. There is no barrel. They still have not started their works. 
I am not lying to you with this white beard. 
                                                             
469 To quote: “It is very hard to get a job. I have seen it. If it was easy, Shēr Muhamad Arab could get a job. 
He is rich.” Another person adds that commander Rahmat Bāy is also trying to get a job. It was concluded 
that it is very unpleasant for someone to try so hard to get a job (“so much running around and after other 
people”). This sudden shift in the conversation obviously was an attempt to vindicate the Sofi-Qarayatim 
elders’ presence at the meeting and suggests that they might have claimed towards Kharoti representatives 
that Faiz Muhamad was not available. See Hāji Jum’a Khān’s second reply thereafter.  
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HJK:  I heard the district governor is in Qal’a-ye Zāl, but he says he was not in Qal’a-ye-Zāl 
and he was also not in Kabul. Do I lie to you? This was what I heard. I am not dishonest [‘I do 
not make my face black’]. I had asked the mirāb to take care of it. Now everybody says the 
aqueduct will be built by an organization. Nobody has started reaping wheat so far. It will be 
built on time. They have transported the barrels to the site.  
Kharoti elder: Hāji Sāheb, there is not a single barrel! 
Qarayatim elder (Abdul Azim Bāy): We heard that barrels have been welded. I do not know 
where they store them. 
SQ-elders: Wuluswāl Sāheb, you have to issue a note to invite the mirāb. No, do not write 
Mas’ud’s name, he is in Kabul right now. If the soldier [‘askar] goes to his place, they will 
send him away and he will come back without a result. Write the name of his kokbāshi, Hāji 
Muhamad Rashid. He is available, he would come. 
DG [to his office clerk]: Take this note to the commandership, they shall bring him here.  
Kharoti elder: Wuluswāl Sāheb, I am full of respect for you and as far as I am concerned 
personally, I would accept any harm and difficulties without referring to the government. I try 
to solve small things within our qawm, we usually do it on our own. I say let us not bother 
anyone. I usually want to live up to my name and not lose my honor. But if my kids die from 
hunger, I cannot sit at home. This guy surveyed the fields and is a witness that there is no 
water. What to do? 
Elder: Wuluswāl Sāheb, write a letter to Muhamad Din from the criminal investigation 
department to solve this problem. Both parties are present and the Nahr-e Sofi people are his 
relatives. He should solve the issue. It is not necessary to send a soldier.  
After the audience session all stakeholders went to the site of the damage to study the 
situation. Afterwards, the district governor and the Sofi-Qarayatim elders went back to the 
district administration and had this conversation: 
DG: Hāji Sāheb! Can Najib be reached today? I will ask the commandership to send someone 
with a note to bring Najib.  
Elder: Wuluswāl Sāheb, you have a sincere heart and good intentions but nobody is listening. 
You have to take care of one thing, God willing, you have to get hold of those five or six 
landowners from the past who received the money for the 15 jerib of land, call them in. First, 
the Kharoti have to provide a list of the people whom they paid money. Second, it is unknown 
whether the person who appealed for compensation has ever received his share or who kept it. 
They have to give us our entire land; if the land is not complete, we are obliged to return the 
land to him. You have to fix a date and invite us and the others. If no one comes, he should be 
punished. One day, one person doesn’t come; another day, another person doesn’t come. One 
says: “I am a shopkeeper and I am not free”, another one simply wants to elude and lies. 
DG: Do you want justice? 
Several elders: Yes, of course.  
DG: Justice is no easy thing. It requires careful consideration of all facts and negotiation.  
Elder: You have to invite those people. We need to know once and for all whom they paid the 
money and whether they will give us a land document or not.   
HJK: Wuluswāl Sāheb! We will solve the problem once this information is provided. Either 
we pay the difference or they pay this guy. 
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DG: Hāji Sāheb, now I have understood everything. I learned that this Najib sold 1.5 jerib of 
land; however, it might not be 1.5 jerib. They sold you 13.5 jerib of land which might also not 
be quite 13.5 jerib, thus the question is whether the total was 15 jerib. It was said that the 
stream is 40 meters, yet, possibly it is even longer, maybe 50 meters. After the field visit the 
issues have become clearer. Najib’s land is located where there is a bend in the stream. Maybe 
the Kharoti elders at that time thought it was the land of another person because they had 
issued this other person a corresponding land document previously.  
HJK: This side might be his land, but that side is not his land. His land is on this side where 
the newly dug stream is located.  
DG: Right. The land which is in this direction is the land of that person and Najib has received 
the money for it. The land wasn’t there at that time, it was in the river. 
HJK:  I did not even want to ask them about the land document and I did not want to request 
that the land is measured. But they force me to. One of them comes saying “I have my three 
jerib of land here”, another one comes and says “I have my jerib there”. Next year another two 
people will come and claim land. I am obliged to get a document from them, no matter 
whether they have sold their own land or someone else’s land. I am forced to take rigorous 
steps. It is not only me who is bewildered, you are also astonished. The river moved 1.5 jerib, 
an amount we will need to buy in addition. But they make a mountain out of a molehill.  
Elder: The stream itself is a document.  
Another elder: Now once the former landowners have been identified, we will not allow 
others’ claims. Otherwise there is no end to the claims in the future. 
HJK: Yes, we will not allow it. I wouldn’t need to get the document. For us it does not make 
such a difference whether it is 10 jerib or 11 jerib of land. We receive our water. What does a 
blind person want to have? Two seeing eyes. We had to refer to the district… we paid the 
money at that time, ten lakh per jerib. Ten lakh Afs was a lot of money then, but we were 
obliged to pay it, we did not have a stream, no water at that time, so we purchased this land. 
DG: Invite Najib.  
HJK: Yes, invite him. Najib’s land should be demarcated.  
Elder: The problem cannot be solved with Najib alone, Hāji Sāheb.  
HJK: Invite Najib together with the other four to five people who sold the land. Write down 
the name of Ghamai, commander Miyā Rasul, Muhamad Jān… Muhamad Jān died... write 
Aowrang.  
DG: I noted down Aowrang.   
HJK: Write the name of Muhamad Jān also.  
DG: You said he died.  
HJK: If he died his sons would come. Whom did we pay the money? Whom did our fathers 
pay the money?  
Elder: No, the sons are in Pakistan.  
Another elder: I had sold 116 ser of wheat to make a payment to Salem. 
DG: Who is Salem? The commander?  
Elder: No. He is a person from Kharoti, not a commander. I had sold 116 ser for 600 Afs per 
ser and paid the whole sum to Salem. He has not returned one Afs so far.  
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Another elder: Salem is not here, he is in Pakistan.  
HJK: We people from Qarayatim paid the money at once, but the people from Sofi paid it in 
three rates. I myself paid our total amount in the bazaar. Meanwhile, our elder died, he had all 
the documents and we are left without any proof. Once the mirāb is back from Kabul, I will 
introduce some more elders, I am tired of this. It is not the matter of one day; it is the matter of 
a hundred days.   
DG and several elders: You were appointed by the qawm to solve this issue.   
HJK: The qawm also knows that this is not the issue of one day.  
Elder: Hāji Sāheb, we people from Nahr-e Sofi support you. We have appointed you as our 
elder and we will share your happiness and your sadness until we die. If we die, of course, 
that’s another thing.  
DG: I understood that Najib’s land might not be quite the size he claims. The land was part of 
the river when you made the joint intake at that time.  
HJK: Have you seen how hard our laborers are working at the intake now? We wanted to 
cement our intake last year but they wouldn’t allow us. Our mirāb coordinated the works at 
the intake for two months last year, the Kharoti people did not allow us to make a concrete 
intake. What is the name of my nephew, that Kharoti? Miyā Khān. Yes, Miyā Khān Kharoti 
also did not allow us to concrete our intake. 
Elder: Wuluswāl Sāheb, this stream was not damaged a lot, it was straight. But when the river 
washed some parts away, the stream was also affected, including the aqueduct. 
HJK: When you say the stream might be 50 meters, it is 50 meters, it is not wrong. The sides 
were washed away. Had it not been washed, people’s houses would have been destroyed and 
the total damage would have been long-lasting. And our intake will again be washed away, 
either by the water alone or boosted by other factors.  
DG: Where, in which part? 
Elder: Our new intake is further up the newly-dug stream and the intake near Jangalak. There 
will be another wash. The land to its east belongs to qarya Gharmatepa. There, 40-50 meters 
of land are left. 
HJK: It will be washed away. 
DG: If it were washed away, what would happen?  
HJK: Our stream would go to Isakhēl.470  
Elder: It would go even beyond and reach Angorbāgh.   
HJK: Will we be able to convince people and find a solution? Everybody would say our land 
is now out of the river and some would say my land is washed away by the river. How we can 
deal with them?  
Elder: Let’s rely on God’s help. We will see. We will sell the remaining lands and pay them.  
HJK: It is our loss and people’s loss as well. Now, let’s go. Wuluswāl Sāheb, don’t be 
disappointed with us. If I am wrong one day tell me that I am wrong. I will not get angry about 
it.  
                                                             
470 One minor of the five main canals (nahr) in Chārdara district, that is, Chārdara main canal, Qarayatim, 
Sofi, Isakhēl, and Basqom. 
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Elder: Wuluswāl Sāheb is the head of the manteqa. He is the same for me, for him and for 
you. 
DG: I am the same for all of you.  
Elder: He is district governor, mawlawi and a very knowledgeable and well-versed person.   
The two conversation excerpts detailed several dimensions of the conflict between Kharoti 
and Sofi-Qarayatim water users and are revealing with regard to everyday interactions 
among the government and local farmers via their representatives (see Ch. 7.3). 
Concerning Hāji Jum’a Khān’s role in the negotiations, the excerpts not only provide a rich 
source for analyzing the representation dimension, but also allow for conclusions about the 
normative underpinnings of his demeanor and the reasoning (moralities) that make him a 
‘conventional’ elder.471 It is striking that Hāji Jum’a Khān was careful to emphasize his 
striving for a solution without blaming the Kharoti farmers or their representatives who 
attend the meeting. He did not attack any of them personally; rather he expressed his deep 
bewilderment about the fact that they have to make such a big fuss about a point that 
should not be an issue at all, given that he – as representative of 15,000 jerib – is ‘forced’ 
to bargain about 1,5 jerib. In his mind, the aqueduct repair had already been checked off 
the list. Hāji Jum’a Khān’s assurance to the Kharoti representatives that steps have been 
taken and that everything would be done in time for the next crop’s irrigation showed his 
confidence about his power of delegation from elder to the mirāb, upon which the water 
manager would presumably implement the issued commands. Further, Hāji Jum’a Khān 
emphasized the good intentions of his constituency in Sofi-Qarayatim by referring to the 
qawm and brotherly relations of the Sofi-Qarayatim people with the Kharoti. With such 
reasoning, he sought to highlight harmony and was eager to avoid endangering it even 
when he mentioned that his nephew, who was also a farmer in Kharoti, had been among 
the ones who prevented the Sofi-Qarayatim landowners from making their concrete intake 
the previous year when they had planned construction. He apparently also felt the necessity 
to mention that he had had no alternative but to involve the district government, given the 
manifold claims of the Kharoti. The penultimate utterance of Hāji Jum’a Khān in the 
second excerpt underpins his and the other elders’ own perplexity and the supposed limits 
of their usual dispute-solving capacity in this case. While all this suggests the government 
was involved given the potential never-ending claims in this land-conflict, the underlying 
motivation was grounded in the prospect of foreign NGO-involvement and of making their 
intake concrete soon. A remark by Faiz Muhamad during our next conversation supports 
                                                             
471 Hāji Jum’a Khān was born in the area known as Qarayatim today in 1925 (1301). His great-grandfather’s 
generation had already been living in the Kunduz area; however, when the government of Abd’ur Rahmān 
Khān started to levy khasbur (duty on cultivated land to be paid as proportion of the harvest) in an 
indiscriminate manner, the families fled north across the Āmu Daryā and settled in the Emirate of Bukhāra in 
the area of Kulāb. With the overthrow of the Emir’s rule and the takeover of Czarist Russian administrators, 
they escaped again south because they feared for life and property – only to return to Kulāb eighteen months 
later after reports had reached them that the Russians would not bother rural dwellers. Once they returned, 
they discovered this to be false and finally emigrated for good in the early 1920s. HJK was raised by his 
uncle because his father had died in an accident before his birth. The uncle saw to HJK’s education in 
Kunduz’s Takhāristan Madrasa and bequeathed him 10 jerib of land. Besides, HJK had a fatherly relative of 
whom he bought another 30 jerib of land for himself and 15 for his uncle. According to his own accounts, 
HJK had made a living from farming all his life. His two sons and cousins had been with the mujahedin 
during the 1980s resistance. Except for two years early in the war, HJK stayed permanently in the area, but 
never took on a role as local commander or arbāb himself.  
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this interpretation. He stated that in his own native area, Qal’a-ye Zāl, the river would 
meander on a regular basis as well, but nobody would make a serious issue out of it 
because washed land is not very good for cultivation. Instead, locals in Qal’a-ye Zāl would 
content themselves with the idea that “it was God’s will and action” and do not create any 
problem.472 Against this background, the agitation of Hāji Jum’a Khān and fellow elders 
from Sofi and Qarayatim is obvious. Hāji Jum’a Khān’s rhetoric demonstrates his wit, first 
of all, because what he actually wanted was to make sure that the Kharoti agree on the 
transferal of the 1.5 jerib (which would close the gap between new intake site and canal for 
the Sofi-Qarayatim stakeholders) as soon as possible. Behind that was politicization of the 
land and aqueduct-issue because of the prospective NGO-involvement. The worry that 
Kharoti landowners could scupper that prospect explains the decision to take the dispute to 
the district government, which in local terms means ‘to make it official’.  
When Hāji Jum’a Khān expressed his dissatisfaction and impatience with the process by 
hinting at how it tires him and that he will possibly delegate the oversight to more elders, 
his fellows as well as the district governor assured him of their support. It was noted that 
Hāji Jum’a Khān had been charged by the qawm to settle the dispute. It is not entirely clear 
why he, instead of any of the other elders present, was given the task, but three factors are 
obvious: first, he had been directly involved in the affairs of the land purchase by the Sofi-
Qarayatim elders from Kharoti elders; he had an excellent record in muysafēdi; and he was 
the most senior among his fellow elders (muysafēd).   
The following example supports the second point before the scope of issues handled 
through muysafēdi is broached on this basis in more detail.  The case from the time of the 
Taliban was narrated by Hāji Jum’a Khān at another occasion473 and I quote him here in 
full, in order to provide a comprehensible account of how he told it:  
We had a district governor, his name was Abdul Aziz. He was a Kandahari from Chārdara; 
he is still alive. I met him at a wedding. He said, “I need ten elders from Qarayatim 
tomorrow to accompany me to the governor. The governor has invited somebody – a guest 
[from Kabul] will be coming.” I said, “Okay we will be there”, but warned him that we 
would make an open request to the governor at this occasion and he or the governor or 
anyone else should not take offense at it. He asked me what my complaint would be about. I 
said I would tell them the fertilizer which is being sold to us is produced in our country, 
made from our own resources. It shouldn’t be sold at a market price of 600-700 Afs but at 
200 Afs. It has been about two or three years now since the government has been on its feet 
to some degree and we have not demanded anything yet. The district governor supported my 
plan and suggested we write a petition letter.We went to the governor’s office in the city and 
exchanged greetings, but the meeting was almost finished when we arrived. Aref Khān was 
governor at that time. He is not alive anymore. The letter was with one of the elders and he 
passed it to him. The governor read it and said, “If you had come yesterday, we could have 
done something about it because the Deputy Minister of Agriculture was here. It is his job, 
not the competence of these representatives” [the guests]. He played around with our request 
letter and I became angry and said, “Who would have known that the Deputy Minister would 
come and talk with farmers or elders or village people? No one informed us. We came with 
the district governor today because he said ten elders would be needed.” I took the letter out 
                                                             
472 However, nobody had promised the water users of Qal’a-ye Zāl (yet) to install the concrete intake 
(Interview with Faiz Muhamad in the afternoon of 22 May 2006, after returning from the field site and the 
elders‘ departure).   
473 Interview with HJK in Madrasa, 4 June 2006. 
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of his hand. The head of court, an old person like me, but with a black beard was sitting next 
to him. I asked him, “Why have you come to this meeting?” He asked me to come closer to 
him. There were a lot of people there. He asked me, “What do you want bāba?”474 I 
responded that I had brought this letter. “Fertilizer is necessary for agriculture. People here 
are poor and cannot afford to purchase it. When there was fighting, people fled and left their 
land uncultivated. Today, they have returned and cannot afford to purchase a sack of 
fertilizer. This government should help these people.” He said, “This is true” [good work]. 
He took the letter and passed it on to the Minister. We are still waiting for the fertilizer to get 
cheaper. 
Even though the muysafēdi apparently did not lead to the desired correction of fertilizer 
prices, it cannot be called unsuccessful because Hāji Jum’a Khān did all he could in this 
case. It was beyond his ability to influence price policies himself or to reach the Ministry 
of Agriculture. This was out of his scope of action at the time of the Taliban regime. And 
the fact that he did take the initiative to appeal to the governor in the presence of guests 
from Kabul must be interpreted as adding to his ‘excellent’ muysafēdi record.475 On several 
more recent occasions he had been involved in conflict mediation processes that repeatedly 
required him to attend meetings at the governor’s (Engineer Umar) home in Tāluqān or his 
office in Kunduz. Almost mischievously, he reported that he told the governor that he was 
neither a commander nor an arbāb and that he did not care if the governor judged him 
inferior for this reason. Everybody knew that he had no special respect for commanders. 
This account can be read as another indicator of Hāji Jum’a Khān’s authenticity and 
credibility as a major elder (muysafēd) and man (mard) of principles with a decent 
reputation (nām).476 
As the examples in this section suggest, muysafēdi is carried out on different scales: 
usually a distinction is made between ‘blood issues’, that is, murder cases, and a three-step 
spectrum of disputes or other issues (‘minor-big-bigger’) that depends on the severity and 
respective involvement of insiders and outsiders if viewed from the locale where the 
dispute occurred or whose residents are otherwise concerned. In the case of Qarayatim, 
Hāji Jum’a Khān gave the following overview of who would be invited to join in the 
consultation to mediate in the different types of conflict and consultation regarding issues 
of different levels:  
 ‘Blood issues’: one or two elders from the manteqa and villages (mosques) 
involved in the conflict between the two or more conflicting parties, and the issue 
will be solved by elders; 
 Minor disputes and other issues of ‘public’ (i.e., manteqa-wide) relevance: in the 
case of a dispute within Qarayatim manteqa, four to five elders from the manteqa 
come together and solve the issue, such as, about water, the stream, a fight between 
two people, and so on. If an issue – not necessarily a conflict, but simply a decision 
that concerns the entire manteqa is at stake, such as the water rotation schedule or 
intake works – one or two elders from each mosque in the manteqa come together; 
                                                             
474 Bāba means grandfather, gaffer.  
475 However, he himself as a landowner, was not disinterested in the issue of course and the ‘poor’ he noted 
comprised the landowners and farmers in the first place. Thus, it reflects his subjective perspective. 
476 Azoy (1982: 22) first pointed out the significance of having a name (nām). The concept entails having 
followers and a reputation.  
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 Big conflicts (such as the land-aqueduct issue with the Kharoti described above): 
managed by one or two elders from Nahr-e Sofi; 
 Bigger conflicts: one or two elders (arbāb) from Mangtepa477 (downstream, of 
Sofi) and one or two elders from Chārdara. 
Similarly, there is a distinction between different muysafēd according to their scope of 
action, which is closely related to the reputation or nām (‘name’) that they have made by 
their muysafēdi record, experience, seniority, and so on. Hāji Jum’a Khān, for example, is 
also considered an elder among his relatives’ (qawmi) manteqa in Aliābād and Chārdara, 
and has been invited when a conflict requires the greater involvement of ‘outsiders’.478 In 
addition, he has been invited to mediate in Chārdara between Arab. Other elders might 
have a limited arena of action where they do muysafēdi, restricted to the local mosque 
community or the wider manteqa, but not beyond it because their competence and status 
are not, or not yet, as fully established as some peers. They most likely are younger and 
have less experience.  
Related to all the above, what I have called the ‘delegation’ of elders is a conspicuous 
phenomenon that deserves attention. It was evident in the run-up to the mirāb ‘elections’ 
and in the fact that Hāji Jum’a Khān was appointed to be in charge to solve the dispute 
with Kharoti about the land and the aqueduct.  
The mirāb appointment is an issue that concerns the entire manteqa where water users’ 
fields are situated. According to different interview accounts, elders from each mosque 
delegate their elders by entrusting them to make the ‘right decision’. However, this is a 
two-stage process with first a passive and then an active element. At a first-level, the 
delegation of elders from mosque communities generally entails the unquestioned 
agreement that if somebody is older he is entrusted with certain uncontested rights and 
possible obligations to represent his qawm.479 Consequently, at a first-level the delegation 
is not a matter of active choice but exists as a passive automatism. At a second-level, the 
delegation for mirāb appointments depend on what is at stake in an individual water user 
community (like the NGO prospects in Sofi-Qarayatim in 2006) and which other interests 
are of importance. For example, there are several accounts of this delegation process taking 
place,480 but, as the case of Ahmad Shāh and his one-man regulation of Mas’ud as 
Qarayatim mirāb shows, there is also evidence for the involvement of merely selected 
individuals or elders. The answer to the question of how such independent efforts and 
effective will enforcement of individual elders can be realized, given other elders’ presence 
comprises several dimensions. One is inherent in the differential power relations of the 
individual elders (see below), another (related to the former) is the fact that some elders are 
                                                             
477 Referring to Arbāb Imām Qul and his son, Arbāb Sofi Muhamad, from Mangtepa (see Figure 2 below).   
478 The insider-outsider distinction was noted by HJK. He emphasized for minor issues that “we ourselves 
among four to five elders solve issues in our manteqa [Qarayatim]. In such cases it is not necessary to 
involve outside elders.” (Interview with HJK in Madrasa, 4 June 2006). 
479 One interviewee put it like this: “People say, ‘He is my elder, he can select whomever [he thinks is right]”. 
(Interview with assistant of district ID, Chārdara, 11 June 2006).  
480 These accounts are summarized from different systems and water courses (Asqalān, Sofi, and Qarayatim). 
See the discussion in Chs. 6.1.4 and 7.1. 
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easily manipulated, because they are first of all self-serving and “love money a lot”.481 In 
any case, a dominant indicator for the involvement of any individual in the mirāb 
appointment is land ownership: “The landowner has salāhiyat,482 not the sharecropper”.483  
Against this background, it is possible to delineate a differentiation of elders on an 
empirical basis in the following paragraphs. The Ahmad Shāh case and previously 
presented empirical evidence from Asqalān (Ch. 6.1.1) suggest that, as far as the mirāb 
appointment is concerned, local elders who are at the same time large-scale landowners are 
in position to exert influence on who will be nominated and finally selected as mirāb. 
However, there is the case of Hāji Jum’a Khān, who owns about 40 jerib of land – not an 
extraordinary amount compared to others’ estates – and was appointed for the resolution of 
a dispute of great importance for all water users of the entire Sofi-Qarayatim system. Thus, 
there are different ‘types’ of elders which can be analytically distinguished according to 
separate competencies, scopes, and scales of action, and qualification. Notwithstanding the 
diverse vernacular terminology (see Ch. 4.1.2), I use the all-inclusive term muysafēd, 
because the particular activities and duties that elders carry out are commonly expressed 
with the verb muysafēdi kardan: (‘to do muysafēdi [elders’ work]’). 
The first and most basic differentiation is between conventional elders (like Hāji Jum’a 
Khān) and novel elders (like Ahmad Shāh). In the micro-realm of social organization, each 
household (or core family) has a head, and each extended family an elder who is 
approached in case of conflict and who takes decisions as necessary on everyday basis. 
Beyond the family level, each mosque community has one or two elders, the most 
important one being either the mosque founder himself or one of his offspring in the 
second or third generation, after whom the mosque and local manteqa is usually named.484 
At the manteqa-level, comprised of different mosque communities, several elders can be 
approached and among them reputation, problem-solving capacity, and seniority are 
decisive factors for involvement in certain issues which might be negotiated within the 
manteqa, or with the participation of outside elders (see above) or even involve turning to 
the district and higher administrative authorities (provincial and capital-level). A 
conventional elder of at least manteqa significance must possess the material means to host 
guests and other elders for consultations and for travelling to places where he is invited or 
where he has to attend to the interest of his qawm, whether at the district administration, 
the governor’s office in Kunduz, or the governor’s home in Tāluqān (see above).  
                                                             
481 Interview, Madrasa, 4 June 2006. Analogously, I quote Muhamad Rashid Bāy, a fellow elder of Hāji 
Jum’a Khān from Madrasa, who stated, “Today, anybody can become mirāb if you only invite the elders for 
palaw.” (Interview with Muhamad Rashid Bāy in Madrasa, 8 May 2006).  
482 Salāhiyat here refers to assigned authority understood as the ability to exercise power and the capacity to 
act based on recognized legitimacy. For a discussion of the concept versus qudrat (ability to exercise power 
based on force) see Ch. 7.4. 
483 Interview with assistant of the district ID, Chārdara, 11 June 2006. A landowning elder in Qarayatim 
vividly sums up the importance of land: “The difference between my life and the life of my [landless] farmer 
is the difference between the earth and the sky”, (Noted by Shah, Madrasa, 28 April 2006). 
484 Thus, the nexus between elder and head of family is revealed. At the smallest social scale, every family 
has an elder, and a large enough family founds a mosque for its wider family network and constitutes the 
basics of a clan and qawm. 
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This is likewise true for the novel type of elders. However, the empirical material derived 
in Chārdara and Asqalān suggests that the main distinction between them is the origin of 
their reputations and problem-solving capacities, thus their source of legitimation. 
However, individual motivations also differ to some degree. In the case of conventional 
elders, their reputation is based on authenticity and credibility and a record of serving the 
qawm in the first place. They have usually stayed behind in their home manteqa during the 
war decades (with perhaps one to two years absence in exceptional cases), often supported 
the resistance-mujahedin as much as they could with the means at their disposal,485 and 
organized local self-defense and protection.486 A few also made a name for themselves by 
joining the mujahedin, but, as a rule, quit after the Soviet forces’ withdrawal and returned 
to an ordinary existence as farmers or something similar. An important criterion of a 
conventional elder is his ‘good’ behavior towards people. 
By contrast, the novel elders I met and have included in the analysis thus far487 were 
previously commanders of at least manteqa-significance at the time of the Taliban regime. 
However, interestingly enough, their fathers had all been locally very important mujahedin 
commanders during the revolution period. A rough consideration of their networks and 
relations with other important men, organizations, and administrative authorities in their 
respective home districts suggests their particular reliance on resource-endowed 
connections and their preference to serve the interests of these networks first. For example, 
the people who can be attributed to the major profit-making (resource-endowed) network 
in Sofi-Qarayatim include Hāji Rustam, Shāh Abdul Hekmat, and Ahmad Shāh (Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1: Selective overview of local family cum commander ties 
Hāji Rustam, sub-commander of Aref Khān488 – the acting governor of Kunduz during 
Taliban rule in the second half of the 1990s – was the dominant figure of the local profit 
                                                             
485 The life-histories of Hāji Jum’a Khān and other elders I met during my extensive fieldwork are cases in 
point.  
486 Self-defense and protection were reportedly needed against a third conflict party besides mujahedin and 
government forces, i.e., ordinary robbers who tried to gain from the confusing situation and insecurity.  
487 They include Ahmad Shāh, Hāji Rustam (both Qarayatim), and Hāji Rahmat Khān (Tobrakash). 
488 Before he became Taliban governor of Kunduz, Aref Khān was one of the influential Jam’iat commanders 
of Kunduz province. He started his career as an agricultural officer in Emām Sāheb and Khānābād from 
1976/77-1978/79 (1355-57) before joining the Jam’iat party and getting involved in jihad in Nurestān, 
Badakhshān, Andarāb, and other areas throughout Afghanistan’s northeastern region. After the withdrawal of 
the Soviet forces, Aref Khān was appointed commander of the 6th Army Corps in 1992-93 (1371). He was 
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network during the time of fieldwork. With his family, he owned petrol pumps, dairy 
farms, fish ponds, greenhouses, and high-yield seed plantations.489 He functioned as the 
local Chārdara agent of ICARDA,490 an organization involved in trial plantations of high-
yield seeds and a variety of other agricultural research activities. Reportedly, he used his 
position to unfairly assist his relatives (see Figure 1), patrons, and friends,491 but largely 
denied seeds and expertise to those who did not have the adequate political or family 
connection with him.492 The riches of Shāh Abdul Hekmat have been noted above. 
However, it is worth indicating that he was not among the group of Sofi-Qarayatim elders 
who were trying to resolve the conflict with Kharoti, despite his obvious importance at the 
local level, given he held the positions of mirāb, arbāb and NSP chief in spring 2006. 
Figure 1 depicts his family relations with some of the most influential people of the area. 
Besides being the cousin of Hāji Rustam, which granted him access to the resources the 
latter controled, his sister was given as wife to Hāji Umar, brother of the late Member of 
Parliament Aref Khān.493 There is no evidence of Ahmad Shāh having familial relations 
with any of the other people depicted in the above figure. He was famous as the sub-
commander of Aref Khān throughout Kunduz. However, he was said to have family ties 
with the governor of Kunduz, Engineer Umar (Sayaf).494 The strength of his economic 
position can be deduced from the fact that he financed several concrete offtakes for his and 
his father’s land along the Surkhak subcanal.495 The fact that he was appointed as NSP 
chief in his area, his obvious jurisdiction as local elder496 and his enforcement of Mas’ud 
as Qarayatim mirāb that year give ample evidence of his socio-political position.  
To put it simply, it could be concluded at this point that novel elders are more occupied 
with the tasks of power, those activities having to do with personal benefit and effective 
rule, while conventional elders deal with matters that involve some idea of justice and 
harmony. Their regulation of land conflicts and their consultations regarding, for instance, 
the fixing of a rotation schedule, pertain to the whole community and carry a normative 
dimension including some wider, public responsibility in the name of ordinary residents. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
reportedly killed in a suicide attack in Hayatābād (Peshawar) in 2001-02 (1380). According to a different 
source, Aref Khān served as governor from 1997 until his death in 1999 and was succeeded by his brother 
Hāji Umar, who served as governor until the end of Taliban rule in late 2001 (Interview in Kunduz, April 
2006).    
489 Besides, he was said to have only eight jerib of land in Sofi (Interviews in Madrasa, 28 April 2006). 
490 ICARDA’s presence in Kunduz (head office) and Chārdara (greenhouses and trial plots) was part of the 
international agricultural rehabilitation efforts in the area. 
491 The local term for such mutual beneficial relations or gentlemen’s agreements between wealthy people is 
sharikān (Interview, Chārdara, 28 April 2006). 
492 According to accounts of Madrasa elders (Interview in Madrasa, 28 April 2006). 
493 Hāji Umar (Zoakhēl) rented one of his compounds and land to the German Provincial Reconstruction 
Team in Kunduz. Furthermore he reportedly handled the entire provision of the PRT with gas and diesel.  
494 The family link between Ahmad Shāh and Engineer Umar could not be confirmed in other interviews.  
495 Ahmad Shāh owned at least approximately 80 jerib along the Surkhak canal in upstream Qarayatim 
(Estimate noted during walkthrough survey by ter Steege, 21 May 2006). Detailed figures were not available; 
however, it is likely that Ahmad Shāh owned land in several locations within Sofi-Qarayatim’s command 
area. 
496 As noted previously, Ahmad Shāh was involved in the resolution of a land conflict and had come directly 
to the office of the district governor to clarify the issue, without involving other local elders.  
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From the responsibilities undertanken, it is obvious that the conventional elders aim 
more497 at community integrity and equity to some extent than obviously preferential 
treatment of a few individuals by advancing their narrow interests over community 
interests. In addition, the generational difference in the observed cases is salient. Seniority 
is common to all conventional elders, but not necessarily so to novel elders.  
Yet, the distinction of conventional versus novel elders should not be taken as establishing 
absolute categories. The empirical reality is too complex for the imposition of ideal 
typologies. The cross-cutting cases of Shāh Abdul Hekmat and Saifudin (Asqalān), to give 
just two examples, demonstrate that there are elders who do not boast a recent commander-
origin, but are just as self-centered and network-focused as the novel elders type. For all 
muysafēd (of both ideal types), the problem-solving capacity necessarily requires relations 
and networks that enable elders’ access to governmental, non-governmental, and elder 
authorities outside their own local realm or manteqa. In the case of Hāji Jum’a Khān and 
Ahmad Shāh, for instance, I observed that both could approach the district governor 
without a written petition, which is the standard procedure for ordinary people.498 Despite 
all the differences regarding sources of legitimation and individual motivation for 
muysafēdi, it would be unfounded to speak of competition or disunity among the different 
elders in Sofi-Qarayatim.499 Even during the war, the elders reportedly took care that the 
commanders did not fight with each other. Unity (ettefāq) was observed to be a strong 
norm that was thought to ensure protection from outside attackers and from conflict 
escalation within the community. Thus, its members seemed well-connected to the outside 
and related well among themselves. The effect is particularly remarkable if Sofi-Qarayatim 
is compared with Asqalān: infrastructure projects (roads, schools, irrigation, that is, check 
dams, offtakes, dividers), NGO involvement (NSP, ICARDA, Welthungerhilfe, Mercy 
Corps, etc.), connections with government agents in Kunduz and Kabul, and political 
interests were evident throughout Sofi-Qarayatim. By contrast, Asqalān’s elders were 
reportedly disunited and, with very few exceptions, such as Hāji Rahmat Khān (see also 
Ch. 7.3), did not have the good relations and access needed to benefit the local populace.  
Another aspect that has become evident from the elaborations in this and the previous 
sections of Chapter 6 are role-overlaps as depicted in Figure 2. It shows the mirāb position 
holders, arbāb, and muysafēd at the time of fieldwork.500 The commander category is 
added for its significance to the differentiation of elders introduced above.501 As muysafēd, 
                                                             
497 However, this is not to argue that conventional elders always act completely out of altruistic motives. 
498 For a contextualization of this observation, see Ch. 7 on issues of representation and access.  
499 As the case of Mas’ud’s appointment as mirāb showed, consent and unity are situationally produced and 
ensured with the help of symbolic rituals (e.g., the joint praying for a candidate) and thus stylized as a social 
norm of rural society. The same rituals are also used in Asqalān (Ch. 6.1.1) and Qala-ye Zāl (Ch. 6.1.3).  
500 This does not exclude the possibility that some individuals served as mirāb for a term in the past; for 
example, Ghayor Arbāb was also at one time mirāb. 
501 However, ‘qomāndān’ as a role activity, was reportedly not existing anymore at the time of fieldwork, 
particularly since the DDR process progressed. I do not presume to be able to assess the DDR process at that 
time, but merely recount that the official rhetoric was of disarmament, demobilization, etc. Thus, the 
common narrative suggested that existing commanders would be a remnant from the past that are still around 
because titles (arbāb, qomāndān, mirāb etc.) usually persist in Afghanistan. One obvious example from the 
Sofi-Qarayatim area was the case of (commander) Rahmat Bāy.  
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only those with greater significance beyond the local mosque community are included in 
the red circle.502  
 
Figure 2: Intersection of roles of rural elites in Sofi-Qarayatim and Asqalān 
I refer to the graph in Figure 2, and especially the arbāb-position, which unlike Asqalān is 
a peculiarity of Chārdara district and Sofi manteqa in particular, in more detail in Chapter 
7.3.1. At this point, I merely want to highlight the diversity of local positions and the 
extent of intersections as evidence for the manifold roles of individual elders. It is 
important to understand that mirāb and arbāb positions can only be gained with elders’ 
consent; they are appointed and controlled by elders and as a rule registered with the 
district administration.      
 
6.1.3 Qal’a-ye Zāl: Tarboz Guzar and Qal’a-ye Zāl irrigation canals 
I devote this third subchapter on irrigation water governance to research locations in Qal’a-
ye Zāl district503 because the situation along the two main canals of Tarboz Guzar and 
Qal’a-ye Zāl adds nuances to the previous findings in several important dimensions. These 
canals on the left bank of the Kunduz river present contrasting layouts with regard to size 
and infrastructure complexity, which consequently impact on maintenance and 
management procedures (section a). Even though differences can also be traced to the 
social composition of the water users, the residents of both canal command areas share 
                                                             
502 For this reason, for example, Fazl Jān who is an elder of five families, is not part of the red circle, but 
merely included as mirāb.  
503 The district consists of three main manteqa: Āqtepa (district center, bazaar location, and area along major 
canal of the same name), Qal’a-ye Zāl proper (along the canal), and Tarboz Guzar. 
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important socio-political features and not least show a comparably high degree of 
tranquility. One likely explanation is the way in which livelihoods are earned and the fact 
that income from cereal cropping is enhanced by other income sources, primarily carpet 
weaving and almond growing but also livestock in upstream Qal’a-ye Zāl.504 In the second 
part (section b), I use a representative depiction of how water reform implementation in 
both systems progressed and the results it showed until the end of the second observed 
irrigation season in late summer 2007. I thus demonstrate how calmly the communities 
dealt with it compared to Asqalān and especially Sofi-Qarayatim, despite struggling with 
high water and insufficient material to prevent their irrigation works from being washed 
away.  
 
Map M7: Tarboz Guzar and Qal’a-ye Zāl irrigation network 
 
a. Proving the diversity of water management arrangements 
At the time I entered the field in Qal’a-ye Zāl in April 2006, a separate intake for each 
canal only a few meters apart could be distinguished. By design, the Tarboz Guzar intake 
is situated a bit north of the intake of Qal’a-ye Zāl, so that at times of low water levels in 
the Kunduz river, Nahr-e Qal’a-ye Zāl would absorb river water first and diminish the 
amounts of water flowing into the Tarboz Guzar canal network. However, since both 
intakes reached between 100 (Qal’a-ye Zāl) and 250 meters (Tarboz Guzar) into the river, 
the whole area resembled a lake-shaped body of water when the river was high. On such 
occasions, as at peak water flow season of 2007 (1386) in late July, the water users were 
                                                             
504 Qal’a-ye Zāl has an excellent reputation for its carpets all over Kunduz province and even beyond. The 
‘Salt-fort/hill’ – as Qal’a-ye Zāl is literally translated – is also widely known. 
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struggling to prevent a major breach that would wash away their canal infrastructure and 
were thus trying to dam the river with sand sacks, reed braids, and wood (see Photo P1). 
 
Photo P1: Flooded intake of Tarboz Guzar and Qal’a-ye Zāl irrigation canals 
With a command area of approximately 48,000 jerib and 32 sub-canals, Qal’a-ye Zāl is the 
largest of all canal systems studied. Its total length is 39 kilometers, as opposed to mere 18 
kilometers and a command area of 7,000 jerib with six major sub-canals in the case of 
Tarboz Guzar.505 The first evidence of difference from the irrigation systems introduced 
previously (6.1.1, 6.1.2) is epitomized in the water allocation unit bēl. Similar to qulba, it 
determines the amount of water allocated for contributing one laborer for maintenance 
work at the intake for a predefined size of land. This size varies, however, depending on 
different criteria in both systems. As a rule, in Tarboz Guzar one bēl can comprise506 either 
10 jerib for land higher than the canal, 20 jerib for land situated at the same height as the 
canal, and 30 jerib for land below the water table. The corresponding water discharge in 
normal times is four hours per bēl. In Qal’a-ye Zāl, not only the land level plays a role, but 
also the quality of the local soil. Thus, a distinction is made between three zones: one bēl 
of sandy soil is 30 jerib and entitled to eight hours (4 centimeters) of water in normal times 
(12 hours when the water level is low, 16 if even lower). If the land lies above the water 
level, one bēl comprises 60 jerib and gets four hours (2 centimeters) water (six hours or 
eight in the other conditions). If the soil consists mainly of clay and is able to conserve 
water well, one bēl becomes 80 jerib entitled to receive three hours (1 centimeter) of water 
(four and a half to six hours if there is less water available).507  
                                                             
505 All numbers are official figures and could not be verified (Welthungerhilfe 2006). The size of the irrigated 
area of Tarboz Guzar is just slightly larger than the Sofi command area of 6,800 jerib. 
506 The correct terminology should be ‘one bēl can irrigate’ a certain number of jerib, as it does not designate 
the area unit, but the amount of water given for labor contribution and a certain water requirement 
determined by land area unit (jerib-size) depending on the land level and the soil quality. Bēl is literally 
translated as ‘shovel’. Interestingly, the amount of water is measured in centimeters. Historically, though, the 
water amounts supplied were measured by the time water was dropping from a jug (koza). 
507 The information on the centimeter amounts is derived from the mirāb of Qal’a-ye Zāl (Interview, 27 
August 2006). 
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Without wading into the technical details of irrigation here, this section adds another two 
dimensions of entitlement patterns to highlight the complexity and diversity of locally-
practiced allocation mechanisms for irrigation water.508 In contrast to the command-area 
sizes that were indicated for both canal networks in jerib above, the size of irrigated land 
of both systems is given in bēl measurements in the subsequent parts of this case study 
because bēl-amounts are likely to be more reliable and an ex-post conversion of bēl into 
jerib amounts risks distorting the figures disproportionately.509 The following list of bēl- 
and jerib-sizes for the six sub-command areas of Tarboz Guzar gives an example of such 
inconsistency.510 According to the mirāb of Tarboz Guzar, Wahid Mirāb, the bēl command 
area of Tarboz Guzar is 200 bēl, for the sub-canal command areas he gave the following 
figures and information:511 
 Panja Bālā/Qotarma: 400+1,400 jerib, kokbāshi Mustafa 
 Onalti: 35 bēl, 900-1,000 jerib, kokbāshi Norullah 
 Pakhal: 60 bēl, ca. 2,000 jerib, kokbāshi Wahid Mirāb 
 Juy-e Jangal: 700 jerib, kokbāshi Nader Pahlawān 
 Toza Aryq: 900-1,000 jerib, kokbāshi Said Murād 
 Jangal-e Bālā: 700 jerib, kokbāshi  Emām Qul 
In comparison, the command area of Qal’a-ye Zāl covers approximately three times the 
area of Tarboz Gozar. According to the mirāb of Qal’a-ye Zāl, Aslam Mirāb, it amounts to 
600 bēl512 and he is assisted by 32513 kokbāshi. In Tarboz Guzar, mirāb Wahid Mirāb 
serves also as kokbāshi of Pakhal514 canal, the largest secondary canal in the Tarboz Guzar 
                                                             
508 Along both canals, the complex bēl entitlements, perfected by an elaborate technical infrastructure, ensure 
relatively stable water distribution during irrigation seasons. See Abdullayev et al. (2007).   
509 The local figures hardly allow for conclusions to be drawn of the total size in jerib, because of the 
different values for bēl presented above. Moreover, bēl can be even more flexible and become situationally 
defined depending on the landowner’s will and the mirāb’s agreement. See Mielke et al. (2010: 194ff). The 
only way to determine the approximate jerib-amount of irrigated land in a certain season would be to consult 
all the kokbāshi in both canal areas, because they have a record of landowners with bēl sizes and knowledge 
about local bēl-jerib ratios in their sub-canal command area. However, the number of kokbāshi was with 
more than 35 simply too large to verify the sizes of sub-canal command areas. Other ZEF-researchers, who 
focused on the technicalities of water management, and Welthungerhilfe staff, had also not systematically 
traced the kokbāshi’s knowledge about their respective areas. 
510 The term ‘inconsistency’ is used here because the bēl-jerib ratio for the substream cases where both 
figures were given and noted turns out to be 25-28 jerib per bēl for Unalte and 33 jerib for Pakhal. The 
calculation does not resolve neatly into 20/30/40 jerib per bēl since the quality of the land is not known and 
apparently varies within individual sub-command areas. Other conclusions cannot be drawn for the same 
reason, and how the figure of a 200 or 216 bēl command area is derived for Tarboz Guzar cannot be deduced 
from the figures given.   
511 Interviews with Wahid Mirāb, 03 April 2006, 28 August 2006, 29 July 2007. 
512 Estimates by Welthungerhilfe that were derived from different surveys amount to 216 bēl for Tarboz 
Guzar and 588 bēl for Qal’a-ye Zāl.  
513 The number 32 was given by Aslam Mirāb, while his assistant clerk spoke of 33 kokbāshi. It is likely that 
the system is constantly extended and if recognized and registered by the mirāb, a ‘new’ kokbāshi will be 
acknowledged as well. See below the case of the newly-dug canal Nahr-e Jadid which alone has added 11 
kokbāshi to the social irrigation infrastructure of Qal’a-ye Zāl. 
514 The canal was named after the tribal name of its founder, Ali Muhamad Pakhal (Mirāb) from Shortepa, 
who started digging the stream with 18 Turkmen tribesmen and served as its first mirāb for about 20 years. 
The canal was originally started from a spillway from Qal’a-ye Zāl canal that existed prior to Pakhal. 
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network. Besides, he is the son of the biggest landowner (700 jerib) in the Pakhal 
command area. In the 2007 irrigation season, he served the third year of his third term as 
mirāb of Tarboz Guzar after he had been appointed mirāb for six and two years in a row in 
the past.515  
 
Photo P2: Canal bank erosion Qal’a-ye Zāl 
The second piece of evidence of difference between these two and the other systems 
introduced previously is that the chain of command between mirāb and kokbāshi appeared 
very robust in both Tarboz Guzar and Qal’a-ye Zāl, with a clear division of labor 
discernible. For intake construction, up to 800 laborers are mobilized over several days and 
weeks. Similarly, the second major problem in both canals, the high amount of siltation, is 
being tackled with regular canal repair and de-siltation works organized locally by the 
kokbāshi.516 Before the start of irrigation season, the laborers reportedly start digging the 
canal from the sub-canals and continue together in the main canal until they reach the 
intake.517 As a rule, it is the mirāb’s job to notify518 the kokbāshi about planned works and 
they then mobilize the laborers in the secondary and tertiary canals. The supervision of the 
laborers along the main canal and at the intake is also the duty of the mirāb, while the 
various kokbāshi are in charge of day-to-day water distribution in the secondary and 
tertiary canals and at field level. Because he is acting at the interface with water users on a 
day-to-day basis, the kokbāshi is appointed locally by the water users in his area of 
command. The mirāb does not have veto power in the appointment of the kokbāshi, though 
he can recommend somebody. The annual appointment or confirmation of the kokbāshi 
                                                             
515 Interview, 28 August 2006. 
516 The high silt amounts of both water systems are problematic and demand regular time-consuming 
desiltation and canal repair works. On average, the canals have to be cleaned as many as ten times a year, and 
in some months, farmers and laborers reportedly spend up to 20 days on this activity in order to ensure that 
water reaches their crops.  
517 This implies that the laborers hired by head-end landowners also have to work at the tail-end for canal 
cleaning.  
518 In Qal’a-ye Zāl the mirāb orders his scribe (katib) to send a letter to the kokbāshi to inform them of the 
locations of planned measures (Interview with Aslam Mirāb, 27 August 2006).  
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provides him the legitimacy to mobilize laborers and collect his salary. Given Nahr-e 
Qal’a-ye Zāl’s vast extent and highly hierarchical canal structure, the position of third-
level (tertiary) canal warden or chakbāshi is common and held by an additional person.519 
Furthermore, a guard (qoruqmāl) is appointed by both landowners and the mirāb to protect 
the physical integrity of the main canal, because severe canal bank erosion due to the 
grass-cutting poses a serious problem in the sandy areas (see Photo P2).  
The salaries of the mirāb and kokbāshi are paid partly in cash (at the beginning of the 
season) and in kind (after the harvest).520 In case a landowner does not receive water for 
some reason (e.g., because of drought, low water levels, destroyed offtakes or dividers, 
high silt load), he is exempted from the payment. Yet, since intake construction and canal 
maintenance are carried out before the start of the irrigation season and continue in both 
systems throughout the year, no landowner can deny his laboring contribution,521 because 
even if water is not received during the first turn, the farmer can do nothing but hope he 
will get water during succeeding turns. Wahid Mirāb noted that locals actually call this 
labor contribution hashar (communal work),522 which carries the normative notion of 
reciprocity. Indeed, the social dynamics in Tarboz Guzar appeared offset in a way and the 
upstream-downstream inequities observed in the other systems (Chs. 6.1.1, 6.1.2) were not 
observed. The main reason for this contrast can be traced to the geographic situatedness of 
Tarboz Guzar, in particular the fact that its downstream area borders on overgrown wetland 
areas (zābur). Here, many families have started to grow rice because of natural water-
logging. Others have made small streams in the overgrown swamp area and channel water 
to neighboring fields so that even during severe water shortages it is not the tail-end 
cultivators who are the most vulnerable. Beyond the small size of the system, another 
factor that likely creates some sense of common purpose as expressed in the hashar norm, 
                                                             
519 The chakbāshi fulfill the same tasks in tertiary canals as the kokbāshi do in secondary canals, though the 
kokbāshi is often also in charge of the relevant tertiary canal oversight. Where the mirāb is also the kokbāshi 
he takes care of the whole network originating from the secondary canal in his command area. For example, 
Wahid Mirāb oversees the tertiary canals of the Pakhal main and secondary stream. In Qal’a-ye Zāl, several 
secondary canals have one to four tertiary canals and chakbāshi appointed, as in Wakil Akhtar area. Faisair, a 
secondary canal splits into Arsari, Chalish, Ketab, and Ortabos with one chakbāshi each, while one person is 
in charge of the two tertiary canals (Qal’a and Said Qabool) of Chaqer secondary canal (Data (including 
transliteration of names) according to the Welthungerhilfe village assessment of Qal’a-ye Zāl, May 2006). 
520 In Qal’a-ye Zāl, Aslam Mirāb is paid one Afs per jerib at the beginning of the irrigation season after the 
canal and the intake have been dug. However, information on the total amount varies between 35,000 Afs 
(according to Aslam Mirāb) and 40,000 Afs (according to his scribe, Sakhi Jān); it is divided between both 
the mirāb and his assistant scribe. The annual cash payment for the kokbāshi is negotiated locally and was 
reported in one instance to amount to 8,000 Afs calculated on 5 Afs per jerib. In addition, a remuneration in 
kind of one sēr wheat per bēl for the mirāb and up to ten sēr for the kokbāshi (depending on the yield) is 
given at the end of the season after the harvest. Wahid Mirāb of Tarboz Guzar received 20,000 Afs cash as 
the mirāb (100 Afs per bēl for an assumed total of 200 bēl in Tarboz Guzar) at the beginning of the season, 
plus 7,000 Afs and 120 sēr wheat in his second function as the kokbāshi of Pakhal. How the chakbāshi is 
remunerated is not known, though it is likely in a similar fashion. The warden is paid three sēr wheat per 
jerib (Interview with school headmaster and Aslam Mirāb in Durman, Qal’a-ye Zāl, 27 August 2006). 
521 By now, with this third case study on local water management, the reader should be familiar with the 
labor contribution mechanism: the sending of one laborer (mardikār) per qulba or bēl for the duration of 
intake construction works or canal cleaning entitles the farmer to a pre-determined amount of water. 
Landowners who can afford it hire a laborer for the whole year for a sum of between 5,000 and 7,000 Afs in 
Tarboz Guzar, 10,000 Afs in Asqalān, 6,000-10,000 Afs in Sofi-Qarayatim, and 8,000 to 12,000 Afs in 
Qal’a-ye Zāl.    
522 Interview, 28 August 2006. 
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and thus facilitates good cooperation among water users of Tarboz Guzar, is the socio-
ethnic homogeneity of its population; all the residents along the canal belong to different 
Turkmen tribes.523  
On the contrary, the settlement patterns of Qal’a-ye Zāl canal are highly heterogeneous and 
ethnically mixed in almost every place in the command area: Pashtuns, Turkmen, Uzbeks 
(Qongherāt), Tajiks, ‘Hazara’, and Arab reportedly all share mosques except for five 
mosque communities that are used only by one qawm (two Turkmen, two Kandahari, and 
one Nāqel). In upstream Zulmābād, Keshāni, and Hāji Ghulām as well as in the settlement 
cluster of Wakil Akhtar,524 Pashtuns (Kandahari, Kākarkhēl) dominate and have land as 
well as large numbers of livestock (cattle, sheep, horses, camels, and donkeys).525 The 
areas further downstream house smaller shares of Pashtuns and are highly mixed 
communities. Here, access to irrigation water reportedly varies from manteqa to manteqa, 
though the mirāb, his kokbāshi, and the laborers work hard to provide water. For example, 
in downstream manteqa Chāgh Aryq the main income sources are reportedly laboring 
(40%) and livestock (40%), and only 20 percent of the households can make a primary 
living from agriculture. Most of the people are reported not to own land. Especially during 
the mujahedin and Taliban periods manteqa Chāgh Aryq experienced disadvantages 
because at times of low water the upstream water users (‘qomāndān’) would not employ a 
rotation scheme. The mirāb of the day was a puppet of these upstream landowners and 
reportedly took money for prioritizing their water needs over those of the downstream 
users. Instead of a proper maintenance crew, he had a maximum of 70 young boys working 
at the intake and along the canal, despite receiving the full amount of money for several 
hundred adult laborers.526  
In the years of severe drought in the second half of the 1990s, the Chāgh Aryq landowners 
referred to the district governor and even the governor of Kunduz several times to ask for 
intervention, but without success. Finally, the situation escalated so that one of the large 
local landowners, Mullā Ergash, mobilized his fellow landowners to dig a separate sub-
canal by the name Nahr-e Jadid. According to local accounts, 2,000 laborers, landowners 
                                                             
523 The main Turkmen tribe in the irrigation areas is the Qara Bēka Gul, it is the same that the majority of 
Asqalān Turkmen belongs to. Subtribes are the (Pakhal) Dali and the Khajambal/Alam (Interview with 
Wahid Mirāb, 28 August 2006). Fifty percent of the initial Turkmen settlers along Tarboz Guzar came from 
the Emirate of Bukhārā, and the other half is said to be from Aqcha in Faryāb province and Shortepa towards 
Mazār-e Sharif. In total, between 900 (according to the mirāb) and 1.250 (according to Welthungerhilfe) 
families live along the canal, or roughly 5,000 people. According to Wahid Mirāb, 440 families live in the 
NSP cluster Tarboz Guzar Bālā (Upper TG) and 460 families in Tarboz Guzar Pāyin (Lower TG) (Interview, 
28 August 2006). 
524 Wakil Akhtar is the home manteqa of Khalilullah Gul, who is Member/Senator of the Meshrāno Jirga 
(Upper House of Afghan Parliament). He was delegated as Transitional Member to the Meshrāno Jirga after 
the 2005 (1384) Provincial Council elections.  
525 Of many families one male member still migrates with the herds to pastures in Badakhshān over the 
summer months. The Kākar first came with their animal herds to the area approximately 150 years ago. Over 
time, they adapted a partly sedentary lifestyle, recognized the value of land ownership and diversified their 
livelihoods. More Pashtuns came at the invitation of Shēr Khān approximately 70 years ago, about the same 
time that members of other ethnic groups came to settle along the canal. Although the second wave of 
Pashtuns also arrived with larger numbers of livestock, they are not pastoralists today, but live mainly on 
agriculture and trading (Interview with Keshāni landowner and Kandahāri in Keshāni, 26 August 2006).  
526 Interview with headmaster of school in Durman, 27 August 2006. 
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and farmers were involved in the digging during the summer of 2000 (1379). They were 
confronted by an equal number of upstream residents who demanded to stop the canal 
digging because they faced a lack of labor contribution for canal cleaning from the 
neighbors downstream. By the time the confrontation began and both sides faced each 
other armed with hooks and other working tools almost on a daily basis, the tensions could 
only be resolved through the intervention of a high-level Taliban commander who 
threatened to jail some of the upstream landowners should they continue to interfere with 
the digging of Nahr-e Jadid. Because the Taliban governor of Kunduz at that time (Hāji 
Umar, see Ch. 6.1.2) was not able or willing to solve the conflict, the water users managed 
to involve the deputy of Mullā Fāzl who was the highest-ranking Taliban commander in 
northern Afghanistan at that time. Reportedly, he had to desert the frontline in Bangi 
halfway between Kunduz and Tāluqān/Takhār to come to Qal’a-ye Zāl to settle the 
issue.527 
A markedly high sense of community and solidarity among the downstream population can 
be deduced from, among other indicators, the fact that several families who had been 
residing in the tail-end area but were displaced as a result of fighting during the mujahedin 
period, found shelter and settled in the Turkmen-dominated cluster Tayebābād until their 
return as late as mid-2007.528 At the time of fieldwork, considerable pressure on the system 
was reported due to returnees’ settling throughout the command area, but especially in the 
upper part. Two mosque communities were newly established by returnees from Pakistan 
with 20-25 families each. As in other regions, the number of family members had 
multiplied considerably. While some families had relocated from Iran and Pakistan under 
the Mujadedi government in 1992, most only returned after the ousting of the Taliban. 
Table 5 shows 2002 to be the peak year for individual returnees to Qal’a-ye Zāl district in 
the aftermath of 2001. However, compared with other districts, such as Chārdara (see Ch. 
6.1.2), the refugee and returnee numbers of Qal’a-ye Zāl were much lower, as the district 
population is less in general.529        
Table 5: Number of returning refugees, Qal’a-ye Zāl district, 2002-2006530 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006531 
Refugee 
returnees 
 
2,902 
 
675 
 
1,356 
 
1.059 
 
483 
During the mujahedin period, the canal had three mirāb because the different parties 
(Jam’iat-e Islāmi, Harakat, Hezb-e Islāmi) dominated separate stretches of territory along 
                                                             
527 It remains unclear how the landowners of Chāgh Aryq managed to attract the Taliban commander’s 
attention, that is, whether they had appealed to him directly or via Hāji Umar or someone else.  
528 Reportedly, the families that could afford to flee Afghanistan during the time of the Soviet occupation and 
thereafter were mainly from upstream areas; hardly anybody from downstream had the means. 
529 The estimated population of Qal’a-ye Zāl in 2006 was 34,439 people, compared to 117,230 in Chārdara 
and 288,361 people residing in Kunduz and the surrounding villages (Kunduz Markaz). See UNHCR (2006).  
530 The data is taken from UNHCR (2006). In contrast, the Provincial Department for Refugee Affairs in 
Kunduz officially registered only 964 families as returnees in Qal’a-ye Zāl between 2002 and late August 
2007 (Interview with deputy of Provincial Department of Refugee Affairs in Kunduz, 1 September 2007).  
531 As of 30 September 2006. 
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the canal. Each mirāb collected money for maintenance and his salary in his own area. 
Whenever there was some disagreement over a mirāb’s and thus party’s mandate, house to 
house fighting (khāna jangi) broke out among their various followers. Reportedly, since 
party adherence did not overlap neatly with the borders of individual settlements or even 
family boundaries, such conflicts regularly involved intra-family and intra-qawm 
killings.532 When with General Rashid Dostum’s establishment of the Junbesh movement 
out of his former militia an additional player entered the scene in north Afghanistan, the 
confrontation between Jam’iat-e Islāmi and Junbesh escalated violently. According to local 
accounts, Qal’a-ye Zāl manteqa served as the regional frontline between both. Tarboz 
Guzar suffered from heavy fighting after their commander Rahim Pahlawān changed sides 
from being with Aref Khān (then Jam’iat-e Islāmi) to allying with Dostum, for which Aref 
Khān took violent revenge. In local memory, a second major breach in the frontline 
occurred at the time when Junbesh fought the Taliban in the area. Again, the local 
commander of Junbesh defecting to the Taliban caused heavy destruction and casualties 
throughout Qal’a-ye Zāl manteqa. 
Against the background of these reported events, one could sense a considerable degree of 
grievance still existing throughout Qal’a-ye Zāl in 2006-07. Nevertheless, these grievances 
were apparently not translated into major differences over the obedience to local water 
allocation rules,533 and there was hardly anybody who would speak a bad word about 
Qal’a-ye Zāl’s mirāb Aslam Mirāb.534 It has not been fully understood which factors were 
responsible for Aslam Mirāb’s ability to enforce the fixed framework of rules effectively. 
On the one hand, these rules were highly complex, as they defined the interdependence of 
upstream and downstream water users in joint canal maintenance and intake works while 
taking into account manpower, nature (soil, gravity, water table), and different water 
supply situations. On the other hand, the rules were easy to follow for anyone because they 
were highly transparent and promised equitable and just water allocation for individual 
cultivators. Aslam Mirāb emphasized that he would be working very transparently because 
his assistant scribe, Sakhi Jān, would take care of accounting and always be ready to 
provide an overview of money raised from water users and expenditures for material and 
transport costs. This was very much in contrast to his predecessors until 2001-02, who 
accepted bribes and were in no need of observing accountability because they were known 
to be henchmen of the local commanders (barādar-e qomāndān).  
Aslam Mirāb was described as a hardworking, poor old man,535 humble and honest, who 
treated everybody equally and thus deserved respect and obedience. His sanctioning 
powers in cases of deviance and illegal watertaking consisted of the ordinary mirāb 
instruments: denying the water thief his turn during the next rotation cycle, fines, and 
possibly the involvement of district authorities. However, if somebody were absent for 
                                                             
532 Interview with Aslam Mirāb and headmaster in Durman, 27 August 2006. 
533 This conclusion is supported by the findings of Abdullayev and Shah with reference to consensus and 
equity rules. See Abdullayet et al. (2007).  
534 Aslam Mirāb’s grandfather was a Turkmen from Kabadiān district, Sharituz Province of Bukhārā (today’s 
Tajikistan). 
535 At the time of fieldwork he was 71 years old. He had served as kokbāshi during the government of Zāher 
Shāh.  
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intake or canal repair work he gave everybody a chance to make up an absence, for 
example by doubling their manpower the next day. Fines were imposed by considering the 
situation of the deviant individual in order to treat him fairly. Thus, instead of imposing a 
fixed rate, fines could vary between 100 and 400 Afs. Not least due to these equational 
activities, Aslam Mirāb won respect and was valued as a mirāb and muysafēd who was 
able to integrate divergent interests and avoid an escalation of conflicts. He was 
reconfirmed as the mirāb of Qal’a-ye Zāl for a fifth year in a row in 2006. His own land 
and place of residence were in the lower part of the canal. However, and in contrast to the 
situation in Asqalān, no special rule existed in Qal’a-ye Zāl that required the selection of 
the mirāb from the downstream area.  
There is no evidence that Aslam Mirāb ever employed force or involved the district 
administration in local conflicts over water or outstanding intake and maintenance 
contributions.536 Yet, these did occur and were the order of the day, though perhaps less 
often than in the other systems given the fortunate morphology and the bēl system. For 
example, the scribe Sakhi Jān accused the Kandahāri landusers of regularly skipping intake 
works. In addition, many illegally-built structures for water diversion existed. To assume 
that such free-riding could be thwarted in any effective way by the mirāb or that 
persuasion might be effective in this case is naïve. Hence, despite the above considerations 
the source of Aslam Mirāb’s power remained sketchy. Nevertheless, the circumstances of 
how Aslam Mirāb became mirāb in the first place help to understand his position and 
status. Accordingly, shortly after Nahr-e Jadid was completed the Taliban were ousted 
from the province and other people gained influence, among them Faiz Muhamad, now the 
district governor of Chārdara, who at that time was the local Hezb-e Islāmi commander in 
Qal’a-ye Zāl. In the event of the mirāb election in 2002, he demanded to have five 
candidates presented and subsequently installed Aslam Mirāb as new mirāb of Qal’a-ye 
Zāl canal. This appointment and Aslam Mirāb’s status benefited from the reputation of the 
appointee.   
At the time of fieldwork, Faiz Muhamad was highly respected and only spoken of well by 
everybody because ‘he treated everybody from the most different qawm the same’.537 In 
contrast with the then current situation (2006-07), the time Faiz Muhamad538 was district 
governor of Qal’a-ye Zāl was cherished, as the following quote indicates:  
When Faiz Muhamad was here, everything was good. When Faiz Muhamad was reassigned 
to Aliābād, it was like the sun had set and darkness had come. When you go to the district 
administration today and want to scratch your skin, they think that you are taking money out 
of your pocket to bribe them. There is lots of bribing.539  
                                                             
536 Even though one account was recorded in the field stating that Aslam Mirāb would bury deviants up to the 
neck in sand as punishment (Recorded by Shah, see Abdullayev et al. [2010]). 
537 Evidence from several respondents, e.g. Hāji Abdul Haq in his manteqa, upstream Qal’a-ye Zāl, 26 
August 2006. 
538 The same Faiz Muhamad who was district governor in Chārdara during my fieldwork in 1385-86 (see Ch. 
6.1.2). With the advent of the Karzai government he was first appointed district governor of his native Qal’a-
ye Zāl, then moved to Aliābād and rotated on to Chārdara in 1384. 
539 Interview with Hāji Abdul Haq in his manteqa, upstream Qal’a-ye Zāl, 26 August 2006.  
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The ubiquity of bribe-giving and -taking was noted by all respondents when talking about 
the district administration in Qal’a-ye Zāl, in particular with regard to the CoP and his 
staff. Aslam Mirāb explained that this was also the reason why he refrained from contact 
with the district administration, except for the district ID in Āqtepa. In the view of the 
locals, all positions were filled with former, ‘bad’ commanders540 of the mujahedin period 
(see above). The administrative corruption (fasād-e edāri) was said to be rampant, and still 
‘force would rule on force’ (enjā zur bālā-ye zur ast) when the district government became 
involved. This reportedly resulted in a situation where rich people would buy justice and 
elders consequently lost significance in local conflict resolution and decision-making 
affairs because affluent people could afford appeal to the district administration for conflict 
settlement with their financial means at hand. Thus, they could confidently ignore or not 
accept an elders’ ruling, turn to the district administration instead and be sure that there any 
conflict was decided in their favor.541  
In the following, I cite as a third piece of evidence that accounts for the differences in 
irrigation water governance of Qal’a-ye Zāl and Tarboz Guzar the distinct role and 
motivations of the respective mirāb. Aslam Mirāb and Wahid Mirāb are able to manage 
water distribution and maintenance in a much more authoritative way than their colleagues 
in the other canal systems (see Table 6). The overview of what I have called ‘individual 
motivations’ listed in Table 6 moreover suggests that the office of water manager and the 
performance of its normative task portfolio,542 that is, not only maintaining the system and 
distributing irrigation water but also allocating water in an equitable manner and serving 
small and large landowners alike, is dependent upon the appointed individual, including his 
status in the community and his personality. Fazl Jān had sincere ambitions, but failed (xf) 
to provide the tail-end farmers in Tobrakash with water because the upstream landowners 
in Asqalān were in cahoots with Sofi Ghulām Nabi and effectively controlled him. In 
Qarayatim, Mas’ud was appointed mirāb by one influential landowner and former 
commander, ignoring all qualifications and interests that favored other candidates. 
Similarly, Shāh Abdul Hekmat appointed himself with the backing of other influential 
people in Sofi. Because he was arbāb (xa), head of the local NSP council, a large 
landowner, and the son of a pre-war mirāb he took over the position from Hāji Tahir, his 
brother, who had served the previous terms and was much favored by smaller landowners. 
Wahid Mirāb was both qualified and successful (xs) in providing stable water amounts to 
the fields in his constituency. However, he was great helped by the morphological 
properties of his canal area and its comparatively small size. Aslam Mirāb was the only of 
the six mirāb studied, who had the status of a conventional elder due to his age, the respect 
he enjoyed, and his social abilities to mediate in conflict situations. Performing as mirāb, 
he could count on the backing of other qawm-leaders and elders, like his scribe Sakhi Jān, 
who were likewise much concerned with equity values. Nevertheless, his appointment as 
                                                             
540 For a basic distinction of different types of commanders (‘bad’ versus ‘good’) see Ch. 7.4.  
541 Several interviewees stressed this point, e.g., Aslam Mirāb who himself acted as muysafēd in conflict 
arbitration (27 August 2006), Sofi Anārgul of Zulmābād, likewise an elder of his qawm (23 August 2006), 
and Hāji Abdul Haq, (qarya-ye Hāji Ghulām [26 August 2006]). 
542 Criteria commonly cited to characterize the person occupying the mirāb post include land ownership, 
honesty, and a helpful attitude, as well as good relations with all water users and the government 
administration. 
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mirāb five years earlier was eventually aided by Faiz Muhamad in his position as 
commander at that time.  
Table 6: Individual motivations of acting mirāb in irrigation season 2006 (1385) 
 
Finally, when talking about the ‘authoritative’ capacities of a local mirāb, the relation 
between elders and mirāb deserves special attention. From Aslam Mirāb’s case in Qal’a-ye 
Zāl the conclusion could be drawn that where the mirāb is at the same time a conventional 
elder, the equity dimension is inherently met. I have also shown for Qarayatim (6.1.2) that 
the elders seem to control their mirāb (Mas’ud) and were able to order him to fix the 
Kharoti aqueduct, for example. However, it has not become entirely clear whether the 
conventional elders (Hāji Jum’a Khān et al.) indeed had full command over the mirāb’s 
activities. It is also possible that they instead fell prey to a classical principal agent 
dilemma in which the agent, that is, mirāb Mas’ud, merely makes the appearance of 
following orders fully but deprives the principal muysafēd, that is, Hāji Jum’a Khān et al., 
of complete information about his activities,543 which allows him to push his own agenda. 
The influence of large landowners (partly novel elders) on who gets appointed as mirāb is 
striking. That Fazl Jān (in 2007) in Asqalān and Hāji Tahir (in 2006) in Sofi were not 
reappointed despite bold ambitions and their support from the majority of small-landowner 
water users suggests that large landowners were ready to put intra-community peace and 
harmony at risk for the prospect of ensuring at least their own share of the envisioned 
benefits from foreign involvement with infrastructure constructions along their canal. 
Consequently, with this politicization caused by the prospect of NGO activities,544 the 
likelihood of smaller farmers, tail-end water users, or farmers with high land to choose a 
person they would trust to allocate water according to their needs, decreased. The above 
Chs. 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 provide evidence in this regard for Qarayatim and Asqalān. However, 
in Qal’a-ye Zāl and Tarboz Guzar, a similar effect was not discernible. 
 
b. Water management reforms (not) touching ground 
The background of the prospected construction interventions was set by the government’s 
plans for water management reforms. By March 2006, a policy document entitled 
‘Strategic Policy Framework for the Water Sector’ had been drafted, pointing out future 
                                                             
543 This explains why the Kharoti claimed no barrels had yet arrived for the construction of a temporary 
aqueduct.  
544 This refers to NGO activities under the umbrella of KRBP, which is introduced in the next section. For the 
general framework for foreign involvement in local areas throughout Afghanistan see also Ch. 8. 
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directions and reform intentions in the water sector. Among the latter were the revision of 
the 1981/1991 Water Law, irrigation regulations, and the introduction of Water User 
Associations (WUAs) at watercourse level.545 While the policy framework was approved 
in November 2006, the drafted Water Law remained blocked in parliament throughout the 
research period.546  
With the magnitude of the national-level aid interventions of the international community 
in Afghanistan in the framework of institution and state-building after 2001 (Schetter and 
Mielke 2008), the transitional government adopted the Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) approach as a blueprint for all water sector reforms, including 
irrigation. This decision had tremendous consequences, because the IWRM-paradigm 
entailed the administration and management of water resources within the natural 
boundaries of river basins and not along the conventional administrative lines of provincial 
and district boundaries. Subsequently, the creation of agencies according to river basins 
and hydrological networks as geographical entities had to be inaugurated, spanning from 
the central to local levels. In a first step, a sub-division of Afghanistan’s water resource 
landscape into five river basins took place as early as 2002-2003,547 including the Āmu 
Daryā basin and within its meso-catchment (‘watershed’) the Kunduz river basin.548 The 
institutional design of this new water management format is depicted for the Kunduz river 
basin in Figure 3.   
The organizational hierarchy in place during fieldwork comprised the Supreme Council for 
Water Affairs Management (SCWAM) reporting to the Ministry of Energy and Water 
(MEW) and the SCWAM-Technical Secretariat in charge of coordination between MEW 
and other national ministries related to water resources.549 At the sub-national level the 
water management departments of the MEW line ministry (IDs) functioned at the 
provincial level. In the districts where I worked (Qal’a-ye Zāl, Chārdara) even district level 
irrigation departments (in Chārdara and Āqtepa) were in place and working under the 
Kunduz ID. The reform plans envisaged the provincial IDs conceding their water 
management competencies to a River Basin Authority which would be formed at river 
                                                             
545 USAID had proposed a WUA Charter based on project activities in Kandahar parallel to the new Water 
Law draft. See Rivière (2006: 51). 
546 The law was not passed for several years until its final approval and announcement in the Ministry of 
Justice Official Gazette No. 980 on 26 April 2009. See Ministry of Justice/GoA (2009). 
547 Based on the second pillar ‘Physical reconstruction and natural resources’ in the transitional government’s 
National Development Framework, which was presented in April 2002. See Rivière (2005: 13, 16).  
548 The five river basins were the Āmu Daryā river basin, Northern river basin, Harirod-Murghāb river basin 
(sometimes called the Western river basin), Helmand river basin, and Kabul river basin (aka ‘Eastern’ river 
basin) and are further subdivided into 41 watersheds (defined as meso-catchment areas). The delineation into 
river basins, watersheds, micro-catchments, and community water points was institutionalized with the 
editing of a watershed atlas for Afghanistan (Favre and Kamal 2004), available at: 
http://aizon.org/watershed_atlas.htm. For a clarification of the terminology, i.e. river basin versus watershed 
(US-terminology) versus catchment (UK-terminology), see ibid.  
549 These were the Ministries of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food (MAAHF), of Rural Rehabilitation 
and Development (MRRD), of Mines and Industry (MMI), of Urban Development and Housing and Kabul 
Municipality (MUDAH). See also MEW (2007: 9) and Varzi and Wegerich (2008: 51) for a similar chart as 
well as a map of the Kunduz river basin and its three sub-basins. 
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basin level over the medium term. At the next lower level, three sub-basins550 were carved 
out according to hydrological criteria, despite the Kunduz river basin actually comprising 
seven rivers and about 50 smaller water courses (Varzi and Wegerich 2008: 52).551 
Contrary to the setup of a government-directed basin and sub-basin authority, the 
complementary council structures (river basin council, sub-basin councils) were envisaged 
as assemblies of non-government stakeholders (private sector entrepreneurs, such as 
construction companies, NGOs, and representative structures like shurā, jirga and 
associations of mirāb), which would have to be formed once their legal basis was 
established by the government.552 At the operational level, the reform was oriented towards 
participatory stakeholder involvement in the irrigation schemes, with user communities 
forming representative local bodies in the form of shurā or WUAs in order to co-determine 
the regulation of water use and users in line with the regulations of the Water Law.     
 
Figure 3: River basin institutional arrangement (adopted from KRBP presentation) 
 
                                                             
550 The study canals were supposed to be part of different sub-basins, i.e., Asqalān to be managed under the 
Tāluqān river sub-basin, and the Qal’a-ye Zāl and Chārdara schemes by the Baghlān sub-basin authority 
(Noted by Shah in SMWA Team Meeting in Kunduz, 23 July 2007). 
551 According to the authors, the Tāluqān (12,919 km2) and Baghlān catchments (28,441 km2) were identified 
as bases for the definition of sub-basins: the area of the Tāluqān-catchment was incorporated fully to become 
the Tāluqān sub-basin, whereas the Baghlān catchment was split up into the downstream sub-basin Baghlān 
and its upstream counterpart Doshi-Bāmiyān sub-basin (ibid.). Despite the fact that this way of dividing the 
sub-basins would have touched on Bāmiyān province and its provincial ID as part of the Kunduz river basin, 
the subsequently established KRBP (see below) limited its activities to the three provinces Kunduz, Baghlān, 
and Takhār. It thus contradicted its own IWRM-approach of following hydrological boundaries (ibid.).  
552 From a functional perspective, the reforms propagated a split between (1) the legal and policy functions of 
the MEW, (2) the organizational tasks of the river basin management, and (3) service providers and 
implementers charged with operational tasks (MEW 2007: 16).  
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The overall aim of the reform was that such a new setup would facilitate a more effective, 
integrated and sustainable management of water resources given the high losses and other 
shortcomings described above, such as regular water losses and infrastructure damage. The 
assumption was that this in turn would provide greater reliability in water supply for 
agriculture, enhance production, farmers’ welfare, and food security. According to MEW’s 
Water Sector Strategy (2007) the national river basin management programs which were 
launched from 2004 on were expected to affect the organizational and technical landscape 
of water management with the establishment of river basin management institutions, the 
rehabilitation of traditional irrigation schemes, and the formation of WUAs.  
The Kunduz river basin was selected to be the first site for the implementation of described 
reforms through the European Commission-financed Kunduz River Basin Program 
(KRBP) starting from June 2004.553 Among the five components covered by the 
program,554 in terms of irrigation, the improvement of infrastructure and water 
management in 10 to 15 small to medium irrigation systems were included. The irrigation 
schemes of Qal’a-ye Zāl and Tarboz Guzar along with Asqalān, Sofi and Qarayatim were 
among the few canals selected555 to be part of the pilot program for implementing and 
testing the institutional and organizational changes.556 By 2006 – the time I was conducting 
fieldwork in all five canal networks – the government was forced, for several reasons, to 
compromise on the balance between infrastructure construction, institutional development, 
and capacity building for the delivery of physical works and rehabilitation of infrastructure 
in the implementation process. The main issue was that the MEW as well as the national 
river basin program managers557 and subcontracted NGOs for the mobilization of 
WUAs558 felt they had to respond to water users’ expectations first (MEW 2007: 7), even 
                                                             
553 KRBP started with a budget of €12.5 million, granted by the European Commission to the MEW for an 
initial five years, that is, until 2009. Why the Kunduz river basin was selected might have been connected 
with the German Technical Cooperation’s Agency (GTZ) leading the Water Sector Reform Project and the 
overall emphasis of German engagement in Afghanistan’s northeast, see MEW (2007: 7). 
554 The other components included (1) the preparation of a river basin water management plan and setup of 
the River Basin Authority, (2) the improvement of the operational efficiency of water use from irrigation 
schemes, (3) capacity development of provincial line ministries of MEW, river basin councils, and WUAs, 
and (4) the regeneration and selection of upper catchments (Rivière 2005: 35). The latter is relevant for Ch. 
6.2 and will be discussed in more depth in the subsequent sections of Ch. 6.2. 
555 According to Varzi and Wegerich (2008: 53), 33 out of a total of 213 canals in the Kunduz river basin 
were included in the KRBP, accounting for 30 percent of the irrigated area in the basin. Contrary to Rivière’s 
report that 10 to 15 small to medium schemes would be selected, the MEW and the consultant in charge of 
KRBP referred to the rehabilitation of eight to 12 medium- to large-scale schemes (MEW 2007: 16, 
Interview with this consultant, Kunduz, 19 April 2006). Among the selection criteria for the irrigation 
networks were the size of the command area, landholding size (rather small, including returnee population), 
ethnic balance, and assumed goodwill and cooperation of local mirāb (ibid.; also see KRBP 2006). In 
Kunduz Province, only four of the 33 canal networks (Qal’a-ye Zāl, Tarboz Guzar, Sofi-Qarayatim, and 
Asqalān) were integrated into the Kunduz river basin pilot program. 
556 The underlying rationale was that if the program should prove successful in the water management realm, 
it could be adopted as management model for other natural resources as well.  
557 The MEW subcontracted the British-based international consulting firm Landell Mills Limited to 
implement the KRBP. 
558 Two out of the five KRBP components were subcontracted to NGOs: the SMWA and Upstream Water 
Catchments’ protection and forest regeneration. Welthungerhilfe won the bid to implement the SMWA 
project in the five irrigation canal areas discussed in this thesis for Kunduz Province, and further in Takhār’s 
Sharawān canal (Welthungerhilfe 2005: 3). A complementary assignment was given to the Aghā Khān 
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though the plan was to also realize the institutional and capacity-building objectives. 
However, since the latter related to the ‘software’ of irrigation, that is, the local 
management capacity and social aspects, it required much more time and trust-building 
with the communities. The implementation of the ‘hardware’ components was thus 
considered to be the carrot that would bring the communities on board with the reforms 
(see Ch. 8). Furthermore, the fact that the organizational inventions (river basin councils, 
river basin authority, WUAs, etc.) were not legalized in any way because the Water Law 
awaited ratification in Parliament, undermined their effective propagation and formation 
considerably.559 
The background of the expected building of concrete intakes, offtakes, dividers, and other 
infrastructure in my study canals has been sketched out. My elaborations throughout Chs. 
6.1.1 to 6.1.3 suggest that the KRBP was largely perceived as a construction NGO. In the 
following, I discuss on the basis of my admittedly and necessarily selective empirical 
insights how the water management reforms materialized locally until fall 2007.560  
Few changes that were however only indirectly related to the larger reform project had 
already been introduced in the preceding years. For example, the traditional time of mirāb 
‘election’ was already altered in Asqalān for the 2006 irrigation season with the 
appointment not being made in the month before the start of the irrigation season and new 
year in late February, but already in the preceding fall between late September and end of 
October 2005 (Ch. 6.1.1). In Chardāra and Qal’a-ye Zāl districts, mirāb appointments for 
the 2006 season were conducted according to the traditional timeline. However, by 2007 
the time-shift of the appointment to the end of the preceding irrigation season was enforced 
in all four schemes and consequently took place in autumn 2006. According to my 
interview accounts (see sections 6.1.1-b, 6.1.2-a, 6.1.3-a) ballot-voting was not practiced 
for choosing the mirāb in either season, although the provincial ID had tried to popularize 
ballot-voting on the occasion of mirāb elections for Chārdara main canal in fall 2006.561 In 
another example for reforms, the identification cards for mirāb were introduced and 
handed out the first time in 2006. Previously, the name of the person selected as mirāb had 
been certified first by the district ID and then by the provincial ID. Now, a card with a 
photograph was issued for the position holder so he could be identified by anybody upon 
need and he could prove his identity. The underlying rationale was to facilitate the 
communication and negotiation process of local water managers with government 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Development Network (AKDN) in cooperation with the French organization Groupe Urgence Réhabilitation 
Developpement (URD) in Baghlān and parts of Takhār (ibid.: 7).   
559 At the sub-basin level, working groups were established for the time being until the approval of the Water 
Law would allow their transformation into sub-basin councils (MEW 2007: 20). For a review of these 
working groups see Varzi and Wegerich (2008). 
560 Because it was not the objective of this PhD-thesis to assess water management reform implementation, I 
did not gather data systematically and did not trace the implementation process in detail. For this reason I 
will use ZEF-researchers’ insights in addition to my own to support the analysis in the next paragraphs 
(Abdullaev et al. 2007). See Chs. 8 and 10 for a discussion of the reforms in the framework of the overall 
development intervention. 
561 Whereas the Chārdara elections were fully covered with video and audio by the local news outlet Kunduz 
TV, other mirāb-‘election results were merely announced on the news. The impression was that the Chārdara 
elections were meant to have a demonstrative and role-model effect to teach democracy and voting.   
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departments, NGOs, and construction companies. Interestingly, these procedural and 
practical inventions were not only established for mirāb of the KRBP-selected canals, but 
for water managers in all schemes. This can be read as an indication of the prevalence of 
other programs and projects in the irrigation sector, as evident for example in the NSP and 
other NGO-led project interventions with a selective, local focus.562 Moreover, the head of 
the provincial ID in Kunduz stated that those NGOs which circumvented his administration 
could usually not be monitored and there were many complaints from local communities 
regarding the inferior quality of the structures that the NGOs built.563 Accordingly, in his 
view one of the main tasks of his department consisted of liaising between NGOs, donors, 
and local communities for the irrigation sector.564   
In the summer of 2006, an increased mobilization in the water user communities along the 
study canals set in because Welthungerhilfe was beginning its community-specific 
activities in the SMWA project. As elaborated above, in anticipation of timely intervention 
with considerable cash input and infrastructure output mirāb positions were filled 
strategically in Asqalān (Sofi Ghulām Nabi), Sofi (Shāh Abdul Hekmat), and Qarayatim 
(Mas’ud). However, due to delays in project implementation, including challenges in 
conducting baseline surveys (see Ch. 5), the expected outputs were not materializing 
quickly.  
SWMA was charged with enabling and enhancing communities’ “sustainable social and 
technical rehabilitation/improvement of medium-sized irrigation schemes by including all 
water users and [to] ensure that their local water management bodies have access to the 
participation mechanisms of the Kunduz river basin management institutions.” 
(Welthungerhilfe 2005: 4). At the local level, the stated aim was to build “more democratic 
social water management structures” by achieving equal representation of water users in 
the communities (ibid.). One instrument proposed in the initial project proposal was the 
establishment of cluster-based Community Water Management Committees. On the one 
hand, these were projected to implement small- and medium-sized water infrastructure 
projects. On the other the idea was to thus create representative bodies which could liaise 
with different interests along individual canals and between water users and external 
(private and government) agents (ibid.: 9). With the issuing and circulation of a Draft 
Water Law in 2006, the terminology changed slightly from Community Water 
Management Committees to WUAs. At the pre-WUA stage and due to the failure to enact 
the Water Law for the 2006-2007 period, the establishment of Water User Groups (WUGs, 
kumita estefāda kunandagān-e āb) and Canal Committees (CCs) was spurred. However, 
                                                             
562 SCA, Mercy Corps, Welthungerhilfe, AKDN, CARE, ACTED, et al. (all NGOs with local offices in 
Kunduz city) had a broad project portfolio centering on agricultural rehabilitation which also allowed for 
activities for irrigation system improvement. Thus, throughout the described canal areas individual 
infrastructure components (diversion structure, offtake, spillways, gates etc.) had been constructed with the 
help of these NGOs prior to 2006 and in parallel with KRBP. For example, Welthungerhilfe had worked 
since 2002 in Baghlān, Takhār, and Kunduz province with a focus on the rehabilitation of water resource 
systems (Welthungerhilfe 2005: 9).  
563 Complaints were also encountered during fieldwork in different locations, where it turned out those 
concrete structures had already ceased functioning several months after being built. According to the locals’ 
opinion, these failures were often because the NGO and construction company engineers would ignore local 
idiosyncrasies and the farmers’ experience. 
564 Interview with Engineer Amir, head of the Kunduz provincial ID, Kunduz, 22 April 2006. 
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given the vagueness that characterized the available draft of the Water Law at that time, the 
future role of the mirāb and kokbāshi remained unclear both to the NGO manager and their 
community-mobilizers in charge of implementing the social dimension of the reform.  
To what degree of clarity the aims of the program were communicated and perceived is 
doubtful, because none of my interviewees referred to the program’s social dimension in 
particular.565 The hardware component and heightened expectations of construction NGOs 
dominated the discussions. The mobilization of those mirāb whose canals were selected for 
the Kunduz river basin pilot program from Kunduz province was successful in a way 
because they met regularly with the head of the provincial ID.566 Furthermore, the mirāb 
from all chosen canal systems in Baghlān, Kunduz, and Takhār were invited to several key 
workshops where the KRBP, its objectives, and benefits were introduced and discussed. In 
the following, I quote the wrap-up speech of the deputy head of the Kunduz ID at one of 
those coordination meetings of KRBP-stakeholders. It was attended by representatives of 
the implementing NGOs, the mirāb from the pilot schemes in Kunduz, Takhār and 
Baghlān, government deputies of the MEW, such as the Deputy Minister Muhamad Akbar 
Barakzai, of the respective provincial line ministries, such as the heads of the three 
provincial IDs, and the deputy governor of Kunduz.567 The speech sheds light on several 
aspects, including the appeal to the water users to show solidarity, unity, and some sense of 
self-reliance arguing that no one but them could fix their own problems and ensure the 
common well-being. Another important point is the allusion to water rights as haq āba.   
My dearest countrymen! I would like to use the opportunity of this day – which is a 
historical day for water resources – to present my cause as a fellow countryman, not a 
manager or an employee in front of His Eminence Deputy Minister of Water and Energy. 
My dearest countrymen, you are the heirs of Afghanistan. We are Afghans and Afghanistan 
is our country. Previously, this country was with our fathers and ancestors. We had 
everything. We had irrigation systems. We had haq āba-designations. We had elders. 
Everything we had was ordered and organized. We know that the 30 years of imposed wars, 
in which the foreigners also had their hands, destroyed our country. Today, everyone from 
everywhere has arrived in our country for reconstruction based on the assumption that we are 
weak and unable. That is not true. We own everything. Firstly, we are Muslims. We have the 
best and most comprehensive law, the holy Koran. We are following the Koran and the rules 
and explanations it contains. If we respect God’s law, we will not face any problem. It is 
neither the matter of the Chief of Police, of the governor, the Irrigation Department, the 
Ministry of Water and Energy nor mine, it depends on you. You should have solidarity. As 
the Deputy Minister said, you should be organized and united. And as the head of the 
Kunduz ID said, if we respect our brotherliness and each other’s haq āba, problems will not 
arise.  
On Thursday, I went with a few people to a village named Kanām. I saw a rice plot, next to 
which two to three jerib of land were lying dormant. When I enquired why the land was left 
fallow, local people answered that the land does not get water. The landlord of the rice plot 
doesn’t give water to his neighbor. I saw that water is going from the rice plot to the river 
and that it is lost, even though the rice plot is situated higher than the fallow field which 
could have been irrigated by the water. If you do not believe me, I will show you the place. 
                                                             
565 For a more comprehensive reflection on the aid intervention in local communities and the consequent 
effects see Ch. 8.   
566 Meetings were scheduled twice a year with all mirāb at the provincial ID office, while weekly meetings 
with district staff were conducted (Interview with Engineer Amir, 22 April 2006).  
567 The meeting was held on 22 July 2006 at the Kunduz Hotel, Kunduz city.  
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[…] If this is the kind of solidarity and brotherliness we have, we will not be able to achieve 
anything. This way we cannot solve our problems.  
As I mentioned previously, we had everything in the past. Now different countries have 
intervened claiming to be our friends despite the fact that each of them has its own agenda. 
Some of them have provided long-term loans which will have to be paid back at some point 
in time. Some have raised donations and established organizations which if they spend ten 
Afs for us they spend 90 Afs for themselves. We should not be disappointed, however. This 
country will be fixed with the support of God. The owners of this country will shape the 
country. Our country was destroyed several times and has been rebuilt. Alexander the Great, 
Chengiz Khān, Timor [Tamerlan], and hundreds of others have come like the Russians. We 
have seen them all. None of them could solve our problems [‘fill our holes’]. The Irrigation 
Departments say ‘We do not have working tools’, and they are right. Our ministries have 
problems. The Ministry of Energy and Water announced that they will divide the haq āba. 
They have received two and a half million dollars. Why is it not possible to purchase two 
bulldozers for each provincial ID? If it is being purchased, we do not have any other 
problem. Then, in emergency cases, we have our bulldozers and human manpower, we can 
construct our intakes. The big money is being spent for nothing, like they say ‘We assign 
haq āba.’ What kind of haq āba will they assign? We have our own measurement tools, like 
one bēl āb. We have good and educated people. We have engineers. The truth is that they 
[the foreigners] do not have the intention and do not want to have fundamental works done.  
During the time of Suleiman, Peace be upon him, an old woman approached him 
complaining that her house had been washed away by a mudslide. The messenger of God 
ordered one of the dēw568 to rebuild her house. The dēw made four stone walls and erected 
the house and asked the woman if she is satisfied. She replied ‘yes’ and the dēw destroyed 
the house. After the same procedure was reenacted several times the old woman decided to 
turn again to the messenger to tell him what had happened. On her way to him, a man saw 
her and asked what she was up to. The old woman told him her story and the man advised 
her to answer the dēw that she is not satisfied with the house, to claim that it is not complete 
and to indicate some more works to be undertaken. So when the dēw returned once again to 
rebuild the house, by the time it was finished the woman claimed it was not complete. Once 
the old woman went to sleep she handed the dēw a fan demanding to fill up her body orifices 
[hole] with air.569 Not having achieved this yet [because it cannot be achieved] and having 
already been asked to get some further jobs done, the dēw finally escaped. Thousands of dēw 
will escape this country. None of them can solve our problems. I have nothing more to say. 
Thank you. 
In its broadest sense, the address is a deeply revealing indicator of the role and status of 
government officials in the reform process, their states of mind, and their comprehension 
of the reform (see Ch. 7.3). Moreover, the vocabulary and content he employs to persuade 
the mirāb in the audience to cooperate with the department suggests conclusions regarding 
the government officials’ perception of their constituency. The aforementioned persuasion 
includes elements of blaming vague donors (‘foreigners’) for the inefficient use of money 
and the implication that foreign stakeholders’ intentions are bad and – indirectly – that thus 
they cannot be fully trusted. The reference to the Koran and the Muslim law serves its 
purpose to give confidence in self-reliance. The anecdote in the end seeks to underscore 
the entire argument.   
                                                             
568 Dēw is a legendary figure in local fables, meaning roughly spirit, genie, or ghostly monster, here under the 
command of Suleiman the messenger. 
569 The exact expression related to a woman’s private parts. The story is highly unusual to be told in an 
official meeting like this. 
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I had the opportunity to discuss the notion of haq āba with both Fazl Jān and Sofi Abdul 
Hākim in the presence of a couple of other people in a group interview just a few days 
later.570 The concept was not familiar to either of the two Asqalān mirāb. After a long 
discussion, the technical translation of the term into the meaning ‘right to water’ was 
concluded and acknowledged; however without them being able to relate to it much. 
Finally, it was related to the eight-day rotation schedule between Asqalān and Tobrakash 
that gave the downstream or upstream community the particular water right on a given day. 
The haq notion in and of itself, was highly valued in a normative sense, though, and the 
Koran as well as sharia law were cited to stress equal rights for everybody, including equal 
access to irrigation water, whether irrigating at the tail end or head of a canal.571  
Prior to the concluding address of the deputy head of Kunduz ID and as an outcome of the 
meeting, a 13-point ‘Resolution for water management and effective use of water in times 
of scarcity and emergency cases’ was announced. Among other points, it included the 
prohibition of rice cultivation in specific areas as defined by the agricultural and irrigation 
departments, justified by the violation of tail-enders’ rights. Furthermore, the selection 
procedure for mirāb and their deputies were designated ‘very old and traditional’ and not 
meeting modern requirements. The subsequent proposition suggested the necessity to 
define and publish precise rules for the selection of the mirāb and the establishment of 
water user committees.  
For Kunduz, the meeting also served to usher in the mobilization process of water users 
with the aim of establishing WUGs coordinated by a CC in each of the four canal clusters 
(Asqalān, Tarboz Guzar, Qal’a-ye Zāl, Sofi-Qarayatim).572 Because of the deterioration of 
the security situation in Chārdara at the same time, SMWA community mobilizers were 
focusing on Sofi-Qarayatim first and managed to set up six WUGs, three along each sub-
canal, through 10 September 2006. Until mid-September, six WUGs were also established 
along Asqalān (three in Asqalān manteqa, three in Tobrakash). In Tarboz Guzar, two 
WUGs (Tarboz Guzar Bālā, Tarboz Guzar Pāyin) were created, and in Qal’a-ye Zāl four 
(see Table 7). Though both WUGs and CCs were registered with the provincial ID, they 
did not acquire any legal status. 
From the table the disproportionate distribution of WUGs relative to canal command area 
is evident. Whereas Asqalān and Sofi-Qarayatim, each with a similar amount of irrigated 
land, had six WUGs formed, Qal’a-ye Zāl with far more than the double command area, 
comprised only four WUGs. This type of cluster formation must be understood as a 
consequence of the local conflict potential sensed by the Welthungerhilfe’s community 
mobilizers. In addition, the mirāb of Qal’a-ye Zāl reportedly suggested Welthungerhilfe to 
                                                             
570 Interview, 25 July 2006. 
571 The limitation and thus the highly normative nature of that rule was expressed in the follow-up 
explanation above, that is, the statement that it is applied in times of sufficient water availability (see 6.1.1 b). 
During scarce water conditions, water theft and deviance according to a farmer’s abilities and relations is the 
norm (Interview with Fazl Jān and Sofi Abdul Hākim, 25 July 2006). 
572 The mobilization component was paralleled with conducting participatory needs assessments regarding 
infrastructure in water user communities. Training and assistance for agriculture started after the 
establishment of the WUGs, as did the assessment for CCCs and additional infrastructure rehabilitation 
measures.  
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include the entire command area instead of small-scale clusters and for this reason 
proposed to split it up into four secondary networks, which each consist of greater subnets 
and diversified branches.573 Thus, because the conflict potential was estimated to be low, 
four WUGs were created in Qal’a-ye Zāl. In contrast, because of contestations that were 
perceived in Sofi-Qarayatim and between Asqalān and Tobrakash, each was assigned six 
WUGs.    
Table 7: Overview of WUGs and CC leaders as of late summer 2007  
Canal network 
(approximate 
size) 
No. of 
WUGs 
 WUG-name WUG-heads574 CC-
chairman 
 
Asqalān 
 
(20,000 jerib) 
6 Asqalān Sāheb Khān Saifudin Mirāb  
Saifudin 
Mirāb & 
Hāji 
Rahmat 
Khān 
Madrasa 
Turkmanhā 
Nazar Bāy 
Beshbālā Sofi Ghulām 
Nabi 
Tobrakash Hāji Rahmat Khān Hāji Rahmat 
Khān 
Norullah Norullah 
Hāji Gul Khān Hāji Gul Khān 
Qal’a-ye Zāl 
 
(48,000 jerib) 
4  Wakil Akhtar Khalilullah Gul  
Sakhi Jān Wortabuz Abdul Qudus 
Olam Shakh Niamat Bāy 
Chāgh Aryq Aslam Mirāb 
Tarboz Guzar 
(7,000 jerib) 
2  Tarboz Guzar Bālā Abdul Jabār Wahid 
Mirāb Tarboz Guzar 
Pāyin 
Wahid Mirāb 
 
Sofi-Qarayatim 
 
(17,000 jerib) 
6 Sofi Khair Karan (Hāji Rustam*)  
(no data) Sofi Abdul Dayān (Sofi Abdul 
Dayān) 
Mangtepa (Arbāb Sofi M.) 
Qarayatim Hāji Shēr Ali Ahmad Shāh  
Madrasa-ye 
Qarayatim 
(Mas’ud*) 
Kulābi (Hāji Murād) 
 
A further look at the table shows the significant difference of CC chairmanship between 
Asqalān and Qal’a-ye Zāl/Tarboz Guzar. Whereas in the latter the mirāb Wahid Mirāb and 
Aslam Mirāb’s assistant, Sakhi Jān, were charged with the task of representing the water 
                                                             
573 See the European Union interim narrative report, submitted by Welthungerhilfe to the European 
Commission in January 2007. 
574 Because of security reasons, I was unable to follow up the WUG formation process in Sofi-Qarayatim. 
The CC- and WUG-head positions remained unknown except for Hāji Shēr Ali WUG which became known 
to be led by Ahmad Shāh (see 6.1.2 c) through an interview with the SWMA community mobilizers in charge 
of Sofi-Qarayatim during summer 2006 (interview conducted by Abdullayev, Welthungerhilfe Kunduz 
office, 17 June 2007). In brackets, I mention elders and big men of the respective mosque communities 
(introduced in 6.1.2) who belong to the individual WUGs. The ones marked * have been representing local 
water users at meetings with SMWA project staff in Kunduz. However, it is not clear whether they were 
chosen to be heads of WUG (not likely in case of Hāji Rustam because of his multiple other activities). In 
addition to those mentioned, commander Rahmat Bāy was also present in Welthungerhilfe-Qarayatim 
meetings; Hāji Jum’a Khān (see 6.1.2 c) attended both, Sofi-Welthungerhilfe and Qarayatim-Welthungerhilfe 
meetings (according to Welthungerhilfe meeting reports of 19 and 27 June 2006). 
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users of the entire canal, in Asqalān the two main representatives of upstream Asqalān 
manteqa (Saifudin) and downstream Tobrakash (Hāji Rahmat Khān) nominated 
themselves, confident of the consent of their respective populations.575 In conversations 
with both, they regularly disputed which one of them was actually the chairman and who 
the deputy, similar to the discussion in Asqalān about who is the head-mirāb in one year 
and who gets registered only as deputy (see Ch. 6.1.1). Moreover, in Tobrakash it was 
clear that the most significant elders took over the WUG leadership position. This explains 
the consonance of the WUG name and its appointed leader Hāji Gul Khān and Norullah 
(Hāji Rahmat Khān’s cousin). They also dispose of guestrooms (mehmānkhāna) to host 
and feed visitors in time of need and can provide security for outsiders in the tail-end area 
of Asqalān canal.576 The acting mirāb do not play a role in the WUGs in either part of 
Asqalān. The upper three manteqa Sāheb Khān, Madrasa Turkmanhā, and Beshbālā 
represent areas of influence of locally influential commanders, who are at the same time 
large landowners: commander Raof ‘commanding’ Saifudin577 and Sofi Ghulām Nabi, 
with Roz Alam (see Ch. 6.1.1 b) having sway over Nazar Bāy. 
Although cursory and admittedly incomplete, this view of representation patterns clearly 
suggests that the WUGs were hijacked by local strongmen. Ahmad Shāh in the position of 
the Hāji Shēr Ali WUG leader is a further indicator from the Sofi-Qarayatim canal system. 
A closer look at Qal’a-ye Zāl and Tarboz Guzar provides additional evidence, although the 
nature of the elite capture is different in the way that the elites here are mostly 
conventional elders or related to them, and as a rule not of the novel elder type (see section 
6.1.2-c). Thus, for example, the Wakil Akhtar WUG is headed by Wakil Akhtar’s son, 
Khalilullah Gul, a younger brother of the tribal elder and Meshrāno Jirga member 
Khalilullah Gul (see section 6.1.3-a). Wakil Akhtar was the first WUG formed in Qal’a-ye 
Zāl, reportedly because of its strategic location in the middle section of the canal and the 
disseminator effects this location offered for the establishment of further WUGs up- and 
downstream thereafter. The respect and authority that Aslam Mirāb enjoys throughout the 
canal area has already been elaborated on above. Indeed, he had been the first choice of the 
local elders for the position of the head of the CC, though he declined and instead 
nominated Sakhi Jān, his assistant. Khalilullah Gul, Sar Mal’um Norullāh, and Sakhi Jān 
were determined to be the primary contact people for outsiders and responsible for meeting 
and hosting them during visits.578 In Tarboz Guzar, Wahid Mirāb is the offspring of a 
traditional large landowning family and respected acting mirāb. Qāri Rahmatullah, who 
leads the WUG of Lower Tarboz Guzar (Tarboz Guzar Pāyin), inherited the position from 
his father, a former mirāb and significant conventional elder, who had been appointed head 
of the WUG initially, but died suddenly after the appointment. In Qal’a-ye Zāl and Tarboz 
Guzar, the WUGs comprise mirāb and kokbāshi to a large extent; for example, all 
                                                             
575 Interviews with Saifudin Mirāb at his home in Asqalān, 2 September 2007 and with Hāji Rahmat Khān at 
his home in Tobrakash, 8 May 2007. 
576 Hāji Rahmat Khān is reportedly elder of eight mosque communities, Abdul Jalil of seven. 
577 Saifudin had been the active mirāb when commander Raof was at the height of his influence in upper 
Asqalān during the mujahedin and Taliban periods. See Ch. 6.1.1. 
578 Noted by Abdullayev in interview with WUG-assistant Qurbān Nazar (WUG Wortabuz) in Āqtepa, 9 
August 2007. 
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members of Wortabuz WUG, including its head, Abdul Qudus, were acting kokbāshi.579 
The explanation for this and why the CC chairmen in Tarboz Guzar and Qal’a-ye Zāl were 
both mirāb, was put simply: since the positions were unpaid, nobody would volunteer for 
such a potentially time-consuming duty. Thus the mirāb and deputies were the right people 
for the job (Shah 2007). 
Beyond the organizational setup of the WUGs and CCs, their mandate as assigned or de-
jure authority, and benefits remained largely unclear even after a year into their existence 
in fall 2007. In some cases, WUG members were not aware of the fact that they were part 
of a water regulating body for their canal area that was supposed to take over governing 
functions at some point of time. Very often, respondents who claimed to be WUG 
members could not explain its aims and purposes. Only a few figures – Hāji Rahmat Khān, 
Saifudin, Sakhi Jān –fully understood the local implications of WUG introduction. Even on 
the side of SMWA management, the scope and legal status of the WUGs and their future 
relation to the mirāb were somewhat uncertain. This resulted in diverse narratives offered 
to the water user communities as time progressed. In one instance, WUG members were 
able to report that WUGs would be effective for five years and then replaced by WUAs 
(not the CC).580 Others reported that the main task of the WUG would be the monitoring of 
construction projects for which private companies and engineers would be hired. In this 
sense, WUGs were referred to as ‘construction-councils (shurā-ye sākhtemāni).581 The 
establishment of CCs remained largely under-reflected throughout the first year, though 
some respondents were optimistic about the chance of unifying the communities when 
referring to WUGs and CCs.582 However, from the time of fieldwork until fall 2007, the 
WUG members did not appear proactive; moreover, because the local perception was that 
there was no need to become active as the water availability was satisfactory and an 
immediate benefit not visible.583 Thus, in most cases the WUG members only gathered 
once the SMWA community mobilizers arrived for some training session or other.584    
SMWA’s promise to have a canal communication center (CCC) constructed in each 
particular canal area left the communities unimpressed and instead provided an additional 
reason to remark that, so far, there had been much talking but little in the way of concrete 
results. If anything, the prospect of having a CCC stirred conflict because of the multiple 
                                                             
579 However, contrasting with this statement, none of the members of the Wakil Akhtar WUG was serving as 
kokbāshi (Interview by Shah with the head of Wakil Akhtar WUG, 20 July 2007).  
580 Abdullayev, interview with Qurbān Nazar, 9 August 2007. 
581 Among the many empirical examples for this account is Qāri Rahmatullah’s (head of Tarboz Guzar Bālā 
WUG) elaboration on the functions of WUG as to taking care of the spillways, painting the gates of offtakes, 
and greasing the gates. Noted by Abdullayev during interview with Qāri Rahmatullah, 8 August 2007. 
582 The CC members were recruited by one to two delegates from each WUG along an individual main canal. 
A contradiction was inherent in the intention of SMWA to integrate a conflict resolution dimension into 
WUGs, because water distribution conflicts were commonly considered to be of minor importance and 
solvable in the jurisdiction of the mirāb and – in more complicated cases – with the help of local elders. 
583 Noted and concluded by Abdullayev on the occasion of SMWA meeting with WUG and CC heads of 
Asqalān, 26 June 2007. 
584 Author’s interviews, see also Shah (2007).  
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opinions and interests regarding where it should be located and which size and status it 
should receive.585   
To sum up, the anticipated but not forthcoming benefits of WUG formation left many of 
the locally-mobilized WUG members skeptical. A considerable difference in the degree of 
agitation could be observed between Asqalān and Sofi-Qarayatim on one hand and the 
irrigators of Qal’a-ye Zāl and Tarboz Guzar on the other. It was obvious that in the latter 
cases, the SWMA was perceived as one among many typical construction projects without 
even the prospect of building necessarily long-lasting, good-quality infrastructure. In 
Asqalān and Sofi-Qarayatim, the degree of politicization and elite interest in the possible 
benefits of constructions was disproportionally higher.586 It urged local stakeholders not 
only to take anticipatory measures like the aforementioned appointment of mirāb who 
could be expected to ensure that the elite’s interests were served (Sadiqullah in Tobrakash 
in 2007, Shāh Abdul Hekmat in Sofi, Mas’ud in Qarayatim), but also to take on the role of 
deputies themselves. For example, Saifudin and Hāji Rahmat Khān (along with Sadiqullah) 
acted as representatives of Asqalān despite not being the acting mirāb in the first place. 
Similarly, meetings of Welthungerhilfe with representatives from Sofi and Qarayatim were 
dominated by large landowners cum commanders from the upstream parts of the canal 
networks. As a preliminary conclusion, the water management reform project can be 
characterized as having had little of the intended impact on the ground through late 2007. It 
was not communicated broadly and the perception was largely hampered by wishful 
thinking on the part of local irrigators and landowners whose primary needs rested with 
infrastructure improvement, ideally concrete fixes. A detailed discussion of the reforms’ 
effectiveness follows in Chapter 8.     
 
6.1.4 Summary of cross-cutting issues related to irrigation water governance 
In this section I limit myself to the summary of cross-cutting issues related to irrigation 
water governance. A more comprehensive analysis, taking into account other aspects of 
local governance presented in the previous sections, follows in Chapter 7 based on the 
empirical data of both water and mountainside resources (Ch. 6.1.2).  
The empirical insights from the five irrigation networks strongly endorse the hypothesis of 
multiple rules being well-established and well-known in the local realm. To what extent 
they are actually practiced is another matter, it is discussed at greater length below. The 
appointment of a mirāb and assistants, the delegation of water allocation competencies, 
maintenance measures, and dispute resolution responsibilities to them, described payment 
modalities, the sanctioning and fining mechanisms for missing labor contributions during 
intake and cleaning works, and the assigned land-water-labor nexus, all prove the existence 
of a relative complex set of local rules. Moreover, the evidence of their viability even 
                                                             
585 Interviews with Hāji Rahmat Khān, 8 May 2007 and Saifudin Mirāb, 2 September 2007; similarly, 
interview by Abdullayev with Roz Alam, 16 August 2007. For Qal’a-ye Zāl: interview notes by Abdullayev, 
9 August 2007.  
586 In the words of Saifudin: “…bāyad, yak chiz mesha” (‘possibly something is coming out of it’), a thought 
he expressed when explaining the possible benefits of the WUG/WUAs for me; in particular, he hoped for a 
salary for himself (Interview with Saifudin at his home, 2 September 2007). 
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throughout the years of conflict and massive depopulation because of war-induced flight 
demonstrates the robustness of those practices. 
The diversity of water management arrangements depicted in the three case studies 
covering five canals demonstrates the existence of a large scope for flexibility and 
negotiations at the local level. I have shown that the personal motivations and 
performances of appointed water managers can be traced back to the local communities’ 
contextual conditions, that is, power structures and assumptions about investments. The 
mirāb position itself is quite attractive for its remuneration in cash and kind and the 
opportunity it offers to extract even higher rents if the position-holder accepts bribes. 
However, as the example of Fazl Jān showed, payment is denied when water users are not 
satisfied with the mirāb’s performance, even though he may have tried his utmost not to 
compromise his principles of equitable water distribution and to sincerely serve faithfully 
the tail-end constituency. While the mirāb is appointed by a few large landowners of an 
entire canal network, kokbāshi are often selected by a representative number of farmers at 
the field level in their mandate. Their enforcement capacity for water distribution 
according to a pre-agreed rotation schedule for periods of water shortage depends on 
power dynamics and their own status. For example, the enforcement capacity of a mirāb 
who is also a respected muysafēd like Aslam Mirāb of Qal’a-ye Zāl is unquestionably 
greater than that of Sofi Abdul Hākim of Asqalān, who functions merely as the extended 
arm of large upstream landowners. Given the Qal’a-ye Zāl mirāb’s obvious integrity (not 
accepting bribes), he thus could credibly argue that the fields of a person who takes water 
out of turn should be skipped from irrigation during the next rotation cycle. Similarly, 
Aslam Mirāb’s response to how he handles absences at intake work and canal cleaning – 
he conceded that this happens rather regularly, but he would oblige the absentees to make 
up for non-attendance by bringing an additional person the next day – shows a degree of 
give and take and the willingness to compromise on monetary mechanisms which were 
also commonly known but hard to afford. Other mirāb gave the impression of being 
forbearing with individual cases of absenteeism despite the fact that they emphasized the 
protocols for fines and sanctioning mechanisms, including the documentation of the 
absence in a special notebook, notification to the responsible ID, and their sending of a 
policeman to levy the due fine on the rule-violator.  
I take this notion of flexible and negotiated modalities further to argue that what 
characterizes local irrigation systems and their management necessarily includes and in 
fact depends on downright vagueness in at least two dimensions. However, this vagueness 
or fuzziness, rather than weakening the overall system, induces robustness and is crucial 
for the local functioning of community-based irrigation management and thus ultimately is 
an advantage. First, it refers to the aforementioned delegation of water allocation 
competencies and entire irrigation oversight to the individual holder of the mirāb-position. 
It can be read as an indicator of the customary nature of local irrigation management that 
the mirāb’s authority does not usually face scrutiny and he can exercise control of and 
even exert some physical force upon rule-breakers at offtakes (see 6.1.1-b) if necessary and 
if justified by local norms. These are usually interpreted to be more binding on small 
landholders, sharecroppers, and other ordinary water users than on the large landlords, who 
after all appoint the mirāb. Because of non-literacy, traditional socio-political status 
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attributions, and related patterns of representation, they fully rely on the mirāb’s goodwill, 
orientation towards justice and commitment to equity in water distribution. However, as 
related by Fazl Jān, these ordinary irrigators can also turn out to be a mirāb’s worst 
nightmare because they do not understand the wider causal connections between water 
delivery and irrigation management (see sections 6.1.1-c and 6.1.3-a). Thus, the vagueness 
can be traced to a disconnect between the extent of the average farmer’s knowledge related 
and the logic of water distribution in an entire canal network. This disconnect is largely a 
function of social differences among water users (see below).  
Second, vagueness largely characterizes every type of information related to water flows at 
basin and canal level, amounts of precipitation, drought forecasting, local measurement of 
water discharge into offtakes, the size of seasonally-irrigated lands and fallow areas, as 
well as crop-water-jerib ratio calculations. Metering devices at intakes, at least at the river 
basin level, are non-existent and thus the overall amount of water that is actually available 
and used remains unknown (Varzi and Wegerich 2008: 59). The reasoning of the Kunduz 
ID in cautioning farmers not to grow water-intensive crops for a second yield (see 
appendix A1-b) is based solely on a commonly-perceived amount of precipitation in the 
previous year, which nevertheless serves as the sole basis for the prediction of seasonal 
water scarcity. Similarly, the Deputy Minister of the MEW on the occasion of the mirāb 
meeting related above noted the general lack of information and the problems that would 
create on a routine basis. Starting from statistical information from the provincial IDs 
about problems with irrigation, water amounts in the Āmu Daryā river for any one of the 
last five years including the year of fieldwork, water flow in the canals in the peak season 
from 22 June until 22 July (Saratān month), the number of canals in the provinces and 
other data would be lacking.587 At the canal level, the situation is even more complex, 
because recent decades saw not only a considerable extension of the command areas 
despite fighting and turmoil, but also uneven and unsanctioned infrastructure adjustments 
in the form of new or enlarged offtakes for rice fields and for the irrigation of other crops. 
My attempt to sketch an idea of the actual command area of a system as small as Tarboz 
Guzar (section 6.1.3-a) provides evidence of the limitations of available area sizes. It 
revealed a likely discrepancy between bēl units and jerib amounts, with the former more 
fixed because of its linkage with contributions of laborers to intake and canal repair works. 
However, the jerib amounts are largely unclear not only because of the reluctance of local 
landowners to report on their property, but also because oftentimes concrete measurements 
never have been and still are not conducted by a professional surveyor. Consequently, all 
kinds of intentional and unintentional slight adjustments over the last two to three decades 
have been integrated into the new contours of command areas, but the effects of how these 
changes will play out over any time horizon is unknown. While at the canal level, this was 
not perceived as difficulty or special challenge by interviewees, it does offer an 
explanation for the varying command area specifications given by different respondents. 
                                                             
587 The way these issues were noted of course served the aim of the Minister to distract the audiences from 
shortcomings of his own department and his management of it; it suggested that the information flow was 
stuck at the provincial line ministry level and not reported regularly. “You should give us the information 
daily or at least once a week. This is really important […] if we have this information we can gather the 
ministerial staff from irrigation, hydrology, etc., and try to work out a solution regarding water shortages.” 
Field notes, speech of MEW-Deputy Minister at the Kunduz Hotel, Kunduz city, 22 July 2006.  
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At times, people of influence noted that they had indicated the size of their command area 
with a certain jerib amount, for example, Saifudin insisted on Asqalān and Tobrakash each 
comprising 10,000 jerib, although he must have known better and the command area has 
likely extended largely in the tail end in Tobrakash in recent years. However, given that 
even the Global Positioning System (GPS)-survey of Welthungerhilfe that measured the 
amount of jerib irrigated by each offtake produced incoherent data once it was related to 
the sum total of the command area, the numbers’ reliability as to the extent of exactness 
and validity for more than just one season must be called into question.  
Saifudin’s statement that “in the past we did not relate the number of jerib to the amount of 
water, but now since we have these numbers, we can calculate…”,588 suggests that such a 
disconnect does indeed exist and, furthermore, that the gap between completely traditional, 
community-managed, and smaller-sized canal networks and large, originally highly 
technical systems, was never closed.589 Against this background, the discrepancy between 
Aslam Mirāb’s salary, which was said to be based on a calculation of one Afs per jerib and 
to total between 35,000 and 40,000 Afs, and the amount of bēl (600) he takes as the 
baseline for the contribution of laborers, becomes comprehensible and cannot but be 
described as a highly pragmatic approach. The toleration of such discrepancies, which turn 
out to be highly context-bound for each individual system, can be summarized as a 
precondition for local irrigation management.  
This observation blends with the finding of various norms for water allocation and 
maintenance conduction. I discussed above the qulba (6.1.1-b), the bēl (6.1.3-a), and 
situationally-defined qulba and bēl ratios that are assigned a certain amount of water, 
measured in allocation time rather than volume. The differences across canal networks and 
the rules’ responsiveness to local conditions on the one hand, combined with the fixed 
qulba-bēl-laborer connection on the other, suggest that water allocation has been 
determined by the social contribution (in terms of labor) in the first place. At least at the 
time of fieldwork, the water-land ratio seemed unquestionably less concrete. However, this 
is not to argue that individual landowners did not recognize the possibility of ill-willed 
manipulation of the jerib-qulba/jerib-bēl nexus. Nevertheless, even in these cases they 
were obliged to send as many workers as the area they claimed to cultivate in qulba or bēl.   
Consequently, the sometimes highly-abstract norms have to be squared with actual 
practices. When looking beyond the usual degree of flexibility which I have argued the 
local structures and norms allow, deviance becomes especially obvious and common 
during periods of water shortages. It comprises many forms from the oft-noted water theft 
by various means, such as the breaking offtakes at night (Ch. 6.1.1), the violation of the 
rule that the mirāb should be from the tail-end of a canal network (Ch. 6.1.2), the 
proverbial preferential treatment by the mirāb of his own network of family and friends 
(Chs. 6.1.1 and 6.1.2), the interference of large landowners by bribing or obliging their 
                                                             
588 Interview about the progress of local water management reforms with Saifudin at his home in Asqalān, 2 
September 2007. 
589 In the past, especially under Soviet influence (see the 1981 Water Law), water sector development relied 
largely on an engineering approach that idealized technical fixes and prioritized large-scale schemes (Rivière 
2005: 16). 
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sharecroppers to take water illegally (Chs. 6.1.1-6.1.3), the selective non-contribution of 
laborers at intake works and for canal cleaning (ibid.), the resigned concession of small 
landowners, sharecroppers, and tail-enders to connive their own de jure right and give in to 
the de facto right of the rich and the powerful (Chs. 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 in particular). Then 
again, these kinds of water conflicts were considered to be minor (section 6.1.2-c) with the 
mirāb being responsible in the first place and possibly the involvement of few elders from 
the local mosque community, but without larger outreach, that is, the involvement of 
conventional muysafēd from other manteqa. As elaborated above, in some cases it was 
mainly the large landowner elders themselves who steal water (section 6.1.1-b).  
This comparison of norms and practices establishes that a heuristic ‘rights’ perspective, 
that is, the conventional discussion of water rights from a property rights perspective, will 
not yield much insight or explanatory power for understanding who obtains access to 
irrigation water, why, when, and how. I had attempted to apply the classical bundle of 
rights perspective in a previous publication (Mielke et al. 2010). However, in addition to 
the difficulty that I had while grappling with the distinction of normative (de jure) and 
practiced (de facto) customary rules in the absence of statutory law, the whole design of 
scientific inquiry remained rather artificial due to the compulsory inclusion of the statutory 
versus customary law perspective. Consequently, that article concluded that water rights 
have been, if at all, only weakly defined (ibid.: 206), depriving customary rights any 
relevance in a specifically formal property rights-based framework of inquiry.  
In this chapter (6.1), I have demonstrated with the three empirical case studies above that 
irrigation water governance was largely a matter of customary use practices throughout 
Afghanistan’s history and was still so at the time of fieldwork. A statutory Water Law had 
been issued in 1981 and 1991 without much effect on field-level practices; and the delay of 
ratification of a revised version during 2006-07 did not influence the situation on the 
ground in any significant way either. Consequently, governance of water resources in the 
canal systems studied can best be described as self-governance in the absence of statutory 
regulations and especially legally defined rights. The everyday perspective of attempts to 
access water surely includes expectations from local government bodies and NGOs, though 
at a somewhat elusive distance of wished-for rather than actual assistance. Among farmers, 
the consciousness of the necessity of self-reliance prevails. Local norms and rules are 
established and serve as a frame of reference as long as water flows sufficiently in the 
canal. As soon as it gets scarce, disputes occur and power relations become relevant as 
they determine the means and processes by which irrigators are able to gain access, use, 
and withhold water.  
As a consequence, in the absence of legally-defined, statutory rights, mechanisms based on 
customary laws590 and structural-relational mechanisms do not merely deserve attention; 
they flatly demand it. Here it is striking that although from a system design and 
infrastructure point of view, existing irrigation networks are notably low-tech, they are 
managed in a complex way by communal social practices. The social component and 
                                                             
590 Defined as “popular normative pattern that reflects the common understanding of valid, compulsory rights 
and obligations” (Orebech and Bosselman 2005: 23) as a consequence of which the public acts as if the 
observance of this custom is legally obligated. Orebech and Bosselman discuss and identify a point at which 
a custom attains the status of customary law. Cited after Tarlock and McMurray (2005: 742f).  
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interdependence – manifest in the mobilization of hundreds of workers along each canal 
and functioning mirāb-appointment, payment, and deviance-sanctioning mechanisms – are 
very strong; self-reliance, community labor and self-help mechanisms play a vital role in 
contemporary small- and medium-scale irrigation systems. The details of customary law-
based and structural-relational access mechanisms are analyzed in Chapter 7. Related to 
that element and before closing this subchapter, the last topic emphasizes the social 
differences among members of water user communities. Socio-economic differences are 
very strong and account for inherent inequalities and the high levels of inequity that play 
out in differential access to water. The differences are not exclusively determined by 
location (head versus tail-end users), but also by the straightforward socio-economic status 
of wealth versus subsistence livelihoods. There is a strong correlation between land 
ownership and wealth, explaining for example why the residents of Uzbekhā in the tail-end 
of Qarayatim canal are largely excluded from water allocation and participation in water-
related decision-making. Then again, wealth might enable downstream landholders to use 
tube wells in times of acute water shortages to save their crops and thus their income. The 
distinction of returnees versus old residents with vintage title deeds adds another 
dimension to the types of social differences that influence access and ‘rights’ to water. 
 
6.2 Mountainsides in the foothills of Takhār and Baghlān 
This subchapter focuses on the governance of mountain resources, that is, access patterns 
to pastures and fuel wood in four districts of northeastern Afghanistan. The vernacular 
term for mountainsides, mountains, slopes, etc. is koh. From the local residents’ 
perspective, mountainsides are comprised of several resources with varying significance; 
they are not only used for grazing of livestock, but provide the main fuel source, 
subsistence timber, rain-fed farming, medicinal plants, springs (drinking water for human 
and animal), and wildlife. In distinction to water access rights that rest on private land 
ownership, access to grazing grounds and fuel wood has traditionally been steered by 
common property and open access regimes. The following subsections demonstrate that 
both types of access regimes have recently experienced changes and that uncertainty over 
the direction of these transitions prevails. Moreover, the different sections elaborate the 
close linkages between the natural environment and governance processes. I summarize 
these in the final section on the micro-political ecology of mountain resources (see Ch. 
6.2.3)   
The case studies are not depicted in as much detail as in the previous subchapter 6.1 in 
order to not confuse the reader with too many names and characters. I provide a basic 
descriptive introduction to each research setting, but the analysis of access issues is 
presented more selectively, despite the fact that I was able to conduct fieldwork over just 
as long a period as I was in the canal networks.  
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6.2.1 Rangelands in Farkhār and Warsaj district 
 
The territories of the adjoining Farkhār and Warsaj districts stretch along the Farkhār river, 
which forms one of the largest valleys of the northwest slope of the Khoja Muhamad 
Mountains in the central Afghan Hindu Kush, over a total length of about 150 kilometers 
(Grötzbach 1965: 279). The glaciers in the upper part of the mountains (5,800 m and 
higher) in Warsaj provide the main source for the river and an important upper water 
storage catchment for the entire Kunduz river basin from the Anjuman Pass (ca 3,000 m). 
As a watershed the pass represents a natural administrative boundary between historical 
Qataghan and Badakhshān and between the provinces Badakhshān and Takhār today (see 
Ch. 5). Thirty percent of the land cover of Warsaj is made up of rock and permanent snow, 
while in lower lying Farkhār the amount is considerably lower at only eight percent. While 
Afghanistan’s rangeland territories591 comprise deserts as well as wetlands and forest 
areas, for the reasons indicated above, I relate the term ‘rangeland’ in what follows broadly 
to mountainsides, including all land cover types except irrigated land and gardens, bare 
rock, and permanent snow cover. Accordingly, rangeland makes up 62 percent of land 
cover in Warsaj and 86 percent in Farkhar;592 Warsaj consisted of 72 villages with 30,000 
inhabitants, Farkhār of 56 villages with a population of 38,000, according to the 2003 
estimates from the Government’s Central Statistics Office.593 The landscape in Warsaj is 
naturally divided into three main valleys (Miyānshahr, Taresht, Qawnduz), and Qawnduz 
splits up further into four subvalleys of significance: Emund, Anuy, Pyu, and Khakhund 
(see Map M9). For Farkhār, including the main river valley, two manteqa are distinguished 
as on a par with each other: Tagaw-e Chap and Tagaw-e Rāst, which opens up into Warsaj. 
All valleys split up further along different streams into smaller subvalley manteqa (see 
Map M8).        
  
a. The socio-economic and political context in Farkhār and Warsaj 
In sharp contrast to the socio-economic situation in the irrigated areas in the Kunduz oasis, 
where large-scale agricultural production is possible and forms the mainstay of the rural 
population’s earnings and welfare, the income opportunities in Farkhār and especially 
Warsaj are very limited due to the natural conditions and provide mainly subsistence 
                                                             
591 In general rangeland is viewed as grazing land characterized by aridity and only in exceptional cases fit to 
be used for cultivating crops or timber. Climatic conditions with extremely hot and cold temperatures, 
natural-geographical conditions like salinity or soil characteristics mean that most rangelands are grass- or 
shrub-lands, savannas, or deserts; other ecosystems summarized under the label rangeland include forests, 
alpine and arctic grasslands, and wetlands. 
592 The figure includes areas suited to rain-fed farming (30% in Farkhār) as well as woodland (jangal) (10% 
in Farkhār). The respective rain-fed and jangal-areas in Warsaj amount to 1 percent of the district’s total land 
cover each and have been included in the indicated 62 percent. For the figures see the IDEAS Grant 
Application Form of Concern Worldwide (2003: 9). 
593 At the start of fieldwork no other source of population estimates was available than that of 2003. See 
Concern Worldwide (2003: 8). The most recent estimates of the Central Statistics Office for 2011-12 indicate 
36,300 residents for Warsaj and 44,800 for Farkhār. See http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/Takhar.pdf [accessed 
on 3 May 2012]. While many of the statistics are based on ‘guesstimates’ and thus subject to large-scale 
speculation, the trend of population increase suggests very high birth rates.   
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Map M8: Farkhār 
 
      Map M9: Warsaj 
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livelihoods. During the fieldwork period,594 the main income that could be derived locally 
and excluding remittances from abroad was from livestock breeding. This is interesting in 
so far as Grötzbach during his extensive studies in the Farkhār valley in the 1960s, had 
identified agriculture and a marked prevalence of craftsmanship like cotton-weaving and 
traditional crafts based on wood and metal as the main income sources.595 However, even 
back then he noted, echoing earlier travelers from the 1920s and 1930s (Kushkeki 1926), 
the tendencies to overpopulation throughout the area, especially in Taresht and Miyānshahr 
(Grötzbach 1968: 121). Given that small-scale farmers and sharecroppers or peasants could 
not produce self-sufficiently any longer, due to land plot fragmentation as a result of 
inheritance and the harvest would only allow two to six months food security, additional 
income sources were sought. Horticulture in the form of fruit trees and to some extent 
animal husbandry provided complementary opportunities. However, only with the 
opportunities for seasonal labor migration as a consequence of the development efforts in 
the irrigated plains and the growing industry in the towns of Kunduz and Takhār did a 
crucial exit valve finally open up. 
Yet, the most considerable effect on local residents’ welfare and worldview was brought 
about only later still by large-scale migration to Iranian cities. From the late 1960s, this 
trend opened up qualitatively new opportunities for income generation and consequently 
transformed the social relations between the traditional landowners (eshān, mir) and their 
laborers (muzdur). The entire Farkhār river valley, today’s Farkhār and Warsaj districts,596 
is special in this regard, because the density of local notables, such as eshān and mir who 
settled in the valley is largely unequaled in Afghanistan. Eshān families – linking 
themselves to holy descent, many call themselves sayed – were already residing in 
different locations throughout the Farkhār valley597 when two Uzbek mir brothers arrived 
and all landholdings were formally conferred to them by the king Amir Habibullah Khān 
as family property.598 Nevertheless, the eshān and mir families did not enter any 
relationships of superiority or subordination with each other. Rather, they are said to have 
co-existed and tolerated each other. For example, in Warsaj, Eshān-e Nabi reportedly 
possessed more prestigious landholdings than Mir Abdurrahim Khān and the eshān were 
exempted from tax collection by the mir.599 The offspring of both, however, are said to be 
enemies (see Ch. 7); the previous generation was killed after being imprisoned during early 
                                                             
594 Extensive fieldwork was carried out in 2006 and 2007 with a short return visit of two weeks in March 
2009, as security conditions permitted travelling in both districts.  
595 See Grötzbach (1965: 299f, 1968: 122-130, 1972: 249ff) for an overview and specifics of the crafts.  
596 Warsaj was traditionally subordinated administratively to Farkhār as an ‘alāqadāri (sub-district) until it 
received district status as result of the 1963 administrative reorganization. 
597 Historically, the entire valley is famous for its spiritual places and activities of Sufi-orders headed by the 
eshān, such as the shrine of Hazrat Sheikhullah in Khānaqāh, the modern district center of Warsaj.   
598 The grandson of Mir Zākhēr Khān narrated his family’s history to me (in several interviews, this one on 
16 April 2007 in Khānaqāh/Warsaj). After his ancestors (mirhā-ye Qataghan) returned from exile in Bukhārā 
and were not allowed to settle together anywhere at the time of Amir Habibullah Khān (1901-1919), six 
brothers split up in pairs of two and settled in Kobāi, Tāluqān/Bangi, and Farkhār respectively. Reportedly 
160 elders from Farkhār signed the ruler’s order (farmān) which transferred the entire landholdings of 
Farkhār valley to the two brothers. My respondent maintains a 17-generation family tree.  
599 The mir were in charge of (in-kind) tax collection and its submission to the storage and collection point in 
Khānābād. Ibid.  
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khalqi activities after the 1978 coup d’état. Given this sharp social differentiation between 
mir and eshān as landownders on the one side and the rest of the population on the other, 
the latter did not have much choice but to work on the formers’ land. Interview accounts 
bear witness to locals’ perception that in hindsight this situation was demeaning, especially 
working in the mir and eshān households and tending and feeding their animals. The labor 
migration income leveled these economic inequalities to a large extent. Eshān and sayed 
still have sharecroppers (muzdur) working for them, but reportedly for mutual advantage 
and based on mutual respect. Over the last decades, descendants of the mir had to sell 
considerable portions of their ancestors’ land due to family needs. Since the cultivable land 
in the valley is limited, remittances have been used to finance estates, land, and shops 
mostly in Tāluqān, not in Warsaj or Farkhār. As a result, a considerable proportion of the 
population has established its own pillar for income generation in Tāluqān and the links to 
that city are very strong (see below and Ch. 7).  
The livelihood patterns observed by Grötzbach were thus already undergoing major 
changes before 1978. Nevertheless, today’s situation can only be comprehended if one 
takes into account the special features of Farkhār and Warsaj as backcountry and as the 
base of Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud’s forces and the related features of the local war economy, 
including its organizational aspects. While limiting the degree of detail, I make the 
argument that in addition to evidence of decades-long overpopulation and a presumed lack 
of management (see section 6.2.2-b), the rangeland conditions deteriorated immensely 
throughout the last 30 years, first and foremost as a direct impact of the war. Although in 
Farkhār and Warsaj the fighting was comparably less during the time of the resistance 
against Soviet forces and the Taliban, the strategic importance of the two districts for the 
resistance and later the Northern Alliance in terms of sheltering and training troops and the 
recruitment of fighters in these districts both left their marks on the local population and 
their asset base. Mujahedin fighters had to be fed by local communities in rotation, 
requiring food and fuel wood in large amounts. Sons were recruited for the mujahedin, and 
multiple members of each household smuggled weapons and supplies across the mountains 
to and from Pakistan.600  
A very prominent example in this regard is the quasi-private, exploitative mining of lapis 
lazuli (lājwar) in Badakhshān by various commanders.601 Under these circumstances, most 
of the pasture areas fell fallow after 1978. Family livelihoods diversified by necessity. As a 
rule, while one male family member was fighting with the mujahedin, another went to Iran 
to earn money. A third perhaps stayed home to cultivate land if the family had any or 
transported weapons and other goods to and from Pakistan to Warsaj via the nearby 
                                                             
600 From the narrated accounts it appears that smuggling and cross-border trade with Pakistan formed the 
mainstay of locals’ income during the war years. During the early years, the route was used by refugees. 
Families were taken on donkeys to Chitral via Cheshma Garmak. After the Soviet forces’ withdrawal 
precious stones like lapis lazuli were the main transport item. On the return trip, weapons and money, 
organized by the different parties’ offices through local representatives, were brought into Warsaj and 
distributed from the military bases. During the Taliban period, food-supplies (oil, rice) gained importance on 
this route because the route from bazaar locations in Farkhār and beyond was controlled by local Taliban. 
601 The lapis lazuli mines in Kurān-u Munjān and Sar-e Sang in Badakhshān, close enough to Warsaj that 
several people I met engaged in mining activities and transportation, were reportedly rented out on temporary 
basis (ejāra) to the highest bidder. That person then sought to get the most profit out of them and used 
explosives and similar exploitative techniques (Interviews in Warsaj, 10 April 2007 and 11 October 2006). 
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mountain passes. The mountainsides became transit places for armed groups and smuggled 
goods. Summer camp shelters of herders were turned into temporary shelters for 
mujahedin groups and into bases for military training.602 Viewed in hindsight, the strategic 
significance of both districts in the events of the last decades in Afghanistan and the fact 
that Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud resided in the area for 11 years603 account for the close 
interconnections of locally prominent men with the course of post-9/10 events604 in the 
country and their domination of local, provincial, and even some national politics today 
(see Ch. 7.3). The close relations of local actors through Shurā-ye Nazār and, later, the 
Northern Alliance which with US-assistance ousted the Taliban government in Kabul in 
late 2001, accounts for the special influence of and access by a small elite network from 
Farkhār and Warsaj to post-2001 governments and local politics. 
Like the previous eshān/mir-muzdur dichotomy in socio-economic status, the Kabul ties of 
the small elite network from Warsaj and Farkhār contrast with the political insignificance, 
lack of voice, and de facto deprivation of political rights of the average local resident and 
his relatives, who had been confined to the ordinary soldiers’ ranks. As the political 
significance and the possibility of establishing and fostering patronage networks provides 
access and results in further socioeconomic benefits, the gap between those with links to 
the local elite and those without also finds empirical support. Locally-conducted income 
and wealth rankings605 provide the following insights. A salient distinction between 
perceptions was that in Farkhār participants identified four wealth groups including a 
distinction between better-off and more genuinely middle-income households, whereas in 
Warsaj only three groups were clearly differentiated: well-off, poor, and poorest. The 
wealthy of Farkhār rely to a large extent on income from agricultural produce cultivated on 
their own irrigable and rain-fed land and complement it with earnings from livestock and 
                                                             
602 Warsaj and especially Pyu manteqa housed several training bases, weapon dumps, and prisons used by 
Mas’ud’s forces due to its direct access from Pariyān and Panjshir. In the 1990s, the main base of Ahmad 
Shāh Mas’ud was located in Chaman-e Khusti, Farkhār. The entire valley beyond Chaman-e Khusti was 
covered with a web of wartime military infrastructure, including several prisons like the one in Lajdeh (see 
Afghanistan Justice Project 2005: 57).  
603 Mas’ud reportedly came as early as 1980/81 (1359) to the upper valley to gather followers who joined him 
in Eshkamesh; in 1981/82 (1360) he was said to have started jihad from Warsaj. From 1984/85 (1363) 
Mas’ud’s family residence was in Cheshma Shāhān/Ebruy, after he had married a wife from Panjshir in 
Ebruy the same year. Cheshma Shāhān was a traditional hunting base occasionally used by King Zāher Shāh 
(Interviews 30 September 2006, 8 October 2006). 
604 Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud was murdered on 10 September 2001 in Khoja Baha’udin (northern Takhār). For a 
journalistic background account see Coll (2004: 574-584). After his death, Mas’ud’s aides and comrades 
continued his efforts. First and foremost was Marshall Fahim, later Foreign Minister in the interim 
government and Vice-President from late 2010 during Karzai’s second term in office, but at subnationl level 
local figures like Dāod from Farkhār’s Tagaw-e Chap and Dāktar Muhamad from Taresht in Warsaj acquired 
considerable importance. See below for empirical evidence (6.1.1-b/c) and an actor-network overview in Ch. 
7.3. 
605 Obtained through participatory methods. The participatory rapid appraisal exercise focused on having 
participants rank the household within the community according to wealth. The participants’ perceptions 
about wealth differences stemmed from their knowledge of the differing assets and income ranges in the 
village. This was used not only to learn about different household types according to their wealth, but also to 
gain insight into how households within each ranking gained their income. The exercises were not conducted 
with a representative sample of communities; instead, eight communities (in Farkhār: Deh-e Miyāna, Deh-e 
Yak, Khuram Āb Pāyin, Khuram Āb Bālā; in Warsaj: Purāwāz, Lokhistān, Deh-e Zārān, Deh Tawa 
Talukandāl) were chosen by random sampling for in-depth two-day appraisals with female and male 
respondent groups in July 2007. 
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orchards. The middle-class group in Farkhār relied on cropping where possible, or largely 
on remittances from Iran and in both cases on animal husbandry. The better-off in Warsaj 
earned a similarly mixed income generated from cultivating their land, livestock, and 
remittances from Iran. In addition, income from shop rentals in Tāluqān, from vehicle and 
driving services, or from laboring by individual household members was reported for this 
group. As a rule the empirical data from the examples suggests a correlation of the 
diversity of income sources with the wealth ranking of income groups; the more diverse 
the sources of income a household enjoys, the better off its members are economically. By 
contrast, poor households in both districts owned considerably fewer animals and a small 
plot of land (if any),606 and their members contribute to the family income by seasonal 
laboring and farming other people’s land as sharecroppers. Savings from Iran add to the 
available assets on daily basis. The poorest often seek work as livestock herders or 
sharecroppers on a daily laboring basis. They lack the necessary assets to undertake long-
term labor migration to distant destinations.607 In Farkhār they rely more on charity (zakāt) 
than in Warsaj.  
The large majority of households in each surveyed community of Warsaj (80-90%) and a 
lower number in Farkhār (35-60%) consist of the poor and poorest. While the middle-
income and better-off households can afford a relatively comfortable living, as they 
produce surplus or can at least absorb sudden shocks with the sale of assets without going 
into deep debt, the poor and poorest groups are highly vulnerable to indebtedness. The 
vulnerability is socially determined by the number of household members and especially 
by the share of male earners in any individual household. Viewed from this perspective, 
the number of sons is an important indicator for potential social upwards mobility. Shop 
owners and moneylenders rate clients accordingly. Moreover, also from a local point of 
view, the rich-poor divide of villagers manifests itself first of all in a household’s food (in-
)security, expressed in the type of daily food intake. A common threefold distinction is, for 
example, between qorma-khor (including meat), palaw-khor (flour, oil and rice are in 
stock, but cannot afford to eat qorma, that is, a meat dish), and those who often do not have 
anything to cook at night because they lack the resources.608 Similarly, other local 
categories offered, such as in Pyu, included consideration of a household as rich if it 
disposes of cash money for emergency cases like urgent medical care and if the money 
does not have to be borrowed from someone else. The basis of such wealth could be at 
least 50 to 100 animals or far more than 100 animals (goats, sheep, and cattle). Usually the 
                                                             
606 This means agricultural land for cultivation. As a rule, each rural household owns the plot of land where 
the family compound is located. Thus, any reference to landless is about cropland.  
607 These include costs for travel and visas for Iran, both usually provided by a smuggler. With the 
crackdown on illegal Afghan immigrants in all major Iranian cities since 2006 this option was significantly 
reduced and resulted in increased joblessness and many youth sitting in Iranian prisons while others escaped 
and returned home without much hope of going back to Tehran, Mashad, Isfahan, and so on. In many cases, 
they had to leave their recent earnings behind because Iranian law enforcement officials forced them to leave 
immediately if they did not want to be taken to prison. 
608 The example is drawn from Deh-e Bālā, one of the main villages of Miyānshahr (Warsaj). The fact that 
‘wealth’ is directly linked to food-intake in locals’ perception is an indicator for the relatively modest degree 
of welfare and the significance of food security in and of itself. Discussing socio-economic changes over the 
last decades during interviews, many respondents recounted how they used to eat bread from patek (a fodder 
crop) and barley in the past and only slowly began to afford wheat bread, though at times they would still fall 
back on patek if nothing else were available (Interviews in Pyu, 29 September 2006; Emund 9 April 2007). 
229 
 
richest family in a community owns a car; in Pyu proper and Dān-e Āb only one person 
has a car. In contrast, the very heterogeneous group of ‘poor’609 people has less than 50 
animals per household. It consists of different clusters: the best-off among the ‘poor’ 
households consist of three to four people with 30-40 animals, followed by large 
households with up to 20 people and 20-40 animals. The numbers alone indicate that 
livelihoods cannot be secured by income from livestock in this wealth group; instead, 
laboring is a major income source. In many cases money has to be borrowed from other 
people and returned from off-farm labor income. A third group of poor includes 
households with less than 20 animals. Depending on the number of household members, 
people cope by seeking additional income in off-farm labor abroad or in other regions of 
Afghanistan.610 The average extent of indebtedness is likely to be extremely high.611  
A crucial addition which interviewees also made is that whether a person or family was 
considered (and actually was) ‘poor’ or better off does not depend on the number of 
animals. More important is what people earn off-farm, so that neither livestock nor farming 
was decisive in their perceptions. This local reality is reflected in families’ and households’ 
livelihood choices and coping strategies. For example, one of the well-off people 
interviewed had accumulated comparative wealth on the grounds that his three sons 
sourced out family income by diversification. One son had twice been laboring in Iran, 
thus providing off-farm income to secure basic survival needs and beyond that to gain a 
capital basis for affording animals; a second son is engaged in animal guarding as shepherd 
(chupān) and in livestock trading in the surrounding area, while the third son stays at home 
and runs a shop in Pyu proper, where he is also responsible for irrigation of the family land 
plot in the village. This example shows a very common pattern of coping with the limited 
opportunities available. Again, it is striking that people with many sons have generally 
better baseline conditions for household income generation.612 Until late 2006, the number 
of sons working in Iran and wiring money to their families in Warsaj and Farkhār was 
roughly the determining factor for the notion of wealth. It was not unlikely that a 
household without assets like agricultural land and animals but with two or three sons 
working in Iran was doing better economically than families without sons of working age.  
                                                             
609 This ranking reflects local villagers’ perceptions of wealth categories. While most use sayings like ‘we are 
all poor, we don’t have any rich people in the village’, the distinction between poor and rich is based on their 
own accounts, in which the ‘poor’ always constitute a very large group of many sub-categories. 
610 The changes and restrictions for laboring in Iran which began in 2006 threatened to have a significant 
impact on income generation in both districts at the time of fieldwork in autumn 2007. At the same time, the 
immobility of some men was compensated for in the short term with pragmatic shifts to seasonal labor on the 
wheat harvest and rice paddy planting in Kunduz and Takhār.  
611 Due to the sensitivity of the topic and feelings of shame associated with debt and lack of resources, the 
extent of indebtedness is hard to trace at the lowest local levels. In addition, informal credit practices (and 
even how they are labeled) are not stable but subject to constant changes depending on the opportunities 
individual families have. Anecdotal evidence collected during this fieldwork supports the argument of Klijn 
and Pain (2007: 40) that “…a household can be a creditor and debtor at the same time.” In fact, the mutual 
dependency through borrowing and credit is at the root of social relations in much of Afghanistan and likely 
an important factor why inequalities are there to stay. 
612 For a discussion of other factors (marriage relations, political alliances, etc.) that determine social upward 
mobility and well-being see Ch. 7. Furthermore, in remote valleys such as Pyu the location of the land 
determines the benefits one can get from it. Whether the land is on the sunny side (in Pyu called pitaw) or in 
the shade (nishr) determines the choice of crops, as wheat cannot be grown on the shadow mountainsides and 
only potatoes yield an acceptable harvest.  
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Given the unclear situation regarding remittance flows in the future, the extraordinary 
importance of animal rearing comes into sharp focus. Since the advent of the Karzai 
government, but especially after the drought years that lasted until 2003, livestock numbers 
increased dramatically, even twenty-fold according to local accounts: “When in the past 
people had five to ten sheep, they now have 100-200.”613 Off-farm labor has enabled 
families who formerly did not own animals to invest in livestock and to build up a mix of 
income strategies related to it. Animals have proven to be valuable assets which can be 
sold on short notice for cash generation in cases of emergency. Moreover, animals produce 
dung that is used for heating, cooking, and baking. For some families, living in areas that 
have been completely deforested, dung cakes – a mix of straw and dung – are the only 
source of heating and thus very precious. In other places or where people own many 
animals, surplus dung is also used as manure for crops and fruit trees. The renewed 
popularity of livestock rearing can be seen as an indicator of at least four tendencies: 1) 
increased peace and security; 2) trends of relative economic improvement among different 
parts of the population; 3) a self-insuring behavior by households towards external shocks; 
4) a perception of high vulnerability among the rural population, connected with 
uncertainty about the future in their immediate local surroundings and in Afghanistan as a 
whole.614 Prices for sheep, cattle, and goats were said to have increased considerably.615 At 
the same time the carrying capacity of rangelands in the two districts studied has already 
been reached in many locations, given the increase in both population and livestock. The 
pressure is likely to mount if the Iranian government effectively blocks worker migrants 
from Afghanistan. Given that a large percentage of the districts’ population lives at 
subsistence level without cash money to purchase food, fodder, or fuel, livestock and fuel 
resources like bushes and wood derived from mountainsides become existential assets for 
securing day-to-day rural food and fuel security. 
  
b. Land use of mountainsides and access to pastures 
In every community local inhabitants have a clear-cut and collective understanding of 
‘their mountains’ (koh) and corresponding pasture (alafshar/aylāq)616 or open woodland 
(jangal) areas. In the rain-fed hills throughout the entrance areas of Farkhār valley, in 
Tagaw-e Chap, and to some extent in Tagaw-e Rāst also, the so-called jangal features a 
sparse covering of pistachio trees. Its density varies highly, but sparse well describes the 
                                                             
613 Interview, 26 September 2006. 
614 As one respondent put it, “People here live on their animals; they buy a certain amount of wheat and rice 
annually. From their land, if they have any, they harvest a maximum of 60-70 sēr of barley which they use as 
winter fodder. But from the sale of animals they can buy foodstuffs.” (Interview, 29 June 2007).    
615 While shepherds in the past received half a sēr of wheat per sheep and half a sēr of barley per goat for 
guarding, arrangements have changed in their favor since 2001, as one sheep could now be sold for 3,000-
4,000 Afs. At the same time, consumer prices in general have risen and gains and expenditures are reportedly 
kept in balance. In Warsaj and Farkhār, sēr is the measurement unit for cultivated crops (the sown seed is 
squared with a certain land size).  
616 Alafshar designates the nearby grazing area that animals go to for a day and return to stables at or near the 
owners’ houses for the night. Aylāq literally means summer quarters that are usually farther away from the 
core settlement and only used seasonally for a couple of months depending on the local grazing cycle. 
Dwellings at aylāq sites are basic and range from cave-like or stone-built unroofed camps to different types 
of tents.    
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densest condition to be found, totaling only one percent of Farkhār district’s land cover. 
Nineteenth-century travelogues, oral accounts of the developments over recent decades, 
and the latest measures with satellite tools paint a picture of systematic and continuing 
clearing of this tree-cover. While Grötzbach (1972: 44) still speculated that the entire 
foothills had consisted of forest-like vegetation (implicating a dense pistachio-tree cover 
stretching between 1,000 and 2,000m) and that farming areas were initially gained by 
large-scale deforestation, a satellite-aided post-2001 Environmental Assessment could not 
detect any of the woodland that once covered 37 percent of Takhār province in 1977 
(UNEP 2003: 64f; see Figure 4 below for the satellite imagery). At the time of fieldwork 
residual trees grew largely scattered on grazing grounds in the otherwise bare foothills (see 
Photo P3).617  
Figure 4: Woodland cover change, Takhar and Kunduz provinces, 1977 and 2002 (UNEP 2003: 
66) 
                                                             
617 Satellite imagery can detect tree cover at a minimum density of 40 trees per hectare. Consequently, UNEP 
gives an estimate of 20-40 trees per hectare for Farkhār (UNEP 2003: 64). The deforestation increased during 
the war years because logging became a pillar of the local war economy. Parallel, the natural population 
increase and the simultaneous lack of alternative fuels contributed to the overall decline of forest vegetation 
cover. The lower Farkhār valley was the site of the main front lines between Soviet and Afghan forces and 
the resistance throughout the 1980s, and between Mas’ud’s forces and Taliban in the late 1990s. For more 
details on fuel resources, see section 6.2.2.     
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Despite the evidence for degradation and the seeming insignificance of pistachio trees, 
they remain a highly valuable monetary asset for their owners, that is, for the communities 
on whose mountains they grow, because pistachio nuts can be sold at high prices. 
Consequently, the rights to harvest certain trees are often contested among neighboring 
communities.618 The common perception holds that while the trees are owned by the 
government, local communities have the right to harvest and sell the nuts from the trees 
within the limits of ‘their’ mountains for their own benefit. Thus, different communities 
with joint grazing areas also commonly enjoy access to the trees growing on it.619 Out of 
fear that the yield will get stolen in a good year,620 local communities appoint their own 
forest wardens as the harvest approaches. In addition, the district forest department (a 
subdivision of the agricultural line ministry in Tāluqān) employs guards who are in charge 
of the entire district year-round.  
 
Photo P3: Erosion in Farkhār mountainsides with few Pistachio trees remaining 
The government fixes the date for the start of the harvest which is then announced by one 
of the guards after he is given a notification by the forest officer. However, in a discussion 
with the latter he admitted that the government’s announcement would be ignored by local 
people and that he was obliged to report about the harvest procedure after the date set by 
the government, despite the fact that by that point of time the harvest would have already 
                                                             
618 Interviews in Shingān-e Bālā, 22 and 23 September 2006. However, harvests are reportedly irregular 
because trees do not yield pistachios every consecutive year.  
619 The usage of certain hillsides and grazing areas in the vicinity of settlements is determined by custom (see 
below for details). 
620 Reportedly, 2006 had been such a relatively good year, with a satisfactory yield of three to five sēr (21-35 
kg) per family (Interviews in Shingān-e Bālā, 22 and 23 September 2006). Unfortunately, fieldwork was only 
started after the harvest time in 2006. In the following year, the harvest failed and yields were less than 1-1.5 
sēr could be harvested (Interview in Haftdara, 3 August 2007). 
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been finished.621 Given that I did not observe the harvesting itself during fieldwork, 
interview accounts concerning possible intra-community contestations over individual 
family and household shares remained inconclusive. Interviewees claimed that within the 
manteqa everybody had an equal right to harvest from any tree as much as possible on a 
first-come, first-served basis. For example, in the case of Shingān-e Bālā this applied to the 
residents of four Tajik-populated communities (Shingān-e Bālā, Shingān-e Pāyin, Deh-e 
Yak, and Cheshma Garmak). Interestingly, the two communities that shared a Friday-
praying mosque with Shingān-e Bālā and Shingān-e Pāyin (Nāqel and Kundakaw) were 
not considered eligible to take part in the pistachio harvest.622 
Given the backdrop of the significance of livestock, I now focus on grazing as dominant 
land use type and the practices and norms regulating it.     
Grazing lands and the mountains with their various resources in the study area represent 
common property regimes distinct from open access regimes because they can be used by 
members of certain communities that exclude nonmembers from resource use, or include 
them by explicit choice. The exclusion of outsiders follows customary use practices and 
local rights perceptions. In the old statutory Land Laws of 1965, 1970, 1993, and 2000, 
which also include provisions about forest and grazing areas, all grazing land is legally 
considered to be government property but people are allowed to use the pastures for 
livestock herding in accordance with the provisions of the respective law. For example, 
statutory legal regulations foresee that buying and selling of pasture areas is illegal, except 
for government projects and public works projects.623 Similar to the situation in irrigation 
water governance (Ch. 6.1), in the absence of statutory legal regulations the guiding legal 
framework is constituted by local law, the practiced interpretation of what is normatively 
claimed to be binding. Consequently, two major cleavages exist; first between a user 
community and outsiders who contest local usage and claim equal access, and, secondly, 
within each user community. 
A look at regular patterns of rangeland use in Warsaj first shows that animal owners in the 
three sub-valleys (Miyānshahr, Qawnduz and Taresht) usually confine pasture use 
(including fuel collection) to their respective valleys. A slight exception occurs with the 
case of some powerful Taresht livestock owners who push into pasture areas around 
Lokhistān and Sar-e Tang at the entrance of the upper Farkhār river valley past Tang-e 
Warsaj (see Map 9 and below). Even in the subvalleys of Qawnduz, herders normally 
confine livestock rearing to the boundaries of their mountainsides in the respective sub-
valley manteqa (Emund, Anuy or Pyu). Only the upper Emund pastures (3,300-3,500 m) 
are still used by eshān families’ livestock and arrive seasonally from Khānaqāh and the 
surrounding settlements of Yāwar-e Suflā, Yāwar-e Pāyin, Gumbaz, and Bāgh-e Dasht.624 
                                                             
621 Interview with head of district forest department of Farkhār at his home in Haftdara, 3 August 2007.  
622 The reasons for this exclusion are likely long-standing ethnic animosities related to the differences in 
settlement history. 
623 No Rangeland, Grazing or Pasture Law existed at the time of fieldwork. A draft was reportedly crafted 
according to the Indian model, though. See Chs. 6.2.3 and 7. 
624 Descendants of the eshān reside mainly in the district center Khānaqāhh and Bāgh-e Dasht and their land 
is mainly located in the Miyānshahr and Taresht valleys. In Qawnduz, they owned only the best grazing areas 
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The rural lifestyle of the Ismaeli population of Pyu manteqa625 is largely characterized by 
settled transhumance. Grötzbach had already noted that Pyuchi were considered the 
wealthiest livestock owners in terms of number of animals in the 1960s (Grötzbach 1965: 
297). At the time of fieldwork Pyu manteqa was said to host approximately 2.000 goats 
and sheep,626 and livestock rearing was still the main and most important activity for the 
majority of the local population, despite its having always been complimented with modest 
cultivation of grain and fodder crops to the extent local climatic and environmental 
conditions allowed. Livestock owners move with their animals and family members 
between at least one and in most of the observed cases two seasonal summer camp 
settlements as well as the permanent settlement in winter which is used all year around by 
the household members who do not join the pasture migration. In addition, single male 
members of the household also tend the animals at the winter pasture on a rotating basis. 
People with lots of livestock sometimes divide herds and do some outsourcing of animals, 
especially sheep, to other herders for seasonal grazing at different aylāq.     
 
Map M10: Pasture migration sites in Pyu manteqa 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
above Emund (Grötzbach 1965: 297). The eshān’s flocks likely herded there because Emund is the closest 
sub-valley in Qawnduz to Khānaqāhh and possesses the largest pasture areas. Grötzbach noted that 
landowners from Bostansar at the entrance of Emund valley correspondingly owned land plots and 
traditionally used the pastures of upper Anuy, the second Qawnduz sub-valley (ibid.). 
625 Pyu manteqa comprises a sub-valley of Qawnduz in Warsaj of several communities: Pyu proper (at 3,050 
m), Deh-e Zēr, Sēyāh Koh, Sēl-e Posida, Qalācha, Qir-e Qāh, Zaitun, Bed-e Ashuk, Cheshma Angusht, 
Yuruz(ik)/Āb-e Yuruz, Ebruy. The residents are almost 100 percent Shia Ismaeli. Elsewhere in Qawnduz 
Ismaeli appeared to be the majority in Khakhund and about 20 families residing in Anuy. At the time 
Grötzbach did his field study, Pyu proper only consisted of a few houses and was not settled permanently 
(Grötzbach 1965: 297); in 2006/07 at least 70 permanent homesteads (each hosting several families) were 
counted (Interview, 15 April 2007). 
626 All numbers are based on respondents’ information; they are at best estimates and cannot be verified since 
people are wary of giving anything close to correct information about their livestock in fear of future tax 
collection. Consequently, the figure of 2,000 animals is certainly too low an estimate and the real number 
must be much higher. 
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Map M10 gives a general overview over the Pyuchi’s pasture migration area. They leave 
their winter quarters and homes around  21 May (1st Jawzā) – depending on when the 
initial crop sowing can be finished – to one of the six camps in Tagaw-e Wār where they 
stay for approximately two months until around the 22nd of July (the end of Saratān). 
From there the different communities split up for their second summer pastures; 
Khakhundis have their own area up beyond their settlement areas in the Khākund 
subvalley. Livestock owners from upper Pyu (Pyu proper) tend to move beyond the village 
to one of the six campsites of Maskashu. People from Ebruy and lower settlements at the 
entrance of Pyu manteqa use the surrounding mountains in the local vicinity with pasture 
places like Ilghāy-e Shabadal or Kharghān above Estuy and Deh-e Zēr. For Tagaw-e Wār 
the particular grazing grounds for each livestock-owning family are reportedly assigned in 
a meeting of elders which takes place in Dān-e Āb’s madrasa around 21 May (1st of 
Jawzā) before the herds leave the permanent settlements.627 During the meeting families 
with different flock sizes are matched together to fit individual rangeland sizes and pasture 
camps.628 For the secondary pastures in Maskashu a similar gathering of elders, but on a 
smaller scale is said to usually be organized to determine who goes to which second 
pasture for the remaining grazing period from late July until the end of October. However, 
this meeting had not taken place in 2007 and everybody apparently went where they 
wanted to go with their flock or where they use to go traditionally. The grazing period is 
followed by a five to seven months stay in the winter quarters. Between winter and 
summer pasture migrations, the animals graze on the stubble and crop residues of 
harvested plots. The winter camps are located outside the permanent settlements and, in the 
case of Pyu, are situated in the same fixed locations every year because these are the areas 
that get direct sunshine throughout the winter season. During the winter months the 
families remain in their permanent houses and the livestock is tended by herders on a 
family rotation system. Reportedly, the animals move to the winter quarter in Tagaw-e 
Wār after 7 December (15th of Qaws). 
The example of summer migration in Tagaw-e Wār is described here more in detail to 
demonstrate how a grazing area is shared. At the time of fieldwork, people differentiated 
six aylāq: Aylāq-e Bē-Āb, Dasht-e Sakht, Wursikhushk, Rafak, Pas-e Shākh, and 
Kamandek (see also Map 10). The first three comprised a collective base for small-scale 
livestock owning families from different communities of Pyu manteqa under the guidance 
of one guardian (sarparast), who was formerly one of Mas’ud’s clerks. For example, the 
18 families who camped at Dasht-e Sakht originated from Pyu proper (5 families), Dān-e 
Estuy (1), Bed-e Ashuk (5), Qalācha (5) and Seyāh (2). They reported using the Estuy 
pastures as a second seasonal grazing ground after leaving Tagaw-e Wār. Pas-e Shākh has 
traditionally been used as aylāq for Khakhund herders. Reportedly, 24 out of 60 livestock 
owning families from Khākund came to Pas-e Shākh, while the others went to Dar-e Erinj, 
a grazing ground off the Khakhund settlements. Khakhundi herders who come to Pas-e 
                                                             
627 Interview with the camp guardian of the first three pastures Bē-Āb, Dasht-e Sakht, Wursikhushk in 
Tagaw-e Wār, 29 June 2007.  
628 The gathering also serves as forum to discuss related issues like fuel collection, potential conflicts over 
grazing areas, and community defense strategies (see below). For the latter two purposes, non-livestock 
owning community members (or those with just a milk cow that stays in the village) are said to take part in 
the meeting as well.  
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Shākh use Erinj as a second seasonal pasture and move even further up for a third grazing 
area called Chārmaghz. Herders at Kamandek emphasized that the upper pastures do not 
have a guardian in charge; instead, all families are equal. The family of the biggest local 
commander and other owners of large sheep herds (gosfanddār) camp at Kamandek.629 
Every family was said to have their own shepherd – usually a family member – unlike at 
other aylāq, where the shepherd is shared and determined on a rotation by day and family. 
In addition, small goats and sheep always have a special herdsman (chupān), as do cattle 
(padawān). On second seasonal pastures, animal owners tend to hand over their entire 
flocks to the herders, because they are busy with cultivation-related activities. A 
professional shepherd at Ilghāy-e Shabadal reported earning two sēr of wheat per sheep 
plus one lamb for each 10 small sheep under his custodianship during the second seasonal 
pasture migration.630 
 
Photo P4: View of pasture camp Kamandek (Tagaw-e Wār, Warsaj) 
Livestock owners in other high-mountain valleys in Warsaj and the lower hills in Farkhār 
use the pastures less extensively in terms of the time spent in the upper camp site. Usually 
the grazing areas in the vicinity of the settlements are the ones most frequented. In general, 
and this is certainly true for Pyu as well as all other areas in the study region, the duration, 
departure, and return times for summer grazing depend on the specific year’s climate and 
weather conditions. Consequently, the dates above are not to be taken as fixed, but instead 
reflect average indications that normalize annual fluctuations. The first move in the spring 
must often begin early because winter fodder stocks have run out. Households with only a 
few animals usually sell them off during the winter in order to stock up with foodstuffs. In 
spring they restart the livestock-keeping cycle over by taking care of other people’s flocks, 
                                                             
629 To give an example of one gosfanddār, a person from Dān-e Āb (Sar Muhamad) owned 300 sheep, 250 
goats, more than 10 cows of one kind and 20 of another kind. Furthermore, his wealth is based on property of 
25 jerib land and a large timber tree plantation in Sēyāh in Lower Pyu. Despite this obvious wealth, 
respondents almost expressed pity for this person during different conversations, stating that he has nobody 
to work on his land and noting that his sons were still young (Interviews 2-10 July 2007).  
630 As recently as five to six years preceding this fieldwork, the rates for the shepherd’s salary were 
considerably lower: half a sēr of wheat per sheep and half a sēr of barley per goat. The increase is due to 
increased revenue that can be derived from livestock, with prices up to 3,000-4,000 Afs per head of sheep 
(Interview at Ilgay-e Shabadal of Estuy, 8 August 2007). 
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fodder collection, and related tasks for which they might receive two small goats in 
exchange. With these they go up to the pastures during summer in order to sell them again 
in winter. One underlying reason for this practice is the fact that larger-scale livestock-
keeping is only possible with availability, access, and storage capacity for fodder over 
winter. Consequently, a regime for access to forages, hay-making, and cultivation of crops 
must be in place to permit keeping larger stocks of animals.631  
In places other than Pyu, such as Wēghnān, the availability of winter forage is a serious 
problem and causes many livestock owners to sell the entire flock before the winter 
because hay-making on the rangeland is not possible or not practiced, buying fodder from 
Tāluqān is too expensive given that transportation costs are higher than the purchasing 
price, and the fact that the climatic conditions do not allow for sufficient rain-fed cropping. 
Several respondents in Farkhār and from the other valleys of Warsaj (Taresht and 
Miyānshahr) reported that they would send their animals to people they knew during 
winter season and pay them accordingly.632 Pasture productivity varies and has to be 
looked at in detail locally. For example, whereas Pyu’s first seasonal pasture, Tagaw-e 
Wār, consists mainly of artemisia steppe today with hardly any other forages, pastures in 
Farkhār’s Khuram Āb region were partly covered with high-growing grasses. Asked for 
their opinion regarding how land cover and pasture conditions have changed over the last 
three to four decades, respondents recounted that 40-50 years ago the rangelands were 
densely covered with trees. Tagaw-e Wār was said to have had chest-high grasses only ten 
years earlier. This claim contradicts Grötzbach’s observation of early overgrazing in 
Tagaw-e Wār (1972: 43), but given the absence of grazing during the roughly 25 years of 
war, a partial recovery seems plausible, although the long drought period until 2002 likely 
affected the recovery process.  
Activities other than herding at the campsites fall largely to the women.633 The female 
labor force forms the backbone of the pasture economy during the different seasonal 
migrations. With this insight it is also easier to comprehend why pastures fell fallow during 
the revolution and mujahedin periods. According to the locals’ explanation, women could 
not be taken up to the pasture camps during that time because the entire mountain area 
served as a transit zone for mujahedin and as a location for related activities, such as 
smuggling, training, and weapon storages. Hence, the risk of women’s exposure to men 
                                                             
631 Livestock is marketed through traders visiting the pastures during seasonal grazing. Two kinds of traders 
are involved: First, local traders from Qawnduz, from Deh-e Gaz or from Mashtān in upper remote Farkhār 
who sell the acquired livestock in Tāluqān’s bazaar. Second, non-locals, often Pashtuns, come and take 
flocks to the central provinces (e.g., Kapisa, Khost, Chārikār, Jalalabad, Sroch past the Salang Pass, and 
Kabul). Some traders have long-established relations with livestock owners and communities; others come 
only in one year. In the former relationships, money is often paid directly by the trader. In case no previous 
relationship between animal trader and members of a local community has been established, money is usually 
only paid after the flocks have been sold. All distances, that is, to buy animals, to take them to the bazaars, 
and to deliver the money, are usually covered by the traders on foot. 
632 Reported for example in Deh-e Bālā/Miyānshahr, where respondents claimed that because their own 
grazing area is limited, they hand their animals over to their acquaintances in return for payments in kind, 
e.g., for oil, tea, or sugar. In addition, the shepherd of the person with whom they made the arrangement, gets 
two sēr of wheat (if wheat happens to be expensive at that time, cash is paid instead; if wheat is very 
inexpensive, more than two sēr are handed over).  
633 In addition, children bear responsibilities for animal guarding from early ages. The schooling cycle is 
partially tailored to their summer camp stays.  
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from outside their home-community was too high to be acceptable to male family 
members. With the onset of peace after 2001 pasture migrations slowly resumed and the 
productive function of the livestock economy once again rests with the female members of 
flock-owning households. Women are on the pastures for up to six months, and depending 
on the household’s migratory preferences live either in one or two seasonal camps during 
this time. Their daily activities include the milking of goats, buttering and dairy 
production, chores related to the camp household organization, such as baking, cooking, 
and washing, and occasionally weaving of different types of carpets.634  
In elevated pastures that are situated a long distance from the permanent settlements like 
Kamandek in Tagaw-e Wār, which is seven hours by foot from Pyu proper, women are 
accompanied by husbands or male family members for longer terms. The bulk of the herds 
comprise goats and sheep which are guarded separately. While the goats are brought to the 
camps twice a day for milking, sheep usually stay up in the higher pastures above the 
camps and the ones without milk will stay overnight.635 Besides taking turns in herding at 
the first seasonal pasture, Pyuchi men devote their time to either firewood collection or 
hunting. By contrast, during the second pasture migration, where the destination is usually 
closer to the permanent settlements or near rain-fed farmland,636 there is often not a single 
man present at the campsites during the day. Instead, they take care of farming and 
irrigation, construction, fuel collection, and harvesting in or around the villages. The daily 
coming and going of menfolk to the second pasture-site ensures the transportation of dairy 
products, fuel wood (chub-e sukht), medicinal plant stocks and charcoal to the permanent 
houses for winter storage.   
Among communities of the same manteqa, and within user communities, social differences 
account for differential access to pastures. These social differences can be traced to family 
origin (eshān or mir gentility), war-time careers as commanders (amir and qomāndān) of 
some significance, to close personal or military relationships of the formers’ family 
networks (as is the case with Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud), and in material wealth. The latter 
might be earned through different means, such as 1) smuggling of weapons, lapus lazuli, 
food items, and money in the past or as human traffickers related with Iranian labor 
migrants in the present; 2) income from labor migration earned by as many male family 
members as possible; or 3) current positions in government departments and NGOs that 
offer not only a regular salary but above all a chance to extract material resources both 
indirectly and directly. 
                                                             
634 Children are taken up to the pastures if they are not attending school, independent of age. It is not unusual 
for women to even give birth during seasonal pasture migration as I could observe in Farkhār. At several 
camp sites women also collect and dry medicinal plants. 
635 Cattle graze largely uncontrolled, because due to their size they reportedly are not attacked by wolves as 
easily as sheep or goats. Another category of pasture animals were said to be so-called ‘wild cows’ (ghaj 
gāw, i.e., Yaks) which are up in the mountains permanently and taken down to the settlements in very harsh 
winters only. Grötzbach (1965: 294) noted that Yaks were brought from the Wākhān-corridor and 
symbolized superior welfare among local people in the 1960s. 
636 Rain-fed cultivation of barley and beans is very common in the lower rangeland stretches. Crops on rain-
fed plots are mostly grown by households that do not own livestock. Livestock owners usually also have 
some irrigable land.  
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In local terms wealth is equated with ‘power’ (see Ch. 7). A closer look at Maskashu – the 
main second seasonal pasture area of the Pyuchi – serves as an example. A comparison of 
historical and contemporary pasture features backs the interviewees’ claims regarding the 
increased significance of livestock and a corresponding growth in flock numbers. While in 
the 1960s Grötzbach (1965: 297) observed only three pasture campsites, at least six 
campsites could be distinguished in 2007, of which two had only been established within 
the last decade and inevitably rather close to existing camps because of spatial 
limitations.637 The additional site of Passe Ambyk was established just between the main 
traditional pasture ground of Ilghay-e Kalān and its upper branch Ilghay-e Āliya.638 At the 
time of fieldwork, Passe Ambyk was used by the livestock and womenfolk, including 
children, of the one-time leading commander and contemporary elder of Pyu manteqa, 
Zāher. Zāher’s brother and his other relatives stayed with 14 families in nearby Sar-e Hawz 
camp, the most distant campsite at the foot of the glacier. The second campsite that was 
newly used, Gabar, is somewhat remote and high above Pyu. In 2007 it hosted 12 families, 
nine from Pyu and three from Cheshma Angusht (lower Pyu). According to one key 
informant, Gabar was revived639 because the main site became overcrowded with flocks 
and traditional users had voiced reservations about the shepherd, which they then used to 
justify a separation from the other Pyuchi flock owners. In general, the richer livestock 
owners have a tendency to separate and establish their own aylāq when they can and to 
send their flocks independently. This requires the hiring of separate herdsmen or the 
appointment of family members for the job. For example, even above traditional Ilghay-e 
Kalān (used by 30 household units) a separate aylāq by the name Aylāqek which was 
reportedly only occupied by two families who ‘can afford their own shepherd’ (a metaphor 
for wealth) was identified.  
Even though interviewees unanimously stressed that not one single aylāq has its own 
assigned area and that the mountains are used jointly, differences were perceived and 
caused tensions which until the 2007 pasture season seem to have been voiced only 
sporadically. The main tension revolved around herd size. Average livestock owners, who 
now dominate the once-exclusive Ilghay-e Kalān, complained that owners of the largest 
stocks should move higher up the mountainsides and have their animals graze in distant 
places.640 Yet, respondents did not expect that a mere verbal appeal to large flock owners 
would be sufficient. “The rich people have salāhiyat [legitimate authority, KM], they can 
do whatever they want; the rights of the poor are always trampled on by them 
(pāymāl)”.641 Aware of the increasing overuse of grazing land in the vicinity of the main 
                                                             
637 Physically, camps consisted of ramparts made of and covered by stone, with fencing for animals of the 
same type. See Photo P4.  
638 Also known as Maskashu proper, which suggests that Ilghay-e Kalān had indeed been the main pasture 
place in the past. In local parlance, Maskashu does not otherwise designate a specific location, but the entire 
uphill area beyond Pyu which is used for grazing and contains the campsites described above.  
639 Reportedly, Gabar had been used in the past, but its original users had died off.  
640 Interviews, Warsaj, 4-8 August 2007. 
641 Ibid. One interviewee went on to explain that the rich he is talking about were not rich before the 
revolution period and are thus not the descendants of gentility, but the new rich who found wealth during the 
years of the revolution, e.g., through remittances from sons laboring in Iran. At another occasion, the 
distinction between ‘dirty rich’, that is, ‘dirty’ elders versus normal or traditional rich elders was noted. 
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camp grounds due to higher livestock numbers, the same respondent from Pyu proper 
wondered whether they might have to split up pastures (between rich and poor) in the 
future and that he should make a corresponding proposal to one of the rich men from Dān-
e Āb, whose livestock had recently been grazing at the Ilghay pasture. This reveals a 
cleavage in social status between livestock owners from Pyu proper and those from Dān-e 
Āb, which was further indicated in one respondent’s quoting their elder Aref from upper 
Pyu saying that the people from Dān-e Āb despise them because they are comparatively 
poorer.642 However, I was asked not to note that there is no solidarity among the factions, 
as the Pyuchi did not want to appear disunited. However, they admitted to not trusting their 
elders of the manteqa who happen to reside in Dān-e Āb; they suspected them of mediating 
in a conflict for their own personal advantage and thereby consciously accepting 
disadvantages for the constituency of people they were supposed to represent.643  
It is striking that apparently no collective decision-making took place through which aylāq-
destinations for the second main pasture migration were fixed. The choice was left to each 
individual livestock owner. Moreover it was reported that stock owners would often decide 
rather spontaneously where to go, making their decision dependent on pasture conditions 
in a given season. This flexibility is aided by the fact that the shelters and enclosures at the 
campsites are reportedly not owned by individual families but were open to anyone based 
on availability.     
Now that empirical evidence has been given with regard to pasture access patterns within 
user communities, I turn to the broader context of inter-community pasture use, including 
interaction with non-community actors. The following Venn diagram maps the basic types 
of actors that the pasture usage communities of Warsaj and Farkhār typically deal with to 
different degrees.  
The size of the circles in the diagram and the extent of overlap with the circle symbolizing 
the user community indicate the perceived importance of the different stakeholders in the 
local realm and life-worlds. The role of government actors is discussed below (section c) in 
more detail, as their intervention is best characterized as ambivalent with regard to local 
conflict dynamics. On the one hand, evidence suggests that they cause and reinforce 
conflicts, and local communities try to avoid them for these reasons. On the other, 
government actors at different administrative levels are appealed to as mediating 
authorities if a conflict cannot be solved by local means.644 Another striking example for 
rangeland usage in which local communities try to circumvent the government is local 
contracting with commercial medicinal plant collectors. The latter approach selected 
communities directly with the request to grant them permission to harvest a particular 
                                                             
642 Interview, 14 April 2007.  
643 See section c below for a case study on the specific conflict.  
644 Animal diseases pose a major constraint for the local livestock economy. In 2006, many animals had died 
from an unidentified disease, even though at some stage an NGO had provided veterinary assistance at the 
request of government authorities. As a consequence of the disease and moreover given that the news of a 
mysterious disease had spread throughout the province, livestock could not be sold that year. This had a 
considerable impact on people’s livelihoods and asset bases throughout the next winter and beyond. At the 
time of the first fieldwork period in 2007, several goats suffered from diseases and were killed as not to lose 
the meat (Interview, Kamandek, 30 June 2007). 
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valuable plant species or to extract parts of it in the appropriate season.645 Since the 
collectors offer a considerable amount of cash money for the communities, some rent out 
whole mountains. The underlying rationale is that if the responsible government 
department were involved in the deal with medicinal plants, communities would benefit 
considerably less, because the contracting parties would be the government and the 
pharmaceutical company and money would only be paid to the government and the hired 
day laborers for cutting.646 This provides an obvious incentive for the communities to 
conclude secret deals with pharmaceutical entrepreneurs. The money is reportedly used for 
communal expenses, such as the hosting of guests, the invitation and payment of 
government deputies (such as in Dān-e Āb, see below), repair works on mosque buildings, 
and so on.647 
 
Figure 5: Venn-diagram of stakeholders in rangeland usage 
However, the main type of collective renting out of grazing land is to kochi.648 According 
to locals’ accounts it has been practiced widely in the past, even in Warsaj. At the time of 
                                                             
645 The main species eyed by commercial plant collectors in Warsaj is chayir. It does not have medicinal 
value itself but it is usually mixed with similar-looking and high-value devil’s dung (heng) which reportedly 
achieves a 24 times greater price. The bazaar price for one sēr chayir is 500 Afs, whereas devil’s dung costs 
12.000 Afs per sēr. The plant is reportedly exported to India where it is used as an ingredient in pulmonary 
medication for treatment of tuberculosis and bronchitis. 
646 According to an official in the provincial forest department in Tāluqān, his department is in charge of 
contracting with pharmaceutical enterprises. The same official mentioned that the new law, which is 
currently being drafted by the government, foresees a 12 percent tax on everything that locals sell for profit 
from the mountains (Interview, Tāluqān, 16 August 2007). 
647 It goes without saying that these business activities contribute to further degradation of the rangelands. 
The harvesting practice is not sustainable, because in many cases the plants are being pulled out by the roots. 
648 Kochi are often denied access to their traditional grazing areas in Badakhshān. They are thus looking for 
alternatives and enter annual agreements with communities that have excess rangeland as in Mashtān. For 
example, one of the kochi caravans that herded its livestock in Mashtān possessed documents for Dasht-e 
Arām between Farkhār and Warsaj and for some Shiwa pastures in Badakhshān. They were denied to both 
places access by locals at the time of fieldwork, this is why they seasonally rented pastures in Mashtān 
(Interview with kochi herder from Nāwābād-e Chārdara (Kunduz Province), Farkhār, 3 August 2007). During 
fieldwork I documented several other cases when kochi were denied access to pastures even if they offered to 
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fieldwork, evidence for pasture arrangements with kochi herders from Kunduz’ districts 
(especially Chārdara) was found in Farkhār’s Khuram Āb and Mashtān; one Taresht 
manteqa (consisting of Purāwāz, Urghāb, Ashku, and Sar-e Hesār) hosted nomads from 
Baghlān, Kunduz, Khānābād, and Tāluqān on their joint pastures for around three months. 
Before 1978, their elders had had an oral agreement with Hazara from Khost-u Fereng in 
Baghlān, but began to deny them access in the late 1980s.649 Any lease arrangement 
depends on individual communities’ disposal of surplus grazing land and the incentive the 
potential income provides for the lessors. For example, locals from Mashtān stated they 
would have enough pasture grounds with one valley for their own animals, and a second 
valley that they could afford to rent out to the incoming herders with their camels and 
sheep from Chārdara.650 The money charged651 is reportedly spent for a broad variety of 
community expenses, ranging from simple mosque repair and buying fodder in Tāluqān652 
to hosting and feeding of guests, and even the intended buying of government positions 
was noted as a major aim, in order to compensate for the lack of ‘good’ elders.653  
The renting out of pastures thus represents part of the collective coping strategies locals 
have developed in response to urgent livelihood and food insecurity, which they say they 
cannot meet with animals alone;654 other income sources must be found instead. Another 
component of the Mashtānis’ coping strategy is an establsihed rotation system that foresees 
alternating land use of the different sides of their valley: one year one side is used as 
pasture whereas the next year they use it for rain-fed cropping. In this system, the manure 
of their animals and that of the kochi flocks provides a natural fertilizer for the subsequent 
cultivation turn. Despite this seemingly clever system of local needs met by local coping 
solutions, the government – or rather its agents, that is, government position holders – are 
also an important stakeholder in this matter. Claiming official property rights of the 
government (“mulk-e dawlat ast”), government representatives demand 50 percent of the 
payments received by the Mashtānis from the kochi. All five villages of Mashtān manteqa 
have their own mountains which they rent out separately to different kochi groups each 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
pay for access, for example, in Deh-e Zārān (Warsaj) kochi groups from Nahrin, Eshkamesh, and Khost-u 
Fereng (all Baghlān) were each turned down (Interview, 12 July 2007). 
649 Interview with residents of Purāwāz of Taresht/Warsaj, 18 June 2007.  
650 What they did not mention in the interviews was that they had obviously expelled Gujars who had 
traditionally been using these pastures and resided in Gurdara where people from Mashtān have now settled 
(Interview with Gujars in Chehraz, 30 September 2006). For more background information on the local Gujar 
population and their violent eviction see below. 
651 According to kochi from Chārdara, who stayed with 550 sheep, 15 cows and 20 camels for two months in 
Mashtān, they paid ‘between 50,000 and 60,000 Afs’ rent, an equivalent of US$1,000-1,200 (Interview, 3 
August 2007).   
652 Winter fodder has to be bought at high prices in Tāluqān and transported all the way up to Mashtān, a 
side-valley leading up from the river at the very end of Farkhār district on the border with Warsaj (see Deh-e 
Miyāna, leading up from Pul-e Mashtān, Map M8). 
653 Interview, 25 September 2006. 
654 It remains unclear how the money is distributed inside the community, that is, whether all is used for 
communal expenses from which every community member can benefit or whether there are some people 
who profit more than others, and if so, how and why. Further research is needed to understand more fully the 
intra-community social relations.  
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year.655 This private taxing of the local communities by government agents appears to be 
common practice not only in Mashtān where even one person was appointed for collecting 
the government agents’ cut, but also in Purāwāz, for example. Here, the district governor 
of Warsaj annually allows kochi with 4,000 sheep to access the pastures of Purāwāz and 
the other villages with which they share their grazing area. Similarly in Warsaj’s Wēghnān 
(Miyānshahr), the district officials, reportedly the CoP, take such taxes directly off the 
kochi for issuing written notes to the local communities that this herder with such and such 
number of animals has been allowed by the district authorities to graze his animals on the 
community’s pasture land. This demonstrates that especially the district administration 
(wuluswāli)-circle in the Venn-diagram above (Figure 5) includes an agglomeration of 
individual position holders who act according to their own personal interests and not for 
collective benefit or according to official legal regulations.  
Whereas in Farkhār local communities that dispose of large grazing areas enter into mutual 
arrangements with kochi who come for a period of approximately two months,656 many 
communities in Warsaj and some in Farkhār have inter-community agreements with non-
community members for using their pastures or parts of them. These agreements are 
typically not between two communities but between the community that holds the target 
grazing area and individual herders. The latter might take care of the livestock of several 
owners from one or more communities. For example, in Deh-e Yak (Farkhār), local 
livestock owners were forced to seek more distant pastures because large parts of their 
grazing land had been washed away by flash floods. For the second pasture stay they thus 
concluded an agreement with the neighboring communities of Shingān and Nahr-e Āb to 
have their flocks use the latters’ grazing areas as a second seasonal pasture against a 
payment per head of livestock. Claims of entitlements to certain pastures, on the basis of 
which belonging to one community and not a neighboring one is determined, are often 
underpinned with documents about tax payments for particular plots in the past. The logic 
behind this can work two ways. For example, in Tagaw-e Wār and the pasture grounds of 
Deh Ta in Wēghnān (Warsaj) pasture areas that had come to be used as agricultural rain-
fed plots had once been registered and noted for tax levying. In another case, inhabitants of 
Deh-e Yak stated that they had bought agricultural land in the mountains from the local 
rulers (mir) and turned it into pasture land. In both cases the claimants have some written 
evidence in the form of either tax receipts or the sales document.657 
 
                                                             
655 The fact that Mashtānis do not enter into any longer-term relations with kochi can be seen as indicator of 
two trends: a certain greed factor, as they are allowed to change the rent price every year according to their 
wishes and rent to the highest bidder; and, though no evidence for this view has been derived from the 
interviews, they may be eager to avoid any institutionalization of relationships on the basis of which kochi 
could claim access rights in the future. 
656 Such arrangements have become rare in Warsaj and if kochi herds arrive, they are generally forced upon 
local communities’ grazing grounds by permission of the district administration officers (district governor 
and CoP), who rent out pastures at their own discretion. See below. 
657 It is unlikely that any of these written proofs would hold in legal cases because of overlapping legal 
provisions of different regimes. It has been determined, for instance, that all grazing areas are owned by the 
government and that changing land use patterns from pasture to crop cultivation is prohibited.   
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c. Conflict case studies: Pyu, Wēghnān, Khuram Āb 
In this section, I highlight three conflict case studies because they feature distinct 
dimensions of stakeholder involvement (see the Venn diagram in Figure 5). The pasture 
conflict of the Pyuchi is interprovincial in scope and has been taken to the national level 
for attempts at resolution, while in the case of Wēghnān manteqa the local user community 
perceived their grazing grounds to be contested by kochi herders from various provinces 
who were under the patronage of the Warsaj district administration. The example of 
Khurām Āb draws attention to the previous ousting of the livestock-herding Gujar/Asmāri 
population from Farkhār, the appropriation of their pastures by local commanders and the 
consequences of those actions for contemporary conflict dynamics connected to mountain 
usage in Farkhār’s Tagaw-e Chap valley.   
Case 1 – Pasture conflict Pyu-Anjuman 
At the time I visited the pasture areas of Tagaw-e Wār in 1386/2007, the conflict with 
herders from Anjuman in neighboring Badakhshān’s Kurān-u Munjān district was entering 
its third year. It started in 2005 when Anjuman herders and their livestock crossed the old 
Qataghan-Badakhshān border coming down from the Anjuman pass (kotal) to use the 
upper grazing areas at Tagaw-e Wār. As has been elaborated above, the Pyuchi consider 
Tagaw-e Wār their traditional pasture area and use it collectively for the first seasonal 
migration. The number of families who had crossed from Badakhshān was small (5-6 
families compared to 120 Pyuchi families throughout Tagaw-e Wār). Nevertheless the 
Pyuchi were outraged and interpreted this as an opening gambit of the Badakhshāni 
livestock owners to take over their pastures, since relevant verbal claims had reportedly 
been addressed to them even before 2005.  
These claims were traced back to some Anjuman families’ upper Tagaw-e Wār pasture 
usage during the revolution period and sporadic usage during subsequent years. The 
Pyuchi argued that they had allowed Anjuman families access to their pasture areas 
because they also sheltered them at the time when Anjuman was under heavy 
bombardment during the khalqi-offense and the subsequent occupation of the district in 
1978. Reportedly, the Pyuchi hosted families from Anjuman on their territory between 
Dān-e Āb and Cheshma Angusht for two years at that time. During the war years, the 
Pyuchi did not use the higher pastures for the reasons noted above (section b) and 
apparently did not care if other herders from elsewhere used it since they could not use it 
on a regular basis. By the time the Khakhund herders (since approximately 1996 [1375]) 
and the Pyuchi (since around 2001 [1380]) resumed pasture usage at Tagaw-e Wār, some 
minor contestations occurred. When the Anjuman herders crossed the mountain pass and 
appeared in upper Tagaw-e Wār in 2005, the Pyuchi mobilized 40 to 60 armed men 
(‘askar) among themselves,658 the sight of which were said to have caused the Anjumani to 
                                                             
658 They were said to have mobilized fellow herders and people throughout the entire Qawnduz valley. This 
included the most important elders from Qawnduz valley and armed guards from the entire Pyu manteqa, 
whether livestock owners or not. The underlying rationale for the latter to take part was reportedly that, first 
of all, non-livestock owning families use other mountain resources like fuel wood and rain-fed agricultural 
plots as well, so it was also their land under threat. Secondly, their children might have livestock one day 
after they acquired wealth and would have a right to use the pastures then, thus, so defense was necessary 
now. 
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leave. It remains unclear what exactly threatened the conflict to escalate in spring of the 
second year (2006): according to some accounts Pyuchi’s livestock was stolen, stabbed and 
killed that year, according to others a larger unit of armed Anjumani were seen at the pass. 
Whatever the chain of events was, both sides agreed to solve the conflict among 
themselves peacefully, with the involvement of their respective elders. The Pyuchi were 
represented by Mawlawi Nikmat and elders from Dān-e Āb (Sar Muhamad) and Pyu 
proper (Aref). Reportedly, both sides agreed that in the future the Anjumani would be 
tolerated on the lower Tagaw-e Wār pastures. The agreement was not fixed in writing, but 
customarily oral (muwāfiqa).  
However, immediately after the conclusion of the peace agreement in 2006, Pyuchi lost 
their livestock and claimed that the Anjuman faction had stabbed their horses and stolen 
three cows on their way back across the mountain pass. One horse died, two other injured 
horses could reportedly be saved. On this pretext, they renounced the agreement and Pyu 
elders sent a petition to the district administration stating that they would not allow any 
Anjuman herder on their mountainsides anymore. In hindsight, several respondents stated 
that it was Mawlawi Nikmat’s mistake that he had conceded pasture usage to herders from 
Anjuman in the elder-negotiated agreement of 2006. The common perception among the 
Pyuchi was that they had used the mountains since Amanullah’s time and they had always 
belonged to Qataghan. Lacking of any ownership documents, the proof they could offer for 
their traditional attachment to Qataghan (besides the obvious geographical location on their 
side of the mountain pass) was the fact that they had paid tribute and taxes to Farkhār in 
the past.659 The receipts of tax payments for rain-fed plots (asnād-e zerā’ati) were taken to 
confirm their rightful usage of these mountainsides. Thus, the main justifying argument 
consisted in the proven claim to belong to Qataghan and now Takhār (“i qawm-e mā, i 
watan-e mā, i Qataghan ast”).660 Mawlawi Nikmat’s conflict resolution rationale was 
based on the idea of zuliyat, that is, the principle that a person or community is entitled to 
ownership of a property after 40 years of customary usage of public land. As both Pyuchi 
and Anjumani users were not the owners and did not have any proper, that is, legally 
binding, ownership documents (asnād-e khati), he had suggested to tolerate some limited 
pasture usage by the Anjumani, because if the government were consulted the Pyuchi 
would risk to have to make even bigger concessions towards the Badakhshāni conflict 
party. Two factors that would help the Anjumani were considered by the Pyuchi: first, they 
were settled closer to the contested pasture area (only two to three hours distance as 
opposed to the Pyuchi with a minimum of seven hours walking distance). Secondly, it was 
widely known that the village of origin of the Anjuman conflict party was the same village 
that the district police chief and district governor came from, so strong political backing for 
the Anjumani’s claims against all justice (location of the mountain pass, traditional usage, 
etc.) was feared. Why the initial agreement said the Anjumani would be allowed only on 
                                                             
659 Apparently, before 1961 (1340) Pyuchi’s in-kind levies went to the grain storage in Farkhār, and after 
1961 they had to pay 10 Afs per jerib as monetary tax for rain-fed land. Livestock was formerly taxed per 
head, i.e., per animal. See Grötzbach (1965: 294).  
660 “This is our qawm, this is our homeland, this is Qataghan.” (Interview, 6 August 2007). Related versions 
of the argument emphasized the mountain pass (kotal) as the natural boundary of the provinces, that God had 
made the border since it demarcates the watershed and that the agricultural department of Tāluqān would 
have a map that proves the Tagaw-e Wār pastures’ belonging to Warsaj.  
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the lower pastures (where small livestock owners prevailed), remains vague; possibly, the 
elders themselves had their stocks herd in the upper parts of Tagaw-e Wār and did not want 
additional livestock on their own grazing areas.  
After the agreement was broken in 2006, the Pyuchi started to lobby actively with the 
district administration to obtain support, but the district governor proved helpless. 
Subsequently several elders from Pyu went to the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal 
Husbandry in Kabul on this matter, but only later that year, at the end of November 2006, 
did some government officials and elders from all of Warsaj (Taresht, Qawnduz, and 
Khānaqāh) arrive at the conflict site and travel to Badakhshān afterwards to investigate the 
claims. As a result of the government officials’ investigations, the Pyuchi’s claims to the 
grazing land were confirmed as legitimate and this was put down in a written document. 
The decision was not accepted by the Anjuman party, however, and subsequently they 
went to Kabul to refer to the concerned government ministry in spring 2007. The ministry 
did not undertake any other action but to refer the issue back to the provincial authorities of 
Takhār and Badakhshān. 
When in summer 2007 some Anjuman families were again seen in the Pyu area, the Pyuchi 
fired at them and reportedly caught some people. Despite this incident, the owners of the 
cattle that had been stolen a year ago were compensated by the Anjumani. At the time of 
fieldwork at Tagaw-e Wār, the Pyuchi were on high alert, given that the conflict was still 
unresolved. They had armed guards in the mountains day and night.661 Around the same 
time another three families from Badakhshān appeared with only four to five animals each. 
However, given that an entourage of provincial government officials (agriculture, justice, 
cadaster department, etc.) along with the district governor and eight elders from wider Pyu 
was on its way up to the conflict site to meet with the representatives and elders of the 
Badakhshān side at the mountain pass, no action was taken. The delegation of government 
officials was supposed to move on further to the district center of Kurān-u Munjān and on 
to Faizābād (the administrative center of Badakhshān province) to resolve the conflict. 
Although on his return to Warsaj, the district governor (who did not follow on to Kurān-u 
Munjān) claimed that the conflict had already been solved with an agreement that from the 
coming year on, the Anjuman families should remain to their side of the mountain, it 
turned out later that the representatives from Badakhshān had not come to the mountain 
pass, where the meeting had been scheduled to take place. Consequently, the Pyu elders 
decided to turn to Kabul again together with their Member of Parliament-deputy Shirin 
Bāy. The Anjuman people did the same because they also did not accept the second 
resolution against them.  
This rough account of the narrated events outlines those involved, their interests, and the 
focus of conflict. The underlying motive for the livestock theft of the Anjumani after the 
conclusion of the first agreement could not be clarified – whether it was greed or the 
selfish action of individuals from the Badakhshān side or a more calculated provocation 
                                                             
661 To add to these often contradictory accounts regarding the attitude of Pyuchi towards people from 
Anjuman, they hosted a single man from Anjuman at Kamandek camp when I stayed there. He had lost his 
cow and was now searching for it on their side of the mountain pass. After he had left early the next morning, 
the Pyuchi were arguing whether they should have searched him before he left, because some suspected he 
would stab some of their cows on the slope or kill a goat (Conversation at Kamandek, 1 July 2007).    
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because some herders from Anjuman were not satisfied with the agreement that the elders 
had reached. The latter interpretation would imply that the enforcement capacity and 
recognition of the Anjuman elders is generally weak. Another possible explanation was 
that the Anjumani had intended to break the agreement, possibly even with the elders’ 
approval. Finally, a third explanation that was considered related to the already-noted fact 
that the district police chief and district governor from Kurān-u Munjān come from the 
same place as the families that crossed the Anjuman pass to have their flocks graze in 
Tagaw-e Wār. According to this reading, the common origin and likely qawm and family 
relations of the intruder families with the district offiicals would explain the Anjumani’s 
confidence in resolving the conflict to their advantage, because their connections with local 
position holders that are most likely part of a larger vertical network with their people in 
the central government who would support their claims for access. Against this backdrop, 
it is hardly pointless, from the Anjumani’s perspective, to press their initial claim.  
This reasoning and the idea that better connections in Kabul might be decisive in the end 
for how the conflict will be resolved becomes even more comprehensible if one considers 
that the summoning of government representatives from the central, provincial, and district 
administration by the Pyuchi carried high financial expenditures. The Pyuchi had to pay 
the district governor and each government official from Tāluqān a honorarium of US$200 
and US$400 for the men from Kabul for coming to the conflict site, plus all expenses for 
transport and lodging.662 They had reportedly raised the money from contributions by 
every household in Pyu manteqa (300 Afs per household) and earnings from subletting a 
mountain to kochi for 250,000 Afs (US$5,000) the previous year. According to numerous 
accounts, it would be hard to obtain any representative’s support without financial reward. 
Thus, even elected local deputies to the Parliament (Wolesi Jirga) and the Provincial 
Council and people related through the Mas’ud and Taresht networks (see below) only 
served as entry figures, able to connect locals with responsible government officials. These 
networks merely ensured access, but did not predetermine the decision-making process and 
its outcome. For effective action at community level, material means were obviously 
needed, in addition to personal relations. This is likely another indicator why conflicts 
begin with efforts at local resolution through elders’ arbitrations. As one Pyuchi reportedly 
had argued with the local Anjuman representatives, “If you want force (zur) we can give 
you force, we are prepared to fight; if you want to involve the government we all need to 
spend money, why not resolve our disputes locally? We are ready to do this.”663   
The consideration of dealing with the conflict violently must be read as an attempt to show 
off and impress the Anjuman faction. The Pyuchi were actually reluctant to undertake any 
violent escalation as the first agreement well indicates, because in their view the 
Badakhshāni “don’t care about the sharia and the government. They said they would take 
the pasture back by force (bā zur).”664 Behind this fear was the prevailing assumption that 
                                                             
662 The average transportation cost amounted to about 5,000 Afs per person (US$100) (Interview with Pyu 
elder in Dān-e Āb, 2 July 2007). 
663 Interview at Kamandek camp site, 30 June 2007. 
664 Interview at Kamandek, 29 June 2007. The reference to the Badakhshāni not caring about Islamic Law 
relates to their breaking of the first agreement that was mediated by Mawlawi Nikmat and reasoned on 
sharia-basis.  
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the Badakhshāni still had their guns while they themselves had turned in most of their arms 
in the DDR process.   
The assembling of elders and government officials in Pyu must be viewed as a success for 
the Pyu faction in the conflict. Besides, the presence of elders who otherwise reside in 
Tāluqān665 or Kabul, such as the locally prominent sub-commander of Mas’ud, and their 
meeting with the government deputies’ delegation was meant to impress and flatter the 
latter. The involvement of government officials indicated that locals were eager to take any 
chance possible to lobby on behalf of their outlook; it was but one of several tracks that 
were followed in this matter, if evidently the priciest one. At the same time, local elders 
were aware of the limited enforcement capacity of the government deputies. Mawlawi 
Nikmat, the local cleric and relative of the aforementioned leading commander, 
summarized this notion by stating, “All these conflicts happen because we do not have a 
strong government. The government has no power (zur), it is weak (quwat nēst). They 
have no cars; our people pay their travel expenses, food, and everything. If we had a strong 
government it would be able to take care of these things by itself.”666 Further, he stated this 
would be the main motive why people in Afghanistan tried so hard to avoid any conflict if 
possible. If an issue nevertheless escalates, local mediation would be the first choice, the 
involvement of the government only a last resort. In this respect it is indicative that in the 
Pyuchi’s lobbying process for support the provincial administration was clearly skipped 
and the elders referred the matter directly to Kabul. Likewise, six weeks after the visit in 
summer 2007, when the next trip to Kabul was in the preparation stage and I enquired who 
among the elders would be going, my key informant stated that it was not yet known. They 
would first meet in Dān-e Āb, then at the district administration office, and immediately 
move on to Kabul,667 another indication of the perceived redundancy of the provincial 
administration. 
The direct link to Kabul was facilitated by still active mujahedin-networks stemming from 
Mas’ud’s presence and military administration in the manteqa and the entire district, 
manifest for example in the links of commander Zāher, who himself stayed in Kabul most 
of the time.668 Furthermore, the Pyuchi used traditional influence networks that had existed 
before Mas’ud’s time, were absorbed into the civil-military administration during his 
                                                             
665 Several respondents expressed the close relationship with Tāluqān and power structures there by saying 
‘Tāluqān nang dorēm’, that is, ‘we have supporters in Tāluqān’, literally: ‘our honor can be defended from 
Tāluqān if necessary’.   
666 However, the mawlawi denied having paid ‘bribes’ or a honorarium to the government representatives 
(Interview with Mawlawi Nikmat, Cheshma Angusht, 2 July 2007). Nikmat received his religious training in 
Pakistan, as is common for the majority of mullahs from Warsaj and Farkhār. Asked about his people’s 
particular confession (Ismaili Shia), he was not concerned and largely downplayed any differences. The 
quality of religious education is taken very seriously in both districts, and from most manteqa several young 
boys were reportedly being educated in Pakistan at the time of fieldwork. The returnees receive much respect 
among the local population, but given the tangible glut of mullah and mawlawi, many had started working as 
teachers and in local NGO offices. Acting mullahs and mawlawi were prominently consulted in local conflict 
resolution matters by elders. In comparison with study sites in Kunduz, the religious authorities played a 
greater role.  
667 Interview at Maskashu, 6 August 2007. 
668 He did not occupy an official position, but networking and other activities kept him in Kabul with regular 
visits at his home. I met his wife, children, and female relatives, supported by few male family members, at 
the different pastures camp sites.  
249 
 
leadership, and branched out again from the successor network of the inner circle around 
Mas’ud after his death. The two most prominent supporters for the Pyu side in the conflict 
with the Anjuman herders were Shirin Bāy, elected as deputy to the Wolesi Jirga in the 
2005 parliamentary elections from Taresht, and his supporter and relative Dāktar 
Muhamad.669 Shirin Bāy had called the district administration to inform the Pyuchi elders 
that an Anjuman delegation of elders headed by their Member of Parliament had arrived in 
Kabul. Reportedly, though, they had not approached the responsible government ministry, 
but went to Dāktar Muhamad’s home asking him to persuade the people of Pyu to share 
their pastures with the Anjuman herders. Upon learning this news, the elders from Pyu 
made a plan to gather at the district administration office and call Dāktar Muhamad before 
immediately leaving to see him in Kabul, confident that he would make peace and find a 
compromise.670 By this time, the information that on the Anjuman side 100 households 
would be eager to get permission to use the pastures at the other side of the mountain pass, 
was increasingly alarming the Pyuchi. For this reason they had used the six weeks since the 
officials’ visit to lobby with other deputies but the success of these efforts was not known 
at the time of the interviews.   
Notably, the choice of elders from Pyu to be sent to Kabul was secretly discussed and 
controversial because it turned out that livestock owners from upper Pyu (Pyu proper) 
suspected that one of the main elders, Sar Muhamad, was on the side of the Anjumani and 
that he would allow them to buy into the Pyuchi’s pastures. The failed agreement of Mullā 
Sarwar, who is Sar Muhamad’s relative, was interpreted as a case in point because it had 
already conceded the lower pastures to joint usage (see above). Dāktar Muhamad was 
trusted with more confidence than Sar Muhamad in representing the Pyuchi’s interests.671  
Case 2 – Pasture conflict Wēghnān/Miyānshahr (Warsaj) 
The manteqa known as Wēghnān consists of six communities at the far end of Miyānshahr 
with a direct link to the valley of Panjshir and, beyond that, to Kabul (see Map M9). The 
communities share the distant first seasonal pastures of Hasht Dara (‘Eight Valleys’). 
Traditionally, rich livestock owners from Dar-e Āb and Khānaqāh (Warsaj’s district 
center) as well as kochi from Tāluqān, Khānābād, andd Chārikār near Kabul, send their 
animals up to these grazing areas. Recently, however, the livestock owners of Wēghnān 
manteqa decided that from spring 2008 onwards they would no longer allow any outsiders 
to use their grazing grounds. The claim was that the pastures would be overused despite a 
slight improvement of pasture conditions, but since their own flocks had increased, the 
                                                             
669 Since respondents referred to Ahmad Muhamad always as Dr Muhamad, that is, ‘Dāktar Muhamad’, I also 
use this name. In Afghanistan, it is very common to add a title to the name of a person who enjoys great 
respect and is assigned some (even imagined) competency, although the person might not have the actual 
formal qualification to bear this title, e.g., engineer, doctor, etc. A detailed attempt to map the local actor 
network with the different kinds of relationships and a brief description of the individual characters is offered 
in Ch. 7. 
670 Interview at Maskashu, 6 August 2007.  
671 It should be noted at this point that Wakil Shirin Bāy and Dāktar Muhamad themselves were known to be 
no dark horses. For example, when Shirin Bāy was CoP in Warsaj (at the time of Mas’ud’s presence in 
Warsaj), he ordered the elders of Lokhistān (near the entrance of Taresht valley) to cede a pasture which 
people from Taresht had occupied and to sign over the corresponding documents to the new owners 
(Interviews in Lokhistān, 12-13 August 2007). 
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local herders could hardly find enough to feed their own animals. To enforce this decision, 
herders arriving with their animals from Khānaqāh who usually grazed their livestock at 
the Wēghnān pastures for three months, were stopped at Angay, the first of the six 
Wēghnān villages, in 2007. While the herds were halted for two days, elders from 
Wēghnān went to the district administration to complain about outsiders using their 
pastures for already 21 years in a row now and that enough was enough. They announced 
that flocks would be denied access in the future. After this incident, kochi from Chārikār 
were stopped on the same basis in Deh Ta by local elders for two days, who then informed 
the district governor. The district governor issued a letter to the kochi saying that they 
should not come again in 2008; they would, however, be allowed for the current year to 
stay and use the pasture for their approximately 5,000 sheep.  
In an interview, the district governor of Warsaj spoke of four large flocks that had been 
allowed access to the district’s pastures in 2007, with one in Wēghnān and the other three 
in Taresht.672 The district governor’s seemingly immediate succor to the complaint of the 
Wēghnān livestock owners can be understood against the background of past intra-
manteqa contestations over pasture grounds. Two villages, Deh Ta and Taluqandāl, had a 
conflict with the other four communities over grazing rights in the early 1990s. The Deh 
Ta and Taluqandāl herders had even at that time claimed to have exclusive rights to some 
distant areas because they had paid taxes for its rain-fed use in the past. After the conflict 
had turned violent leaving several men dead, the district governor sub-divided the entire 
pasture area among the six communities.673  
 
Case 3 – Resource conflicts in Khuram Āb/Farkhār 
Khuram Āb with its two constituent settlements of Khuram Āb Bālā and Khuram Āb Pāyin 
is exemplary of many Tajik communities in Farkhār who ousted the Gujar674 population 
from the surrounding mountainsides during the late 1990s. Their livelihood was mainly 
livestock-based and relied on semi-nomadic seasonal pasture migration high up in the 
mountains. Around Farkhār they settled at points far from other villages, though behind 
                                                             
672 Interview, 14 August 2007. In Purāwāz/Taresht this information was partly confirmed as respondents 
mentioned that the district governor would allow 4,000 sheep of kochi herders from Baghlān, Kunduz, 
Khānābād, and Tāluqān to access the Taresht pastures for three to four months. In the grazing grounds of 
Purāwāz proper, however, another conflict existed because the contemporary livestock owners denied Hazara 
kochi from Khost-u Fereng (Baghlān) access, and the latter had an age-old agreement about joint pasture 
usage with their ancestors. The Hazara were reportedly prevented access with the onset of the revolution, but 
their claims have amplified in recent years. Reportedly, the decision is enforced with guns. As in other cases, 
none of the disputing parties possessed documents. If anybody, only the grandfather of Dāktar Muhamad and 
father of Wakil Muhamad Ayub Khān, Hāji Emām Ali Bēk, was trusted to have had any document in the past 
because of his close relation with the royal dynasty (Interviews, 18-19 June 2007).   
673 This was the only case found during fieldwork where mountains were said to be clearly sub-divided for 
grazing purposes. Usually a clear demarcation of land (though not necessarily physical) could be found for 
rain-fed plots with the annual shifting of sides between the respective slopes.  
674 The fully nomadic ancestors of the Gujars, who are also known as Asmāri (ICG 2003: 5), originate from 
the Gujarat region of northwest India, but have long had a presence throughout Afghanistan, and in Qataghan 
specifically since the 1930s. The Farkhāri Gujars’ grandfather generation had reportedly come from 
Laghmān or Kunar, where a larger Gujar community resided (Interview with Gujars in Chehraz, 30 
September 2006). Fischer (1970: 29) and Grötzbach (1972: 96) estimated their total number in northeastern 
Afghanistan at 5,000 people in 1970, while for Farkhār Grötzbach noted 40 families (ibid.), which is close to 
the Gujars’ own account of having initially arrived in Farkhār with 35 households.   
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Pul-e Mashtān (towards Warsaj, see Map M8) they had reportedly been living near the 
river on the valley floor before their expulsion. The livelihoods of local Tajiks and Gujars 
had been mutually complementary: Tajiks were primarily into crop cultivation and the 
Gujars served as their livestock herders when taking their own animals to the pastures. 
Farmers of rain-fed plots high up in the mountainsides had Gujars harvest their crops for a 
share of the harvest. Both groups shared Friday-praying mosques and fought jointly in the 
resistance against Soviet-Afghan forces during the revolution period. Later on, Gujars 
fought on the front line with Mas’ud’s Jam’iat and Northern Alliance forces against the 
Taliban.  
Nevertheless, and although the Gujars are not related to Pashtuns in either ethnic or 
linguistic terms,675 they became increasingly equated with Pashtuns in the 1990s. They 
were accused by Tajiks of stealing livestock and cutting down trees, and lumped together 
with kochi on the one hand and with being Taliban and Al Qaeda sympathizers on the 
other. The verbal accusations and demands for them to leave the area were followed by 
violent action, with houses burnt down and several people dying in the fires. In Khuram 
Āb, different rumors were spread, according to which the Gujars would take sides with the 
Taliban when they gained a foothold in Farkhār, that they would take Tajiks’ wives and 
daughters to Pakistan, and that they already had a plan for dividing the Tajik villagers’ 
property among themselves.676 They consequently became highly vulnerable to 
persecution throughout the district. In Khuram Āb, the two dominant local commander 
factions attacked the Gujars and ousted their leader commander Ghulām, who they claimed 
had taken money from Dāod as well as from the Taliban, who Dāod’s forces were fighting 
against. After Ghulām and ten of his followers were killed in the fighting, the Gujars 
reportedly were not seen again in the area and their pastures were distributed among the 
livestock owners of Khuram Āb Bālā.677 
These and other pasture areas (‘mountainsides’) were disputed between the commander of 
Khuram Āb Bālā and Khuram Āb Pāyin at the time of fieldwork. The conflict escalated in 
2006, after the commander of Khuram Āb Pāyin unilaterally allowed Arab678 herders from 
Kerāni in lower Farkhār to use some of the upper pastures in the Khuram Āb area in return 
for an informal tax. This was seen as an offense by the commander of the upper settlement 
who alone wanted to tax any incoming herders in the upper pastures after his followers had 
appropriated them from the Gujars. Only with the mediation of elders from entire Tagaw-e 
                                                             
675 Gujars have similar physical features to Pashtuns, but speak Dari in a dialect very similar to 
Hindustani/Gujarati.  
676 Interviews, 14-17 July 2007. 
677 It remained unclear if the hostility towards the Gujars was deliberately launched; however, in hindsight 
the actual motivation to dispel the Gujars seems to have been locals’ demand for their grazing areas. In 
2006/2007, only few a Gujar families were still living in other areas of Farkhār, e.g., in Chehraz above 
Khusti and Hafdara, but they were often heavily discriminated against, as for example in Hafdara. The ousted 
Gujars from Farkhār were said to live in the IDP-camp Bāgh-e Sherkat near Kunduz. After several attempts 
by the government and international organizations to reconcile the disputing parties had failed, the Gujars in 
Bāgh-e Sherkat still waited to get resettled in Farkhār, though some had already moved to Sharshar 
(Eshkamish), Darqad, and Yangi Qal’a (Interviews 30 September 2006, 29 November 2006, 1 August 2007). 
678 They are Tajik-speaking and claim to be descendants of the Arab Abbasi tribe. Their self-designation is 
Arab. Several Arab communities are situated at the valley entrance of Farkhār district behind Dasht-e Rubāh, 
and faced similar accusations as the Gujars, apparently due to their being non-Tajik.  
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Chap could a violent escalation of the conflict be prevented and the status quo of de-facto 
divided areas of pasture control by the rivalling commanders be re-established.679 
Consequently, the commander of the lower settlement controlled the traditional pasture 
areas of Khuram Āb proper, while the commander of the upper settlement oversaw the 
stretches once used by the Gujars at four to six hours walking distance from the village. 
While on the lower traditional grazing grounds Khuram Āb livestock holders had 
traditionally shared the pastures with livestock owners from other Farkhār villages, such as 
Shingān-e Bālā, Hafdara, and Khānaqā-ye Farkhār, the commander of Khuram Āb Pāyin 
had recently denied them access. Instead, he was said to have rented out pasture land to 
kochi from Kunduz, Baghlān, and Takhār in exchange for cash. Other respondents claimed 
that the Farkhār CoP, a key patron of the Khuram Āb Pāyin commander, would make the 
rent arrangements.680 However, the local Arab herders from Kerāni, who had traditionally 
grazed their flocks on the high-mountains pastures above Khuram Āb based on customary 
arrangements with the Gujars, were now forced to seek new arrangements with the 
commander of Khuram Āb Bālā.681   
The cases of pasture usage comply with the examples elaborated earlier where local power 
elites effectively appropriated grazing land for personal profit. Thus, the cases highlight a 
pattern of ongoing redefinitions of different types of livestock-owners’ access to pastures 
by local strongmen, either former commanders, government agents (district governor or 
CoP), or both. The role of government officials is at least highly ambiguous in this regard 
(see Ch. 7). With recourse to the Venn diagram in Figure 5, however, it is obvious that 
government officials can be said to act largely according to their personal interests and not 
for the public good. In Farkhār, contestations over resources are closely interlinked with 
complex conflict structures that can be traced back to earlier feuds and the competition of 
more diverse interests than in Warsaj. The conflict between the commanders of lower and 
upper Khuram Āb, for example, had roots in an old rivalry about ‘ushr between the upper 
commander and the father of the lower commander, who were both famed during the anti-
Soviet resistance. In the course of events, the brother of the upper commander killed the 
father of the lower commander when the latter was a boy. The boy fled, became a trained 
fighter who earned himself much respect and fame throughout the northeast in early battles 
against Taliban. He arrived back in Khuram Āb and killed the son of the murderer of his 
father, that is, the nephew of the upper commander, in revenge. Reportedly it was 
commander Dāod who mediated a truce between the two Khuram Āb commanders and 
convinced them to join his forces against the Taliban (in which the Gujars appeared to 
become the ‘collateral’ target as described above). After 2001, the cold peace between both 
commanders remained rather fragile as both the above and the following incidents 
demonstrate.  
                                                             
679 In 2007, Arab tents populated the pasture grounds opposite of the grazing areas of Khuram Āb.    
680 Interview, 17 July 2007. 
681 In Kerāni, shifting power structures during the revolution period and the related heavy armament of local 
residents had encouraged the Arab to contest the mir’s exclusive possession of all rain-fed land in the 
village’s surroundings earlier. Hence they broke with the customary sharing arrangement and denied any 
shares to the mir families explaining, “Since they are weak, they cannot enforce their share. They have not 
tried it since then. But even if they tried, they would not be successful. The Afghan document is a PK and an 
AK-47.” (Noted by Glassner [2009: 15]). The acronyms PK and AK-47 refer to automatic machine guns.   
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Preceding the 2006 incident was a similar unilateral decision of the upper commanders’ 
brothers, elders, and youth, to prevent their fellow villagers in the lower section from 
taking any more firewood down from ‘their’ mountains in the previous year. They 
reportedly stopped twenty donkeys loaded with wood and had the Khuram Āb Pāyin 
residents leave the wood fuel loads in the upper village. In response, the brother of the 
local Khuram Āb Pāyin commander turned up with 20 armed men in the upper village 
demanding the 20 donkey-loads of wood. He was shot by the brother of the rival 
commander from Khuram Āb Bālā, which led to serious fighting between both factions 
that involved the use of heavy artillery.682 The casualties remained surprisingly low with 
only the accidental killing of one old woman. Women, children, and everybody who was 
not directly involved in the fighting had gone up into the mountains for the time of the 
confrontation, because the front lines passed between the two sub-villages. 
The two examples of renewed conflict escalation show that perceived resource scarcity (in 
the case of fuel wood) and greed for taxing resources (Arab’s pasture access) obviously 
triggered violence. By the time of fieldwork, residents of Khuram Āb Pāyin were again 
able to collect fuel wood from the mountains and a guard (muhāfez-e kohestān) had been 
appointed to control wood-cutting by neighboring communities in the adjacent valleys. The 
main incentive to appoint a local guard, as opposed to relying on one of the government 
guards, was to prevent wood stealing, but also reportedly the fear that Gujars might return 
from beyond the pass in Keshm (Badakhshān). The guard and his helper were paid one sēr 
of wheat per household from Khuram Āb Bālā. According to the guard, the community 
decided to limit fuel wood withdrawal to one day of the week (Monday) and one donkey-
load per household.683 The significance of fuel resources and observed communal 
regulations for access are discussed in the following subchapter, based on the example of 
Fulol valley in Burka district of Baghlān.   
 
6.2.2 Fuel resources in the foothills of Burka and Eshkamesh 
With this last case study on fuel wood (chub-e sukht)684 I complete my inquiry into local 
communities’ everyday use-practices of natural resources. In addition to the resources 
presented so far (irrigation water, pasture land for livestock grazing), fuel wood  is not only 
used by all households regardless of their social status, but also the basic subsistence 
component of fuel security for the majority of rural households. I show below that the 
                                                             
682 This and the other facts of the story were reported by residents of both parts of the settlement, including 
elders and the commander, in several interviews and conversations throughout 15-17 July 2007. The degree 
of armament in the area was tangible. 
683 Interview in Khuram Āb Bālā, 16 June 2007. Nevertheless, the researcher witnessed donkeys carrying 
wood into the village on a Tuesday as well. 
684 Chub-e sukht literally means firewood (‘wood for burning’). In the area where primary field data was 
collected (Burka and Eshkamesh districts), the term refers to any material that produces heat or power when 
it is burnt, including animal manure and different plant fuels besides wood. In the following, it is designated 
accordingly as fuel wood, that is, including wood, non-woody fuel plants, and manure. If reference is made to 
fire wood from trees it is called wood fuel. Timber is not considered in the elaborations below; its cutting, 
distribution and trade follows a different logic and is rather insignificant in terms of everyday local life-
worlds and livelihood-making. For basic empirical evidence on timber in the research districts, see Yarash et 
al. (2010). 
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politico-economic context in Burka and Eshkamesh further conditions the local fuel 
economy in a way that also makes it the mainstay for basic income generation for many 
rural dwellers, although with local specializations and a division of labor depending on the 
distance from the still fuel-bearing mountainsides in a few remote side-valleys.  
A previous study investigated the different fuel uses, changes in use patterns over time, the 
amounts of biomass withdrawn from the mountainsides, and the consequent degrees of 
degradation in both Burka and Eshkamesh districts (Yarash et al. 2010). The quantitative 
study found evidence of a dramatic shift in biomass composition of fuel wood between 
1977 and 2007 and alarming rates of annual fuel withdrawal for local needs within the 
districts.685 Large-scale depletion of forest trees has led to sole reliance on juniper trees 
(archa), artemisia (posh),686 and different kinds of animal manure as the main types of 
fuel. The further degraded an area, the less wood is actually used and compensated for by 
bushes, shrubs, and other elements of natural vegetation with increasing reliance on animal 
manure.687 Moreover, the research found that over a year, 67 percent of households 
collected more wood fuel than they used, 65 percent collected more artemisia than they 
used, 50 percent collected more of other types of bushes than they used, and 67 percent 
collected more manure than they used (ibid.: 29f). The surplus indicated by the difference 
between the amount of biomass collected and cut, and the amounts used, suggests that for 
many rural dwellers fuel-trading constitutes an additional component of local rural 
livelihood-making in an otherwise resource- and employment-scarce environment. 
Qualitative interviews and participant observation in the five major valleys of Eshkamesh 
and the main valley of Burka (Fulol) confirmed this finding and shed further light on the 
economic and livelihood dimensions of local fuel harvesting and marketing in neighboring 
villages and the local bazaar in Burka.  
In the following sub-section, I focus on the case study of Fulol valley to highlight the main 
governance characteristics of the local fuel economy in Burka district. It adds value to the 
previous analysis because it shows the interlacing of local government actors into the fuel 
economy. Where applicable, data and insights from Eshkamesh are used to buttress the 
argument. The investigation into local attitudes and practices to preserve mountain 
resources in the next section relies on data from all rangeland districts, and thus also 
includes insights collected from Farkhār and Warsaj. 
 
                                                             
685 For details on the amounts and composition of fuel types’ withdrawals see ibid.  
686 Artemisia (posh) is a perennial bush (beta) with a perceived high fuel value and is preferred for boiling 
water and heating to substitute for juniper, if its wood is not available, as opposed to cooking and baking. 
The research showed that it is increasingly harvested through uprooting, thus causing permanent damage to 
the plant cover and contributing to soil erosion (Ibid). Artemisia and juniper are the most common and most 
popular fuel types and combined account for 44 percent of all fuels used (23% juniper, 21% artemisia) (Ibid: 
28). 
687 In communities where irrigated agriculture is possible, crop residues are traditionally used for heating in 
winter. The use of coal, diesel, petrol, and oil is very rare, limited to specific purposes, and dependent on 
availability in terms of both supply at the local bazaar and a household’s ability to purchase. 
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a. Case study: The fuel economy of Fulol valley  
Fulol is the main valley of Burka district with regard to forest resources, both wood fuel 
and other non-wood types of fuel. It largely provides the population of Burka town (district 
center) with fuel resources. However, within the valley increasing degradation and forest 
depletion has caused progressive dependence of local communities on those communities 
with more direct access to ‘forested’ mountainsides further away from Burka town and the 
valley entrance in Nawābād-e Fulol. The valley’s middle section is called Fulol proper and 
leads via Fulol Pāyin and Fulol Bālā towards manteqa Sāi-ye Hazāra at the far end of the 
valley. Sāi-ye Hazāra includes several settlements, the farthest and highest up the 
mountainside, Dān-e Kor, (Map 10) is populated by Gujars. Gujars account for 
approximately 12 percent of the population in Burka, while 30 percent are Hazara (residing 
mainly in settlements of Sāi-ye Hazāra proper, that is, in the lower parts of the main back 
valley), 50 percent are Tajik (mainly in Fulol Bālā and Pāyin), and about 8 percent Uzbek 
(at the valley’s entrance).688  
According to an NSP survey,689 the valley, including the settlement Nawābād-e Fulol, has 
a population of about 3,000 families.690 The amount of biomass collected and used 
annually throughout the entire valley was calculated to be 68,400 tonnes or 22.8 tonnes per 
household.691 As Table 8 shows, this total amount can be split up further:  
Table 8: Annual fuel use amounts calculated for Fulol valley (Yarash et al. 2010: 31) 
Fuel category Amount used in one year in Fulol 
(based on 3,000 households) in tonnes 
Wood 23,550 
Non-woody plant fuel 23,430 
Manure  21,420 
Total 68,400 
         
The figures highlight the magnitude of deforestation and progressive degradation of the 
overall vegetation cover. 23,550 tonnes of wood (equaling 15,000 trees692) and 23,430 
tonnes of bushes and other fuel plant material is withdrawn by the Fulol valley inhabitants 
                                                             
688 The figures are taken from a Baseline Survey conducted by Mercy Corps for its project settlements in 
Burka in 2007. See Smith and Natori (2007). 
689 In the framework of the NSP, the Fulol valley was one of four zones into which the district was sub-
divided for the program’s implementation. The FP was the French NGO ACTED. Typically, a baseline 
survey is conducted before starting any CDC establishment and subsequent infrastructure development 
measures (Interview with ACTED staff member in Burka, 30 March 2009). 
690 The exact number is 3,028 families for NSP zone of Fulol, including the valley and a few villages at the 
entrance to Fulol valley. Ibid. 
691 In order to calculate a fair minimum of fuel use and avoid the risk of overestimating the use and to keep it 
reasonably simple, this calculation is based on the assumption that one household is equal to one family. 
However, the empirical figures are slightly higher: 69 percent of all households surveyed in the fuel economy 
research were said to consist of one family, 17 percent of two, and the remaining 14 percent of more than two 
families. See Yarash et al. (2010: 31). 
692 Calculated with one tree on average equaling 2.5m³ = 1.57 tonne of wood (conversion rate: 1m³ = 0.628 
tonne).  
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annually. If it is considered that individual households only use a share of what they 
actually harvest in the mountains, the losses are even bigger.693 At peak times in autumn – 
as was the case during fieldwork, even though it was Ramadan – in places like Sāi-ye 
Hazāra at the remote end of Fulol, 70-100 donkey-loads694 of juniper were transported to 
houses for use and storage for the winter every day five to six days a week. The 
investigation into seasonal collection patterns did not provide evidence for any wood-
cutting in winter, though nearer destinations are targeted in the sunny parts of the 
mountains.695 In spring and summer, other livelihood and income-generating activities 
compete with fuel collection, that is, in spring the sowing of crops and the first pasture 
migration with livestock keep at least one or two males in each household occupied. In 
summer, labour migration to near-by Kunduz, Khānābād, and Tāluqān for wheat 
harvesting and paddy-planting offers employment. During these seasons, fuel collection 
relies either on additional male household members, if there are any, or solely on female 
household members who cut different types of non-wood fuel plants near their houses. 
Given that the peak heating season starts in late autumn and lasts until early spring, the fuel 
demand in the remaining months is comparably lower and limited to fuel for cooking, 
water-boiling, 696 and baking.  
The access patterns of fuel resources can best be comprehended with a look into the past. 
The common narrative, derived from dozens of interviews during fieldwork, runs that 
extensive cutting of trees and subsequent heavy degradation set in only after the start of the 
revolution when the government-appointed forest guards had disappeared. Reportedly, 
before the revolution the forest guards possessed a considerable degree of enforcement 
capacity in protecting the mountainsides from illegal cutting. This referred to the cutting of 
so-called ‘fresh’ wood; the collection of old or dry wood and the cutting and sale of 
artemisia and other bush varieties (beta) was not sanctioned by law. The enforcement 
capacity rested on fear among ordinary members of rural society towards the government, 
which was known to punish and arrest people for violating laws.697 Nevertheless, the 
degree of obedience to or violation of the law appears to have been highly dependent on 
the location of respondents’ houses even then, as residents close to resource-rich locations 
appear to have flouted the law. Some respondents, although they were from Eshkamesh,698 
                                                             
693 However, even if all the households and families use fuel for heating, cooking, baking, boiling water, etc., 
by no means all of them harvest fuel because the town population has other income possibilities and lacks the 
means of both labor and time to collect fuel themselves.  
694 For the methodology of estimating donkey-loads etc. see Yarash et al. (2010: Appendix 5). The average of 
one donkey-load equals 10.31 ser or 70 kg, the daily wood harvest amounts to 722-1,031 sēr or 5,052-7,217 
kg or 5-7 tonnes. 
695 To give just one example from Gujar villages in Sāi-ye Hazāra, the respondents stated that households 
usually go out twice a week for cutting wood during the winter months and obtain four donkeys loads.              
696 It would be wrong to underestimate the fuel use amounts for boiling water for tea. Given the cultural 
context where tea is one of the basic and most commonly-used food items, a kettle remains almost 
permanently on the fireplace – and thus continuously consumes fuel wood. 
697 If a wood-thief were caught by the local forest guard, he had to pay a fine of 50 to 100 Afs, and the price 
of two donkey-loads of wood equaled 50 Afs at that time. Sometimes the thief was reportedly jailed and the 
local elders had to appeal to the district administration to free the person.  
698 Interviews conducted in Eshakmesh permit the hypothesis that fuel resources have traditionally been in 
higher demand in Eshkamesh than in Burka, possibly because of its bigger size and better connection to the 
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admitted that even then it was common to steal wood, mostly through cutting and 
removing trees during night hours. In their oral accounts, they legitimized such theft by the 
fact that the dry wood available for legal harvesting was nowhere near enough for 
individual households’ demands and that the cutting of trees was not noticeable, because at 
that time a dense forest tree cover existed. Others however emphasized that stealing was 
rare because there was enough dead wood available and that the demand was much lower, 
given that stoves for heating were not yet in use.699 In any case, no wood was sold, only 
artemisia for Burka townspeople. Nightly wood sales set in by late 1979 when the 
government reportedly had lost influence in the rural communities because of the local 
mobilization and resistance against the Khalq government’s reform package (see Ch. 4). 
Parallel, the first trucks with fuel wood were reported to have left for Kunduz once a week 
since this time. In addition, throughout the revolution period villagers from locations 
without direct access to resource-rich mountainsides appeared in places near to the forest 
and harvested wood for their own needs and for selling at the local bazaar.  
 
Map M11: Fulol valley with side-valleys 
An outright commercial selloff of wood from the local mountainsides started at the time of 
the mujahedin after 1992. Locally this meant a shift in power structures from Hezb-e 
Islāmi to Jam’iat-e Islāmi, reportedly first of all caused by Jam’iat’s massive distribution of 
weapons throughout the district. The Hezb-e Islāmi commanders who had spearheaded the 
revolution in the area were either disarmed, forced to flee, or switched alliances and joined 
Jam’iat-forces over the subsequent years. Reportedly, Jam’iat’s district-level commander 
Arbāb Safar initially enjoyed influence and support throughout Fulol-valley and the entire 
district, including in Kāriz, another small side-valley with considerable fuel resources. 
After he was killed in combat with the Hezb-e Islāmi commanders, Majid Khān became 
Jam’iat commander at district level. In Sāi-ye Hazāra Sayed Faqir (formerly Harakat) 
became known as local Jam’iat sub-commander. Under him and throughout the mujahedin 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
larger urban centers like Khānābād, Takhār, and Kunduz. Eshkamesh district had three officially appointed 
forest guards under Zāher Shāh and Dāod.  
699 Cooking and baking in the same room as living and sleeping, houses had largely only one room which in 
hindsight economized much wood. Manure was not in use then, either. 
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period wood-cutting was not sanctioned. Given that the representatives of the government 
administration did not possess any enforcement capacity because ordinary people were 
heavily armed, deforestation progressed without limit. Local commanders were reportedly 
selling wood to Kunduz, Baghlān, and Mazār-e Sharif. Only Tāluqān was a less targeted 
bazaar place for local wood because its bazaar was flooded with wood from nearby Namak 
Āb district and consequently the prices were comparatively low. Besides this profit 
dimension, different accounts were recorded regarding the restrictions of cutting for locals’ 
fuel wood purposes. Whereas according to one version, local commanders reportedly 
restricted the cutting of wood to local households in a particular zone of influence, another 
version recounted the exploitation by force of local mountains by non-local wood-cutters 
who were heavily armed and locals, likewise armed, were eager to avoid violence.  
The confrontation between mujahedin military units and Taliban troops advancing towards 
Burka town and Eshkamesh in the second half of the 1990s had a severe impact on fuel 
stocks. The long-term front line in Sāi-ye Hazāra and Sharshar (a valley in southern 
Eshkamesh towards Sāi-ye Hazāra) implied the presence of about 40 commanders and 
2,000 soldiers in this area who needed fuel, money, and food over a period of 
approximately 18 months. One respondent from Eshkamesh’s Āluchak Bālā area (see Map 
M11), described for example how the 50 mujahedin groups present in the vicinity of 
Āluchak bought as many as 50 to 60 donkey-loads of wood from the local population per 
day.700  
A renewed shift in access patterns set in once the Taliban forces had occupied the district 
center and the Taliban government gained more influence in Burka. Consequently, former 
Hezb-e Islāmi commanders were reinstated in many places as Taliban commanders, as was 
true of the commander in Fulol Bālā. In Dān-e Kor, at the very far end of Sāi-ye Hazāra, 
Akhundzada, a former comrade of Sayed Faqir in Harakat (during the revolution) and 
Jam’iat-e Islāmi (at the time of the mujahedin), took over. Himself a Gujar,701 he 
prohibited tree-cutting for outsiders in his area (Mazār Pir and Khushk Dara sub-valleys), 
reportedly arguing that it leads to degradation, one effect of which would be recurring 
mudslides in Mazār Pir. He forced locals to use exclusively non-wood fuel plants, such as 
artemisia or great blue lobelia (sabzgul), and dung cakes (tapi) for fuel purposes. Still, 
                                                             
700 Interview, 21 October 2007. The front line continued between Khānābād and Eshkamesh near Sandoq 
Sāy. At that time money does not seem to have been a major problem for the local mujahedin groups, as they 
were financed by headquarters from Peshawar. Gaining money and profit-making had previously been a 
major motivation for deforestation, in the first half of the 1990s. 
701 Similarly, once the Taliban forces seized Eshkamesh, in the far-end valley areas with primarily Gujari 
populations, like Sharshar, the local Gujar commander joined Taliban forces. This, however, was a strategic 
decision, based on the intention to protect the local population. The case of Sharshar is exemplary in this 
regard: formerly the main residence of the local Uzbek mir-family who left the far-end valley to move up to 
Koka Bulāq at the entrance of Sharshar valley, the hinterland became a base of a powerful resistance 
commander during the revolution period. After he was killed in a bombing Mir Abdul Khānān succeeded 
him. The local Gujars were loyal to both and fought at their side against first the Soviet-Afghan forces and 
then rival mujahedin factions. Once the Taliban advanced, the mir and Gujars reportedly agreed that it would 
be to the advantage of the entire valley population if the Gujar commander joined the Taliban and thus avert 
further assaults on the local population. (Interviews with Gujar commander in Sharshar and with members of 
the mir-family in Koka Bulāq, July 2007). The validity of the reports is supported by the fact that even at the 
time of the interviews the mir had a close relationship (rafta-āmad) with the Gujar commander (own 
observation, July 2007). 
259 
 
local accounts suggest a difference in enforcement capacities between mujahedin and 
Taliban commanders with the latter embodying stronger and the former weaker ability to 
protect the wood stocks. Consequently, the selling of wood fuel was again not possible, 
and in Mazār Pir/Khushk Dara and Sharshar even cutting was largely prohibited.702 
However, for the drought years it was reported that if households did not have animals that 
they could sell or several male family members to send off for labor migration, selling 
wood remained the only option for income generation. During fieldwork and from 
analyzing the data collected, it remained unclear whether the prohibition of wood-cutting 
was eased by the local Taliban strongmen or whether the evidence referred to areas where 
the prohibition had never been as strong as in Mazār Pir/Khushk Dara and Sharshar.   
The ousting of the Taliban government meant another gap in fuel wood protection because 
renewed uncontrolled cutting set in and reportedly continued throughout the first two years 
of Karzai’s interim government, until 2004. One interviewee in Sāi-ye Hazāra reported that 
five trucks with wood were leaving the area daily to Kunduz, Baghlān, and Takhār.703 The 
transitional government prohibited wood-cutting and re-appointed forest guards to the 
government payroll. Despite the cutting ban excluded all non-wood fuel-plant varieties, 
such as hawthorn (erghay) and artemisia, it was largely ignored until the time of fieldwork 
for this study in 2007 and throughout 2009, at the time of a follow-up visit. The discursive 
framing of this nexus was usually comprised in the saying ‘I[n] beta mushkelāt-e mardum 
hal namēkuna[d]’704 (literally ‘these bushes cannot solve people’s problems’). Non-woody 
fuel resources were thus perceived to be nowhere near sufficient to meet local households’ 
fuel needs, not to mention the needs for income generation and basic food security. Against 
this background it can be drawn that the government-appointed forest guards were 
perceived to lack sanctioning capacity as they faced whole communities where each 
individual household transported wood from the mountainsides to their houses. Local 
narratives implied that there was nothing any forest guard could do to prevent cutting and 
that “the forest guard knows that there is nothing for people to burn besides wood and 
bushes from the mountainsides”.705  
The situation throughout Fulol valley at the time of intensive fieldwork in autumn 2007 is 
summarized in Table 9. At a general level the overview suggests that livelihoods 
throughout Fulol valley are directly linked to access to fuel. A simple typology of three 
main degradation stages706 – with the boundaries between them being fluid – was 
combined with findings on the role of the district government, its forest guard, and 
                                                             
702 In Eshkamesh, the local Taliban government appointed an officer in the agriculture department who was 
connected with a subordinate forest guard in Sharshar valley by radio. The latter reported illegal wood-
cutters, who were then fined between five to eight lakh Afs (500,000-808,000 Afs) or arrested and detained 
for two to three days (Interview Sharshar, 6 October 2007). 
703 Interview during fuel transect walk in Mazār Pir, 13 September 2007.  
704 Written as spoken, i.e. grammatically incorrect and slang.  
705 Interview, Burka, 5 September 2007. 
706 Two categories – on one pole ‘environment under stress’ as preceding the ‘beginning degradation’ 
category, and on the other pole ‘total degradation’ as describing a situation where soil cover, vegetation, and 
biodiversity have been completely eroded – have been deliberately left out of the overview. 
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resource conflicts (in the three lower clusters of the table) to establish an overview of the 
nexus between basic governance patterns and advancing fuel resource depletion.707  
Table 9: Characteristics of governance and advancing fuel resource depletion throughout Fulol 
Valley  
Fulol 
Valley 
locations   
Fulol Pāyin/Fulol Bālā  
(Entry to middle section of 
valley) 
----------------- 
next to total degradation 
Dar-e Kāriz  
(Side-valley of upper Fulol) 
 
----------------- 
advanced degradation 
Sāi-ye Hazāra to Dān-e 
Kor (end of Fulol valley) 
 
----------------- 
advancing degradation 
 
Fuel use   Wood fuel is almost  
nonexistent  
 Artemisia cannot be 
found in close proximity 
either, thus non-wood fuel-
plant use is highly 
diversified and on decline if 
it cannot be bought 
 Consequently the 
demand for and use of 
alternatives in animal  
fossil fuels is high, to the 
detriment of non-livestock 
owning households, and 
even dried pellets of sheep 
or goat dung are collected 
in all seasons 
 The juniper to be found is 
all small, fresh trees, no 
timber usage 
 Artemisia is small and 
‘green’, with less fire value 
 Other non-wood fuel 
plants are used all year 
around 
 Livestock owners do 
collect manure to dry up and 
store it for fuel use purposes 
in the winter 
 Juniper, partly also 
hawthorn, and some third 
group of tree species 
(bashāl, Ephedra (matraq), 
or maple (zarang) as well as 
artemisia with long roots 
and strong branches can be 
found and are used in 
relative abundance 
 Fuel users do not have to 
diversify their fuel 
resources (no or next to no 
manure use), can use 
juniper for timber as well 
Fuel 
collection 
 Juniper is only found in 
neighboring valleys or at 
very remote locations, thus 
the effort in labor and time 
it takes to collect juniper 
has grown enormously 
 Different non-wood 
fuel-plant species are 
collected where available 
 Walks of 5-10 hours one 
way  
 Cutting wood and loading 
a donkey takes a long time 
 Most households close to 
mountains and without any 
other income possibilities go 
for cutting of last available 
mountain resources 
 Wood fuel collected at 
relatively far distances from 
the settlements 
 All households collect 
wood fuel and artemisia or 
other non-wood fuel plants 
as well as timber from the 
mountains 
Vegetation 
cover 
 Collection patterns for 
non-wood fuel plants 
prevent their recovery as 
perennials and support 
decreasing fuel value and 
long-term vanishing of 
non-wood fuel plants 
 Other tree species besides 
juniper have vanished due to 
extensive cutting in the past 
 Varieties of non-wood 
fuel plants also have to be 
collected from locations far 
off  
 Near the settlements 
deforested area 
 Only non-wood fuel 
plants are left in close 
proximity, including 
artemisia 
 
Harvesting 
practice 
 Stems and roots from 
trees cut years ago are 
pulled out by force for fuel 
purposes 
 Artemisia and other non-
wood fuel plants are pulled 
out with roots for additional 
fuel value 
 Axes to cut fresh wood  
Impact of 
degradation 
 Loss of rain-fed and 
pasture land due to 
mudslides, loss of houses 
and settlement sections, 
displacements 
 Soil erosion 
 Plant loss of non-wood 
fuel-plant varieties, 
including artemisia 
 Mudslides occur on more 
regular base 
 Houses shifted to higher 
parts 
 Occasional mudslides 
damage houses and 
agricultural lands and 
gardens  
 Advanced degradation in 
Sāi-ye Hazāra 
                                                             
707 The aim is not to suggest that there is necessarily a causal connection between governance, households’ 
livelihood situation, and fuel wood depletion, although a correlation is obvious. For a further discussion see 
below. 
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Livelihoods   Labor migration to Iran 
and Kabul as alternative 
livelihood strategy pursued 
by the majority of local 
males due to lack of 
alternative income 
possibilities 
 Fuel harvesting is part of 
household livelihood 
strategy, though seasonal, as 
about one third of what is 
cut in autumn and/or winter 
is being sold 
 Localized and diverse, 
including laboring in 
Kunduz/Takhār during 
summer months 
 Subsistence livelihoods 
from selling wood and 
artemisia at Burka bazaar or 
to households of 
neighboring villages during 
the night, for many Sāi-ye 
Hazāra households one way 
of generating cash to afford 
foodstuffs and pay off debts 
Role of 
forest 
guard 
 Government-appointed 
forest guard has assistant 
from Fulol Bālā (2007), 
Fulol Pāyin (2009) 
 Appointed government 
forest guard is never seen in 
Kāriz  
 Elders drafted request 
letter to police chief/district 
governor to have forest 
guard appointed for Kāriz 
(September 2007) 
 Forest guard appointed by 
local user community of 
Sāi-ye Hazāra, rejection of 
government-appointed 
forest guard  
 Taxes wood withdrawal 
per donkey-load 
Resource 
conflict 
 Conflicts over access 
arise with communities 
whose mountains still 
dispose of fuel resources 
 Search for alternative 
mountain in neighboring 
Gudri, likelihood of 
violence in case Kāriz 
cutters are caught 
 Request to district 
administration to stop other 
villagers’ cutting in Dān-e 
Kor mountains (2008) 
 Gujars face extraordinary 
taxes 
Role of 
district 
government 
 Sale of juniper wood 
prohibited: during day-time 
police can confiscate wood/ 
fine sellers or will ask for 
bribes 
 Seen as enemy of local 
users, stopped donkeys with 
non-wood fuel plants even 
and confiscated it (2009) 
 Sale of juniper wood 
prohibited: during day-time 
police can confiscate wood/ 
fine sellers or will ask for 
bribes 
 Police chief/district 
governor demand timber 
and wood fuel from locals 
 Sale of juniper wood 
prohibited: during day-time 
police can confiscate wood/ 
fine sellers or will ask for 
bribes 
 
Decreasing extents of degradation from the settlements close to town further into the valley 
and up into side valleys in the remotest ends of Fulol could be observed. Dependence on 
diversification of fuel types obviously decreased with distance from town because 
residents of the remotest locations had direct access to fuel resources simply by living near 
forested areas. The population of Burka town and residents of the middle section of Fulol 
valley were not in such a favorable position and needed to rely on stocking up for 
emergency needs and the cold season by buying fuel wood from the communities close to 
the forest. In the economic chain of fuel supply and demand, the residents of Fulol Bālā 
took on the role of intermediaries as they bought wood from community members at the 
far end of the valley and resold it to clients in town or even transported wood on to Kunduz 
and Takhār. Artemisia was often already being sold by the person who harvested it on the 
way to the bazaar in one of the lower villages. The livelihoods of tail, middle, and head-
enders of valley inhabitants thus presented themselves as directly interlinked and 
complementary. A rising use of animal manure fuels could be traced from the remote end 
of a valley to the lower entry sections. In line with this logic, the inhabitants of areas near 
the forest – mainly livestock-rearing Gujars who live at the far end of Fulol valley in Sāi-
ye Hazāra, in Bostān of Dar-e Kalān (Eshkamesh), and in Sharshar (Eshkamesh) – were 
said not to be using much manure for fuel purposes as they had enough artemisia and 
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juniper available, even though their livestock would have theoretically enabled them to use 
manure and dung cakes in self-sufficient manner.708  
The number of livestock-reliant households that actually use manure for fuel purposes was 
found to be non-Gujar livestock holders in the lower parts of the valleys. Nevertheless, 
popular local claims that the Gujars are to be blamed for the bulk of wood fuel usage must 
be revised as the comparison of fuel use for the three different income groups (based on 
income mainly derived from either livestock, diversified sources, or agriculture) 
undertaken in a previous analysis does not show any significant differences in average use 
patterns (see Yarash et al. 2010: 29ff). 
Besides the information in the table, the accounts of the local forest guard who had been 
appointed by Fulol elders alongside the government-appointed forest guard is very 
insightful and provides a meatier account of the economic dimension of fuel cutting and 
degradation. For the whole district only one forest guard is paid by the government and 
charged with overseeing all forested areas throughout Burka district. Thus the appointment 
of a local guard to assist the government-appointed district guard is plausible and 
legitimized by tradition as a conventional practice (see also Ch. 7). He is to be paid by 
local households. Before delving into the experiences of this local forest guard709 the 
contradictory responses regarding who appointed him should be noted to demonstrate the 
diversity of perceptions about him throughout the valley. These perceptions determined 
how locals made sense of his professional conduct, even while local payment modes 
demanded by the forest guard in turn reinforced individual perceptions. As an example, 
interviewees from Fulol proper (Fulol Pāyin and Fulol Bālā) stated that the local guard had 
been appointed by their community, that is, the elders of the mosques in the Fulol middle 
section (Fulol proper). In contrast, Gujar respondents from the remote end of Sāi-ye 
Hazāra reported that the official forest guard had appointed the community forest guard as 
his assistant without consulting any local elders.  
This view fits well with the unequal allocation practice of the salary payment for the 
locally appointed forest guard and might even have been recounted that way despite the 
source knowing better, in order to meet and accommodate the normative orientations of 
upper valley respondents. Residents of Fulol proper did not have to pay anything to the 
forest guard, whereas Sāi-ye Hazāra households officially contributed one sēr grain per 
household. Unofficially, though, several interview respondents noted that one timber log 
would have to be provided by each household from Sāi-ye Hazāra, in addition to the grain. 
On top of that, Gujar households were charged another 500 Afs per year on the grounds 
that they were commonly suspected to carry out most of the cutting since they lived in the 
most remote, highest-up areas throughout the Sāi-ye Hazāra side-valleys, such as in Mazār 
Pir and Khushk Dara. In the perception of individual local households throughout Sāi-ye 
                                                             
708 The relationship between fuel, degradation, and the livestock economy has not been investigated in this 
study and thus is not fully understood in terms of if and how overgrazing and increasing livestock numbers 
impact on deforestation and loss of vegetation cover in the two districts. 
709 The forest guard, a resident of Fulol Bālā, himself emphasized his legitimacy through the elders’ selection 
when reporting in the interview that he had just resigned two weeks earlier and now the government guard 
had indeed appointed an assistant without consulting the Fulol elders. The consequences of this action were 
not yet known at the time the interview was conducted. 
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Hazāra, the grain-contribution and allocation of a salary to the forest guard was rather seen 
as a bribe and consequently designated as ‘dud puli’.710 This perception was interlinked 
with their daily experience of paying the forest guard for every donkey-load of wood 
brought down from the mountainsides during daylight hours. Whoever among the Sāi-ye 
Hazāra residents did not pay the local forest guard a bribe between 20 and 50 Afs per 
donkey-load would lose their wood. This ‘guarding’ practice had at least two effects: on 
the one hand, the main transportation activities of wood from the mountainsides to 
individual homes took place mainly at night, with people leaving their homes to obtain the 
wood stored in a nearby side-valley between 8:00 and 10:00 pm. On the other hand, the 
bribing of the forest guard by Sāi-ye Hazāra wood-cutters sanctioned his corrupt and 
highly unequal and discriminatory practices of bribe-taking. By going along with his rules, 
the Gujars put up with being charged extraordinary taxes, and all community members of 
Sāi-ye Hazāra thus accepted being charged for the salary allocation of the forest guard 
alone while the wood-cutters from lower villages (Fulol Bālā and Fulol Pāyin etc.) did not 
have to pay anything.      
In an interview, the community forest guard reported to have resigned from his post 15 
days earlier out of fear that the government would hold him responsible for the 
extraordinary high amount of juniper cutting that occurred that year in his area of 
responsibility.711 When asked to explain, he first stated that when he was forest guard no 
Gujar family was allowed to construct a house, but in the current year they had already 
built 20 houses in Khushk Dara and Mazār Pir, all with juniper logs as the main building 
material. He felt he was obliged to report his observation to the official forest guard’s 
superior, the agricultural extension officer712 in Burka town, who did nothing but to extort 
a payment of 17,000 Afs from him in return for not reporting him to any higher authority. 
Furthermore, in the course of the interview it turned out that actually the dissatisfaction of 
the government-appointed guard with him was behind this resignation which was thus in 
fact a dismissal. The local forest guard had withheld considerable amounts of money taxed 
from Sāi-ye Hazāra wood collectors from the government-appointed forest guard who 
would have expected to get at least 50 percent of the profit. Given that in fall, at the time of 
fieldwork, 100 to 150 donkey-loads of wood were transported down the mountainsides 
during the daytime daily, the profit that was at risk of being lost that year provided a clear 
incentive for the government-appointed forest guard to replace the local guard two weeks 
before the day of the interview. Other respondents from Sāi-ye Hazāra spoke of the local 
forest guard as a reshwatkhor (bribe-eater) who had ‘rented out the mountain’. They added 
that locals would be content with paying the forest guard because the majority cut the 
wood for profit making and sold it to traders from Fulol proper who would come to Sāi-ye 
Hazāra twice a week and buy it for 25 Afs per sēr or up to 250 Afs per donkey. In Kunduz 
city, the wood could be sold by the Fulol traders for 60 Afs per sēr.713   
                                                             
710 Literally: ‘vaporizing money’, meaning money paid for no reciprocal exchange service or good. 
711 Interview with locally appointed forest guard, Sāi-ye Hazāra, 12 September 2007. 
712 The provincial agricultural department of Takhār has one agricultural extension officer in every district 
(Interview with the provincial forest officer in Tāluqān, 15 July 2008). 
713 Group interview with Sāi-ye Hazāra residents in local mosque, 12 September 2007. 
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Other interviews throughout Sāi-ye Hazāra confirmed that Fulol valley is apparently one of 
the most significant transfer sites in the local wood economy. According to one 
respondent: 
People of Sāi-ye Hazāra go to the mountains every day. If there is one person [youth or adult 
male, KM] in the household, one person goes, if there are five people in one household, all 
five go to the mountains for wood-cutting. People collect at least 15 donkey-loads of wood 
each week, store it intermediately at their houses and then sell it at night. Forty to fifty 
donkeys with wood leave Sāi-ye Hazāra for Fulol every night. There, some people pay 30 
Afs per sēr and afterwards sell the wood in Kunduz for 50 Afs. The forest guard gets paid 30 
to 40 Afs per donkey-load of wood.714  
The accounts suggest a division of tasks among residents from different parts of the main 
valley. The residents of the middle section of Fulol valley (Fulol proper), where the last 
trees had reportedly been cut ten years ago, had since specialized as traders between the 
upper part of the main valley in Sāi-ye Hazāra and Kunduz, bypassing  the market in Burka 
town. The supply and selling of wood in Burka was carried out at night by the same sellers 
from Fulol, Sāi-ye Hazāra and Kāriz who would sell artemisia during the first half of the 
day twice a week on bazaar days. The five permanent eateries (hotal) in Burka in particular 
were the most lucrative customers to sell wood and artemisia to, but they were said to have 
fixed suppliers. To locals’ minds fuel wood trading was considered a good income source, 
as some households were thus able to earn up to 600 Afs per night or at least 900 Afs per 
week.715 For those households that do not sell any other assets like livestock or land, wood 
selling can generate the entire household income. According to several Gujar respondents 
from Mazār Pir, one of the valleys that still have abundant juniper stocks, 600 households 
from Sāi-ye Hazāra and 700 households from Fulol would be in their sub-valley, at least in 
autumn, to obtain wood fuel.716 This shows that besides the specialized wood traders from 
Fulol – who represent the richer stratum of local inhabitants because they need to possess a 
pickup truck in order to bring the wood to Kunduz – a considerable number of ordinary 
residents also cut wood in the remote side-valleys of Sāi-ye Hazāra, both for their own 
firewood purposes and to sell it to Burka town people.  
Seen from a different angle, it could be argued that the more advanced the degradation (for 
example, in Fulol Pāyin or Nawābād-e Fulol), the more money is involved in the fuel 
economy along the entire valley, because not every household can spare time and labor to 
harvest fuel. Consequently, households in valley entrance settlements would rather buy 
from neighboring Fulol Bālā and in particular Sāi-ye Hazāra, whose residents go to the 
mountains regularly and sell in the villages on the way to the bazaar in Burka town at 
lower prices than at the bazaar proper.  
                                                             
714 Ibid. The wood is not openly sold in Kunduz (Yarash et al. 2010), but supplied to fixed customers like 
bakeries and eateries (Interview in Fulol Bālā, 16 September 2007). 
715 Interview in Fulol Bālā, 16 September 2007. There are at least 15 households in Fulol Bālā which make a 
living like this, cutting wood every second day on the mountainsides and collecting three donkey-loads two 
to three times a week. In contrast, respondents from Kāriz considered selling fuel wood a poor income 
source, as it would only allow affording basic necessities like tea, sugar, and diesel (Interview in Kāriz, 20 
September 2007). From this follows that again the location of wood-cutting and access likely determines the 
potential benefit, because the quality of the wood and the labor and time spent on cutting differ depending on 
the degree of wood abundance.   
716 Interview during fuel transect walk in Mazār Pir, 13 September 2007. 
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Various accounts mentioned that Gujars were not involved in the wood fuel business. 
However, they were selling juniper timber logs for 300 Afs apiece717 and sometimes 
bartered one log for a sack of chaff (kāha) for their livestock. The seemingly 
disproportionate barter suggests the relatively low value of juniper timber logs for the 
Gujars and, thus, that they must be disposing of juniper trees in great abundance while the 
lower parts of the valley have experienced progressive and near-complete deforestation 
over the last decades. Another indicator for the normality and necessity of the daily cutting 
of wood, despite its official prohibition by the government and the usual taxing of the local 
forest guard, is the fact that respondents performed hashar for members of their 
communities who were not able to go to the mountains to cut firewood themselves. In local 
parlance these are people ‘who don’t have a son or any helper’. In practice, co-villagers 
use one or two days before the winter to provide 20 to 40 donkey-loads of juniper wood for 
the household in question.718 
The ‘guarding’ attitude of the government-appointed forest guard and his superior, the 
agricultural officer of the Burka district administration, has already been described. The 
night sales of wood in Burka town indicate furthermore that the police are also part of the 
local fuel economy. In theory they were said to demand a considerable fine of 200 to 300 
Afs for wood-selling during the day and that they would take the wood from the wood 
seller for their own purposes. Should a seller refuse payment of the fine, the police could 
take the person to the district governor who would then order his arrest for several days 
until an elder from his village came for him. However, none of the interviewees could 
remember even one such incident. Nevertheless, the shifting of all major trading activities 
to night hours must be understood as a reaction to this imagined police threat.719 Moreover, 
the regular wood transports from Fulol to Kunduz simply could not go unnoticed by local 
police at checkpoints. Therefore it is highly likely that the police are paid money or wood 
at these checkpoints in order to let the pickups pass.720  
A revealing and exemplary account of how the district administration is involved in the 
local fuel economy was recorded from one of the Gujars of Mazār Pir. He complained 
about the re-appointed CoP, who had recently sent a notification that he expected one big 
juniper tree to be provided from each Gujar household of Sāi-ye Hazāra, of which there are 
about 200. He would have the stems picked up by his armed soldiers (‘askar) with a truck 
and brought to his private residence. The interviewee stated that almost the same thing 
happened already two years ago when the commander had been CoP previously and 
requested two trees per household, which were then picked up on two different dates. 
When the Gujars had reportedly made the point that juniper-cutting is illegal and 
                                                             
717 As a rule, though, only people with sufficient cash money would buy timber from the Gujars; normally 
everybody who is in need of timber would go to cut it himself.  
718 Group interview with residents of Sāi-ye Hazāra in local mosque, 12 September 2007. 
719 However, one incident was reported from two years back when the agricultural extension officer stopped 
two cars with juniper wood in the bazaar on bazaar day and distributed the wood among the bystanders. 
Apparently since that episode, the trade was shifted to the darkness of night.  
720 Fieldwork could not investigate this dimension of the local fuel economy; however, there must be several 
checkpoints on the way from Fulol/Burka to Kunduz that could tax the drivers. Consequently, the profit 
margin must still be large enough, with reports 15-20 Afs per sēr juniper wood purchased in Sāi-ye Hazāra 
and 60 Afs per sēr sold in Kunduz. 
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forbidden, the reply by the police chief was ‘We are the government and we did not 
prohibit the cutting of mountain wood.’ A similar scenario appears to have taken place in 
Eshkamesh’s Sharshar valley, still fairly rich in juniper and primarily Gujar. There, the 
local commander had ordered 100 trees and one truck of fuel wood to be cut for his private 
use.  
The empirical examples reveal two main motives for lumbering, both of which are often 
shared by one and the same wood-cutter. The first is to secure his family’s fuel needs, 
while the second is to gain an extra income through selling additionally cut wood and 
artemisia. A common arrangement is that male household members cut fuel wood two days 
for their family’s consumption and two to four days for selling. Although a distinction has 
to be drawn between income groups meaning that ‘the rich’ do not (have to) go cutting 
themselves but can afford to buy wood and artemisia off the actual cutters, the former 
provide a considerable incentive for cutting more than is actually locally needed. The 
traders who own pickups and make money by selling wood from local mountainsides to 
Kunduz, for example, belong to the more affluent households in the middle or entry section 
of Fulol. Thus, while every household relies on fuel wood for fuel security, no clear 
‘poverty-degradation nexus’ can be determined to exist. It is not the poorest who claim and 
enforce disproportional access and who can alone be blamed for the extensive cutting. 
Nevertheless the interviews indicated that households without any other income from 
livestock or land would be obliged to go to the mountains in order to ensure their families’ 
food security by selling juniper to end users or traders.  
Spot-checks with shopkeepers in the Burka bazaar showed that fuel-selling is a cornerstone 
of the local economy of indebtedness.721 According to the local distinction between being 
able to make a living as opposed to being able to buy only the most necessary things like 
sugar, tea, and diesel,722 average clients balance their borrowings by bringing non-wood 
fuel plants or wood instead of cash repayments.723 The small cash amount received from 
buyers enables ordinary wood-cutters to service some of the many debts rural families 
have with each other, with several shopkeepers, with doctors and others, as to restore, at 
least partially, their credibility when necessary. Even so, for many rural dwellers fuel-
selling more or less constitutes their entire livelihood and survival basis in these resource- 
and employment-scarce surroundings. However, interviewees also indicated that much 
lower numbers of local males would be going away for work migration724 to Iran and 
                                                             
721 The survey showed that the indebtedness of people with shopkeepers in Burka is not any less than what is 
known from other locations in Afghanistan, and there is a high interdependence of families where usually 
everybody is both debtor and borrower at the same time (Klijn and Pain 2007). One shopkeeper stated his 
outstanding amounts receivable at 320,000 Afs (US$6,400). The bulk of his 500 debtors are managing to live 
by fuel-selling, from which they pay back small amounts every bazaar day in order to maintain 
creditworthiness for further purchases, which sometimes take place on the same occasion or are otherwise 
seasonally concentrated. 
722 The popular discursive framing for this type of subsistence livelihood was that people have “zendagi 
bukhor wa namir”, best translated as ‘to lead a hand-to-mouth existence’ (Several interviews in diverse 
locations, e.g., in Mazar Pir, 13 September 2007).  
723 Interview, Burka bazaar, 31 March 2009.  
724 As one respondent put it, “The people of Fulol valley are not interested in going for labor migration 
because they have their family and would rather cut wood, no matter whether fresh or dead, for sale in the 
bazaar. These people who sell wood cannot make a living exclusively from this activity; at least one other 
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Pakistan, suggesting that the exploitation and possibilities of marketing of fuel resources 
mitigate the overall level of desperation and food-insecurity. The division of labor among 
Fulol residents throughout the valley, the locally existing concentration of forested 
rangeland (juniper), and the largely unlimited access regime to fuel resources for anybody 
in the valley comprise the cornerstones of the local fuel economy. Locals’ understanding is 
such that in principle any resident from Fulol – and according to some accounts even 
Burka town residents – is entitled to cut and use fuel wood from any place anywhere in the 
valley. Thus, it is merely the obvious distances and consequent inconveniences of 
transportation that prevent, for example, Burka townspeople from going to Sāi-ye Hazāra 
to collect artemisia and other fuel wood types.725  
This kind of open access regime applies to the same mountainsides that are otherwise 
understood as common property grazing grounds of individual communities. Furthermore, 
the mountainsides often hold individually-assigned rain-fed areas where biannual 
cultivation takes place in turns with grazing (see section 6.2.1-b). During the initial 
fieldwork period in 2007, only one case was registered where a conflict had actually 
escalated between local users in the Chap Dara valley of Eshkamesh and those claiming 
access from their more distant residences in Zarmukh (see Map 10). In Kāriz (Burka) 
elders stated that they had jointly decided to write a letter to the district administration, 
specifically the CoP and the district governor, to complain about the ruthless logging and 
to demand that the government appoint an additional forest guard for Kāriz because the 
existing one never came to their valley. In his explanation, one of the Kāriz elders, who 
was among the people who initiated the note to the district administration, emphasized that 
they did not have the fantastic goal of stopping the logging entirely. However, they hoped 
to cause fuel wood users shift to other types of fuel wood, especially dung cakes and 
animal manure and spare the small (‘green’) juniper trees.726 Attempts of the local elders 
and religious authorities to caution wood-cutters against extreme logging failed because 
when confronted with the request to refrain from cutting small green trees, the cutters 
reportedly accepted it but continued as before out of necessity. Local interpretations more 
often than not suggested a link between poverty and logging, and sometimes added that dry 
wood had not been found for years. Similarly, interviewees in Dān-e Kor expected the 
government to ‘appoint a good Muslim’ as forest guard, one who would protect the trees 
and not oversee the tree stocks’ selloff.727  
This, and new evidence collected during a short follow-up visit to the research area 18 
months later at the end of March 2009, indicates a renewed change in access patterns 
which is possibly better described as a progressive transition, given its slow and 
incremental process. The trend is towards limiting the once open access regime for fuel 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
male household member should be having some other income, such as from daily laboring nearby. But 
people can afford their basic necessities, like tea, sugar and salt, from wood selling”. (Interview with 
shopkeeper in Burka bazaar, 17 September 2007). Another interviewee reported from Eshkamesh’s Dar-e 
Kalān valley that “of the 210 households in Dar-e Kalān, 200 sell juniper wood during the night.” (Interview, 
2 October 2007). 
725 For a discussion of legal provisions see below.  
726 Interview with local mullah/NSP cashier in Kāriz, 19 September 2007. 
727 Interview in Fulol Pāyin, 4 September 2007. 
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wood collection to local users in the immediate vicinity of the fuel-yielding mountainsides. 
For example, in summer 2008 Gujars from Dān-e Kor referred to the district administration 
requesting such restrictions for fuel wood collectors after they had tried to stop wood-laden 
donkeys coming down their mountain, which had caused those wood-cutters to turn to the 
district administration first. The Gujars’ complaint was that about 200 donkey-loads with 
wood were extracted on a daily basis from their mountainside, although other parts of Sāi-
ye Hazāra and Fulol Bālā would still contained considerable fuel wood as well. During a 
large gathering they reportedly reached an agreement, according to which fuel wood 
collectors were to stick to their immediate surroundings for harvesting.728 How this was 
supposed to be enforced remained unclear, but a new forest guard from Fulol Pāyin had 
been appointed by local communities and was said to take his job seriously.729 In Fulol 
proper, the communities had reportedly agreed on a ban on cutting and selling juniper to 
start with the New Year on 21 March 2009. Given the high dependence on fuel resources 
for basic fuel security and basic income generation for many households and the 
consequently perceived necessity to cut wood despite prohibitions, the effectiveness of 
these new measures must be regarded with doubt. Nevertheless, their establishment and the 
ongoing discussion are indicators of local residents’ increasing awareness of the finiteness 
of most natural fuel resources, in particular wood, the alarming extent of degradation, and 
its negative consequences for the local residents by 2009.  
 
b. The normative idea and observed practices to access and use rangeland 
Related to what has been said so far in this subchapter, this section focuses on the 
disconnect between observed practices for rangeland access and the normative 
underpinnings, both rights-based and moral-based. Given the trend of an ever-widening 
incoherence despite the attempts noted above to stop resource degradation, the analysis 
highlights the high degree of uncertainty for future access modes. 
Conventional access practices to rangeland resources as described above entitle the 
residents of certain communities to use customarily-designated grazing areas for livestock 
herding and fuel withdrawal. How large individual communities are, for example, whether 
they consist of just one relatively compact and bounded settlement, several settlements or 
an entire valley, depends on – besides natural-geographic conditions – historical factors, 
including socio-political considerations like different types of past and enduring conflicts. 
In some locations, as in Eshkamesh’s Āluchak Bālā and Pāyin, grazing is restricted to 
certain users, but for fuel collection the mountainside is open access. For dry-land 
agriculture, quasi-private areas are used, though no legal ownership is held. The example 
of Fulol shows that access to fuel resources depends on several factors, one of which is the 
location of the residence, and another the ability to adjust to increasing levels of 
                                                             
728 Interview in Dān-e Kor, 31 March 2009. 
729 He was chosen by the local communities and introduced to the government for appointment; that is why 
his salary is paid by the government. Furthermore, he chose two assistants who are paid by the population, 
one from Fulol and another one in the pistachio-growing areas near Chulāt. According to his accounts, 
together they are in charge of guarding the entire district. In addition, locally appointed forest guards 
appearedalso paid by local households, for example, in Fulol Bālā and Kāriz. (Interview with local forest 
guard in Fulol Pāyin, 31 March 2009). 
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degradation. However, in contrast to access to pastures, where wealth as an expression of 
power is the major precondition, but belonging to certain influential familial or military 
networks also matters; fuel resources are more equitably accessible for anybody who 
accepts the labor and efforts involved in it.730 Thus, the number of sons or male household 
members is an important factor for fostering access (see above). The common legal 
understanding of interviewed rangeland users in Takhār and Baghlān included the idea that 
all land or the mountain is either God’s land in the first place and the government’s land in 
the second place or that the land does not have any owner (lāmālek).731 In either case, local 
residents are perceived to be the rightful users of the mountains and rangelands. As one 
mullah in Dān-e Kor put it, “God is the owner of everything; the land and the sky and 
whatever is in the mountain is God’s property, then the government’s, but we use it.”732 
As in the case of irrigation water, a statutory legal void existed at the time of fieldwork 
because of the lack of a revised and enforced rangeland law.733 The latest pre-revolution 
version of 1970 decreed in Article 3 that all grazing land is public property, but that people 
would be allowed to use it in accordance with the rules framed by the same law. The 1970 
law was amended in 2000 by a ‘Law on Pasture and Maraa’734 issued under Decree No. 57. 
It introduced a distinction between public and private pastures (maraa), the latter restricted 
to usage for residents of adjacent communities, and the former referring to barren lands 
(mawaat). The 1970 regulation seemed to have been internalized not only by local 
rangeland users but also government workers.735 However, as noted with the notion of 
lāmālek (no owner) but for God or the state, a tentative distinction between what might be 
meant by public and governmental property was made by some respondents. Given the 
users’ concern with their own role, that is, their access and use rights for rangeland, it can 
be argued with validity that the reference to government versus public property was used 
interchangeably. No far-reaching distinction between public and governmental land was 
made. From a legal perspective, it is interesting that government land is not defined in the 
constitution, but instead a category of ‘state land’ was introduced by different political 
regimes (ADB 2005) which has caused some confusion throughout the last decade.736 
Furthermore, the matter is complicated by the fact that the Afghan constitution of 2004 
lacks a clear definition of what precisely is meant to be public property. Given the idea that 
the access to public land is established through traditional user rights shared by both settled 
                                                             
730 At the same time, the income that can be derived from fuel collection is very low when compared to other 
labor, especially payments received for laboring jobs outside the valley. 
731 Several interviews, e.g., in Deh-e Bālā/Warsaj, 20-21 June 2007.  
732 Interview with local mullah in Dān-e Kor, 11 September 2007. 
733 What I call ‘rangeland law’ here is sometimes also called pasture law (‘Law of Pasture Lands’), see Wily 
(2004: 94).  
734 Maraa was designated as public property with its usage patterns governed by sharia provisions. It was 
specified not to mean government-owned land. The term referred to unoccupied land for public purposes, so 
besides pastures it also included dumps and graveyards. As local public land, maraa fit the category of 
private pastures versus mawaat, characterized as public pastures with open access for everybody (Ibid.: 96f.). 
735 Interview with the head of the provincial forest department in Tāluqān, 15 July 2008. 
736 Consequently, state land could designate land which is registered under the ownership of a government 
agency as opposed to land over which the state claims the right of administration, including the right of 
disposal. It could be defined as land which does not fall into the category of government-owned land 
(registered on behalf of a government agency), but over which the government claims custodial right.   
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local communities and semi-nomadic pastoralists, their customary and unwritten style have 
made them become highly vulnerable for contestation by rival interest groups (see sections 
6.2.1-b/c and 6.2.2-a), not to mention other influences, such as natural hazards (mudslides, 
floods, droughts) and increasing demographic pressure.737  
In 2008, a draft Forest Law (which had never before existed separately) and a draft Pasture 
Law were submitted for discussion in parliament and subsequent ratification.738 According 
to the provincial forest officer of Takhār, the new law was crafted after the Indian 
Rangeland Law and would imply a complete overhaul of the old forestry legislation. In the 
meantime, the Presidential Decree of the Interim President No. 736 on the prohibition of 
forest harvesting constitutes the only valid document since 2002.739 Apparently, many of 
the interviewees in Burka and Eshkamesh, and in Warsaj and Farkhār, referred to this 
decree when mentioning that the new government had prohibited the cutting of juniper 
(again).740 With this ban in mind, local fuel wood users had apparently tested the local 
government agents’ enforcement since it was reported that until 2004/05 juniper wood 
could be openly sold in the bazaar. Only when juniper sellers (both with donkeys and 
pickup trucks) were fined and their wood taken from them and distributed among passers-
by, a shift of juniper trading to night hours occured. Consequently, one could speak of a 
shadow economy of fuel wood trading in Burka and Eshkamesh. It has become clear that 
the current access practices, which mainly consist of outright theft from a legal rights-
based perspective, contradict existing legislation.741  
Local communities try to deal with the situation by introducing seasonal wood collection 
restrictions and a general surplus allocation restriction. Besides the relevant examples that 
have been noted in the earlier section on Fulol, in Warsaj’s Pyu, all Pyuchi were said to 
have the right to collect firewood in the higher and lower parts of Tagaw-e Wār up to 
Qalācha and in the side-valleys. However, for the summer months collecting fuel was 
prohibited in lower Tagaw-e Wār and in the nearby settlements in order to be able to find 
fuel materials in close proximity with less snow to overcome during the winter months. 
Traditionally, the first seasonal grazing period was used to stock up firewood for the next 
winter because after sowing in spring the men had hardly another agricultural activity. In 
2007, large-scale fuel collection of firewood during the first grazing period had been 
prohibited, though, because some people obviously piled up excessively large stocks 
                                                             
737 The ADB-typology of different land ownership categories further distinguishes ‘communal land’ 
assigning it a more robust property characteristic of ‘ownership’ than just use rights in the ‘public’ land 
category. Thus, communal land in the initial sense of the category was granted to one or two villages. In 
contemporary (non-legal, but users’) understanding communal is also actually public land that has been 
quasi-appropriated by villages for communal usage at some previous point of time. See ADB (2005). 
738 To date (March 2011), neither law has passed parliament and Meshrāno Jirga. 
739 This Interim Decree of 7 August 2002 reiterated the earlier Decree No. 405 of 24 January 2002. See GoA 
(2009: 23). 
740 It was commonly known that juniper-cutting had already been prohibited under the government of Zāher 
Shāh. This rule caused the intense cutting of all other tree species like Ephedra (matraq) varieties and bashāl, 
for example and led to a situation where those have largely vanished from the landscape throughout the 
northeastern districts. However, also livestock damage should be considered, as it is reported that the Gujars’ 
animals loved Ephedra. 
741 Thereby it does not matter whether the old legislation or the one in draft stage is considered. Both are 
being ignored and violated.  
271 
 
despite their households consisting of only a few people. This surplus allocation restriction 
was also observed in Burka’s Dān-e Kor and Farkhār’s Khuram Āb (see section 6.2.1-c), 
among other places. In Kāriz and in Dān-e Kor, the district administration was requested to 
support the enforcement of the local banning decision, and the sanctions were similar in all 
places. For example, in Pyu the sanction mechanism that was put into effect for non-
obedience of the fuel cutting and transportation ban was that if somebody got caught with a 
donkey-load of firewood in the village during daytime before the end of the grazing period 
in Tagaw-e Wār, the wood would be taken from him and used for communal purposes, 
such as in the mosque. The Pyuchi also appointed a local forest guard, a practice that was 
common in most places throughout the four districts under investigation. Immediate 
government involvement was not discernible as a motive to appoint a local guard. In Koka 
Bulāq, the mir-residence in Eshkamesh, the mir family had newly broadened the mandate 
of two guards (mirāb) in charge of overseeing the water pipes coming down from the 
mountains to the village with the additional task of controlling fuel withdrawal.742  
The position of the forest guard – especially the government-appointed forest guard and 
assistants he has chosen himself without prior legitimation from the local community – 
embodies the incoherence between the intentions of forest resources regulation from the 
side of the government and the locally perceived and practiced necessity to involve in a 
shadow economy of juniper trading and a creeping but systematic depletion of other fuel 
plant stocks. The office of forest guard had been established under the government of 
Zāher Shāh in the 1960s. In Farkhār and Warsaj, appointed forest guards were in charge of 
enforcing the ban on cutting pistachio trees and juniper. As one result of this policy all 
other trees were cut heavily throughout the region until the revolution period began. In 
Fulol, the forest guard prior to 1978 had come from Kabul and was residing in Fulol 
proper; he was said to be incorruptible and capable of enforcing the cutting ban, including 
the execution of sanctions and punishments for violating the law. Today, the duty of the 
official forest guard who is part of the district-level agricultural department and his 
workers suffers from a lack of training and the absence of resources to move around in the 
district. Because of these working conditions, including the rather low salary743 of 
government officers, the fact that the local population’s demands for fuel cannot be 
compensated for by alternative energy provision in the short and medium terms, and the 
fact that the forest guard is usually one of the local residents, the enforcement capacity of 
the government and its appointed guards is weak at best. From the users’ perspective the 
lack of alternatives at the same cost, that is, basically no cost, as wood fuel gathered by 
users themselves, is the strongest argument for cutting – the issue is discursively framed in 
terms of necessity. Thus, for example, in Farkhār I conducted an interview during the 
heating period in the district administration’s agricultural department and witnessed how 
the government-appointed forest guard himself brought and burned freshly-cut wood.744 
Fining takes place only on a cursory basis and is generally actually carried out when 
                                                             
742 Interview in Koka Bulāq, 6 September 2007. 
743 The argument is not that the salary is too low, but as a salary it is already an assumed resource. It is the 
use of the office for extracting further financial gains that is most important and makes a government position 
attractive.  
744 Interview, 11 March 2007. 
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personal enmities and antipathies are involved or wood-cutters decline to pay the usual 
bribe to the local forest guard who ‘taxes’ donkey-loads of wood. In Burka, the profit 
orientation of the government-appointed forest guard was obvious in the fact that he 
appointed his assistant from Fulol (proper) to check fuel withdrawal in Sāi-ye Hazāra 
while he expected to receive at least 50 percent of the money taxed from local wood-
cutters (see above). Less lucrative areas, such as Kāriz, were left to themselves. Based on 
these observations, the venality of government representatives can be described a fixed 
cornerstone of the local fuel economies.  
In comparison with access to mountainsides for grazing, where local rules seemed both to 
exist and to be enforced, the widely-practiced ignorance of rules for fuel wood withdrawal 
represents a collective failure of local authorities, that is, government representatives at 
district and community levels, elders, and religious authoritities. At the time of fieldwork, 
none of them was able to enforce surplus collection restrictions or the juniper cutting ban 
in any meaningful way, first of all because elders, mullahs and local forest guards were all 
part of the local fuel economy, because of their fuel dependence as users (necessity-
discourse and lack of alternatives). Moreover, often times they also were involved as 
surplus benefactors.  
The situation presents a serious dilemma with uncertain outcomes. The mullah and 
mawlawi regularly try to raise awareness about the situation during Friday prayers in the 
local mosque, appealing to the community members to limit their cutting to personal fuel 
wood needs and not cut for profit because this practice does serious harm and causes 
degradation. Part of the argument was also the demand to restrict fuel collection to dead 
parts of the trees, to preserve young ‘green’ trees, and abstain from uprooting artemisia. 
All violations and cutting beyond one’s own needs would be a major sin [gunāh] in this 
world and in the next. The interviewee who gave these accounts added, “But what can the 
mawlawi do more than this [preaching]? They do not have guns to punish people. People 
still cut the trees.”745 The reference to having a gun as precondition for rule enforcement is 
meaningful in this context. It relates not only to the physical possession of a gun, but also 
includes the willingness and readiness to use it for enforcing one’s position. Otherwise, the 
carrying of a weapon by ordinary police and many forest wardens (depending on the area 
where they are on duty746) would be misinterpreted. Furthermore, attempts at enforcing 
cutting restrictions on settlers adjacent to the forest-bearing mountainsides in favor of more 
distant fuel wood users suggest a high potential for violent escalations of such conflicts. 
The use of force induces further violence, as the example of Khuram Āb (section 6.2.1-c) 
showed. At the same time, local accounts bear witness of a general fear of force and 
violent conflict, and attempts to avoid it whenever possible (see above). It must be read as 
an indicator of the extent of desperation that local community elders, who themselves 
depend highly on fuel resources, turn to the district government which is obviously highly 
ineffective in enforcing official policies, to have their demands for access and cutting 
restrictions on fuel users from neighboring communities supported and enforced. These 
                                                             
745 Interview with Gujar in Dān-e Kor (upper Fulol/Burka), 11 September 2007. 
746 For example, the locally-appointed forest guard in Khuram Āb Bālā carried a gun with him walking the 
mountains above the Khuram Āb settlements; the guard in Fulol who strolled around in Sāi-ye Hazāra proper 
taxing the incoming donkey-loads of wood did not carry a weapon (own observations).  
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neighboring communities have at least temporarily and often for much longer terms shared 
the same access rights by custom until they became contested, providing for the above-
noted transition in access patterns evident throughout the period of fieldwork from 2006 
until 2009.  
In the research districts there was no evidence of management mechanisms other than the 
spontaneous punishment of wood thieves, the issuance of a cutting ban, the sanctioning of 
other violations related to the pasture areas (Art. 19-25 of 1970 Law of Pasture Lands), 
legislative regulations forbidding the conversion of pastures or rangeland into cultivation 
areas (Art. 9 ibid.), and a prohibition to graze goats and camels in forest areas (Art. 18 
ibid.). Measures linked to sustainable use of rangelands, eventual reforestation, and basic 
environmental awareness-raising are largely nonexistent. The idea of sustainability 
seemingly doesn’t inform legal or other management provisions. The forestry legislation 
and practices under King Zāher Shāh and Dāod through 1978 did not foresee active 
preservation measures in the area, but were limited to restricting the extraction and cutting 
of trees; in those days, the rules were more faithfully observed and successfully 
enforced.747 In interviews, Gujars referred to their local norm of using only dead wood 
instead of cutting fresh wood. Otherwise a common response to the question of what will 
happen if the last trees are cut on the mountainsides was ‘God is kind’ (khudā mehrebān 
ast). The phrase can be read as an expression of fatalism, but is also conveys a certain 
amount of desperation and a high degree of uncertainty; it is simply not known what will 
happen in the future. Furthermore, the attempts described above to limit fuel usage to 
personal needs and consumption by adjacent residents suggests that fatalism is not 
something with which the local population is content. 
Instead, with the progressing degradation and negative consequences thereof, signs appear 
which hint at an emerging sense of environmental value that locals attach to tree and plant 
vegetation. It is rooted in experienced harm, especially recurring flash floods that often 
wash away agricultural land and houses. In Dar-e Kalān, the interviewee who reported that 
200 out of 210 households would regularly be logging, pondered that if the cutting 
continues unabated the trees will be finished in two years’ time and “not one house will be 
left standing because of mudslides”.748 The Gujars of Dān-e Kor blamed the loggers from 
Sāi-ye Hazāra for excessive cutting mainly for profit purposes and opined that their own 
houses and livestock would be affected by mudslides first as they live closest to the 
mountainsides. Consequently, they spoke of their expectation to have ‘a good Muslim’ 
appointed as forest guard by the government.749 The expression alludes to the normative 
idea that a ‘good Muslim’ would never accept bribes and be able to enforce a cutting ban 
as necessary.  
Thus, it can be concluded that many wood fuel users seem to be aware of the long-term 
harm caused by daily logging. In local parlance this idea found expression in the phrase 
“tisha dar pāy khod zadan ast” (literally ‘cutting a tree is like striking with an ax at one’s 
                                                             
747 Reported in qualitative interviews with respondents of Dar-e Kalān, Sharshar, Āluchak (Eshkamesh), 21-
23 October 2007.   
748 Interview, Kochihā, 3 October 2007. 
749 Interviews, 12-13 September 2007. 
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own feet’).750 Even so, the principle of necessity was emphasized and used as an argument 
to ensure basic food needs of the family in Fulol and Eshkamesh. By contrast, in Farkhār 
and Warsaj the marketing aspect was not evident, though the fuel needs for personal 
consumption showed similar cutting patterns, degradation, and increasingly contested 
access (see section 6.2.1-c).751 The moral dilemma between perceived necessity and 
violating the law found expression in the shift of trade activities to nighttime hours. But 
this shadow characteristic of the fuel economy does not fully explain the moral tightrope 
walk of the wood-cutters between being aware of violating the cutting ban and the need for 
survival in a subsistence economy where everything that is earned one day (whether in 
cash or kind) is spent almost instantly to maintain survival. In addition, the awareness of 
inflicting the most severe harm directly on oneself and one’s qawm over the middle to long 
terms added a third dimension to the predicament of locals residing in the areas closest to 
the forested mountainsides. A fourth dimension of this dilemma relates to the patterns of 
resource extraction and rent seeking that were essentially localized in nature because of the 
relative isolation of local elites within both districts who were not good at fostering 
relations with patrons, elders, deputies, friends, former commanders, and so on in Kabul. 
Instead, the lack of representation at any administrative level was deplored which, if 
compared to the situation of Warsaj and Farkhār (see Ch. 6.2.1), might partially explain the 
degree and profit-orientation of local fuel exploitation. 
 
6.2.3 Summary: The (micro-) political ecology of mountain resources 
Given the high dependence of the rural population in Burka, Eshkamesh, Farkhār, and 
Warsaj on resources from mountainsides for subsistence livelihoods and surplus income 
generation, the access patterns to fuel wood and pastures are summarized from a human-
environment perspective below. The main argument is that the environment, in this case 
the mountainsides bearing fuel wood and grazing land, is becoming increasingly 
politicized. The politicization is based on a contestation of customary access patterns due 
to perceived increasing scarcity of available wood and pasture resources by the immediate 
inhabitants of the resource-bearing locations. There is an imperative political question as to 
how the conflicts over access to resources are and will be mediated, because given the 
irreversibility of the land cover degradation these conflicts are likely to increase in 
frequency and intensity in the future.  
                                                             
750 Interview, 4 September 2007. Residents of Fulol Pāyin and Fulol Bālā expressed awareness of the nexus 
between illegal cutting (including artemisia) and land cover erosion with subsequent occurrences of 
mudslides that had damaged houses and fields of local residents in the past. 
751 Wēghnān in Warsaj, for example, yields similar characteristics as Kāriz in Table 9 above. Local residents 
reported that the wood stocks had largely run out by the end of the 1970s. When in the past people in 
Wēghnān burned whole trees before the introduction of wood stoves (bukhari), in the last three and a half 
decades they have relied mainly on non-wood fuel plants for heating and cooking. But even non-wood fuel 
planst are reportedly about to run out and already do not cover their fuel needs. Lately wood fuel and non-
wood fuel plants are increasingly compensated for by dung. In this view, a higher number of animals secure 
more fuel from animal manure. Since the winter is particularly harsh in this remote area and neither man nor 
beast can leave the house for about four months during the winter, the piling up of firewood and fuel is one of 
the main activities throughout the remaining eight months (Interview with Deh Ta and Tāluqāndal 
representatives, 8 July 2007). 
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The conflicts observed in the field and described above form the basic indicator of 
politicization. All these conflicts are fundamentally a contestation over fuel wood or 
grazing grounds752 and the underlying access mechanisms between distinct social groups, 
which at least temporarily and often over a longer period of time had shared access based 
on customary joint practices. It is the mutual agreements, assumed to underlie these 
customary access patterns that have recently become concretely contested by open 
violation. The examples above demonstrate that the conflicts are not limited to competing 
user communities within a local realm or rivalries between members of different social 
status groups within one user community. Many of the conflicts also involve outsiders, 
such as incoming herders, kochi, wood traders, commercial medicinal plant collectors, and 
local government representatives.  
However, it is important to note in this argument about newly-evolving conflicts, which 
could fuel violence at any point, that the previous decade-long violent conflict actually 
created the prerequisites for the current situation. The war years meant a quantitative and 
qualitative shift of resource exploitation. While the revolution period was significant for 
pasture recovery, the onset and ceasing of mujahedin rule created milestones for the 
exploitation of fuel resources. Anecdotal evidence collected during fieldwork suggests that 
before their reign (and in Farkhār and Warsaj again after 2003) logging was mostly done 
for individual households’ fuel security and for survival reasons, though theft and 
individual cutting for profit certainly occurred. During the mujahedin period, however, 
logging and the exploitation of local fuel resources became an intrinsic part of the war 
economy with the main focus on logging for profit. Viewed from a natural resource-violent 
conflict linkage perspective, one could thus argue that the exploitation of fuel wood 
resources in the four study districts contributed at least partly to the indirect financing and 
sustaining of the war at the local level (see sections 6.2.1-a/b). It can be assumed to have 
been of significance especially during the onslaught of the Taliban in the mid-1990s and 
again their ousting from the districts of Burka, Eshkamesh, and Farkhār in 2001, because 
the front lines753 passed directly through the area. Shifting power relations at the local level 
were another widespread consequence of the war. The intimidation and partial 
disempowerment of traditional elites like mir and eshān has been reported in several 
communities; for example the case of Kerāni (see 6.2.1-b) showed how eshān’s traditional 
land use rights were contested by members of an armed local group who claimed it for 
their flocks. Similarly, in Deh-e Gumbaz villagers denied eshān access to the grazing areas 
they had used exclusively until a few years earlier, reasoning that a new need arose for 
them because they had purchased livestock and needed pasture areas.754 In a similar 
pattern, the exclusion of customary pasture users with their herds from other districts and 
provinces and the maintenance of local hostility towards them even when in many 
instances they offered money, points to a shift in local perceptions regarding the ability and 
necessity to restrict access to local resources for outsiders as well.  
                                                             
752 In the case of Khuram Āb, the conflict over resources overlapped with an existing family feud. The 
contestation over resources acted as trigger for a renewed escalation of violence.  
753 The front lines between different mujahedin groups and Taliban forces in second half of 1990s; the front 
lines between Northern Alliance and Taliban troops at the end of 2001. 
754 Interview, Deh-e Gumbaz, 10 August 2007. 
276 
 
The exhaustive wood logging and fuel selloff during the 1990s and tendencies of 
overgrazing due to the tremendous increase of livestock on the pastures since the onset of 
peace and in the aftermath of the latest droughts (until 2001 and again in 2006-08) 
precipitated the creeping degradation and land cover change underway since the early 20th 
century (see section 6.2.1-a). Against this background, scarcity is increasingly perceived 
by local users and causes them to undertake attempts to restrict access to other user groups. 
Figure 6 depicts a simplified view of these linkages in a rack-wheel and the respective text 
boxes belonging to each wheel.755 As the previous sections elaborated, any direct nexus 
linking poverty and degradation cannot be detected. The case of Pyu showed that the 
largest flocks and the best pastures belong to the better-off members of local communities.  
 
Figure 6: Micro-political ecology of mountain resources 
Likewise, though the actual loggers are people who often do not have any other income 
option, the incentive for surplus cutting (i.e., more than needed for own fuel purposes) is 
largely generated by the rural elites in Burka and Eshkamesh who possess cars and 
connections to buyers in Kunduz and other urban centers in the region. Their profit 
                                                             
755 The entire complexity of the relationships which capture the politics of human-environment interaction 
(political ecology of mountain resources) cannot possibly be portrayed in one graph. For example, the 
underlying causes for degradation are not fully captured by just focusing on the fuel economy, deforestation 
phenomena and over-grazing. In addition a whole set of interrelated dynamics and motives must be taken 
into account, i.e. rain-fed cultivation practices up on rangeland plots, usage of other mountainside resources 
(water, timber, medicinal plants), seasonal use patterns (including livestock winter pastures), and hazards 
(mudslides) caused by soil erosion. Mudslides have come to be looked at by local stakeholders as causes and 
consequences of degradation at the same time. I tend to interpret this as further indicator of the complexity of 
local environmental issues.  
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orientation is a more significant driver for wood fuel degradation than the actual logger-
laborers’ cutting of firewood for personal or household purposes.     
Remarkably, the roles of local rural as opposed to administrative elites in Farkhār and 
Warsaj differ from the situation in Burka and Eshkamesh. While the administrative agents 
(district governor, CoP) show the same rent-seeking attitude, the rural elites of Burka and 
Eshkamesh, such as the mir family in Eshkamesh, local elders and former commanders, are 
rather disconnected from influential networks and power relations. In contrast, in Warsaj 
and Farkhār the mujahedin-connection and the legacy of personal relations with Mas’ud 
have ensured direct links with very influential position holders in the central government 
(see Ch. 7 for details). Thus, rural elites in Farkhār and Warsaj are able to seek and derive 
rents from office appointments and administrative security in terms of legal backing in 
conflict cases. The conclusion from Burka and Eshkamesh was that logging and the 
admittedly illegal ’shadow’ trade of wood fuel constitutes about the only rent-seeking 
activity among the few available possibilities for income generation. 
The perception of increasing scarcity and damage to the land cover by the residents of 
adjacent to the mountainside communities in the first place has led to attempts to restrict 
resource usage for others, whether loggers, artemisia-harvesters, and flock owners from 
neighboring communities, or kochi from Kunduz, Baghlān, Kāpisā, and other places. As a 
result of such attempts, a transformation of common property (grazing land) and open 
access (fuel wood) regimes is currently underway in many locations of the districts 
discussed. The mediation of conflicts that arise out of the contestation of access rights is all 
but uncertain, given the complexity of interests and motivations underlying the continuing 
resource depletion. It is on the one hand directly abetted by government officials as the 
example of the police chief in Burka or district administrators in Farkhār and Warsaj 
demonstrated. In all the described cases, the public servants draw legitimacy from their 
office and use it for their own personal economic gain in the local pasture and fuel 
economies. Most obviously in Burka, the administrators (police chief, district governor, 
government-appointed forest guard with assistant/s) could draw upon the same legitimacy 
to sanction excessive logging activities, but they do not and their behavior does not meet 
open opposition from any quarter. However, a perception of injustice of these actions 
among the local populace certainly exists, framed by phrases like ‘zur kam zur mēkhora’ 
(‘the powerful suppress the ones with less power’). On the other hand, a high and usually-
misunderstood degree of the complexity of local power relations must be concluded from 
the observation that despite all these shortcomings of local government actors and their 
immediate roles in the local fuel and pasture economy, local communities appeal to them 
to seek support and what they feel would be just access arrangements, whether restricting 
outsiders’ access to pastures and fuel resources or to appoint a ‘good Muslim’ as forest 
guard. The disconnect between normative expectations towards the government as an 
abstract concept while at the same time being aware of the practical behavior of 
government officials presents an opaque behavior pattern which is examined in more detail 
in Chapter 7. Against this background, the outcome of the observed politicization of access 
and resultant evolving conflicts is highly uncertain. Consequently the prospects for 
effective management or control of the decreasing resource stocks, including access, are 
very low.   
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“If you wash your hands, you hope to eat something.” 
Interview with Shāh Abdul Hekmat, mirāb of Nahr-e Sofi, 25 April 2006 
  
7 – Modalities of local governance in Afghanistan’s rural society 
 
In this chapter, I conflate the main strands of the empirical material presented in Chapter 6 
by identifying what I call the modalities of local governance. The first part (7.1) concerns a 
comparative analysis of access patterns to irrigation water, grazing land and fuel wood. I 
will discuss the protagonists’ varied abilities to derive benefits from these resources and 
analyze the reasons for the observed differences in access patterns. In the remaining 
sections, I will abstract from the realm of natural resources access patterns to discuss more 
general mechanisms that shape local governance processes and the rural social order. 
These include the following: mechanisms for dispute resolution (7.2); the mediation of 
access in social relationships at the community level and aspects of its representation, 
especially by the people to the government and by the state to the people (7.3); pluralistic 
and contested legitimacies (7.4). The chapter unfolds the mechanisms of power in 
everyday life and demonstrates the crucial role of moralities in the enforcement of access 
to collective goods. The conclusion provides a summary of the main points in this chapter 
(7.5).  
 
7.1 A comparative analysis of access patterns to natural resources 
The preliminary analysis of irrigation water and rangeland governance indicated the 
existence of a multitude of local arrangements and rules that are often community-based 
and not backed by any legal basis other than custom and/or convention. Statutory laws 
regulating the access and use of productive natural resources in the form of a legal code for 
water, pastures, or forests were de facto absent because under revision within the 
framework of Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy (ANDS) (see Chapter 8). In 
Chapter 6, evidence of the domination of access patterns to resources by some users – what 
I subsequently call differential access patterns – was found in the theft of water by 
upstream users at times when insufficient water flows in the irrigation canal and rotation 
schedules apply; socially differentiated pasture use in Pyu and Farkhār’s Khuram Āb; 
place-based access to fuel resources by Gujar communities; and economic incentives for 
logging provided by middlemen residing in the middle of the Fulol valley. Despite the 
existence of local rules concerning intra-community access, which in theory apply to every 
community member equally, on the one hand, and the existence of provisions that regulate 
the rights-based access for different parties (outsiders and community members) in a 
balanced equalizing manner on the other; the empirical material showed that some 
individuals are better able to benefit from the resources in question than others. This leads 
me to ponder the question why some resource users are able to benefit more, that is, have 
‘better’ access – or indeed access – than others who are disadvantaged or even become 
excluded. It is obvious that the enforcement dimension, that is, how rules are perceived, 
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interpreted, implemented and practiced, is crucial in any discussion aimed at clarification 
of this question.  
For example, in the case of the allocation of irrigation water, existing arrangements of 
qulba/bēl-laborer ratios, the appointment and communal payment of a mirāb and a 
kokbāshi to oversee water distribution and ensure maintenance work, and local norms 
alluding to offsetting upstream-downstream imbalances in access (e.g., the rule that the 
mirāb ought to hail from downstream), have not prevented significant inequalities in water 
provision when it is contested (e.g., during droughts, seasonally low water levels, etc.). The 
elaborations of irrigation water distribution in all five canals in the three case studies 
showed that large landowners with farmland in the upper section of the canal usually 
benefit disproportionately and are likely able to irrigate their fields, whereas the crops of 
tail-end users die. However, the ability of these individuals (who so far have been lumped 
together in the ‘large landowner’ category) to get sufficient water when it is needed, rests 
on distinct factors in the various canal schemes.       
The material presented on Asqalān (section 6.1.1) showed considerable disparities in water 
allocation during times of scarcity not only between upstream and downstream users but 
also among head-end and tail-end farmers. It was suggested that a strong correlation exists 
between the amount of land owned and the status of landowners as elders and 
commanders. Moreover, the data indicated that returnees from Pakistan and IDPs were 
largely excluded from water distribution, as are the Baluch who reside near the intake. The 
contestation over water allocation not only between upstream and downstream 
communities but also among the members of individual communities suggests that local 
rivalries are rampant and that highly fragmentized solidarity patterns exist. The fact that 
the person in charge of overseeing irrigation practices, the mirāb, is appointed by the large 
landowners is reason to scrutinize the entire allocation regime, not only in times of 
contested water distribution. The mirāb’s position could be interpreted as the invention of 
large landowners because several arrangements with mutual payoffs exist among them. 
The appointment of mirāb not only is rewarded with a considerable amount of money (see 
section 6.1.2) but also allows unscrupulous water managers to extract additional monies by 
taking larger or smaller ‘fees’ from different water users in return for timely allocation. 
Furthermore, the selling of laborers guarantees an additional source of income sanctioned 
by the largest landowners. These kinds of arrangements are closed at the expense of small-
scale landowners and tail-end users. Although they have to contribute equally to the 
mirāb’s regular salary, they are systematically disadvantaged. Dissatisfaction with this 
situation led to the downstream users’ denial of payment to the mirāb of Tobrakash in 
2006. Ironically, he was doubly inflicted because he owed his appointment to the smaller 
landowners’ attempt to enforce their interests by appointing their favored candidate whom 
they trusted to be honest in bringing water to tail-end users. However, structural factors, 
such as the upstream-downstream power dynamics manifest in Fazl Jān’s subordination to 
Sofi Ghulām Nabi caused Fazl Jān’s failure to deliver, although he tried hard to be a 
worthy mirāb (section 6.1.1-c). 
Access to irrigation water when crops need it thus depends largely on whether a user is a 
landowner who appoints the mirāb or has ‘good’ (e.g., family) relations with him. Indeed, 
the mirāb is the direct, personified link between water in the canal and its allocation at 
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field level. The largest landowners with a stake in everyday irrigation affairs had been 
commanders at some point in the past.756 However, as the example of Fazl Jān showed, 
being elder and having been commander and even being acting mirāb are not sufficient for 
a landowner to enforce his own water rights in accordance with the rotation schedule. 
Instead, obviously, not only a mere bundle of factors determines who can enforce the 
allocation of water and who cannot but also how the different components in the bundle 
are arranged, that is, the weight of single components in proportion to the weight of others. 
These components can be thought of as diverse assets, which – because of their unequal 
distribution among different individuals – underlie socio-economic differences among 
community members and determine power relations. The empirical analysis demonstrated 
that despite existing tensions and a clear perception of injustice on the part of those 
deprived of water, the disadvantaged farmers seemed to have acquiesced and submitted to 
the situation according to the motto, ‘It is a matter of force, not of the law’ (gap-e zur ast, 
gap-e qānon nēst). The interview statements of Sofi Ghulām Nabi and Fazl Jān (section 
6.1.1-c), in which the latter discloses that Sofi is stealing water and explains his 
motivations with more empathy than grievance, serve as a case in point.  
In all three irrigation networks (that is, five canals), conflicts about water allocation do 
usually not escalate violently. Except for verbal and physical quarrels at offtakes, single 
casualties or cases of collective violence have not been reported. Local practices, such as 
the privileges of so-called ‘elders’, who by convention take three hours-worth of more 
water in upstream Asqalān than is their allotment, the employment of armed men at 
offtakes by large landowners to enforce their illegal claims for water out of turn, and the 
cultivation of rice by head-end farmers at the expense of downstream users, are not met 
with discernible objections beyond selective rhetoric. Against this background, it is valid to 
conclude that reoccurring deviances are sanctioned and social differences and differential 
de facto ‘rights’ to water are acknowledged. For example, farmers who grow rice in 
upstream Asqalān claim their right to more water and take it illegally by breaking seals at 
offtakes and destroying dams during nighttime hours. Such incidences were justified by the 
landowners, who asserted on practical grounds that indeed they had more rights as 
upstream residents than did downstream landowners simply because their fields are located 
upstream, that is, closer to the intake.757 These accounts were supported by water-deprived 
downstream users who admitted that location de facto determines the amounts of water 
allocated.  
The question of why the water-deprived landowners refrain from enforcing the rotation 
schedule agreed upon before the start of the irrigation season comprises at least two 
dimensions. The first is that they do not form a collective action group but are individual 
entrepreneurs. They depend on the performance of the mirāb,758 but if he is not able to 
                                                             
756 Several cases of extensive landownership by absentee landlords (overseas) have been reported. With 
regard to the landownership-commander correlation, there is no automatic causal nexus between having been 
commander and now owning the biggest land plots. When all data collected in this study were taken into 
account, it became evident that many (superior) commanders (e.g., sar-e grop) were actually the offspring of 
endowed families. See 7.3 below for a discussion of the role and authority patterns of commanders. 
757 See the empirical evidence as described in sections 6.1.1-b and 6.1.2-b. 
758 As respondents along the Surkhak canal (Sofi-Qarayatim) reported, a mirāb must first be skillful in 
negotiating with upstream-water users to allow water flow to the tail-end sections of the canal (Interview, 6 
May 2006). 
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enforce the schedule they have no legal and only limited illegal759 means to enforce it 
themselves. Some interviewees admitted that the cited theoretical option of the mirāb 
involving the ID and the police in cases of any violations of rotation times or other 
transgressions was not practiced along the Asqalān or any other canals. Second, if they can 
afford it, landowners buy a water pump to cope in times of insufficient water in the canal, 
as does Fazl Jān, the downstream mirāb, for example. Such an ‘exit’-option outbalances 
the temporary lack of irrigation water, albeit at a high monetary price (section 6.1.1-b). 
Against this background, it is evident that again farmers who have the smallest assets – 
owners of small land plots and sharecroppers who do not have the means to afford a water 
pump – lose out. The recognition of such unequal access to water can be deduced from the 
fact that conflicts about irrigation water are usually not considered as significant and not 
worth the involvement of elders as mediators (see section 6.1.2-c). The most important 
factor is that claims are not openly contested, which would be the precondition to the 
involvement of mediators in the conflict. Instead, claims are expressed directly through 
actions and the begetting of facts, with the difference that downstream claimants have few 
to no options for taking meaningful action to save their crops.  
However, it is peculiar that water theft and illegal withdrawal are carried out with 
impunity, obviously sanctioned, and do not lead to larger-scale violence or conflicts that 
are locally characterized as ‘blood-issues’. The connivance and absence of escalation 
despite perceived injustice and concrete material losses (crops) suggest that local 
stakeholders in irrigation governance throughout Asqalān are well aware of their limited 
scope of action and the domination of structural-relational factors over rights-based ones. 
Although in the popular perception Afghan societies are often attributed a special ‘culture 
of violence’ in which everyday casualties are not uncommon; violence flares quickly and is 
accepted as an everyday normalcy. However, the empirical data presented throughout 
Chapter 6 evinces a surprisingly different impression. It suggests instead that strong efforts 
are made locally to avoid open conflicts and violence whenever possible. Farmers deprived 
of irrigation water resigned themselves to accepting their inferior status in the local 
allocation hierarchy, which was determined by special bundles of assets. The apparent 
contention with this situation can also be read as an indicator that any type of objection and 
resistance by concrete action (e.g., illegal water withdrawal or use of force) is perceived to 
put at risk whatever it is that the individual holds dear, for example, land property, 
harmonious relations with fellow water users, family relations, and so on. Conversely, 
open conflict and violence are avoided because in the perception of the disadvantaged 
individual, this person has either too much to lose or has generally resigned to believing 
that nothing could alter the unequal allocation practices he is faced with.  
As I previously discussed, the influential figures living along both canals at Sofi and 
Qarayatim managed to appoint two new mirāb in 2006, one of which was loyal to the 
largest landowners (mirāb Mas’ud in Qarayatim) and the other of which was a large 
influential landowner himself (mirāb Shāh Abdul Hekmat in Sofi). The appointment that 
year was strategic because the local big men expected infrastructure measures to be 
implemented with foreign aid money in the upcoming irrigation season. Their aim was to 
                                                             
759 Stealing water does not make sense for tail-end users because there is usually no water in the downstream 
part of the canal during the rotation period of the upstream users. 
282 
 
influence the distribution of measures (offtake construction, intake concrete, and so on) 
indirectly through the person of the mirāb, who was the ID reference person at the canal 
level and would certainly be involved in the planning and implementation of measures. In 
contrast to Asqalān, the access patterns in Sofi and Qarayatim were eased slightly by the 
overlap of the Qarayatim irrigation network with that of the Chārdara main canal. 
Consequently, downstream water users in Qarayatim had the option of relying on water 
allocated by either canal (see section 6.1.2-a). In contrast to Asqalān, kokbāshi play a 
greater role in local water allocation in Sofi and Qarayatim because they are appointed by 
the landowners along the sub-branches of the canal, not by the mirāb as in Tobrakash and 
Asqalān. This practice outweighs the unilateral intervention of Ahmad Shāh and the big 
men behind Shāh Abdul Hekmat to appoint loyal followers at canal level because at the 
field level, more legitimated figures were selected as kokbāshi in charge of establishing a 
rotation schedule with elders and allocating water according to the agreed-upon turns.760  
The relatively authoritative allocation of water by Aslam Mirāb in Qal’a-ye Zāl and Wahid 
Mirāb in Tarboz Guzar was discussed at length in section 6.1.3-a. The strong social 
identity caused by the ethnic homogeneity of the population throughout Tarboz Guzar and 
a favorable layout of the canal, given the possibility of growing rice in the swampy tail-end 
areas, seems to have resulted in only rare cases when water is seriously contested. The 
ability to irrigate was ensured through contributions to maintenance and to the salaries of 
the mirāb and the kokbāshi. In Qal’a-ye Zāl, the size of the system necessitated a high 
degree of hierarchical outsourcing of water management oversight. Subsequently, a high 
degree of delegation of tasks to the 33 kokbāshi and several chakbāshi made the mirāb 
appear effective and able to enforce equitable water distribution.761 The high flexibility of 
the bēl-unit, a favorable irrigation network design that incorporated natural physical 
conditions, the mirāb’s personality (respected muysafēd), his pro-transparency stance and 
being assisted by a scribe (kāteb), all worked in favor of the impression that inequalities in 
access to irrigation water were much less pronounced in Qal’a-ye Zāl – and likewise in 
Tarboz Guzar – than in Asqalān, Sofi or Qarayatim.  
However, in the case of irrigation water, the availability of the resource depends to a great 
extent on external, that is, climatic-geographic factors, including amounts of precipitation, 
weather, and related snowmelt-timing; moreover, wood fuel, fuel wood in general, and 
pastures constitute finite assets the availability of which rarely varies. How selective 
different members of the community are in using the pastures and making use of fuel wood 
was summarized in sections 6.2.1-b and 6.2.2-a. The notion that the pastures are God’s 
property and are not owned by anybody and that local residents are privileged to use the 
mountainsides for their own needs (of grazing; fuel wood, herbs and medicinal plants 
collection; hunting; rain-fed cultivation; and pistachio harvesting) in accordance with their 
                                                             
760 To what extent the kokbāshi are complicit with the largest landowners along the sub-branch of the canal of 
which they are in charge, could not be investigated in depth because of time constraints. It goes without 
saying that their appointment likely follows the same motivations of resident landowners as does the mirāb-
appointment at the canal level. The extent to which he serves his mandate or acts in the sole interest of large 
landowners in his area and sub-branch of competence thus depends on the person of the kokbāshi and his 
principles.  
761 However, at the field level, this could not be investigated systematically because of time and 
organizational constraints. See the above the discussion of the role of kokbāshi at the field level in Qarayatim 
and Sofi (section 6.1.2-a). 
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social identity of belonging to a certain community (which claims use rights for 
customarily defined mountainsides) suggest the ability of all to make use of the attached 
resources. However, the data revealed in Chapter 6.2 indicated that access to 
mountainsides is also partially unequal. At the time of this fieldwork, access practices to 
pastures were determined by previous intra-community contestations (e.g., in the case of 
Weghnān’s past conflict) or other factors that likely caused an uncontested redefinition of 
access and pasture use. For example, in the case of Pyu, the location of pasture camps at 
Tagaw-e Wār is based on belonging to a local group and wider network of people with a 
common past as companions of Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud. The members of this group dispose 
of a whole bundle of power resources, such as authority,762 legitimacy, force, social status 
and economic resources (wealth), which support their claim for access and its enforcement.  
Thus, access depends on place-based and authoritative factors. In particular, given the 
absence of a rangeland law at the time of this field research, the access of outsiders to 
mountainsides, which the local communities perceived to belong to them because of their 
geographical proximity, became increasingly contested. Here again it is quite remarkable 
that force and violent means to deter rival claimants were avoided with much effort, even if 
it meant involving the local government,763 such as in the cases of Pyu and Weghnān. 
Indeed, this restraint is noteworthy given the perceived scarcity of rangeland that caused 
local communities to contest kochi’s and neighboring communities’ customary rights to 
graze flocks on ‘their’ pastures (Weghnān). The contestation was justified with necessity. 
Based on the same principle of necessity, in the case of wood, a ban on cutting issued by 
the government was largely ignored throughout the research area. In contrast to irrigation 
water, which can be seen as a strategic resource for commercial agriculture that is linked to 
private entrepreneurship, landownership, and land-labor relations, mountain resources have 
traditionally been more accessible; for example, pastures were seen as common property 
and fuel resources even as open access resources. Consequently, if differences within local 
user communities are considered, the notion of necessity, that is, the perceived lack of 
alternatives and the significance of resources for survival, translates into conventionally 
more equitable access mechanisms at the community level.  
However, in section 6.2, I argued that these property perceptions are currently undergoing 
transformation. Resources are increasingly contested not only by outsiders (in the case of 
pastures), but even among and within local user communities (see sections 6.2.1-c, 6.2.2-
a). In the particular case of fuel wood and the underlying open-access regime for non-wood 
fuels, the war resulted in a blurring of the original user community which had been defined 
according to locational proximity. Because of progressive depletion caused by excessive 
logging for profit connected to the economic incentives of war, the availability of fuel 
wood was expanded considerably to entire valleys. For example, the mountain trees of Sāi-
ye Hazāra in Fulol have come to be cut by loggers from throughout the valley. Similarly, in 
Kāriz or the five valleys of Eshkamesh, fuel wood increasingly originates from the last few 
side valleys, which still contain varieties of wood and non-wood fuel plants. Access to 
                                                             
762 Here, authority designates a mix of factors: not only influence and decision-making competence, but also 
legitimacy based on charisma and tradition or convention, in addition to co-notions of force and social status 
(see also below). 
763 For a further discussion of why the involvement of government agents in conflict cases is really an 
exception and remarkable, see subchapter 7.2 below.  
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grazing land is increasingly restricted to members of local communities, whereby anybody 
who decides to buy livestock enjoys the right to have his flocks graze in the mountains 
adjacent to the community. From pasture-scarce communities, such as Khānaqāh in Warsaj 
or different locations in Farkhār, livestock owners usually send their animals to the 
pastures of friends, clients and other people they ‘know’ and with whom they have 
relations. Accordingly, the incorporation of occasionally significant numbers of non-
community flocks by community members on community pasture land is common, but has 
not been the subject to open debate so far.764 Despite indicators that deteriorating pasture 
conditions and recurrent drought765 have led to local considerations of seasonal access 
limitations for selected pastures, the exclusion of local community members’ flocks is not 
an issue. Access restrictions are enforced by selective appointments of local forest guards 
as was shown for Pyu, Fulol, and Khuram Āb Bālā.  
Against the background of increasing resource depletion especially in the case of wood and 
other fuel resources, the transformation of access remains highly inconclusive regarding 
where it will evolve and which implications for modes of resource distribution and local 
peace will develop in the future. The involvement of the government in many cases where 
pastures and fuel wood access has become contested among user communities both near 
mountainsides and farther away, could be interpreted as indicators of desperation. The 
government has traditionally been a last resort in cases of conflict (see section 7.2) because 
of its incapacity to enforce rules, its interest in seeking rents, the self-interest of its 
representatives, and the general suspicion of local community members regarding exposure 
to government attention.  
In summary, I have identified three features that are shared by all of the presented case 
studies on environmental resource governance:  
 Illicit access prevails over licit rights-based access mechanisms; 
 Relational access mechanisms prevail over licit and illicit rights-based mechanisms; 
 Open conflicts and violent escalation of contestations is largely prevented by major 
efforts in peaceful conflict mediation by all stakeholders involved (see section 7.2). 
The first point concerns the absence of statutory legal regulations for resource access and 
use, that is, for water, rangelands and forests, and the identified gap between customary 
conventional legal regulations and access enforcement (de facto practices). To recap the 
examples in telegraphic style: Water theft is widely practiced despite local norms and 
established agreed-upon rotation schedules and the annually appointed mirāb and kokbāshi 
to enforce the respective communal agreements. Juniper wood is cut despite the 
governmental ban on logging, and locally appointed forest guards rent the right to cut the 
forest instead of restricting cutting. Kochi are denied access to pastures they have 
customarily used and for which they even hold documents and title deeds. The differential 
access patterns within local user communities furthermore highlighted that even if the 
ability to benefit from irrigation water or mountain resources is based on de facto 
                                                             
764 It is likely that the rejection of single flocks in the matter of unrelated outsiders is because he has to 
accommodate his own livestock, so he refuses the additional burden of animals or entire herds on a pasture 
with limited available space and fodder.   
765 Droughts have repeatedly resulted in large-scale losses of animals.    
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violations of local norms and regulations, it is not sufficient to understand why some 
resource users benefit unduly compared to others. The latter can only be understood when 
the significance of structural-relational factors is taken into account. Location, authority or 
social status, social identity and economic resources endowment have been mentioned to 
be components or branches which form bundles of power.766 The fact that this study 
departed from natural resources governance naturally resulted in the importance of 
physical geographical locations and place-based factors for the general availability of the 
resources in question. Within the research framework, which relied on local user 
communities as primary level of analysis in small-to-medium-scale resource exploitation 
settings, it was found that the limits of local self-management and the absence of ideas of 
sustainable management (sections 6.1.3-b and 6.2.2-b) caught local users in the trap of the 
desire to practice equal resource distribution (as indicated by local norms and de jure 
distribution mechanisms) but the inability to do so because of various constraints.  
Table 10 provides a simplified overview of the factors that enabled local community 
members to benefit from resources, as outlined in Chapter 6:   
Table 10: Overview of factors underlying access mechanisms to natural resources 
Location Factors that enabled individuals 
to benefit from resources 
Remarks 
Asqalān  Upstream location of field plots 
 Authority derived from (former) 
commander status, ‘elder’ status 
 Appointment of ‘weak’ mirāb loyal to 
large landowners 
 Unduly claim of water by cropping rice 
without effective sanction  
 
… commander-status related 
with potentiality/threat of 
force 
… fragmented, mosque-based 
commander influence in 
Asqalān 
Sofi-Qarayatim 
 
 
 Upstream location of field plots 
 Authority derived from (former) 
commander status, ‘elder’ status 
… more influential (than in 
Asqalān), supra-mosque 
commander-patterns  
Tarboz Guzar 
& Qal’a-ye Zāl 
 
 
 Social identity/community belonging 
 Location of fields/geo-physical outline of 
both canals 
 Enforcement capacity of respected mirāb 
… in Tarboz Guzar stronger 
social identity based on 
exclusive Turkmen 
population; mixed in QeZ 
Farkhār and 
Warsaj  
(pastures) 
 Social identity/community belonging 
 Relations with residents of places which 
have access to pastures 
 Authority derived from belonging to 
former commander-networks 
 
 
 
(of Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud and 
Dāktar Muhamad, see 7.3) 
Burka and 
Eshkamesh  
(fuel wood)  
 Remote place of residence (Gujars) 
 Social identity/community belonging 
 Number of sons/male helpers in 
household 
 Relations with wood-selling loggers of 
Sāi-ye Hazāra and Dān-e Kor 
 Relations with buyers in Kunduz 
 Cash resources/wealth enable to buy fuel 
from sellers at bazaar 
… different fuel purposes 
determine unchecked demand 
for various fuel types incl. 
juniper wood 
 
 
… owning of transport vehicle 
as precondition for fuel trade  
 
                                                             
766 I owe this notion to Ghani (1995) (cited in Ribot and Peluso [2003: 158]). However, although he spoke of 
a ‘bundle of powers’, I would not support this pluralization or apply it in my own study (see Ch. 2.2.2) 
without specifying that it designates a bundle or bundles of power resources. In contrast to power, which only 
exists in relationships, power resources can be possessed by individuals and collective/corporate actors.  
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Table 10 shows the close interconnection between wealth, status, authority, and power. 
The single factors are linked in multiple, overlapping ways; they are mutually constitutive 
and form a complex pattern underlying the local governance of these natural resources. In 
individuals, different factors overlap in what I argue are bundles of power. From this 
perspective, individuals can be viewed as nodes in larger webs of social relations where 
power manifests. The distinction of individual factors or power resources being bundled in 
individuals is a purely analytical, albeit useful, exercise to understand differential access 
patterns and their dynamics (Ribot and Peluso 2003: 158).  
I will now leave the realm of natural resource management behind and extend the 
perspective of this chapter to power mechanisms that transcend the governance of 
resources. The examples of Ahmad Shāh and Hāji Rustam in Qarayatim (Figure 1) 
resemble preliminary attempts to map bundles of power resources in single individuals. 
They showed that a longitudinal view of changes in available power resources and their 
support in deriving further benefits is fruitful for analysis. For example, Ahmad Shāh’s 
father was an important commander during the revolution period, which entailed a 
leadership role for his son, who then took over as commander during the period of the 
Taliban government. Strategic family relations and their pro-active ties led to the creation 
of the web of power relations in which Ahmad Shāh and Hāji Rustam are important nodes. 
As such, they determine the modes of local governance beyond the local arena of natural 
resource management. In the subsequent sections, I therefore discuss patterns of conflict 
mediation (7.2), representation (7.3) and legitimacy (7.4).  
 
7.2 Mechanisms for conflict mediation 
Cases of conflict arise in the governance of natural resources and contestation over 
increasingly scarce assets, such as cultivable land (because of advanced plot fragmentation 
as result of inheritance, arrival of returnees from exile in Pakistan and Iran), fuel wood, and 
the deterioration of pasture areas, accompanied by a dramatic increase in livestock 
numbers. The mediation of such conflicts marks a significant cornerstone of local 
governance in the society under investigation. The previous section elaborated that 
contrary to the popular perception of a ‘culture of violence’ characterizing the population 
of Afghanistan, everyday conflict behavior strives to avoid violent escalation. The 
mechanisms and motivations underlying conflict mediation efforts will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs.   
The case studies analyzed in Chapter 6 revealed the following pattern of how disputes are 
addressed: In the majority of cases and whenever possible, local communities and conflict 
parties try to find solutions to issues among themselves, without exposing the object of the 
conflict or disclosing disunity among qawm to the outside – whether neighboring 
communities or the government.767 Instead, the aggrieved person usually consults the local 
elders, who listen to versions of the conflict and possibly consult further witnesses before 
                                                             
767 See the statement of the Kharoti elder addressing the district governor in section 6.1.3-c. 
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deciding on a verdict. The most common object of conflict was found to be land,768 and to 
great extent, within one extended family (see section 6.1.2-b). Conflicts over water, 
detached from land rights, are not considered big issues, so they are usually left to the 
jurisdiction of the mirāb. If conflicts over resources arise between different user 
communities or claimants (such as in the case of kochi, or in the case of Sofi-Qarayatim 
with rival claims to water because of the joint intake), or because of transforming access 
regimes (e.g., change of access to fuel wood from open access to common property regime 
of a narrower user community in Fulol), outside mediators, such as muysafēd from both 
conflicting parties and possibly even from a trusted third party with a good reputation, get 
involved in the mediation of the conflict. One indigenous differentiation of conflicts was 
elaborated in the example of Qarayatim, as reported by different elders (section 6.1.2-c). 
Accordingly, three socio-spatial scales are distinguished: 1) conflicts among parties within 
the same (mosque) community; 2) conflicts among parties from different mosque 
communities but the same manteqa; 3) conflicts with involvement of parties of different 
manteqa. With the increasing scope of a conflict, depending on the issues at stake and the 
behavior and background of the conflict parties, elders from the respective communities as 
well elders from a third and possibly fourth location are asked to participate in negotiating 
a settlement of the dispute in question.  
The district administration becomes involved either after one of the conflicting parties does 
not accept the elders’ decision or from the very outset, if the aggrieved party does not 
consult the elders first but immediately appeals to the district governor. In the former case, 
either the elders or the aggrieved person sends a letter to the district governor asking for 
assistance with the clarification of claims. In the latter case, either the aggrieved person or 
somebody he knows would send a letter to the district head. The mode of appeal depends 
on the socio-economic status of the complaining party or his relations with influential big 
men. For example, in Chapter 6.1.2-b the observation was reported that Ahmad Shāh had 
taken one of his followers to the office of the district governor without first sending a 
letter. In this case, he had direct access because of his social position as former 
commander. He was still an influential person because he belonged to a network of big 
men in Qarayatim and owned a considerable amount of land. Similarly, Hāji Jum’a Khān, 
who was charged by his qawm and the water users of Sofi and Qarayatim to mediate the 
land issue with the Kharoti people, approached the district governor directly.769     
As described at length above (in section 6.1.2-b, c), the district administration was 
involved in mediating the conflict over the aqueduct. It was not addressed with severe 
measures, such as threats or violence, despite the uneven distribution of strength (arms and 
                                                             
768 For an impression of the proportion of land versus other objects of conflict consider the number of cases 
addressed by the sub-national government departments. Accordingly, of the 1,664 petitions filed in the 
Kunduz Provincial Justice Department and the six district offices of the department in 2005-2006, 1,053 
concerned land disputes. The remaining petitions related to loans and trading (561) as well as family issues 
(38). Of the 1,664 petitions, only 295 were handed over to the court. All others were solved without the 
involvement of the provincial court (Interview with the head of the provincial justice department in Kunduz, 
31 May 2006). Courts cannot be approached directly by a private person. According to the head of the Land 
Affairs Department, the only exception is when a couple wants to marry without their parents’ consent 
(Interview in Kunduz, 29 November 2006). 
769 That said, the importance of middlemen and representation becomes evident. It will be discussed in the 
next subchapter (7.3). 
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manpower, that is, number of followers) among the conflicting parties, in this case the 
landowners of Sofi and Qarayatim on the one side and the few farmers of Kharoti on the 
other side. One indicator that could answer the question of why no force became involved 
was the existence of family ties, as mentioned by Hāji Jum’a Khān in the office of the 
district governor when he alluded to his Kharoti nephew. This case supports the notion that 
local conflicts (in the broader sense) within user communities are usually contained. If 
violence occurs, the escalation usually cannot be traced back to the contestation of 
resources alone, but is conflated with several other factors. Often a politicization of the 
conflict is boosted by animosities between families, as in the case of Khuram Āb in 
Farkhār. If the administration learns about a conflict in which human casualties are 
involved, it will take action by jailing the murderer and processing a court sentence. Local 
dwellers in the most remote places reported that the local government would have to be 
notified of any such cases and the security organizations would be involved.  
Hence, in addition to cases, which are categorized by the elders’ socio-spatial outreach 
from an emic point of view, the administration distinguishes murder and criminal cases 
that involve the police from rights cases that concern family matters such as divorces, land 
disputes (either between two individuals or land disputes between individuals and the 
government), and corporate rights in business (e.g., bazaars), in addition to loan-issues. 
The basic distinction is between huququllah and huquq’abed. Conflicts that fall in the 
latter category can be settled by elders through conventional compensation strategies, 
sometimes involving the district or even higher administrative authorities. Huququllah 
refers to murder cases that require punishment as capital crimes. Exit options, such as the 
self-ransoming of murderers who dispose of considerable monetary and relational assets, 
are not sanctioned legally. The reality, however, does often not meet these normative legal 
standards, although the government is obliged to jail and punish the offender even if the 
afflicted party – that is, the family of the killed person – settles with the murderer’s 
family.770 As a rule, such cases are treated by the provincial or Kabul prosecutor; district 
authorities do not have the competence to address huququllah.  
Land conflicts between the state and individual owner-claimants are rampant because 
under past political regimes in the mujahedin and Taliban periods, government land was 
sold or appropriated by government representatives. There is a plethora of documents, 
some of which are considered illegal because the issuing authority is not recognized by the 
present government authorities. Some are faked and are often based on claims that elders 
closed the deal, but are now passed away. In the absence of a land-record administration 
(see Ch. 5.2.2) there is no possibility to verify their fingerprints, and other witnesses 
usually can not be found.771  
All interview respondents perceived that the law enforcement capacity of the government 
was very weak, regardless of whether they were villagers who solved their issues with 
local elders or if they were government deputies. Once any government department 
becomes involved in the mediation of a conflict, justice can be bought by the person who 
offers the highest amount of money or is meted out to the person who has relations with 
                                                             
770 Interview with district governor of Chārdara, 22 May 2006. 
771 Interview with head of Department of Land Affairs in Kunduz, 29 November 2006. For a discussion of 
matters referred to as legal or norm pluralism, see Chapter 7.4 below. 
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more influential persons.772 This practice causes many ordinary aggrieved persons to use 
the mediation efforts of local elders. However, it depends on the characteristics of the local 
elders whether or not justice would guide the mediation process. Self-interest, greed and 
possible bias are endemic if family or other social relations of the elder side with one of the 
conflict parties. A decision taken at the communal level usually depends on local power 
relations that are reflected in the composition of the council of elders tasked to solve the 
conflict. That leaves the choice of local conflict resolution by elders with only three 
advantages – less time needed, peaceful solution, less expenses – to be weighed against a 
similarly corrupt outcome in cases when the government is involved. Another possible 
effect of local conflict resolution, which is occasionally enforced through the exchange of 
daughters, is the fostering of ideally concordant family relations between initial conflict 
parties.  
The data collected during fieldwork demonstrated the tendency towards turning to the 
government for conflict mediation. However, this alternative is pursued by persons who 
can afford it, hoping to buy justice and rights. This is also an indicator that mediation 
efforts by local muysafēd are not necessarily corrupted, that is, not every elder can be 
bought. By referring most of the conflict appeals involving the local government back to 
the community level for clarification by local elders, the government compensates for its 
lack of capacities and resources, and at the same time strengthens non-governmental, that 
is, elders’ authority. In such cases (see section 6.1.2-b), elders are requested to ‘solve’ an 
issue and report back to the concerned government department at the district-
administration level via written notice. However, the data collected in the interviews in 
Qal’a-ye Zāl, Tarboz Guzar, and Sofi-Qarayatim revealed an opposing trend; cases were 
reported in which elders’ decisions were not accepted by wealthy persons.  
Related, another question concerns for whom the government authorities at the district-
administration level are accessible. I have described the reception hours of the district 
governor in Chārdara. However, social differences and the differential power of 
individuals automatically urge the less endowed with power resources to seek access 
through somebody who dispenses direct access – in this case to the office of the district 
governor. Otherwise, they do not appeal to the government and thus must submit to 
disadvantages of injustice and unequal power relations. In this respect, the changing role of 
elders and other middlemen must be considered.  
 
7.3 Representation: Interfaces between community members and ‘authorities’  
The preliminary analysis of elders’ mediation activities (muysafēdi) at the interface of local 
communities and the Chārdara district government or other ‘outside’, non-community 
                                                             
772 The Director of the provincial Land Affairs Department, gave several examples of high government 
officials sending letters to his department even before a case was submitted to his office in order to support a 
conflict party, which is often the criminal charged. Subsequently the Director has to submit to the ‘order’ 
from above or otherwise put the case to rest for a long while before taking it up again. If criminals are 
sentenced to prison terms, they are often set free again after a short period. The provincial Head of 
Department of Government Affairs admitted, “This is the reality: most cases are solved by order (command), 
not on the basis of law” (Recorded during a workshop organized by Mediothek Afghanistan in Kunduz, May 
2007).  
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agents discussed in section 6.1.2-c revealed the crucial role middlemen play in Afghan 
rural society. Figure 7 presents a simplified depiction of their position within the wider 
scheme of the political actors’ landscape in Afghanistan.  
 
Figure 7: Political actors’ relations in Afghanistan 2006-09 
In the above figure, the dashed horizontal line demarcates the limits between two basic 
spheres of governance. One is restricted to encompassing the average local community and 
its representatives, here designated community governance (see 7.3.2).773 The other sphere 
relates to the ‘outside’ world beyond the community’s physical and social boundaries, 
which includes political actors of all kinds, such as the local government administration 
(district and provincial government), parties, Provincial Councils, NGOs, the central 
government in Kabul, and international actors (7.3.1). The identification of these two 
spheres of governance is an analytical exercise to distinguish between the intra-community 
levels of representation on the one hand and the community versus outsiders-relation on 
the other hand. In the latter case, the schematic depiction of the main actors illustrates that 
these spheres are linked by community representatives (elders, commanders, arbāb, 
deputies, etc.) who mediate on behalf of locals and outsiders and similarly communicate 
outsiders’ demands to their respective constituencies (see Ch. 8.3). The continuous line 
cutting horizontally through the identified ‘second basic sphere of governance’ separates 
the central government in Kabul and international actors from sub-national government 
actors and non-government actors, thus establishing a distinct arena where decisions about 
programs and policies are taken and passed on to the sub-national government agencies, 
that is, the provincial and district level administrations. This arena of national governance 
is largely detached from local realities and follows a separate logic, guided mainly by 
requirements and opportunities provided by the various facets of the ‘international 
community’ in Kabul (see also Ch. 8). The government agencies at different administrative 
levels, as shown in the upper right of Figure 7, are nevertheless not to be understood as 
                                                             
773 Note that here ‘community’ refers to local socially and physically bounded communities (the ‘local level’) 
that transgress the different resource-user-type-communities conceptualized in Ch. 5 and focused on in Ch. 6. 
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merely organizational bodies that follow an institutionally predetermined agenda. Instead, 
the individual interests of office holders determine the individual government department’s 
performance and functioning (see below). On the other hand, the access of local 
communities to government departments depends on their representatives’ connections to 
office bearers and officials.  
 
7.3.1 The representation of ordinary community members 
This section focuses on details of representation of community interests and mediation 
with government actors (that is, ‘crossing the dashed line’ in Figure 7). However, first, the 
idea of representation as encompassing surrogateship, delegation, leadership and authority 
within communities, including the execution of responsibility and accountability, is 
discussed as a main dimension of community governance.774 The preliminary analysis of 
different types of elders in section 6.1.2-c, as shown in Figure 2, depicted the intersection 
of rural authorities in Sofi-Qarayatim, Asqalān, Qal’a-ye Zāl and Tarboz Guzar. An 
apparent effect of the analysis so far concerns the role of arbāb in the study sites and how 
their position relates to muysafēd, commanders, and mirāb. The interviews and discussions 
with rural dwellers found that in general arbāb, mirāb and elders (‘conventional elders’) 
have altogether lost significance in comparison with the time before the revolution period. 
Thus, a timeline is used to discuss the various stages of elders’ significance, roles, and 
tasks in the communities, and how their declining role was manifested during the field 
research.  
The distinction between elders and arbāb shown in Figure 7 is somewhat artificial because 
it depends on both the circumstances in a specific locality and the time frame. For 
example, in Warsaj and Farkhār, conventional elders, who were then also acting as arbāb, 
were eshān (sayed) and heads of mir-families prior to and during Zahēr Shāh’s reign. 
Elsewhere, especially in the newly ‘colonized’ settlement areas along the irrigation 
networks in Chārdara and Qal’a-ye Zāl district, single individuals were appointed by the 
government with local leaders’ consent to act as arbāb. The case of Hāji Rahmat Khān’s 
father, Hāji Sarwar, in Tobrakash (see 6.1.1.-a) who was known to be the leader of the 
settlers from Maymana, evidences that it was regular practice that tribal leaders or persons 
already holding elite status within a social group and having contacts with government 
representatives were appointed arbāb. Hāji Sarwar bequeathed the position to his eldest 
son who was killed during the revolution period.775 The overlap of sources of authority 
extending to ‘conventional’ elders and arbāb before 1978 mainly applies to some of these 
omnipresent leaders. They mediated in local disputes and made decisions on behalf of the 
community, but they also protected their people from harassment by the state. The table 
therefore includes the hint ‘either distinct or overlapping array of responsibilities’ in the 
muysafēd-row-box ‘before the revolution’, which refers to the time before 1978. An ideal 
                                                             
774 Interactions ‘across the dashed line’ also constitute a part of actual community governance; however, for 
the reasons mentioned in the previous section, an analytical distinction is introduced here in order to 
elaborate meaningfully on the topic.  
775 Interview with Hāji Rahmat Khān, Tobrakash, 11 April 2006. He said in the interview that after the death 
of his father and eldest brother he has become known as arbāb, although it is not an appointed position in 
Asqalān. Local dwellers endowed him with the title. 
292 
 
categorization would describe the arbāb as a local community member in charge of 
communication of government issues to his fellow community members. In contrast, local 
conventional elders (muysafēd) would be consulted in decision-making and conflict 
settlement tasks. The common perception of the all-powerful state prior to 1978 among 
local rural dwellers was that in their view, the arbāb was endowed with unpredictable 
loyalty towards the government,776 whereas a muysafēd would have appeared more 
trustworthy in resolving local matters. However, the roles of both, elders and arbāb, had 
changed significantly by the time of the field work performed for this study. 
The role of arbāb as liaison person and ‘tool of communication’ on behalf of the 
government administration ceased with during the revolution period, because the 
government was declared the ‘enemy’ in the process of ideological mobilization of the 
Islamist parties. Among the initial tasks of the arbāb was reporting murder cases to the 
district administration, ensuring law and order, confirming a person’s father’s name for the 
issuing of identity documents (tazkera), providing proof of identity in cases when local 
residents needed a guarantee or guarantor, and helping implement different government 
policies in the local realm (e.g., designating villagers for road-building and anti-locust 
measures).777 These government activities as well as the arbāb’s role as liaison became 
irrelevant from 1978 onwards. The collected interview accounts of local community 
members, who themselves or whose relatives never held the position of arbāb, indicated a 
generally unfavorable attitude towards arbāb, including during the time prior to 1978. As 
Hāji Jum’a Khān put it, arbābi is the job of “somebody who could lie and tell the truth 
when mediating between the government and the people”, and lying is not in the nature of 
a ‘good Muslim’ or a proper ‘good’ elder.778 Some of the arbāb, like some of the 
conventional elders, became active in the resistance as commanders. Ghayor, the arbāb of 
Mangtepa at the tail-end of Sofi canal, became head of the local cooperative at the time of 
the Najibullah-government (1986-1992), but otherwise none of the initial tasks and 
responsibilities he had fulfilled as arbāb during Dāod’s reign was revived.  
During the mujahedin period, the commanders had a military hierarchy in place to function 
according to governmental administration logic. Their local counterparts were qomāndān-e 
mahalli at the community/‘village’ (mahalli) and/or manteqa levels, and sar-e grop/amir at 
 
                                                             
776 Interview, Qarayatim, 4 June 2006. Reportedly, one of his main tasks was to ’identify people of the local 
community‘ in the case that the government had any request, such as to find a criminal or to conscript locals 
into army service. 
777 Interviews, Qal’a-ye Zāl, 11 June 2006; Sofi-Qarayatim, 26 May 2006. There is indication of a further 
distinction between arbāb and elders prior to 1978: the arbāb would charge community members for their 
services. In Warsaj, respondents reported that they used to pay their arbāb 5 Afs for settling a conflict and 
not letting police men (‘askar) enter the village and bother them in such matters (Interview in Mulkik, 11 
April 2007). Sofi manteqa’s arbāb Ghayor (Mangtepa), who served from 1970-1977 in this role and whose 
son was newly appointed arbāb under the Taliban regime, stated that he received 200-500 Afs per year from 
every household in his constituency, depending on the financial situation of the individual household. No 
extra charges would be imposed for his involvement in dispute resolution cases. How far these accounts can 
be generalized is not certain because it is not known whether conventional elders also received remuneration 
for their services.  
778 HJK continued by saying, „Why should I do it [the arbāb-job, KM] and go to the government and lie with 
this white beard or swear all day from morning to evening?” (Interview, Qarayatim, 4 June 2006).  
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the district and provincial levels. Only with the onset and relative stabilization of Taliban 
rule in the areas of the northeast included in this study did the arbāb-position gain new 
clout in Sofi-Qarayatim and Qal’a-ye Zāl. Apparently, the Taliban administration intended 
to gain a foothold in local communities and requested local elders to appoint a person as 
arbāb. The appointments favored whoever volunteered for the position because “good 
people at that time did not want to be arbāb”.780 The re-invention of the position by the 
Taliban seems to have discredited it even further in the sense that it lost its initially 
monopolistic gatekeeper function in liaising with the government. According to HJK,  
“In Qarayatim three people have been appointed newly as arbāb by this government [Karzai 
government, KM]. But today arbāb do not go to the government unless a conflict or problem 
occurs. There is security and so there is no work for arbāb. Only sometimes the government 
asks the arbāb to send laborers for locust killing. … Now people are also smart. They might 
select an arbāb, but they themselves go to the government. They know the government 
better than any arbāb.”781  
The multiplication of newly instated arbāb in some districts continued clearly to qualify 
the status and significance of the arbāb position. In the Chārdara district, for example, 
where there had been one arbāb serving more than 20 villages in the entire district in Zāher 
Shāh’s time, reportedly 40-44 were appointed in 2006. An elder in Warsaj’s Miyānshahr 
expressed a similar idea stating “We call everybody arbāb today. He is a person in charge 
of a village. I am an arbāb, the other elder as well.”782 However, Arbāb Sofi Muhamad, 
son of Ghayor and head of the local cooperative, embodied a kind of unofficial arbāb in 
2006 because he had been appointed during the Taliban time and had not been reconfirmed 
since then in his position by the district administration. This deprived him of the legal right 
to act as deputy in court of any of the local dwellers in his constituency. Nevertheless, he 
saw himself within a good hereditary tradition by acting as arbāb. In the interview, he 
reported recent conflict cases he had solved by himself after the government had not been 
able to find a settlement. Therefore, Sofi Muhamad did not see himself in opposition to 
‘elders’ (both conventional and novel) and admitted that in cases when a dispute was very 
complex he would consult the elders and even pass the issue on to them if necessary. In 
nearby Laghmāni, Arbāb Kākar was appointed arbāb by local people after the request of 
the district governor in 2005.783 At the time of this field research, Arbāb Sher was also 
known as muysafēd and NSP-chief. In a contrary case, in a neighboring hamlet, the district 
administration refused to reconfirm Ghafar Salām as arbāb, who had been appointed under 
the pre-2002 administration in 2000-2001 (1379). 
                                                             
780 Reportedly, elders would just introduce any volunteer to the Taliban administration in order to not be 
bothered further and to fulfill the request for appointment. Interview with HJK, Qarayatim, 04 June 2006.  
781 Ibid.  
782 Interview in Deh-e Zārān, 12 April 2007.  
783 Historically, the arbāb was obliged to submit proof of his acceptance in the local community by providing 
fingerprints of the elders to the district administration (Sofi-Qarayatim) or a collection of identity cards 
(tazkera) of his supporters (Warsaj). It remains unknown whether this is still practiced after 2001. At least in 
Warsaj, arbāb were not formally reinstated; instead, the district governor possessed a list with elders’ 
(muysafēd) names and their fingerprints, from each community. From the sub-governor’s perspective, the 
purpose of having this list was likely not different from appointing an arbāb as the district governor would 
contact the elder in his list regarding a certain issue. However, from the perspective of the community, the 
difference between muysafēd and arbāb is usually significant. Moreover, Warsaj used to have a few arbāb 
who at the same time were conventional elders (eshān, mir; see above) in the past. 
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Eldership must be understood as a position of scale. As described previously (see sections 
6.1.2-c, 6.2.1-c), a community elder’s significance and mandate can be limited to the 
households of his immediate mosque-constituency, expanded to the populace praying in 
one Friday-praying mosque, and beyond that to a wider manteqa level (however 
encompassing it would be defined by its dwellers according to the situation). An elder of 
larger significance is likely to possess better access to higher-level decision-makers and 
persons of influence, whether government officials, armed strongmen or NGO-
representatives, because of his reputation (see 7.3.2). The source of the individual’s 
reputation can include a long-term relationship, a kin-relation with the influential person in 
question in case of a conventional elder, a joint party belonging and history of fighting 
(qomāndān-sar-e grop bond) for a novel elder; having a good muysafēdi-record, that is, 
problem-solving capacity; and the ability to bring about harmony and unity to the qawm 
and its conflicting factions.784  
Within communities, elders are not appointed, but derive their status from two main 
factors. One is a certain conduct and behavior over time, which thus consequently 
engenders legitimacy (see below 7.4). Secondly, their status of material endowment can 
rely on inherited wealth, land, business, possibly war booty, and so on; it most simply 
manifests in the possession of a mehmānkhāna (literally: ‘guestroom’; which includes the 
means to host and feed guests) and the means to travel for visiting government offices or 
dispute sites. This is true for novel and conventional elders alike.785 They embody 
legitimate representation functions of their particular constituency for regulating qawm- 
and community affairs, a phenomenon that I refer to as ‘delegation’. This delegation could 
be passive or active and find expression in acceptance and respect as credit given to 
authorities. The interviewees’ responses showed that ‘to accept elders’ means accepting 
their choice of action on behalf of the community, even if it might not be agreed upon or 
seem rational in the eyes of the members of the respective constituency. In most cases, the 
majority of a constituency’s members would not consider the decisions or actions of an 
elder in terms of its being ‘right’ or not. Credibility and trust – in some cases mere 
compliance without necessarily agreement – are advanced on an interpersonal basis and 
related assumptions of reciprocity. Delegation and assigning elders’ credibility dos not 
involve generalized trust. Elders of various status (‘scales’) are mandated with appointing 
community-bound office holders for certain areas of responsibility, such as irrigation 
management (mirāb), forest guarding (muhāfez-e jangal), road-keeping (sarakbān), wheat-
guarding (qoriqmāl), etc.786 However, no general rule and appointment cycle for all offices 
exists; appointments depend on the local circumstances. Where irrigation agriculture 
                                                             
784 Increasingly ‘good eldership’ is also related to the cashing in of projects. See 7.3.2 and Ch. 8 for further 
elaborations. 
785 Given the commander-elder nexus, i.e., the fact that one and the same person can be both at the same time 
or might have turned from being elder to commander (and possibly back again), the statement is also partially 
valid for the commander category. However, additionally, at least two distinct patterns of appointment of 
commanders can be deduced from cases documented during the fieldwork: a) from above; commanders can 
be instated by a higher authority, whether it is a governmental body or a provincial-level commander (amir); 
b) from below; as reported in cases where local influential big men were requested by the population to act as 
their commander and represent communal interests in the competing claims of other factions. See the second 
column in the table of Figure 8, section 6.1.1-b and further below. 
786 The delegation of outsiders follows a similar logic. See section 7.3.2 on state-local relations. 
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provides the main livelihood, the mirāb is selected annually on a certain date (see 6.1). In 
areas where subsistence livelihoods depend on the usage of mountain resources (pasture, 
fuel wood, rain-fed cropping, and so on), the appointment follows local needs and seasonal 
cycles. On the one hand, not all necessity-based recruitments are undertaken by elders 
because not every task concerns all members of a community. A wheat-keeper charged 
with guarding the wheat against birds and other theft once harvest time is near is usually 
hired by wheat cultivators. The data showed that in many communities that had 
constructed small hydropower projects in the framework of the NSP (see Ch. 8), the 
position of a mirāb-e barg (‘electricity manager’) was created in order to have a person in 
charge of collecting monthly fees for electricity usage.787 A road-keeper for inner-village 
roads might be appointed when repair works are needed.On the other hand, for roads 
significant to local inter-village mobility, especially roads that connect remote areas to the 
district center, the post of roadkeeper is often registered with the district administration 
(see Ch. 8.2.2). 
One office that is universally filled by appointment by elders is the position of mullah.788 
The mullah or emām-e masjed is appointed from within the community if there is a 
suitable candidate available, but more commonly from elsewhere. To find a qualified 
candidate is often very challenging because knowledge about Islam, that is, the content of 
the Koran and hadiths, is generally rather limited. In addition, the mullah must agree to the 
package offered by the community for his stay. He usually is provided with a residence, 
food, a monthly salary and the skins of sacrificed animals during the second Eid (Eid-e 
qurbān/Eid ul-adha). In return, he leads the prayer and teaches the children the Koran. 
Often, the mullah resides with his family in the community and has a second source of 
income from small-scale farming, livestock or crafts. The relationship between the elders 
and the mullah/mawlawi, that is, the extent to which the religious authority789 is consulted 
in legal and decision-making cases, varies from manteqa setting to manteqa setting and has 
often changed over time.790  
                                                             
787 In the initial phase of NSP, in places where micro-hydropower could not be established, the communities 
were often advised to buy electricity generators. In such cases, the mirāb-e barg would be charged with 
collecting money for diesel fuel. However, because of high fuel prices, the communities stopped using these 
generators soon after the initial project money was spent.    
788 As mentioned previously, in localities where the district government requested the appointment of an 
arbāb, elders are in charge. 
789 Religious actors are ‘authorities’ by default because they are perceived to embody Islamic knowledge, 
morals, and thought. 
790 Religious authorities (mullahs/emām-e masjid, mawlawi) were not included in the timeline in Figure 7 
because of space constraints and the overall impression that their role does not compare to that of arbāb, 
muysafēd and commanders in the research sites. As a rule, mullahs and other religious authorities have 
always been sub-ordinate to elders – as well as to commanders during the revolution period and Taliban time 
– and restricted by the latter to service (school, prayer) and consultation functions. However, few regions in 
Farkhār and Warsaj have a very high number of trained mullahs. For decades, they have been attending 
Pakistani madrasa to attain a proper Islamic education. At the time of this fieldwork, mosque construction 
activities, the local recruitment of young boys for madrasa training in Karachi and other Pakistani cities, and 
newly circulating ideas that ‘real Islam’ condemns women’s weekly pilgrimages to local shrines indicated 
that the future might see an increasing influence of religious actors who claimed moral superiority derived 
from ‘true’ religious knowledge and possibly contest both elders’ ‘wisdom’ and the folk Islamic tradition 
popular in the area to date.  
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The timeline provided in Figure 8 shows that in the aftermath of the coup d’état in 1978, 
many of the previously mentioned traditional local leaders, respected figures and local 
elites were murdered by the khalqi government. Rural elites were constituted by large 
landowners who became labeled as ‘feudals’ and were targeted by the six jerib-policy of 
the regime. The oral history cited in the interviews collected for this study indicate that 
traditional leaders of great clout, literate persons, Islamic scholars and intellectuals in the 
provinces were particular victims of arrests and murder. By the early 1980s, an entire 
stratum of traditional rural elites had vanished from the countryside. Those who were not 
targeted either took up arms and turned into commanders or organized support for the 
resistance in the subsequent revolution period. As the revolution period waned, and the 
individual commanders’ interests connected with the incentives and partial legitimacy of 
Najibullah’s reign (see Ch. 4) became increasingly fragmented, the precondition for the 
evolution of a new type of elders – designated as novel elders throughout this thesis – was 
created. The interviewees reported that after the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the previous 
muysafēd turned qomanāndān were said to have left the battlefields to become farmers, 
herders, Iran-migrants and muysafēd again. Other persons who had made a career as 
commander and had been ordinary peasants or laborers before, continued as ‘mujahedin’ 
and engaged in the civil war economy that followed after Najibullah’s government broke 
down. During the 1990s, the opinions and experience of conventional elders were largely 
disregarded in local governance affairs. Only the Taliban’s practice of inquiring about a 
local commander’s legitimacy in the eyes of his ‘constituency’ limited the arbitrary 
influence of the local commanders. At the same time, the enforcement of speedy justice for 
conflict cases that had been simmering for years without progress or solution prior to the 
Taliban’s taking root in the northeast, robbed conventional elders of their main traditional 
responsibilities and often made them appear redundant. On the one hand, the request of 
local Taliban administrations to have arbāb appointed further solidified this trend; on the 
other hand, it quasi-mandated elders with the arbāb’s appointment and thus reconfirmed 
the formers’ role. 
As result of the merging and partial overlap of the authorities of muysafēd and 
commanders over time, the situation during 2006-09 was characterized by the co-existence 
of conventional and novel elders as shown in Figure 2 regarding the irrigation field sites 
(see 6.2.1-c). During the revolution period, commanders had replaced traditional elders – 
sometimes as the same person. Because they concentrated all power resources on 
enforcement, ordinary people turned to them for support and help in dispute resolution or 
decision-making.791 The commanders’ legitimacy rested on their possession and active 
employment of arms, their ability to lead a group of follower-fighters, and their access to 
material and financial support. Similar to the above description of elders’ positions, 
commanders also embodied positions of scale because of the quasi-military hierarchy 
according to which they organized. However, this hierarchy of amir/sar-e grop/qomāndān, 
and so on eventually permitted the replacement of arbitrary commanders who had records 
of bad conduct towards their populace at the local level, by which local elders appealed to 
the senior position holder in the concerned hierarchy. This replacement required only two 
                                                             
791 The previously mentioned examples of implementing the dubandi structure in Sofi-Qarayatim (6.1.2-b) 
and the support of irrigators working on Nahr-e Jadid (Qal’a-ye Zāl) by Mullā Fazl’s deputy are 
representative of the second half of the 1990s. 
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pre-conditions: 1) the misbehaving commander was not the patron of the local elders or 
possibly the elder-turned-commander himself; 2) the senior position holder was receptive 
to justice appeals of conventional elders. The evidence gleaned from the interviews 
indicates that the exchange of local (mahalli) commanders upon the request of the local 
populace was common practice. Along a similar line, narratives about commanders, some 
of which were told by (ex-)commanders, often suggested that they had been approached by 
‘the people and begged to be their commander’. This occurred mostly during the time of 
the Taliban’s advancement into the northeast.792 Hezb-e Islāmi and Etehād-e Islāmi 
commanders often carried out this function.793 If they more or less showed ‘good conduct’, 
that is, not exposing the local population to arbitrary violence and injustice, and possibly 
even trying to protect ‘their people’ from oppression, they were perceived as stabilizing 
figures and enjoyed legitimacy.  
The same pattern I described in section 6.1.2-c, with the example of Ahmad Shāh and his 
father, can be discerned in the notion that commanders during different regimes were often 
offspring of the same family. A father who fought against Soviet army bases during the 
revolution period was suceeded by his son who was a commander of any of the fighting 
factions during the civil war, which was manifest in khāna jangi (house-fighting) at the 
local level close to the frontline. Thus, it was often necessary to be a commander 
(qomāndān-e mahalli) or group leader (sar-e grop) in order to defend against looters. As 
far as my field sites are concerned, during the second half of the 1990s, a son was either 
with the Taliban on any of the Islamist parties’ ticket, with General Dostum or with 
Mas’ud’s Jam’iat-e Islāmi.794  
With the undifferentiated US support for the Northern Alliance against the Taliban at the 
end of 2001, many of the local commanders (qomāndān, sar-e grop, amir) in and around 
Kunduz were able to extend their influence and reconfirm their clout. Once the fighting 
was over, these influential commanders did not just return home, but used their resources 
to secure assets in Afghanistan’s immediate post-war order. As explained in Chapter 4 and 
section 6.1.2-b, the so-called warlords occupied large amounts of land illegally and used 
their deterrence potential to intimidate the average population, not the least through the 
collection of ‘ushr. Only with the DDR process starting in 2003, during which they 
submitted their weapons to the police, did the pressure on local communities notably 
slacken. The evidence from Chārdara shows how crucial a power resource the possession 
of guns was for a commander in maintaining his authority. After 2003, average dwellers 
dared to voice contesting claims over land against commanders, such as commander 
                                                             
792 For example, in upper Asqalān, elders requested commander Raof to act as their ‘Taliban-commander’ 
(Interview, 20 July 2007). In Burka, the heads of the mir-family in Kokah Bulaq had an agreement with a 
Gujar commander who previously had fought jointly with them in the resistance against Soviet forces to act 
as Taliban commander for the Fulol Valley and ‘save its population’ from harm (Interviews 5 September 
2007, 26 March 2009).   
793 For the provincial (amir-)level, see the example given for Kunduz in section 6.1.2-c. Because there was no 
such thing as a membership in the Taliban, it did not matter which Islamist party a commander (whether 
qomāndān or amir) belonged to under their administration. 
794 After 2001, the generalized stigmatization of commanders as cruel butchers (sarkush) and that of the 
Taliban as oppressive Islamist fanatics led to dissimulation, deception, and denial on the part of former 
followers and ‘members’ regarding foreigners.  
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Rahmat Bāy, because they knew he had turned in his weapons. Similarly, the collection of 
‘ushr and other taxes ceased because of problems with enforcement and the need for 
former commanders to legitimize using measures other than force in the mid to long term. 
With the ousting of the Taliban, the reshuffle of local positions, the subsequent formation 
of the transitional government, and the prospect of occupying government positions 
provided opportunities. In local parlance, commanders turned from being ghairi rasmi 
(without official status) to occupying rasmi (officially assigned) positions in the 
government administration (see section 7.3.2 for examples). Nevertheless, several of these 
formerly significant commanders secretly sustained armed groups. They had already 
revived training camps in their areas of influence and still possessed loyal commanders at 
the village level at the time of this field research (2006-2009). 
Regarding the significance of conventional versus novel elders (including all types of 
commanders) from a representation perspective, the study found that the delegation 
function had become fragmented over time. In 2006-2009, conventional elders were 
largely disrespected by wealthy and otherwise power resource-endowed community 
members who could support their own causes and interests, such as the payment of money 
for justice (see 7.4). Subsequently, their general reputation suffered because of a visibly 
growing lack of enforcement capacities. As one respondent said, “Today elders are not 
respected if they have no money. In the past, if the handkerchiefs of elders were worn out, 
people would gift a new one for them. Now people laugh and make fun at the back of the 
elders.”795 Similarly, in the case of the make-shift aqueduct, the conventional elders of 
Sofi-Qarayatim ordered the mirāb Mas’ud to take care of it. This indicated that mirāb 
Mas’ud showed proper conduct towards the elders by saying he would take care of it, 
while behind their backs he followed his own interests and delayed the repair. He could 
allow himself this disrespect because he had been appointed against the initial interest of 
all other landowners by the novel elder and former commander Ahmad Shāh.  
 
7.3.2 The mediation of local-state relations 
The previous discussion demonstrates why some communities complained about not 
having ‘good elders’ in 2006-07. Beyond the intra-community affairs elaborated above, 
this related especially to local-state-relations where middlemen act as gatekeepers who 
mediate access to the local (that is, the district and partially the province) government and 
the mediators’ grasp on local community members. In the local view, useful ‘good elders’ 
do have access to government departments and allow the community to benefit through 
development projects, such as the construction of roads, schools, clinics, and cash-for-
work schemes for community members. Thus, lobbying, interest representation and 
advocacy aimed at the government and non-government actors constitute the middlemen’s 
main tasks in addition to their involvement in conflict resolution. One group of middlemen 
(see Figure 2) includes elders on a broader scale, ex-commanders, and community-
appointed position holders charged with the oversight of limited governance arenas and 
interaction with the local government administration (e.g., mirāb, arbāb and local forest 
guard). Elected deputies from the area constitute a second group, that is, Provincial 
                                                             
795 Interview, Qal’a-ye Zāl, 26 August 2006. 
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Council members and delegates to the Meshrāno Jirga. Furthermore, appointed officials 
are assigned to be in charge of any local community (CoP, district governor).796   
I have shown for the cases of Pyu/Warsaj and Farkhār that elders (both conventional and 
novel) in some places have direct ties with position holders in the central government in 
Kabul (see Table 11 and Figure 9 below). The empirical analysis detected a striking 
difference in access to high-level government authorities in Warsaj and Farkhār versus 
Eshkamesh and Burka. The latter lacked access and ‘good’ elders from the local point of 
view. Similarly, in Asqalān, water users complained that they did not have ‘good elders’ in 
comparison with Chārdara, which was eventually indicated by the unequal number of 
projects and NGOs perceived to be directed to that area by the government.797  
Table 11 presents a simplified overview of local communities’ accessibility to the 
government by the different districts of my field sites.798 
Table 11: Access of natural resource user communities to government offices 
NR-user 
communities 
in  
Qal’a-ye Zāl, 
Tarboz Guzar 
(Qal’a-ye Zāl) 
Asqalān 
(Kunduz 
Markaz) 
Sofi-
Qarayatim 
(Chārdara) 
Farkhār Warsaj Burka 
District -  
+ 
+ + + - 
Province  - + + - - 
Kabul   +  -     + + + + + - 
 
Instead of aiming at a robust comparison, the table depicts basic differences in the 
connectedness of local communities to office bearers at different administrative levels. 
During my field research in Warsaj, I was able to trace cases in which a central 
government official and a Member of Parliament originating from the area were directly 
involved in local issues. One was the Pyu-Anjuman pasture conflict (see 6.2.1-c); the other 
incident occurred in the aftermath of a major landslide (see below). In the case of Farkhār, 
former local commander turned General Dāod, Deputy Interior Minister, was the 
overarching figure to which local people’s aspirations of access became connected (see 
below, section 7.3.2).  
The connections of user communities in Qal’a-ye Zāl and Sofi-Qarayatim with Kabul are 
potentially established through representatives (wakil). Examples are the son of Wakil 
Akhtar of Qal’a-ye Zāl who became a member of the Meshrāno Jirga via delegation from 
the Provincial Council, and Faiz Umarkhēl of Qarayatim, who had no office at the time of 
                                                             
796 An additional group of middlemen could be categorized as consisting of newly appointed local 
governance bodies, such as NSP-heads or heads of NRM-councils, WUGs/WUAs, etc. However, because of 
the broad-based hijacking of these positions by elders (section 6.1.3-b, also see Ch. 8) I refrain from 
including them as a separate category at this point. 
797 Interview, 11 June 2006. The NGO-dimension and representation will be dealt with separately in Ch. 8.  
798 Given the differences in user communities and density of my data, the table should not be taken as a basis 
of comparison in order to make statements about the state of representation and connectedness for all 
localities in the districts Qal’a-ye Zāl, Kunduz Markaz, Chārdara, Farkhār, Warsaj and Burka. Accordingly, it 
is not valid to say that Burka is the least connected and Chārdara and Farkhār the best connected because the 
quality of a (and possibly only a single) connection is much more significant than the existence of linkages to 
(office bearers at) all administrative levels.  
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this field research but has been (Constitutional) Loya Jirga deputy from Kunduz and 
elected chief of the Islamic Council of the People of Kunduz (Shurā-ye Islāmi Mardum-e 
Kunduz).799 He failed to win a seat in parliament in the 2004 elections, but his influence 
stemmed from being the representative of Etehād-e Islāmi (Sayaf)800 for the whole 
northeast of Afghanistan, the same party to which the Kunduz governor, Engineer Umār, 
also belonged. In addition to what I have already indicated in section 6.1.2-c (Figure 1) 
about the connections between Qarayatim-landowners and strongmen in official positions 
during the Taliban-administration in Kunduz,801 the figures of Faiz and other Provincial 
Council members provide another insight into the mediation of local issues in the post-
2004 period. When the NSP-program introduced a possible scope of activities in 
Qarayatim, but did not meet locals’ prior needs, that is, the provision of electricity because 
of program limitations, their deputy reportedly lobbied the responsible government 
departments in Kabul to seek exceptional permission for using NSP-funds to provide 
electricity.802 
Local community residents in Fulol/Burka and Qal’a-ye Zāl/Tarboz Guzar reportedly 
refrain from appealing to the district or even higher government authorities because of the 
high level of administrative corruption. These interviewees not only reported the lack of 
‘good elders’, that is, local leaders not only with the authority (reputation and relations) to 
lobby at the district level for local causes, but also the financial means to bribe government 
officials. On the contrary, in Mashtān at the far end of Farkhār towards Warsaj, local 
residents were able to buy government positions to pursue their interests better.803 The case 
study of the Pyu-Anjuman conflict (section 6.2.1-c) showed how expensive it could be to 
acquire the support of government officials.  
I would like to take the example of Dāktar Muhamad and General Dāod to provide insight 
into the genesis of one part of the post-2001 government elites, specifically those 
connected to Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud and his Northern Alliance. Both Dāktar Muhamad and 
General Dāod are offspring of Mas’ud’s hinterland (the upper part of Farkhār valley in 
today’s Warsaj) and made post-2001 government careers after being high-level 
commanders throughout the 1990s. Figure 9 shows the main steps in their careers and the 
relations they had established by the time of the field research in 2006-07.  
                                                             
799 Faiz Umarkhēl was an important person during the decades of turmoil. Stemming from Qarayatim, he had 
been nominated to participate in the Rabāni Jirga, the Loya Jirga and the Constitutional Loya Jirga. 
Reportedly, the first joint intake of the Sofi-Qarayatim canal was built under his local commandership. 
800 Etehād-e Islāmi was one of the allied parties in the Northern Alliance. The Kunduz Governor Engineer 
Umār, hailing from Takhār/Tāluqān, belonged to Etehād-e Islāmi after he had been with Jam’iat-e Islāmi for 
a short period.   
801 Moreover, the special relations of Chārdara people with the Taliban administration (Figure 1) caused 
Pashtuns from Zulmābād at the head-end of the Qal’a-ye Zāl canal to move to Chārdara for the sake of 
security during the late 1990s when their manteqa had turned into one section of the frontline (Interview, 
Zulmābād, 23 August 2006). 
802 Interview with HJK, Qarayatim, 4 June 2006. 
803 In an interview they claimed to use earnings from renting out pastures in one valley for the bribes 
necessary to have their local strongman appointed in a government position (Interview, 25 September 2006). 
302 
 
Figure 9: Main actors‘ relationships in Farkhār and Warsaj district 2006-07804 
Although Dāod enjoyed heroic fame among the people of Farkhār at the time of the field 
research, Dāktar Muhamad (from Taresht valley in Warsaj) was considered more 
influential in the eyes of people from both districts. He had occupied the post of head of 
the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC), a 
newly established government office charged with implementing the Public Administration 
Reforms.805 Reportedly, among his competencies as head of this office is the appointment 
of government officials at sub-national levels. Though his duties were to assign posts in the 
public administration based on proven qualifications806 and not personal networks, Figure 
9 shows that he used his own position for personal interests to support relatives and cronies 
to further his influence in the Warsaj district and throughout Takhār province. One position 
reshuffle traced to his office included the removal of Saifullah, CoP of Farkhār, who 
belonged to Dāod’s loyalists, and his personal family network. This move in 2007 was 
                                                             
804 Acronyms: Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud (ASM); commander of police (CoP); Dāktar Muhamad (Dr M); Farkhār 
(F); Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCS); Member of Parliament 
(MP); sub-commander (SC); Shēr Khān Bandar (SKB) (border post towards Tajikistan, near Emām Sāheb); 
Warsaj (W); district governor (DG).  
805 A program for restructuring the Public Administration Sector (Public Administration Reform, PAR) was 
launched as early as 2002 with the aim to bring coherence to administrative structures, to intensify 
communication between sector departments, and to improve the staff’s capacities. Slogans used to describe 
the content and aims of the reform included efficiency, transparency, and accountability. The vision was to 
review all governmental organizations and offices until 2010 for their potential for rationalization, 
standardization, and unification in order to implement budgetary and administrative adaptations. 
Additionally, the overhaul of recruitment and assignment procedures for positions at all administrative levels 
and in all sectors was another mainstay of the reform. 
806 In the qualification-based recruitment of positions, public administration employees (including teachers) 
must pass a centralized testing to determine which administrative post (at which level) their qualification fits. 
This test was introduced to enable a more objective recruitment of government posts in Afghanistan.  
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interpreted as a showdown between Dāod and Dāktar Muhamad, who were considered 
rivals. Reportedly, it ended in a standoff because after several weeks in which his local 
followers staged regular demonstrations, Saifullah was said to have been reinstated in his 
post; moreover, it was assumed that Dāod had lobbied intensively for him at upper 
administrative levels. 
Dāktar Muhamad hails from a respected, landed family of wakil from Ashku, a small 
settlement in the Taresht valley (Warsaj). His father, Muhamad Ayub Khān, and his 
brother, Wakil Tura, had enjoyed close relations with the former King Zāher Shāh and the 
pre-revolutionary governments in Kabul. With the coup d’état and the formation of 
resistance combat units against the Soviet and Afghan armies, Dāktar Muhamad was 
reportedly one of the first figures to run a military base (station) in Warsaj before the first 
arrival of Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud in the area in the 1980s and the latter’s subsequent build-up 
of Warsaj and Farkhār as the hinterland of his main military base and retreat center. At the 
time of Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud’s stay in Warsaj, Dāktar Muhamad was first made district 
amir and was subsequently sent to Peshawar as the representative of Takhār province. 
When the Taliban forces approached Takhār, he is said to have fled with his family to Iran. 
Under the transitional government, he was initially appointed Afghanistan’s Ambassador 
in Iran and reportedly used his office to enroll 18 students from Taresht in Iranian higher-
education institutions. A brief posting as Minister of Education in Kabul followed before 
he was appointed head of IARCSC with the first full establishment of the Government of 
Afghanistan after the Presidential elections in October 2004.807  
Through an extensive network of family and marriage relations, Dāktar Muhamad 
established a solid base of loyal followers throughout Warsaj. His position allowed him to 
strengthen these relations by placing some of his relatives in government posts. The 
number and density of positions in Warsaj and Farkhār assigned to members of his 
personal network and close relatives is striking. Also from Ashku, his cousin was 
appointed CoP Warsaj in 2005 and was succeeded by Dāktar Muhamad’s nephew after the 
former was promoted to Head of the Criminal Investigation Department in Tāluqān in 
April 2007. A second nephew was in charge of the MRRD line ministry in Warsaj from 
2005, a position that otherwise did not exist at the district level.   
In the parliamentary elections in 2005, of the four candidates from Warsaj, three were 
related by family to Dāktar Muhamad (see Figure 9). However, only one, Shirin Bāy, who 
in the end succeeded in winning a seat, was supported by him. Everybody who did not 
support Shirin Bāy during his election campaign was actively sanctioned against at the 
time of this field research, reportedly entire villages fell out of favor. Dr Yaqub, a 
physician who made a name for himself by helping people in his district and whose sister 
had married Dāktar Muhamad’s grandson, was opposed because he dared to run in the 
election against the candidate patronized by Dāktar Muhamad. Similarly, Anwar Khān, the 
husband of Dāktar Muhamad’s sister, also residing in Ashku and one of the major 
commanders with a base station under Dāktar Muhamad before Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud’s 
arrival, had a strained relationship with the head of the family. Both Anwar Khān and 
                                                             
807 Dāktar Muhamad is still in this office at the time of writing (2010). That he was also appointed chief of 
the Anti-Corruption Task Force in 2006 does not conflict with his position as an official in IARCSC. 
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Shirin Bāy had subsequently been CoPs in Warsaj at the time of Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud. 
Also hailing from Ashku, the fourth Wolesi Jirga election candidate, Mawlānā Jār 
Muhamad, had been district governor in Warsaj in the same period. His candidacy was 
supported and reportedly entirely financed by Yonus Qānoni,808 a big figure in Jam’iat-e 
Islāmi and the Northern Alliance who was elected speaker of the new parliament (Wolesi 
Jirga) in 2005. 
The involvement of Shirin Bāy and Dāktar Muhamad in the mediation of the Pyu-Anjuman 
pasture conflict at the Kabul level was discussed in section 6.2.1-c, where I showed that the 
provincial administration was entirely left out in this case, and local people directly 
activated their ties with patrons in the national administration and parliament to lobby on 
their behalf. In April 2007, in a similar case, a major landslide occurred in a Taresht 
village, washing away the road, homes and the mosque. Villagers then called Dāktar 
Muhamad via satellite phone to request help. Subsequently he ordered a bulldozer from an 
Indian construction company that was hired to construct the main road between Tāluqān 
and Farkhār to be sent to the village and start the clearing-up operation.  
Dāod was said to have good personal relations with Anwar Khān, Dāktar Muhamad’s 
brother-in-law, and Mawlānā Jār Muhamad. However, because Anwar Khān’s relationship 
with Dāktar Muhamad had soured (for unknown reasons), he was not well esteemed by the 
local population. He was said to be bad tempered and had been involved in a major fraud 
with the NSP money allocated to his cluster (hawza) in 2006. In contrast to Dāktar 
Muhamad, Dāod made a career from being driver of Dr Hussain in Farkhār to becoming 
district-level commander in 1996 (1375). He was one of the main sub-commanders of 
Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud’s Northern Alliance fighting the Taliban in the area (see Ch. 1). 
According to local accounts be became ‘famous’ when he gave BBC interviews during his 
efforts of fighting the Taliban on the way from Tāluqān to Kunduz after 11 September 
2001. Following the logic already explicated above, he was subsequently rewarded with 
the post of CoP in Kunduz and in 2007 was elevated to Deputy Interior Minister Counter 
Narcotics. This position allowed him to undertake rent-seeking activities and sponsor 
several clients, such as his former sub-commanders, the most obvious cases of which are 
presented in Figure 9. Besides Saifullah, the CoP of Farkhār, one of Dāod’s former sub-
commanders (SC 1) from Kerāni (Farkhār), was appointed to the lucrative post of Chief of 
Border Police in Shēr Khān Bandar, the border crossing and custom station to Tajikistan. A 
second sub-commander (SC-2) became the appointed head of criminal police in Kunduz; a 
third (SC-3), brother of the former and a Hezb-e Islāmi renegade in Jam’iat, served as 
governor in Parwān. Finally, the former commander from upper Mashtān (SC-4) was 
posted as CoP of Badakhshān and Ghor province. Among the lower-level clients of Dāod 
and his sub-commanders, many were employed in government offices of the security and 
anti-narcotics forces. In a group interview, respondents provided anecdotal evidence that a 
co-villager who was employed in the provincial anti-narcotics unit in Tāluqān (Riyāsat-e 
                                                             
808 Yonus Qānoni, a Panjshiri and close comrade of Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud, became political head of Jam’iat-e 
Islāmi after Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud’s assassination on 10 September 2001. He had initially been appointed 
Interior Minister in the transitional government after the Bonn conference in 2001, but then served as special 
adviser on security and as Minister of Education before being elected to the Wolesi Jirga and becoming 
Speaker of Parliament. See also Adamec (2006: 315). 
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mubāreza ‘alaye mawād-e muhader) helped the community with 20,000 Afs to fix the 
motor of the hydropower installation after he received a substantial bribe from a drug-
trader.809  
Both Dāktar Muhamad and Dāod were usually called ‘our big elders (in the government)’ 
by the interviewees, suggesting that they had established favorable patron-client relations 
with their loyalists among the local population. Because interviewees in Warsaj and 
Farkhār were proud to have resisted Soviet and Taliban attempts to penetrate their area, 
they generally disguised animosities between party followers at the local level as well as 
the exploitation and fostering of family feuds under the umbrella of party-differences.810 
Only a few respondents mentioned that, for example, Dāktar Muhamad was a ‘big butcher’ 
(sarkush) and complained that justice could never materialize in post-2001 Afghanistan, 
given that all the jihadi commanders would now be occupying government posts.811 Such 
statements are reminders of the commonplace insight that alliances and networks are often 
selective and only benefit those who have ‘good relationships’ with an influential figure. 
Nevertheless, organized resistance at the community level offered ordinary peasants and 
young men (e.g., Dāod, Anwar Khān) opportunities to advance their social status and earn 
respect based on their ‘ordering’ influence, that is, their rule-setting and enforcement 
capacities. These included military strategic successes and the successful running of the 
local para-military administration.812 In addition, Dāod was said to have had the talent to 
unite brawlers and mediate different factions of commanders as well. The case of the 
Khuram Āb commanders of the upper and lower village is an illustrative point (see section 
6.2.1-c).  
The data collected in all the cases explicated in this subchapter revealed that local access to 
government departments and offices is largely dependent on personalized relationships 
with government office holders. After 2001, the population in Warsaj and Farkhār 
benefitted from the Jam’iat- and Northern Alliance connection of their former 
commanders, because of their above-average representation in government positions. In 
Burka and the districts of Kunduz that were investigated in this study, single figures with 
the ‘right’ affiliation (e.g., Faiz Umarkhēl and Ahmad Shāh) qualify as patrons, but are 
                                                             
809 Interview Anuy, 14 April 2007. The example of the anti-narcotics department employee represents a 
typical pattern of how former commanders’ clients have been provided jobs that offer the opportunity to earn 
a great deal of money. In this case, the regular salary of the person amounted to 3,000 Afs (US$60) per 
month. However, bribes would sometimes allow the employee to earn US$60-70,000 in a single month. 
Thus, not surprisingly, most of the former sub-commanders throughout both districts possessed landed 
property in Tāluqān. See also the backgrounds of elders in Pyu (section 6.2.1-c).  
810 The differences and turf wars between Jam’iat-e Islāmi and Hezb-e Islāmi (Gulb’udin Hekmatyār) 
loyalists led to Mas’ud entrance into the local political arena whereupon he had many of the Hezb-e Islāmi 
commanders systematically murdered after inviting them under the pretext of personal talks (Interviews, 9-11 
October 2006).  
811 Interview Heyut/Miyānshahr (Warsaj), 12 April 2007. 
812 During the period when Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud took refuge in Warsaj and Farkhār and organized the 
resistance from there, he established a para-military administration in four hawza (Markaz, Miyānshahr, 
Qawnduz, and Taresht) with quasi-governmental functions. Not only did the already mentioned registration 
of local positions, such as roadkeeper, take place, but Mas’ud also had schools, health stations and roads (to 
Khost-u Fereng) built. Many respondents – although likely biased – claimed that he was the first to have 
local people benefit from the idea of ‘government’ (Interviews Andruy/Anuy, 14 April 2007).  
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comparably less influential than former commanders from Warsaj and Farkhār.813 
However, those communities without enough elders with higher-up patrons are 
disadvantaged and can compensate their lack of access only by money (bribes). The 
venality of government officers, as demonstrated in the cases of Pyu (6.2.1-c) and of 
district officials in Qal’a-ye Zāl, Farkhār and Warsaj,814 in addition to the vested interests 
of the CoP, forest guard, and agricultural extension officer in Burka (6.2.2-a), indicates that 
financial resources are an important precondition for interest representation at any 
administrative level. At the same time, ordinary residents expressed a high degree of 
dissatisfaction with this type of administrative corruption. Even if somebody chose to refer 
to the government for assistance in a dispute resolution case or similar event, without prior 
consultation of local elders, the district authorities would usually send a policeman who 
himself would charge 100 Afs for the return trip.815  
There is no difference in the relation of local communities with elected deputies versus 
appointed government officials, except for the disappointment that many of the former’s 
members expressed about their failed expectations of deputies. “Our wakil sold us…” was 
the response of residents in Qal’a-ye Zāl, “…he had promised to construct the road and 
bridges. Now he is residing in Kabul most of the time and gets a salary in dollars. He does 
not remember his promises. Our wakil sold us.”816  
 
7.4 The ambiguity of legitimacy: Norm pluralism, forum shopping, uncertainty 
The previous discussion might lead to the somewhat simplified conclusion that 
‘traditional’ representatives lost significance and that legitimacy of government 
representatives and middlemen (conventional and novel elders) was largely forfeited. They 
either could not live up to the expectations of their constituency or increasing distrust and 
doubts regarding their motives and honesty had surfaced (section 6.2.1-c, Chs. 7.1 and 
7.3). However, a closer look at the resources and effects of the observed trends reveals 
several ambiguities connected with legitimacy and the underlying exercise of power. 
                                                             
813 Against this backdrop, this study adds valuable empirical insights for understanding the structure of 
government-making during the interim and transitional government phases after 2001. It helps to understand 
not only that the top-placement of government officials (usually the vice-president and the heads of 
ministries) who were recruited from the so-called Panjshiri faction of the Northern Alliance, but also that 
Farkhār and Warsaj were significant as zones of refuge and training for Mas’ud’s forces and the close 
network of allies he had built up in the area and which helped his military success. One could conclude that 
Warsaj and Farkhār served as recruiting source for second and third tier positions, e.g., the level of Deputy 
Ministers, task forces and independent government commissions. The superficial tracing of a few branches of 
the network between the local and government levels illustrates the penetration of patron-client ties to the 
community level in the areas of this research and proves the close interconnectedness of putative ‘state’ and 
‘society’ structures. See subchapters 7.5 and 9.2 for further elaboration.     
814 This refers to cases reported by interviewees, e.g., the taxing of kochi for pasture usage while claiming to 
act on behalf of the local pasture user community, and in parallel, the taxing of earnings by local 
communities for renting out their pastures. Several respondents in the districts of Kunduz stressed that they 
would only see the point of referring to the Kunduz ID if they knew they could get access: “You only go 
there if you have access and know somebody.” (Interview 7 May 2006). 
815 Evidence was provided from Qal’a-ye Zāl and Warsaj (Interviews 26 August 2006, 14 April 2007). 
816 Interview, Qal’a-ye Zāl, 26 August 2006. 
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Legitimacy has been defined in Chapter 2.2 as having two sides: legitimation is the attempt 
at, or process of claim-making and enforcement on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
the acknowledgement and acceptance of the respective claim. The latter reflects the belief 
in the rightfulness of a certain order, that is, the authority roles (claim to establish and 
occupy unequal positions) characteristic of a particular order, its incumbents (the 
enforcement of the claim), and their commands and actions (Uphoff 1989: 312). However, 
the empirical examples given throughout Chapter 6 showed that several normative orders 
are utilized in order to validate a certain social action or claim to authority. In practice, 
these normative frameworks include mainly two dimensions: customary law (if argued 
from a legal pluralism-perspective) and sharia, that is, Islamic law.817 I have discussed the 
role of largely absent statutory law in regulating the usage of different environmental 
resources.818 However, the prevalence of ‘legal pluralism’ in the narrow sense of its 
meaning is limited.819 Nevertheless, what matters are perceptions and ideas, such as the 
potentiality of government administration. This is captured by the observation that even 
though the state is not necessarily viewed as legitimate and although it is not endowed with 
the powers to (re-)distribute any resources to the wider public, it certainly is perceived as 
being able to provide legitimacy to individual office bearers (administrative legitimacy, see 
below). In this context and given that legitimacy does underlie the exercise of power and 
the degree of authority depends largely on the degree of legitimacy, the heuristically more 
significant question concerns who can validly claim to define what is legal, ’right’ and 
‘proper’ and what is not (power of interpretation and definition) by relying on which 
resources.  
The empirical insights presented in the previous chapters have led me to adopt the idea of a 
‘fluid’ legitimacy of position holders on a continuum between two poles: full-fledged 
legitimacy and the withholding of legitimacy (see Table 12 below).820 The transitory space 
is a two-way (but never exclusively one-directional) incremental process of forfeiting or 
increasing legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. For the purposes of analysis, I 
distinguish an in-between extent of the legitimacy of local governance actors as ‘mere 
conformity’ with their representatives and those respective actions. It means that the belief 
in the rightfulness of an incumbent to occupy a certain position or the rightfulness of his 
actions is for some reason shattered. Thus, I suggest a distinction between moral versus 
administrative authority.821 In the case of the ‘mere conformity’ by people towards 
                                                             
817 Islam as practiced in everyday lives in the research region, that is, folk Islam, would include both custom 
and shari’at for decision-making or dispute resolution. 
818 Likewise, international law does not play any role in everyday social interactions at the local level. 
However, international concepts and ideas, such as IWRM, have some repercussions given their guidance of 
local NRM-projects.  
819 I speak of ‘norm pluralism’ for this reason.  
820 Needless to say, legitimacy is always a question of perspective. That something, an act, or somebody is 
considered legitimate always implies that there is a contrary view. From a different perspective, the same 
thing, person, or act could be considered illegitimate. See Ch. 2.2.3 for a theoretical elaboration of this point. 
In addition, whether or not some claim, relation, or act is ‘legal’ determines who has the right to exercise 
political control over people and resources, such as land, forest, and water in order to draw economic benefit 
from them.  
821 I derived this distinction from the empirical data.  
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political leaders at the local level, one of the two types of authority is missing.822 However, 
given the power resources available to the actors or leaders in question, the complete 
withholding of legitimacy is not an option for the population. For example, a corrupt 
government (represented by its venal local officials) usually loses its moral authority 
among those suffering from injustices because of the venality of individual position 
holders. However, administrative authority (resting on the fear of sanctions in case of 
contestation, even though that sanction is likely to be derived only from the relation 
network of the position holder) still exists and discourages open contestation of the 
government’s (including its office-holders) legitimacy. The table depicts an attempt to map 
the changes with regard to the legitimacy of different actors in local politics in the research 
sites from before 1978 until 2009. It is based on emic perceptions I documented at the 
different field sites and summarizes several findings from the empirical analysis. 
Table 12: Change in legitimacy of different local governance actors over time 
   Full legitimacy Mere conformity Withholding of 
legitimacy 
<1978 King Zāher Shāh 
arbāb, mullah 
local elders (‚traditional‘ 
elite) 
 
government 
representatives (district 
administration) 
 
 
‚revolution‘ ‚good‘ qomāndān,         
sar-e grop, amir  
mullah 
 
 government 
representatives 
‚bad‘ qomāndān 
‚mujahedin‘ ‚good‘ qomāndān-e 
mahalli 
              mullah 
 
 
‚bad‘ qomāndān government 
representatives 
Taliban ‚good‘ qomāndān-e 
mahalli                                 
mullah 
government representatives 
 
2002-2009 
 
 
                                       government representatives 
mullah 
             ‚good‘ elders                                          arbāb 
             ‚good‘ qomāndān                  ‚bad‘ qomāndān    
former ‚bad‘ qomāndān, 
sar-e grop, amir etc. (who 
submitted weapons in 
DDR process) 
 
Table 12 not only shows the changing degrees of legitimacy that the listed types of actors 
enjoyed at different periods over the last 30 years but also reveals basic emic normative 
                                                             
822 Consequently, full legitimacy is constituted by the prevalence of both administrative/’structural’ and 
moral authority. The former refers not only to ‘government-imposed’ legitimacy (what corresponds more or 
less to Max Weber’s ideal form of rational-legal authority) but also to customary (‘traditional’, traditional-
legal) and ‘charismatic’ authority, as the examples in the column demonstrate. Thus, the sources of individual 
position holders’ authority/power as members of the local governance ‘elite’ play a crucial role in 
determining their ability to exercise power and to benefit from access to resources. For example, the authority 
of King Zāher Shāh – and of local mullahs, and traditional elders and elites (eshān, sayed, mir) in the period 
before 1978 – largely relied on the then common belief in divine authority, which encompassed both the 
moral and the administrative/structural dimension.    
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distinctions in different actor categories, such as the ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ commanders, 
mujahedin and elders.823        
In the words of Sofi Ghulām Nabi,824 which are representative of other accounts collected 
throughout the field research, a ‘good’ commander is one “who has not bothered people 
and not taken property by force. Bad commanders are those who have disturbed people and 
arbitrarily harassed and punished them.”825 Fazl Jān added regarding the authority of a 
commander, “Each mosque had one commander who was like a king. If you lost 
something or if you needed something, you would appeal to the commander, the king. He 
could do anything he wanted. When you went and opened the offtake, the commander 
caught you, beat you and fined 5,000 Afs. If the mirāb complained to him about anybody, 
he got hold of this person and imposed these same punishments. Such a commander was 
considered bad.”826 Similarly, several interviewees normatively disqualified the behavior 
of ‘bad’ commanders by mentioning that they kill people’s sons and take ‘ushr by force. 
Thus, the disregard and disrespect for people’s property, lives, and privacy can be 
summarized to characterize a ‘bad’ commander. “Good commanders still have the power; 
they are still the elders of the people. They have salāhiyat.”827  
Judging from the interview responses and several focused discussions throughout my stay 
in Afghanistan, the meaning of salāhiyat is ambiguous. In the local realm, it can best be 
described as moral authority, although recently an official dimension seems to have been 
added, shifting its content towards ‘legitimate authority’, that is, authority relying on at 
least on one type of legitimacy (moral or administrative/structural legitimacy) as iterated in 
Table 12. For example, whereas before 1978, the king as an abstract idea with assumed 
divine powers/origin828 was said to have had salāhiyat, today’s government is somewhat 
automatically assigned salāhiyat because of the existence of its polity,829 the constitution,  
and the government incumbents’ assumed powers, including their abilities to derive benefit 
from their respective individual positions. The moral dimension, which I argue was 
                                                             
823 Note that according to the logic examined so far in this study (especially in 7.3), elders are not listed in the 
revolution, mujahedin and Taliban-periods because of the negligible significance of their authority in their 
roles as elders in these years. As pointed out above, they became commanders (at various scales) who largely 
took over the tasks and functions of classical elders.  
824 See section 6.1.1. Sofi Ghulām Nabi had six brothers; one of them was amir for several years during the 
mujahedin-period. A second brother, who fought in the resistance against the Soviet occupation, was killed 
after less than two years, and Sofi then inherited the commander-position (“People appointed Sofi 
commander”, stated by Fazl Jān in interview with Sofi Ghulām Nabi and Fazl Jān, Asqalān, 25 July 2006). 
Sofi held the position for 12 years until Sebghatullah Mujadedi became interim President for two months in 
1992: “When Mujadedi came to power I put my guns in the ground and started farming”  (Sofi Ghulām Nabi, 
ibid.).     
825 Ibid.  
826 Ibid.  
827 Words of Sofi Ghulām Nabi (ibid.).  
828 See Olesen (1995) for an excellent overview of the relationship between ideology/Islam and the state in 
Afghanistan since 1880. Based on Islam, Abd’ur Rahmān Khān presented himself as a God-entrusted amir 
deriving and needing legitimacy only from Him. Although this mode of legitimation definitely shifted under 
successive governments starting with Amanullah (1919-1929), from the point of view of rural dwellers, 
Zāher Shāh still possessed much of this divine, i.e., moral authority.     
829 Polity here refers to the totality of the system of authority, that is, governmental structures (organizational 
hierarchy) and authority roles (offices).  
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important in the past, mainly signified respect (ehterām). This can be detected in the 
authority that reportedly used to be assigned to community actors, such as ‘traditional’ 
arbāb830 and mirāb. Accordingly, one mirāb could tie up 20 persons and deliver them from 
the remotest village to the district administration if need be. Nobody would have dared to 
resist his order.831 Similarly, a mullah would always have been described as having 
salāhiyat because he represents Islam.     
The concept of salāhiyat is closely connected to qudrat, which is best translated as power 
understood as the product of a combination of different resources.832 Qudrat designates 
authority that is taken based on the endowment with certain resources but not necessarily 
legitimated through consent. Salāhiyat can exist without qudrat according to the traditional 
understanding that it simply signifies the moral authority assigned to a person by external 
forces (divinity) or the belief in the competence of the person to whom people ascribe 
salāhiyat thereby imparting legitimacy and authority that does not need other power 
resources. Qudrat can likewise exist without salāhiyat because it can rely on a variety of 
combinations of resources, only one of which could essentially be authoritative. Compared 
to the past, today salāhiyat in its extended meaning with the prevalence of moral, 
administrative and structural authority is furthered by qudrat (different power resources). 
Subsequently, full legitimacy could only be deduced in the empirical cases in which the 
actors enjoyed both qudrat and salāhiyat. In the period when this fieldwork was 
conducted, the actors who came closest to the ideal embodiement of both dimensions of 
legitimacy were the so-called ‘good’ elders and ‘good’ commanders, as Table 12 shows. 
During the time of the revolution all types of resistance fighters fit into this category; they 
were succeeded by only ‘good’ commanders at the time of the mujahedin and the Taliban. 
The slight positional shift in the legitimacy of the ‘good elders’ and ‘good commanders’ 
during 2001-2009 towards ‘mere conformity’ takes into account the detected loss of 
influence and authority of conventional and new elders (including commanders), even the 
‘good’ kind as elaborated throughout this study (especially in section 6.1.2-c, Chs. 7.1-
7.3). ‘Bad’ commanders had to be endured during the first half of the 1990s once the 
resistance fighting transformed into a war between local commanders allied with different 
parties and the so-called warlords at the sub-national level. People’s conformity with ‘bad’ 
commanders was caused by the commanders’ exercise of structural authority based on 
threats of force, which allowed the potential arbitrary violent subjugation of the local 
populace.833 After the DDR-process started in 2003, this situation changed in many cases 
when former commanders turned in their weapons and therefore their main means of 
                                                             
830 The examples in which respondents described the omnipotent powers of the arbāb were all collected in 
communities that used to have ‘traditional’ arbāb, i.e., where a respected elder or leader of the extended 
family/qawm was charged with acting on behalf of ‘his people’ as a middleman for the local government 
administration.  
831 Interviews, 20 July 2006, 27 August 2006. Similar stories were reported about arbāb, e.g., in interviews 
on 26 May 2006 and 11 June 2006, and about armed guards (‘askar), e.g., interview with Hāji Jum’a Khān, 4 
June 2006. 
832 The local notion of ‘qudrat’ encompasses descriptive/factual content, i.e., of factors, which according to 
the elaborations in Chapter 2, could be understood as power resources. Thus, qudrat does not capture the 
exercise of power.  
833 Including the forced recruitment of sons, forced ‘ushr collection (partly arbitrary amounts), illegal land 
grabbing and arbitrary violence as described above.   
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deterrence according to the point of view of ordinary people (see section 6.1.2-c, Ch. 
7.3.2).834  
As far as religious authorities (mullā emām, mawlawi)835 at the community level are 
concerned, the data analysis also showed a trend to loss of authority and legitimacy in most 
parts of my study region.836 The traditional moral authority (salāhiyat) that religious actors 
had been endowed with before the revolution period and the initial confirmation of their 
legitimacy because of their role in the jihad and their declaration that the Soviet 
intervention was directed against Islam disintegrated in the subsequent decade after 
withdrawal of the Soviet forces. I could not detect a particular increase in the acceptance of 
the moral authority of religious actors during the years of Taliban rule in the Kunduz 
districts. Instead, the common narrative of ordinary people reiterated that they blamed the 
mullah and mawlawi for deceiving them into jihad and a war from which none of them 
profited except for few persons who also used religion to legitimate their own enrichment 
at the expense of the larger share of the population. Ordinary rural dwellers found 
themselves only the foot soldiers of commanders.   
Another trend discernible in my data analysis was that salāhiyat has increasingly become 
related to wealth, however from a distinct perspective (that is, ‘top-down’ directed towards 
ordinary people, not their outlook). For example, some interviewees stated that in the eyes 
of the government the landowner would have salāhiyat, not the sharecropper. Similarly, in 
line with the venality described above, a common narrative stressed that government 
officials would respect only individuals with money.837 These observations added a certain 
ambiguity to the concept of salāhiyat as moral authority. From an outsider’s point of view, 
one could conclude that the concept has become hollow and corrupted. However, this 
perspective should not be rendered insignificant because ordinary individuals give 
salāhiyat, meaning they assign certain actors different degrees of legitimacy because of 
moral authority, whereas government position holders discern only materially endowed 
persons and offer them a kind of salāhiyat that enables the former to deal with the 
government and influence its members according to their needs. In contrast, ordinary, poor 
persons were labeled supplicants (darbadar).838 In short, this reportedly meant that people 
without money or material wealth would neither be able to irrigate their fields nor enjoy 
                                                             
834 Not everyone submitted their arsenal. Many former commanders (at different scales) kept their armory 
and – more importantly – their followers, partly by integrating them into regular combat and security forces 
of the government, i.e., the police (Afghan National Police, ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA), partly 
by maintaining secret training camps.  
835 In Table 12 all community-based religious authorities are captured by the term mullah because of limited 
space.   
836 It is hard to generalize in the case of religious actors because piety, habitual respect towards the moral 
authority of Islam (folk Islam, see Ch. 4.1.3), and the different degrees of importance the investigated 
communities gave Islamic scholarship does not allow coherent conclusions. For example, as a marked 
exception, I reported that some communities in Warsaj have a substantial number of mullahs who had been 
educated in Pakistani madrasa, and who at the time of the field research have already, because of their 
disproportionate numbers (the rest of the male population was largely absent because they were labor 
migrants in Iranian cities) suppressed folk Islamic traditions claiming full moral authority by their knowledge 
of ‘true Islam’ (see 7.3.1).     
837 Interview, Qal’a-ye Zāl, 26 August 2006. 
838 Interviews, 11 June 2006, 13 May 2007. 
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any esteem by position holders and organs of justice and the law. Put differently, they 
would not have competence, because nobody assigned them legitimate authority. 
After legitimacy was withheld from government representatives throughout my study area 
during the 1980s and most of the 1990s, they were met with due conformity because a 
formal governmental structure was established and individual position holders relied on 
other power resources. However, the relationship between the rural population and the 
government was paradoxical. On the one hand, the expectations placed on the government 
were immense. They extended from technical and welfare assistance (e.g., machinery, 
price checks for fertilizer and petrol, agricultural loans, provision of development 
infrastructure like schools, hospitals, clean drinking water, employment, etc.) to the claim 
of elite figures to be provided with a government job after they had been unsuccessful in 
parliamentary or provincial council elections.839 The non-performance of the government 
because it lacked capacities, such as personnel and a budget, and the large-scale venality of 
its representatives diminished its legitimacy. Nevertheless, as the following example of 
Taresht, the home area of Dāktar Muhamad (see 7.3.2), shows, the intersection of multiple 
loyalties and feelings of belonging and identity ensured habitual support for rural elites. 
One respondent stated, “Dāktar Muhamad does not do anything for us people here, though 
he must know how we live”, emphasizing in the next sentence that locals are too proud to 
appeal to him and to ask for assistance (“mā mardum-e nangistēm”; literally: we are 
honorable people and deserve respect), yet, “in case he should need us we will be there and 
support him”.840 Underlying this paradox is habitual loyalty, which fuels political credit, 
despite the fact that the normative expectations of the people are not met. They complain 
about injustice and jihadi commanders in the government as well as all kinds of 
administrative corruption, while at the same time they consciously attempt to amend their 
own positions in this set-up. One such similarly dubious strategy has been identified as 
collective position buying in Mashtān, where the community felt they lacked ‘good elders’, 
that is, access to governmental resources. They subsequently collected enough money to 
buy the way of a person from their community into a government position (see 7.3). The 
second and most commonly applied alternative is the strategic maintenance of personal 
network relations with persons who control access to resources, according to the logic that 
many individuals and communities have no other option but to maintain access through 
those who hold bundled power resources and thus exercise control.  
I have elaborated on actors’ legitimacy patterns from the perspective of the authority that 
the average population assigns to its representatives and agents of local governance. I will 
now focus on the legitimation of the actions ordinary members of rural society employ. In 
this regard, the empirical data showed two main arenas of social action with distinct 
justification patterns. One concerns the mediation and settlement of disputes; the second 
involves the distribution, use and exclusion patterns in natural resource usage, that is, 
resource access. In both arenas, both individual users and entire user communities can 
revert to several sources of legitimacy. As mentioned at the beginning of this subchapter, 
                                                             
839 Interview, Kunduz, 5 June 2006. 
840 Interview, Warsaj, 4 April 2007. 
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theoretically three coexisting normative sources can be identified: the Islamic law-system 
sharia, customary norms,841 and statutory law.  
However, even sharia law cannot be considered an unequivocal legal source because of the 
limited knowledge that ordinary Islamic clerics possess. At the community level, the 
average rural mullah in my study area842 was not literate in Arabic843; Islamic knowledge 
was disseminated based on the customary interpretation, common sense, and credibility 
generated by degrees of authority religious figures traditionally enjoyed. As the example of 
Pyu showed, putative Islamic competence put Mawlawi Nikmat into an uncomfortable 
position because his interpretation of a solution to the Pyu-Anjuman conflict did not hold 
and was contested by conflict mediation authorities and norms (e.g., lobbying government 
representatives embodying administrative authority with an assumed backing of their 
action by a statutory legal framework). Other cases, especially family conflicts, have been 
reported, in which a local religious figure would be consulted for his opinion by the 
mediating elders. However, as elaborated in Chapter 7.2, with the tendency of conflicting 
parties to contest an elders’ verdict and appeal instead to the district administration, 
religious law was no longer considered binding. Thus, on the one hand, the limited 
knowledge of sharia law leaves space for ambiguous customary interpretations and dispute 
settlements. On the other hand, and in addition to the former, the awareness that religious 
actors have forfeited moral authority has furthered the attraction of alternative normative 
frameworks. Moreover, not only has it raised awareness among ordinary people, but also 
and most important among those potentially able to buy justice, it has fostered the 
existence of a kind of legal pluralism (in the broad sense of plural normative 
interpretations).  
In the case of statutory law, the situation is also ambivalent. I have shown that the validity 
and application of statutory law depends on the personal interests of any office holder, 
whether he is working for the collective benefit or following his own personal interests. 
Furthermore, over the period discussed in this study, different governmental regimes and 
partial regional and localized rule dominated. As a result, one regime often questioned the 
validity of the previous regime’s legal framework and made decisions (e.g., the ruling in 
property and rights cases) according to self-serving interpretations and newly issued 
regulations of law. The effects were evident in contesting property documents for land at 
the time of this field research. The prevalence of ‘urufi-type documents and connected 
ambiguities (see section 6.1.2-b) add another dimension to the complex multiplicity of 
reference systems.  
The literature on legal pluralism (e.g., Benda-Beckmann, F. 2001; Benda-Beckmann, K. 
1981) has coined the term ‘forum shopping’ to describe the activity of some actors in 
selecting the arena of law, custom, or convention that will favor their objectives. However, 
                                                             
841 Although throughout Afghanistan customary norms may vary widely depending on location and cultural 
background (e.g., origin, sect, and ethnicity of the social group in question; possibly also the history of power 
changes), no major differences and subsequent effects of governance were discernible in the research region.  
842 The above-mentioned exceptions for several communities in Warsaj and to lesser extent in Farkhār apply.  
843 Arabic is the language of the Koran and is read and reiterated by the majority of the Afghan population, 
including its ordinary religious establishment, often without knowing the meaning of the words. The decade-
long violent conflict and illiteracy can be assumed to underlie this gap in knowledge. 
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my data indicated that the idea of forum shopping is related not only to the existence of 
multiple coexisting legal systems and their interconnections but also the demand by 
different arenas for different sources of legitimacy or ‘legal forums’. Examples are the 
distinct jurisdiction of criminal cases versus water rights and contested natural resource 
distribution cases (7.1). Although the former lies with statutory law, because of the lack of 
resources and competence (administrative authority with little power-resources to rely on) 
it will usually be referred back to a community elders’ council (shurā, jirga, jalsa). 
Furthermore, the demonstrated flexibility of customary rules for irrigation water allocation 
(6.1.1-6.1.4), the coexistence of government-initiated rules for fuel withdrawal, locally 
additional appointed forest guards, and the annual re-definition of pasture usage indicate 
that a high degree of negotiation and brokerage is involved in the local governance of 
natural resources. Nevertheless, as I have shown, the outcome of such bargaining and 
negotiations as well as local customary law and applied interpretations of Islamic law more 
often than not support local elites endowed with power resources and authority. Power 
resources are used to legitimize unequal access and deviance. Hence, benefits are derived 
from resource access facilitated by the de-facto structural power relations, without 
necessarily having a legitimate right.  
Furthermore, the empirical data also showed that rural elites get away with far higher 
levels of nonconformity with local laws in comparison with individuals who are less 
endowed with power resources. I want to argue that this situation can be viewed as a 
structural deprivation of the majority of rural dwellers who are relatively less empowered. 
The subjection is largely habitual and is hardly ever contested. Indeed, the research 
revealed a variety of subconscious strategies rural dwellers employed to justify the 
inequality of access and their own conformity with it. The shift in meaning of salāhiyat is 
one indicator. A second indicator is the acceptance of place-based rights to irrigation water 
for upstream farmers (7.1) despite local norms condemning water theft from downstream 
cultivators (6.1). A narrative frame employed to mitigate this injustice was the claimed 
observation that the worm pest that had befallen the melon crop in 2006-07, had spread 
only to the fields of water thieves.844  
A related type of conformity could be understood by the notion of ritualism (see Ch. 2.3). 
A case in point is the ‘praying for the mirāb’-practice that was observed in Qarayatim in 
2006. Ahmad Shāh enforced the appointment of the mirāb against the will of every other 
elder (6.1.2). It shows, on the one hand, how a ritual can be used to manipulate decision-
making processes even among the rural elites. On the other hand, the example highlights 
the strategic usage of Islam for the enforcement of individual agendas to achieve the 
compliance of others with these subjective aims. It supports my earlier finding that 
diminished moral authority is attached to Islam and qualifies it as source of authority and 
power. Religious authority was used discursively in various instances to support normative 
attitudes. For example, diverse resource users stressed the importance of having a ‘good 
Muslim’ appointed as mirāb or forest guard. However, ‘good’ commanders were never 
associated with being ‘Muslim’. Instead they were assigned the characteristic of humanity 
determining their conduct.845 The moral authority of Islamic values and local mullah lost 
                                                             
844 Reported in several interviews, e.g., Chārdara, 11 June 2006. 
845 Interview in Deh-e Zārān/Miyānshahr, 10 April 2007. 
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regularly when it came to justifying resource depletion and progressing erosion caused by 
pasture overuse and extensive fuel exploitation. Thus, although the mullah in Fulol 
reiterated in his Friday prayers and sermons that it was unlawful to cut fresh trees, villagers 
would reason by a discourse of necessity that they were left with no choice but to cut trees, 
including saplings and artemisia with entire root stocks because of their subsistence-based 
livelihood needs. The fact that the family members of the mullah and the staff of the forest 
officer in the district administration of Farkhār also admitted to cutting wood illustrates the 
dilemma of legitimacy. Similarly, in poppy-growing communities, cultivators used to say 
that they had no choice, “We are obliged [majbur]”, despite its non-conformity with Islam, 
as local religious figures reportedly reminded people of on a regular basis.846 The 
justification narratives say ‘better grow poppy/cut trees than die of hunger’, and ‘better 
steal water than have your crops die’. They are associated with reported sayings from the 
Koran, which stress that Islam allows a person to save himself from death by taking 
exceptional measures. 
A still further enhanced type of legitimacy can be seen in ‘fatalistic’ retreat. Resource users 
are in most cases conscious of the damage their practices cause to the environment and 
their children’s prospect of finding fuel resources on the mountainsides. However, at the 
same time, they are not able to limit cutting in the absence of alternatives for heating, let 
alone to enforce any cutting-restrictions at the community level. This leaves them with the 
phrases “khudā mehrebān ast” (‘God is kind’), and “Mā dar dast-e khudā hastēm” (We 
rely on God).847 These expressions serve the purpose of disguising helplessness and the 
general uncertainty about the future of resource usage and prospective modes of access. 
The case studies on irrigation water allocation, pasture usage, and fuel wood harvesting 
mark increasing degrees of uncertainty regarding access regimes. Because of the obvious 
finiteness of fuel resources in the short term, the future of fuel wood was the most 
uncertain at the time of fieldwork. 
 
7.5 Conclusion: On the moralities of everyday politics 
To summarize the previous subchapters (7.1-7.4), local governance in northeastern 
Afghanistan comprises the following main features: the ability to derive benefit from 
resources, meaning that access to or the governance of irrigation water, pastures and fuel 
wood resources depends more on structural-relational factors than on actual users’ rights 
(7.1). Existing rules of open access and common property regimes are opposed by 
contradicting de facto enforcement patterns of access, which reconfirm differential access 
and socio-economic inequalities. The extent to which an individual is able to enforce his 
use and withdrawal rights for a particular natural resource depends on the user’s bundle of 
power resources. The less power resource-endowed were found to have acquiesced to the 
prevailing inequity and obvious deviance of fellow resource users because they 
                                                             
846 Several interviews, May and August 2007. Interview locations are not given in order to protect the 
respondents. Local leaders throughout Kunduz reinforced this line of reasoning by complaining about the 
provincial government’s falling short on its promises for local development after the farmers had stopped 
poppy cultivation. 
847 Literally: ‘We are in God’s hands’ (Interviews, 18 April 2007, 29 September 2006). 
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acknowledged their lack of capacity to exercise power and were often reduced to 
employing force (gap-e zur ast, gap-e qānon nēst848). In the case of irrigation water, they 
do not form a collective action group, but depend individually on the mirāb’s performance. 
The exit option is to buy a water pump, or in the fuel case, coal or gas; however, even this 
is a matter of financial affluence – itself a resource of power. Thus, the fact that some 
individuals control resource access because of their possession of power resources849 
leaves others with no choice but to try to gain access by building relationships and 
maintaining them with those in control. The rural elites – muysafēd, commanders, arbāb – 
in their position of elders and middlemen play a crucial role in this regard. Employing 
statutory legal mechanisms is not an option for disempowered users because the large-scale 
absence of statutory law, a weak judiciary, and the described deficiencies and incapacities 
of the government administration. Open conflicts and violent escalations of conflicts are 
usually avoided, which leads to further perpetuation of the inequalities of access (7.2). In 
the cases where conflicts are mediated within the community (either initially or referred to 
the elders by the government) or where community-wide decisions have to be made, the 
communities rely on traditional authority roles by calling in a jirga or shurā, but the 
incumbents filling the position of elders are often novel elders.  
Their agendas might be in the interest of the community or they might not. Rural society is 
mediated by middlemen that ordinary dwellers cannot fully trust, but must rely on 
habitually. Representation is better achieved through patron-client relations, and interest 
enforcement is ensured by financial payments. The corrosion of different government 
administrations with individual position holders that first follow their own agendas must be 
seen in close interplay with the vast amount of administrative corruption commonly 
perceived by ordinary people. The allocation and distribution of resources, the mediation 
of conflicts, and the dispensation of justice are highly negotiable, often more readily in 
personal relations and return service. The validity of available sources for norms and rules 
are a matter of interpretation. Consequently, those endowed with the most and best power 
resources define and enforce the application of local law in their own interest.   
These features are the political corner marks of the rural society in northeastern 
Afghanistan. Given the persistence and stability of these features, they frame everyday 
affairs by providing a comfortable ‘state of consciousness’ (Bewusstseinslage) through 
tacit and explicit knowledge about basic certainties in daily interactions. In other words, 
the predictability of what is and could be provides certitude regarding the social order 
(Ordnungssicherheit; Popitz 1968: 35).  
Ordnungssicherheit includes the acknowledgement of inequalities within local society. 
Values such as unity, association, participation (kul-e mardum), solidarity, equity, 
assistance, and brotherliness are emphasized on a discursive level, but they do not 
materialize in community-level interactions involving contested resources; therefore, when 
irrigation water is scarce, pastures are overgrazed and fuel resources are increasingly 
depleted. Once open access and common property regimes are contested, community 
members who might have equal rights from a normative theoretical view are excluded and 
                                                             
848 Translation: “It is a matter of force [physical force/power], not of law.” 
849 These actors can be imagined as nodal points in the web of power relations, where several strands or 
branches of power bundles intersect. See section 7.3.1 above. 
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denied access (see Ch. 9.2). With reference to James Scott’s concept of the moral economy 
among peasants (Scott 1976), one could conclude that no such solidarity is manifest in the 
everyday life-worlds of the communities investigated in this study. However, in contrast, 
the ‘rational peasant’ (Popkin 1980)850 is also not embodied in any of the rural dwellers, 
since their agency is limited by the boundaries of the prevailing power structures present in 
their local environments. The power structures in which they are embedded are often not 
perceived as unjust or unequal, but as providing patronage, protection, and security. Thus, 
rationality is indeed bounded by the normative moralities of local life-worlds. As shown in 
the example of forum shopping and the significance of individual authority of 
interpretation, deviant practices and any form of ‘resistance’, such as objections, take place 
within the existing framework of power relations and do not challenge them at their root. 
In this context, the plural standard of local rules, the fluidity of norms, and their 
interpretation through local elites (arbāb, muysafēd, commanders, mullah, government 
position holders) qualifies deviance.851 Similarly, the distinction between state and society 
is often made obsolete by the intermixing of government and personal agendas and the 
prevalence of webs of relationships that connect office holders and a constituency instead 
of electoral mandates based on programs and policies. Decisive power resides in the tightly 
knit web of relationships because this mode allows reliance on several power resources 
(administrative legitimacy and resources held by the office-bearer and his cronies). 
However, not all constituencies/manteqa have a person in government offices (e.g., Burka 
and Asqalān), causing some to buy a position if the community possesses the necessary 
financial means (e.g., Mashtān).  
Hence, it is rational that ordinary members of rural society attempt to accumulate power 
resources. The most promising strategy uses economic resources because the other main 
resources – social status, force, legitimacy and authority – require collective wealth if a 
person was not born into a family already endowed with social status and authority. Thus, 
money is earned through labor migration (e.g., laborers, farming and livestock-rearing 
families) near and afar, by charging others (e.g., for pasture usage, as practiced by 
government officials and local communities), selling the forest (by government appointed 
forest guard), water allocation, selling laborers (by mirāb), and selling daughters,852 to 
name only the most common strategies encountered during fieldwork. It is obvious that 
different social groups rely on different strategies to extract rents853 or earn incomes. 
Because labor migration is crucial for the survival of many families and upward social 
mobility, sons are a highly valuable asset for ordinary families (see 6.2.2-a). Parallel 
strategies to broaden the individual’s repertoire of power resources include establishing 
marriage relations with influential persons in order to build networks or become part of 
                                                             
850 For an overview of the debate on peasants’ moral versus rational motives for (non)cooperation, see 
Edelman (2005) and the earlier discussions by Feeny (1983), Fafchamps (1992), and Lichbach (1994). 
851 Moreover, one might add that solidarity or orientation towards some kind of communal well-being cannot 
be detected, not even in the name of ideology. Instead, short-term alliances of self-interested individuals 
predominate and align according to interest and need. 
852 It was not mentioned previously, but families or heads of households also capitalize on daughters in the 
absence of other means (Interview, 1 October 2006). 
853 It needs no further explanation that these small-scale rent-seeking activities perpetuate and enhance the 
wide-spread venality (see 7.4) and show the systemic character that marks the rural society’s social order. 
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already existing power networks (see 7.3.2). All these activities can be described as 
responsive because they express conformity with the prevailing conditions characteristic of 
local governance patterns and the local social order. From an agency perspective, they can 
be read as investments in a social order that provides individuals with certitude (Popitz 
1968: 36).  
The existence of such investments by which society members strive to improve their lives 
imparts legitimacy on the existing order. The dynamics of legitimacies were discussed 
previously in Chapter 7.4. Although the identified ambiguities shed light on several 
contradictions, such as administrative authority and moral authority, I want to argue here 
that they generate (not merely by their sum, but by what evolves from it) the type of basic 
legitimacy Popitz (1968, 2004) introduced in the theoretical discussion on power and 
authority (Ch. 2.2). Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the subjectivity of the 
basic legitimacies of social groups and individuals because the content and significance 
might vary from person to person. This also depends on the power resources and frames of 
interpretation available to an individual. For example, a local strongman would resort to 
the threat of force and his personal relations in order to influence the outcome of a conflict 
mediation process, such as the exclusion of tail-end water users from rotation after his 
armed laborer had been caught opening the offtake valve out of turn. The tail-end farmer 
on the other hand would not even bring this deviance to the notice of any administrative or 
local authority other than the mirāb and even then both would be aware that the right or 
more precise the claim of the stronger prevails.  
The certitude and predictability that characterize the perception of a local social order, as 
well as investments in it, create value (Ordnungswert), which is evident in individuals’ 
everyday experiences. Social practices and moralities provide for multiple, individually 
experienced social interactions of everyday life. Because these interactions are inscribed 
with differing particular content and meaning, which are held legitimate, they underpin 
individuals’ life-worlds. Thus, at the societal level, social order is both the state of 
awareness provided by the sum of basic legitimacies of the various social groups and 
individual members of a local society and the potential generic effects of the interplay of 
legitimate social practices and moralities. Against this background, moralities and 
legitimacies constitute a reference of consequence for local politics because assumptions 
about legitimate authority directly affect the evaluation of situations and the scope of 
agency available to an actor. Furthermore, as a reference the interplay of moralities, 
practices and legitimacy sheds light on specific local patterns and frames of interpretation 
of social action and by ‘indigenous logic’ and the rationalities that underlie local politics.  
This highlights an important contrast: In the outside view, chaos and anarchy are seen as 
determining patterns of local order that result in an uncomfortable feeling caused by the 
perceived unpredictability of political outcomes and high degrees of uncertainty. The 
inside view entails a set of basic legitimacies and prevailing values of certitude, stability, 
and predictability (Ordnungswert) for the members of rural local society. 
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“If they do not have a community, we make them one.” 
Community mobilizer in Farkhār (Interview 11 April 2007) 
 
8 – Intervention logic meets local social order 
 
The analysis of local governance in northeastern Afghanistan would be incomplete without 
taking into account the ramifications of recent development interventions,854 which are 
manifest in the results of programs and projects that target local communities. In this 
chapter, I intend to show how the rural social order and local governance mechanisms (Ch. 
7) have adapted to the introduction of programs designed to challenge and alter traditional 
local social structures.  
In the following sections, I will explain the intervention logic and its emphasis on 
community-driven reconstruction, government legitimacy, and the fixing of property rights 
(8.1). Next, in order to highlight normative-theoretical pretensions (8.2.1) and empirical 
observations (8.2.2), I will focus on the formation of local councils as a core idea in the 
participatory management of local resources and development using the example of three 
projects of the Kunduz River Basin Program (KRBP) (see Ch. 3 and sections 6.1.3-b, 
6.2.2-b). Subsequently, in section 8.2.2 policy communiques about the ‘progress’ of state-
building in Afghanistan are discussed in the context of the perceptions of community 
members and their strategies to incorporate intervention logic into their life-worlds and 
local governance mechanisms. Given my previous discussions in Chapters 6 and 7, it will 
not be surprising that middlemen act as development brokers (Bierschenk et al. 2002) in 
the interface between local needs and international aims. Their influence and power resides 
in their position and skills in dealing with ‘the other’, that is, the interventionist social 
order, its rules, practices, and agents (8.3.1). Finally, following Franz von Benda-
Beckmann (1994: 62), who called upon researchers not to stop pondering once deviances 
between normative and actual behavior were identified and analyzed, I focus on the social, 
economic and political ramifications of such disconnects. I argue that the putative state-
building in the recent decade in Afghanistan can at best be grasped as negotiated state-
making between two tiers of local elites (8.3.2). The outcome of this negotiation process is 
far from certain, but it certainly will not be what the international community envisages in 
terms of stability, government legitimacy, equity-focused poverty alleviation, and so on.  
 
                                                             
854 As the international intervention(s) since late 2001 can be conceptually distinguished into the three 
categories of military, economic civil, and political (Schetter and Mielke 2008), the latter two are 
summarized here as ‘development’ intervention, which broadly aims at state- and institution-building at 
national and sub-national levels as well as at reconstruction and reconciliation in communities. 
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8.1 State-building through community-driven reconstruction and the definition of 
property rights 
State-building855 has been one of the many unprioritized objectives of the international 
intervention in Afghanistan. It started to gain prominence only recently (Schetter and 
Mielke 2008), although the overall destruction narrative provided plausible grounds for 
starting holistic reconstruction and state-building from what was perceived to be a zero 
baseline. The ousting of so-called Taliban and al-Qaeda elements from Afghanistan was 
the prior aim of the military intervention. The ensuing state-building efforts were meant to 
deliver basic administrative competencies and the establishment of a functioning 
government bureaucracy to administer the country, including capacity-enhancing measures 
in the human resources sector. In addition to the political intervention were socio-
economic programs to jump-start the economy and achieve food security as well as create 
employment, education, and health facilities.  
The state-building paradigm had emerged prior to the need in 2001 to adapt it to the 
situation in Afghanistan. War-to-peace transitions and state-failure processes in many 
countries of Africa (e.g., Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia), 
former Yugoslavia and South-Asia (Timor-Leste and Sri Lanka) had raised awareness and 
caused conceptual and policymaking responses. As a result, many analyses in academia 
and think tanks were put forward by the scientific community (Milliken and Krause 2002; 
Ottaway 2002; Spanger 2002; Pugh 2000; Anderson and Spelten 2000). In addition, 
templates for dealing with conflict-affected countries and failing or failed states had been 
provided by international organizations, such as the World Bank and the UN, and 
governments since the turn of the century in 2000 (Cliffe et al. 2003). The idea of 
maintaining statehood, that is, keeping states from collapsing or to provide cures to reverse 
their courses from failure to stabilization and reconstruction smoothly merged in the 
political-economy-shaded paradigm of good governance.856 Typically assigned 
(normative) features of good governance included the principles of participation, rule of 
law, transparency, accountability, equity, consensus-orientation, responsiveness to people’s 
needs, and valid degrees of effectiveness and efficiency (UN ESCAP).857 Although good 
governance was initially used as term to subsume criteria for establishing conditionalities 
for aid provision in so-called developing countries, this original idea turned from being a 
                                                             
855 For this thesis, I understand state-building as the formal top-down process aiming at the establishment of 
political control over a territory and its people and the attempt to create a monopoly of violence, without the 
need to obtain the subjects’ acceptance for this process. According to this definition, it is not contradictory 
that state-building is attempted by bottom-up participatory development and reconstruction programs among 
other elements and strategies (e.g., military and diplomatic). In Afghanistan, state-building is driven by 
international intervention; the central government has been elected and appointed by the facilitation of the 
international community. Consequently, it has more external than internal legitimacy because it is recognized 
politically and de jure by other states, yet the extent of legitimacy it enjoys among its populace is debatable 
(see 7.4).  
856 The paradigm can be assumed to have taken root after the introduction of the post-Washington Consensus 
(see Ch. 2.4). Franz von Benda-Beckmann (1994) provides a concise overview of how the World Bank’s 
legal constraints have resulted in a specific normative construction of the linkage between good governance 
and economic development.     
857 Effectiveness and efficiency refer to meeting societal demands with the studious utilization of available 
resources, including the sustainable use of natural and environmental resources. See UN ESCAP (undated).   
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means of achieving development to an end in the context of post-conflict countries and 
state-building. Moreover, with the establishment of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) in 2000-01, community empowerment and decentralized governance were 
regarded as mainstays of participatory development. Thus, the rationale for community-
driven reconstruction (CDR) in countries like Afghanistan was “to make peace sustainable, 
countries face even stronger imperatives to rebuild social capital, empower and provide 
voice to communities, and generally rebuild the social fabric torn apart by violent 
conflict.”858     
In the context of my empirical findings, which were explicated in Chapters 5-7, the above 
assumption about a fragmented social fabric and the implication that community-based 
resource provision had been dysfunctional and broken, is a misconception. The same 
World Bank document continued, “In situations where a new state is being built, such as in 
Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, it can be used to design a new local governance structure 
that is decentralized and participatory from the outset” (Cliffe et al. 2003: 3). Thus, an 
undifferentiated concept of community-driven reconstruction and (in an envisaged next 
step) community-driven development underpinned the intervention practice in 
Afghanistan. In seeking to bolster government legitimacy with the main aims of “(i) 
speedy and cost-effective delivery of reconstruction assistance on the ground; and (ii) 
building a governance structure that stresses local choice and accountability” (ibid.: 2), 
CDR relied on supposed core skills, incentives and unity in local communities, which it 
assumed only needed empowerment. Afghanistan’s NSP is based on the CDR blueprint. 
One goal was to enhance the government’s credibility (on the ‘how’ see Chs. 5.2.3 and 
8.1.2). The major ‘design elements’ of CDR projects included support for “the democratic 
selection of local community councils, including measures on the representation of 
women, youth or other disadvantaged groups” and the provision of “resources in the form 
of block grants directly to community councils such that they can plan and manage their 
own reconstruction priorities” (ibid.).  
Moreover, decentralized and participatory community-support approaches for the 
governance of local environmental and natural resources implicitly aimed to fix property 
rights because they were regarded as an incentive and decisive factor in mobilizing local 
action for sustainable resource allocation and usage (Coward 1986: 501). However, as I 
will show below, attempts at irrigation development, reforestation projects and pasture 
regeneration conflicted with the existing governance patterns in local communities because 
they aimed at the complete re-organization of resource usage and the expansion of 
proprietory interest859 through the creation of new property objects and an inherent equity-
norm in its participatory appraoch. The underlying assumption for the restructuring o fthe 
property regimes is that well-defined property rights – which not only refer to statutory 
                                                             
858 Foreword by Ian Bannon, Manager of the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit of the World 
Bank, in Cliffe et al. (2003).  
859 Coward (1986: 493) coined the term ‘property-creating processes’ based on his empirical work on 
irrigation development. Accordingly, property creation through ‘development’ measures results in new 
relationships among new and old users, even in public property joint use arrangements (e.g., common pool 
resources, also open access).  
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rights, but also non-governmental ‘customary rights’860 – offer management incentives, 
provide ‘ownership’ in the sense of responsibility and authority on behalf of the ‘owners’, 
and possibly allow the extraction of income for maintenance services (Meinzen-Dick 2002: 
228).  
The donor community’s awareness that property creation might result in conflicts was 
implicitly acknowledged by measures, such as stressing the importance of ‘right’ context 
factors. According to Cliffe et al. (2003: 3), “The CDR approach has a stronger positive 
long-term impact on local governance if the right preconditions exist.” These preconditions 
included security, local representative leadership, governance characteristics, and an 
available cadre of project workers (ibid.: 4-7). No reference was made, however, to the 
then already very prominent ‘Do no harm’-approach (Anderson 1999) in international 
development practice. Instead, the solution for an effective CDR-approach was seen in the 
context-specific adaptation of design elements for community-driven measures (Cliffe et 
al. 2003: 7). One such design decision concerned the selection of a community-inclusive 
versus sectoral model for creating community councils (see 8.1.2).   
In hindsight, but without prejudice to my argument, the specific characteristics of 
community governance in Afghanistan were assumed instead of documented. The origins 
of rights, the significance of normative pluralism, local characteristics of leadership 
patterns and representation were not acknowledged, but ignored. Moreover, the capacities 
and objectivity of local communities as well as project facilitators (local workers and 
community mobilizers of international NGOs) had been largely overestimated by the 
selective perspectives of authors who created logical frameworks while sitting behind 
desks at international organizations. 
 
8.2 Case study: The Kunduz River Basin Program 
Halfway through the first decade of the new century, northeastern Afghanistan was 
becoming a vanguard for reconstruction programs, not the least of which was indicated by 
the number of international and domestic NGOs (further designated as INGOs)861 working 
in the area as well as the selection of this region for the EC-funded Kunduz river basin 
pilot project for water sector restructuring. As previously mentioned in section 6.1.3-b, the 
Kunduz River Basin Program (KRBP) aims to implement an IWRM-approach based on the 
hydrological unit of a river basin that is believed to facilitate more efficient management 
and enhanced sustainability of water resources. The Kunduz river basin stretches over 
large territories of northeastern Afghanistan, including the upper and lower catchment 
areas, and thus comes under the jurisdiction of provincial government agencies in Baghlān, 
                                                             
860 There are a variety of property rights concepts and distinctions, such as public versus private, control 
versus use, ususfruct versus usus and different shadings of the ‘bundle of rights’ perspective. See Meinzen-
Dick (2002), Ostrom (2000), and Schlager and Ostrom (1992). 
861 It would be more correct to talk of (I/N)GOs because a wide variety of corporate organizations are active 
in the development sector. However, because in the three KRBP sub-projects that were studied only non-
governmental international organizations play a role, I will use the easier abbreviation, INGO, in the rest of 
this chapter.  
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Kunduz and Takhār. The KRBP consists of several components, three of which overlapped 
the area of my field research:  
 the Social Management of Water in Afghanistan (SMWA) project as 
implemented by Welthungerhilfe in five irrigation schemes in Kunduz and 
Takhār862 (see 6.1.3-b) 
 the Integrated Development, Environment And Sustainability (IDEAS) project 
in the two upper catchment districts of Farkhār and Warsaj in Takhār province, 
jointly managed by Concern Worldwide and Welthungerhilfe 
 the Catchment Development Program (CDP) of MercyCorps active in the three 
upper catchment districts Eshkamesh (Takhār), Burka and Khost863 (Baghlān).  
  
The two micro-catchments864 in Takhār and Baghlān form tributaries of the Khānābād 
river, which joins the Kunduz river near Qal’a-ye Zāl (see Map M2). The rationale for 
including micro-catchments in the generally water-focused KRBP is rooted in the 
conviction that massive deforestation and a gradual loss of vegetation cover have caused 
erosion, increasing run-off rates, and a heightened frequency of floods with massive silt 
loads, resulting in higher demands for maintenance in the lower basin.865 KRBP’s 
objectives866 and prime focus on water complies with the latest international development 
standards (IWRM, see 6.1.3-b), which were formulated and implemented after recognizing 
and accepting that water resources are under pressure and face shortages. Unsustainable 
management has caused the potential for large-scale food insecurity and future conflicts 
among water users on global, international, and local scales. Underlying the motivation to 
implement large-scale water sector reform is the aim to contribute to poverty alleviation 
via the improvement of food security and rural development. Consequently, all three 
KRBP components share this objective; however, because they have different foci, they 
employ distinct strategies.  
SMWA “aims at building sustainable social and technical water management capacities” 
(SMWA 2005: 3) in the five canal systems in Kunduz and Takhār (Shah 2009). This will 
be achieved through the introduction of more efficient and equitable irrigation 
                                                             
862 SMWA focused on five schemes, four in Kunduz (Sofi-Qarayatim Asqalān, Qal’a-ye Zāl and Tarboz 
Guzar) and the Sharawān canal in Takhār. The Sharawān irrigation area was not part of my field research 
area.  
863 Because I did not work in the Khost district of Baghlān, subsequent statements and findings with regard to 
CDP do not relate to Khost. 
864 For an overview of the terminology and definitions (river basins, watersheds, micro-catchments etc.) see 
Favre and Kamal (2004). 
865 In addition, the formation of ravines and subsequent loss of agricultural land as well as houses and pasture 
areas impacts negatively on local people’s livelihoods. As obvious solutions, the introduction of community 
forestry and reforestation projects, innovations in rain-fed farming techniques, use of alternative energy 
sources and sustainable rangeland management practices, including livestock-keeping, have been proposed 
for human capacity building.  
866 The overall objectives include the establishment of a river basin plan with the creation of river basin 
organizations; the initiation of upper catchment conservation and reforestation; the improvement of irrigation 
schemes management; the rehabilitation of 10-15 schemes; and capacity-building of the MEW and river 
basin organizations (see KRBP 2006). The KRBP was funded with €12.9 mio in the first phase (2004-08) 
and an additional €12.1 mio in the second phase (2006-09) (ibid.).  
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management and system maintenance, which builds on the implementation of bottom-up 
stakeholder participation of all user groups and institutional bodies by WUGs, canal 
committees, and so-called basin and sub-basin authorities. The label ‘social’ water 
management alludes to the aim of building on enhanced participation and engaging all 
stakeholders, including non-farming households, in an equitable manner for the effective 
and sustainable use of surface water.  
IDEAS has clear priorities for the implementation of natural resource management 
measures to protect the basin’s upper catchment, where the main contributories of the 
Kunduz river originate in the high mountains of Warsaj. In this upstream area, two 
watersheds form the natural boundary of Takhār province, one with Panjshir province, the 
second with Badakhshān (see Map M9). The IDEAS project focuses on protection 
measures, such as reforestation, introduction of alternative fuels and their use, as well as 
general land use and land management practices. CDP has the same objectives of installing 
incentive structures for upper catchment residents for sustainable natural resources 
governance, thus contributing to improving water management in the entire river basin, but 
in another upper catchment area further south in Baghlān (Burka and Khost districts) and 
Eshkamesh district of Takhār.  
 
8.2.1 The community-based management paradigm: WUGs, CCs, WUAs, NRMCs 
All three projects aim to support local stakeholders in the efficient management of natural 
resources – irrigation water, pastures, fuel resources, rangeland, and land in general – with 
an emphasis on equity and livelihood sustainability at the community level. Furthermore, 
the objective of creating or regenerating physical capital (e.g., canal and dam 
infrastructure, reforestation, and disaster risk reduction infrastructure), the building up of 
organizational capacities at ‘village and district levels’ (IDEAS 2003: 5) and human capital 
through specific training, constitute the most substantial elements of the project’s 
objectives.  
As indicated previously, the first dimension – infrastructure improvement – is based on the 
assumption that the pre-war infrastructure was completely damaged or destroyed and 
rendered dysfunctional. Thus, reconstruction efforts begin at the bottom, whether they 
entail concrete and steel irrigation structures, check dams, dividers or the construction of 
electricity poles and micro-hydropower facilities. These kinds of development activities 
serve a double purpose. On the one hand, they are an incarnation of Western mainstream 
development practice (Thomas 2000), which is a product of modernization-inspired 
thinking. On the other hand, the local worldview (moralities) is being attended to because 
it has maintained a strong belief in technical, concrete, and steel solutions to any kind of 
rural development ‘deficit’. Interestingly, this perception originates in the experience of the 
state-led facilitation of development initiatives under the Najibullah regime during the 
second half of the 1980s (e.g., embodied in cooperatives, see Ch. 6.1.2).    
To build organizational and human capital, the SMWA project envisages that “Intensive 
training, workshops and activities on water management will include all especially poorer 
sections of the community with equal representation of their interests in the accessibility of 
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water and thus contribute to establish functioning problem solving and mediating 
mechanisms at community level” (Welthungerhilfe 2005: 9). The expected results include 
the mobilization, training and empowerment of target communities to ‘successfully 
manage their water resources’ (Result 1 of five expected results). Furthermore, 
“Community solidarity is enhanced by local problem solving mechanisms, joint 
management and participation of all water users” (Result 3), and the successful functioning 
of five model institutions that ensure participatory and representative local water 
management (Result 5) (ibid.: 10). Similarly, two (of three) intended results in the IDEAS 
project proposal specifically focus on the enhancement of the human, social and political 
capital of local community members. Result No. 1 states “Local stakeholders will have the 
organizational capacity (that is, social and political capital) they need to lobby for 
resources and changes in order to sustainably manage natural resources and their 
livelihoods” (Concern Worldwide 2003: 10). One indicator of this aim in terms of village 
level participation is the ability of 80 percent of all local council members (CDC/shurā) 
and at least three non-members to explain the village’s Natural Resources Management 
(NRM) plan (ibid.). The human capital dimension refers to knowledge and attitudes local 
stakeholders will have gained, which will enable them to implement best-practice solutions 
to their local NRM problems and lack of sustainable livelihoods (ibid.).   
Examination of the human resources and organizational capital support dimensions reveals 
the role of local bodies, that is, different kinds of councils at the community level. As 
explained in Chapter 6.1.3, for the implementation of social water management reforms, 
the establishment of WUGs and CCs was actively undertaken during the period of the 
present field research between 2006 and 2007. Both types of local councils were supposed 
to lead to the formation of WUAs and merge into the hierarchical institutional arrangement 
of the Kunduz river basin administration over the medium term (see Figure 3 in Ch. 6.1.3). 
Similarly, the program objectives of IDEAS and CDP anticipated and implemented 
different types of NRM Committees (NRMCs) in the upper catchment areas.  
INGOs implementing these programs found different preconditions for the establishment 
of councils in the KRBP-framework. For example, in Farkhār and Warsaj, where Concern 
Worldwide led implementation of the IDEAS project jointly with Welthungerhilfe, it had 
the option of relying on formerly established CDCs. Concern Worldwide was established 
as FP within the NSP-framework (Concern Worldwide/Welthungerhilfe 2007: 8; Ch. 
5.2.3). However, the local state of implementation of NSP projects varied to large extent. 
In some communities, CDCs had only been formed recently, in others the community had 
already spent all the grant money and viewed the project as lapsed after having had varying 
effects and successes. In a third category of communities, the consultation process with the 
FP-NGO and the MRRD was ongoing because council members were either preparing for 
selecting councils, formulating their village development plans and prioritizing their needs, 
or were on hold waiting for a reply from MRRD Kabul to get their budget approval. 
SMWA faced different situations in its canal clusters: Whereas in Sofi-Qarayatim, NSP-
implementation was proceeding and partly finished, it was only beginning in Qal’a-ye Zāl 
and Tarboz Guzār, but not foreseeable in Kunduz Markaz/Asqalān867 (see also 7.3.2). In 
                                                             
867 The implementation of the NSP followed a district approach. Accordingly, international and local NGOs 
were assigned by district as FPs to implement the program on behalf of the GoA. They were financed by 
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Burka district of the CDP area, ACTED was quite advanced in implementing local 
measures of the NSP, that is, by mid-2007 CDCs had already been established and had 
articulated their infrastructure needs throughout Fulol.  
Underlying the establishment of CDCs in the framework of the NSP was the governance 
objective of the CDR-approach (Ch. 8.1). Accordingly, by taking a lead in physical 
reconstruction projects, democratically elected local councils were supposed to strengthen 
reconciliation needs within communities by finding a local consensus on the definition of 
physical reconstruction priorities. Furthermore, CDCs were implicitly envisaged to become 
forums for collective problem-solving within communities and thus were to supplant 
traditional decision-making and problem-solving structures, such as conventional elders’ 
councils and commanders’ rulings. Hence, with NSP, local councils oriented towards good 
governance-norms came to form the centerpiece of Western state-building visions, such as 
CDCs, NRMCs, WUGs, WUAs and CCs, which can be characterized as collectively 
forming the vanguard of state-building from an interventionist perspective (Agrawal 2001: 
35). They therefore suited the design template of hierarchical state structures manifest in 
the formation of councils and the establishment of development plans at various 
administrative levels. Figure 10 shows this hierarchy, pointing out prescribed interactions 
among the different levels.   
The second column in Figure 10 stands for the supposedly coherent hierarchy of 
development councils at different administrative levels. The creation of councils was 
envisaged at these levels (community, district and provincial) with the prior aim of forging 
level-wise development, including sector-specific plans within communities (Figure 10, 
third column), in accordance with ANDS (see section 6.1.3-b, which also served as 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper [IMF 2008]). Subsequently, Provincial Development 
Plans (PDPs) were intended to form the framework for District Development Plans (DDPs) 
and CDPs. For this purpose, Provincial Development Councils (PDCs) with members 
drawn from provincial line ministries, UN-organizations, Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs), INGOs and IGOs were created within the provincial administrative structure for 
the elaboration of five-year PDPs.868 Nevertheless, the NSP is the principal element in 
governmental development outreach to the local level. Because of security and logistical 
challenges, the program, which was supposed to be fully implemented nationwide by the 
end of 2006, lagged behind and was considerably delayed. The intended elections of 
district-level councils (DCs) were not conducted in the framework of the 2005 national 
elections. In 2007, district development assemblies (‘councils’) were in the process of 
initiation throughout my research area. These were meant to provide a superstructure for 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
international donors (see Ch. 5.2.3). In the project region, these were ACTED (Qal’a-ye Zāl, Burka), GRSP 
(Chārdara, Kunduz Markaz), and Concern Worldwide (Farkhār and Warsaj). GRSP was one of only two 
Afghan NGOs that were acknowledged as FPs the NSP-process at the time of fieldwork.     
868 Tension arose from the fact that while the governor was supposed to take charge of the PDC, the PDC-
secretariat in charge of coordinating the different sector working groups had been subordinated to the 
provincial line-ministry of the Ministry of Economics, not the MRRD. In Kunduz, eight such sector working 
groups officially existed in 2007, including security, governance, economics, education, society, agriculture, 
the private sector, and infrastructure/natural resources. However, only the agriculture working group was 
active. Two years after the initiation of the PDC in 2005, its venue and budget had not been determined, 
despite the fact that the PDP should have been drafted by 2007 (Interviews in Kunduz, 5-6 November 2007). 
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CDCs at the district level and consisted of 25 delegates who were mostly chairmen or 
deputies of selected local CDCs.869    
 
Figure 10: Levels of interaction in Afghanistan’s state-building and development template870  
Thus, in the natural resource management sectors, the NSP served as template for a meta-
development project that encompassed both objectives of development, the infrastructure 
overhaul and governance reform.871 Statutory law, which was in the process of drafting  
                                                             
869 At the time of field research, this process was more advanced in Kunduz and Takhār compared to 
provinces in the southeast, such as Paktiya and Khost. DDAs had been established in Warsaj and the Emām 
Sāheb district by 2007. However, this build-up of sub-national governance institutions followed very 
technical procedures. One indicator was the formation of DDAs in some districts, e.g., in Farkhār, where not 
even CDCs had been established exhaustively throughout the whole district, thus obviously depriving 
communities (which were without CDCs at the time of DDA-formation) of potential participation. The 
reason for this non-concurrent timing can be traced partly to the fact that the implementation of sub-national 
governance structures was guided by different partners. Consequently, the different timelines of FPs in 
charge of CDC-formation and NSP-implementation at times collided with those of UNDP and other 
international organizations in charge of DDA creation. See Mielke et al. (2008). 
870 Adopted from a GTZ power point presentation, no author or date was indicated. NRMP stands for Natural 
Resource Management Plan.  
871 However, both dimensions have been met with different rates of success. While the governance 
component showed mixed results, the infrastructure building component can be regarded as more or less 
successful, given that almost complete destruction constituted the baseline level. In addition, the level to 
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and revision during the period of this field research, was meant to support this ideal 
development scheme. For example, the draft Forest Law of 2008 prescribed the formation 
of Community Forest Associations (CFAs), which would then have to apply for forest 
resource rights to manage local forest resources (Bowling 2008). Alternatively, existing 
organizational bodies, such as WUAs, CDCs or cooperatives, were considered eligible for 
managing community forest resources productively and sustainably, if they appointed a 
special sub-committee with a chairman, and would register both with the district 
administration’s forestry section of the Agricultural Department (ibid.). In the case of the 
water law, at least two different draft versions with varying content can be distinguished. 
The first draft of 2005-2006 explicitly included the objective of establishing local councils 
and WUAs as part of the river basin approach (MEW 2005). Later versions in 2007 and 
2008 (MEW undated; MEW 2007) contained optional wording that stated ‘water user 
associations can be established’ and if they are being established, this should take place 
according to rules agreed upon in the particular local context, that is, river-basin specific. 
At the time of this field research, SMWA was in the process of establishing CCs and 
WUGs as WUA-precursors (see 6.1.3).872 However, as was the case with other local 
natural resource-councils (e.g., NRMCs), WUAs and CCs could not fall under the 
authority of CDCs because they transgressed the boundaries of NSP communities.873  
In comparison, the strategic purpose of NRM committees in the upper catchment project 
districts Warsaj, Farkhār, Burka, and Eshkamesh of KRBP seemed vague about their actual 
strategic role within the hierarchy of consultative and decision-making bodies of the 
envisaged sub-national administration. Throughout 2008,874 IDEAS community mobilizers 
made efforts to establish community and sub-catchment pasture agreements in the 
framework of NRM sub-catchment associations. For the non-cost extension period 2009, 
their link with sub-basin committees was planned (Concern Worldwide/Welthungerhilfe 
2008: 4, 6). Given that details about the proposed rangeland and forest law (section 6.2.2-
b) were largely lacking at the time of the project intervention, the further intention of 
NRMCs was unclear not only to project management staff but also local government 
representatives and local NGO-workers.      
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
which infrastructure construction and its implementation status can be ranked meaningfully in order to 
compare it with achievements in the local governance realm must be put under scrutiny, including an audit of 
the actual and accounted-for costs and the quality of implementation of infrastructure projects.    
872 The finally issued Water Law of 26 April 2009 states in Article 18: “(1) Water User Associations and 
irrigation associations can be established in accordance with this law. (2) The manner of activities, extent of 
duties, authorities and other associated issues related to Associations will be established by their respective 
charter in accordance with this law.” (GoA 2009). However, while this article seems to allow the formation 
of WUA on an optional basis, Article 20 addresses the conversion of irrigation water rights to permits for 
which only WUAs are eligible to apply. Article 23 speaks of ‘irrigation associations’ which “may delegate 
the responsibility for the management and distribution of water rights to a Head Water Master (Mirāb Bashi) 
or Water Master (Mirāb) who are designated by the irrigation associations” (ibid.).    
873 See Mielke (2007) and Ch. 5.2.3 for what I have called the territorizalization and villagization of rural 
areas by the NSP.  
874 Including the six-month period of a non-cost extension, IDEAS was implemented from 1 April 2005 until 
30 September 2009. By the end of 2008, nine ‘sub-catchment committees/associations’ had been established 
(Concern Worldwide/Welthungerhilfe 2008: 1).  
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8.2.2 Perceptions of aid intervention components in northeastern Afghanistan 
The first part of this subchapter will focus on two effects of the implementation of KRBP 
components in the three projects: One effect is the perception of community members that 
the implementation of the projects has been detrimental to communal unity. In some 
locations, the projects have caused intra-community conflict, hostility towards project 
implementers, and general disappointment. Second is a remarkable perception of 
separateness regarding the mandates of qawmi (‘traditional’ and customary) councils 
versus newly established CDCs, NRMCs or WUGs and CCs. This is noteworthy because 
according the logic of intervention (see 8.2.1) the latter were supposed to supplant and 
replace the former.875 It was also assumed that traditional local decision-making structures 
were corrupted and resource allocation mechanisms had hence ceased to exist, had failed, 
or had broken down (see 8.1). In the second part of this subchapter, the empirical bottom-
up perspective that this thesis has so far pursued is complemented by an external analytical 
view by applying the notion of development brokers. It leads to the finding that despite 
good intentions, the unintended consequences of the observed early KRBP activities 
resulted in the opposite effect, that is, the strengthening of existing social differences and 
traditional power structures. 
The objectives of the projects were efficiency and equity, that is, to create sustainable 
natural resource management patterns that benefitted all stakeholders, even beyond the 
resource user community. The projects engineered ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ types of 
intervention measures. SMWA provided or improved irrigation infrastructure through the 
construction of intakes, stone walls, check dams, bridges, canal-lining, offtakes and canal 
committee communication centers (CCC). CDP and IDEAS created hardware that included 
the construction of protection walls from mudslides, bridges, fencing, and gabions as well 
as the establishment of nurseries, the planting of trees, and alfalfa seeding. All these 
measures touched upon ownership issues of land: ownership of existing property and 
ownership of new property. In the case of SMWA, the water user community, that is, the 
irrigators were distinguished from the non-irrigators876 as members of WUGs and CCs. 
While irrigable land is always private property, the canal and its infrastructure had been 
created in the past by communal work under the guidance of a mirāb.877 Subsequently, the 
water sector reform strategy foresaw the assignment of responsibilities for newly created 
infrastructure to the respective irrigation associations, such as WUGs.878 Even if in some 
                                                             
875 Not mentioned above, but insightful in this regard is the 2009 decreed Water Law Chapter 6, Article 
34/35, in which WUAs are assigned a dispute resolution authority, thereby further mentioning the assistance 
of WUAs by the mirāb and sanctioning/fining mechanisms backing the assigned authority. See GoA (2009). 
However, in this case the articles refer to disputes that arise regarding the usage of water.    
876 This approach nevertheless entailed faults because another meaningful distinction must be made between 
landowners and sharecroppers and their respective representation in WUGs and CCs.  
877 As explicated throughout Ch. 6, a mirāb was in charge of mobilization and maintenance works. However, 
the number and quality of constructed ‘illegal’ structures during the last two and a half decades, i.e., the 
disproportionate widening of offtakes etc., could not be checked and prevented by the mirāb because of his 
limited authority over the largest landowners.   
878 According to the recently decreed Water Law 2009, the construction, rehabilitation, development and 
protection of irrigation networks rests with the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, presumably 
in close cooperation with WUAs at the local level. See GoA (2009), Article 11. 
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locations, the construction aided particularly and exclusively one or several large 
landowners whose fields were attached to a certain offtake or spillway, the idea was to 
cover all maintenance costs relevant to all irrigators through WUG budgets, which were 
supposed to be derived mainly from farmers’ financial contributions.  
Chapter 6.1.3 described how access to herding and pasture were regulated based on 
traditional ideas of common property held by members of the same community,879 which 
excluded ‘others’, such as kochi who customarily used the same pastures, and sometimes 
held title deeds. For the case of fuel wood collection, I revealed an ongoing transition of 
open access regimes towards common property regulations (Chs. 6.2.3 and 7.1). However, 
contrary to irrigation sector interventions, the upper catchment project measures requiring 
maintenance and cooperation by the local communities also involved long-term horizons 
and uncertain property relations. For example, the planting of tree saplings for reforestation 
within the framework of the IDEAS project was an objective: 270.000 saplings were 
planted during the first three years (see Concern Worldwide 2009). However, at the same 
time considerable damage was done to forestry plots by livestock because plantations on 
common land were not protected by local dwellers. Several explanations have been offered 
from non-cooperation because of lack of faith in the future and the project’s sustainability 
connected to the finding that locals have no sense of ownership of the newly planted 
seedlings (ibid.: 14), to misperceptions regarding local communities’ own contributions to 
NRM projects. The common perception among locals was that their contributions referred 
to their labor during immediate project implementation, such as the planting of trees or the 
construction of a protection wall. However, the payment of a tree-warden for a nursery did 
not fit into this mental concept of community contribution. Subsequently, with the 
withdrawal of immediate daily interaction with local NGO workers after the guard had 
been appointed, the salary of the guard was not paid by the community. Instead they 
accepted that the trees died because they either did not get enough water or were eaten by 
grazing livestock.880 In short, the NRM-project interventions were not very successful, 
even with the incentive of receiving five Afs per surviving tree for the community budget. 
Consequently, the project focused on the establishment of private nurseries, the 
precondition of which was of course land plot ownership or exclusive use rights.881  
                                                             
879 I also elaborated that the idea of community in this case is mainly territorial and includes the nearby 
village or hamlet. However, the cases where local livestock owners take in animals from relatives and friends 
show that the territorial principle is being undermined by social relations and network principles. See Ch. 5.2.   
880 I recorded several examples of where this happened, such as Kaj Dara/Farkhār or Yukh (Warsaj) 
(Interview Yukh, 24 March 2009). 
881 Needless to say, with this focus on private nurseries, the poor and most vulnerable population groups were 
excluded from benefits of the aid intervention. Posed to nursery owners was the possible condition that they 
would have to give a certain number of saplings to ‘poor’ people free of charge, but it was never 
implemented. In addition, the NGO’s claim that nursery owners were mostly women could not be verified in 
spot-checks during my field work. See Daulatzai (2008) on the complex problems that the exclusive 
privileging of gender in development work might and do actually rise in the case of Afghanistan. Although I 
did not collect systematic data on gendered perspectives (see Ch. 3.1), the insights I gained during my own 
field research on men’s and women’s subjectivities (admittedly mostly aggregated at the user-community 
level) confirm Daulatzai’s elaborations. In particular, I found that, locally, the concept of widow does not 
match the aid practitioners’ understanding of widow as an unsupported female having to bear alone the 
burden of household chores and everything related to them.  
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After an initial period of one year, the implementing NGO recognized that it had ‘proven 
difficult to persuade communities of the benefits of NRM’ in Farkhār and Warsaj (Concern 
Worldwide/Welthungerhilfe 2007: 11). Adding to the complexity of local perceptions was 
the fact that local community members felt uncertain regarding their future access and use 
rights to the mountainsides, which was caused by the reforms and property overhaul that 
were being carried out at the time of this field research.882 Furthermore, tax receipts from 
earlier farming of rain-fed plots in the mountains were used by various families to claim 
private ownership and thus exclusive access in the case of other, competing claims.883 The 
‘potentiality’ of future claims originates from the understanding that it does not make sense 
to insist on family-wise compartmentalization of mountainsides, such as aiding the 
conversion of rangeland to rain-fed plots, because the benefits of keeping livestock 
outnumber those derived from rain-fed farming. Only at community level, boundary- 
drawing practices – to exclude other user groups or to selectively allow outsiders to access 
communal pastures – make sense and protect single communities’ natural resource base. 
Project activities, such as the seeding of alfalfa for subsequent pasture regeneration, which 
required the introduction of fallow seasons and the erection of boundary protection walls in 
some locations (e.g. Burka), and rotational herding for selected trial plots were also not 
very successful.884 
In particular, the attempt to create inter-community agreements and committees (anjuman) 
involved the tightening of what had been a loose mutual understanding of pasture and tree 
usage.885 Consequently, various conflicts surfaced and escalated because of the 
dissatisfaction of local community members. For example, in Farkhār local NGO staff 
crafted a joint pasture agreement between three communities and thus established a 
committee named ‘Anjuman ba nām-e Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud’ (‘Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud-
association’). However, mutual suspicion among members of different participating 
communities and the arbitrary lambasting of the deputy head of the anjuman by 
neighboring villagers caused one community to leave the grazing arrangement because of 
                                                             
882 Thus, for them, the question was whether they would be the beneficiaries of long-term regeneration efforts 
that required commitment without immediate results and benefits. 
883 As early as the 1950s and 1960s, by growing crops on rain-fed land, locals established private ownership 
rights on plots that were traditionally common property for the first time. Accordingly, Article 64 of the first 
Land Law from 1965 prohibited the conversion of pasture land into farmland. See Land Survey and Statistics 
Law 1965 (31 Jawzā 1344), Art. 64; Jentsch (1973: 50). Against the general trend towards the conversion of 
pastures into rain-fed agricultural plots, which had been observed in other areas of Takhār, the opposite was 
detected in Warsaj, and partly also in Farkhār. Given the popularity and profitability of livestock (see section 
6.2.1-a) few people, only the poorest, would try to cultivate in the mountains of both districts, where yields 
are low and wheat and other food items would have to be bought at the bazaar. In the past, the main incentive 
to cultivate rain-fed mountain plots had been the production of wheat and grains for selfconsumption because 
at the national level the demand of the population could not be met. Thus, the post-2001 decade has seen the 
distortion of local wheat markets by food aid, which resulted in the fact that even wheat cultivators in the 
lower catchment’s oasis were not able to profit from their wheat crop because of artificially low wheat prices. 
See Yarash and Mielke (2011: 26).  
884 Interviews in Koka Bulāq and Kunduz, September 2007. Apparently, the implementing NGO had chosen 
the land of the local influential mir family for the implementation of the pasture project – without knowing 
on whose property it was active. Their selective communication strategy to interact with only few elders had 
ensured that nobody informed the NGO representatives about the true ownership situation. The information 
was simply withheld. 
885 This relates to pistachio and fuel harvesting.  
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lack of cooperation and suggestions of the dishonesty and unfairness of co-anjuman 
members in other settlements.886 Thus, the attempts at fixing and breaking up customary 
management patterns, that is, from anjuman-crafting to the ‘privatization’ of natural 
resources, in my field sites led to open conflicts.887 In many cases, jealousy and 
competition arose over the unequal distribution of funds and material aid, leading not only 
to disunity within communities, but also to large-scale disappointment and hostility 
towards implementing NGOs and their staff. Respondents in Kaj Dara complained, “The 
organizations have spoiled us. It is good if the organizations don’t come anymore, if they 
have spent all their money. It made us disunited.”888 In this respect, the distribution of 
livestock for ‘poor widows, the disabled and the most vulnerable people’ (Concern 
Worldwide/Welthungerhilfe 2007: 10) was also questionable because the definition of 
these categories usually lay with the head of the local NRMC or anjuman (see below). 
According to the logic of the social order in local rural society, the preferential treatment of 
family members, clients, and friends is obvious.889      
In the case of the SMWA-project, property renegotiations were conducted to prepare the 
construction of Community Communication Centers (CCCs) in the project area.890 The 
transfer of titles from private owners to a future WUA with unclear legal and official status 
seemed difficult.891 Even more contentious was the inter-community decision regarding 
how many CCCs should be built and where, that is, in which manteqa and on whose land? 
The following statement of the WUG-leader of Wakil Akhtar (Qal’a-ye Zāl) exemplifies 
the irrigators’ perspective:  
We have not reached a decision about the CCC in our meeting with the NGO. The canal is 
10 kilometers long, it is impossible to have only one CCC. We expect three CCCs from 
GAA [Welthungerhilfe, KM], it is impossible to have only one. … If they want only one, in 
this case it is better to construct it in the bazaar so that everybody can visit. … We had no 
WUGs for 200 years; we have not used CCC, why do we need it now? If you will not 
construct the CCC for us, we will not attend your meetings. We had no WUGs for 70 years, 
nothing will happen now also.892  
                                                             
886 Interviews in Kaj Dara and Kundakaw, 27-28 March 2009.  
887 This is not to say the conclusion would be to refrain from intervention in NRM realms. The strengthening 
of customary tenure arrangements definitely makes sense because it can be read as a minimal advantage for 
the actual poor of the respective community in that the current governance system of the pasture and forest 
resources, as communal commons, entitles them to collect fuel, pistachios and herbs etc., even though they 
might not own land and/or livestock. However, the ‘how’ of this kind of intervention makes the difference. 
See also Ch. 8.3.   
888 Interview in Kaj Dara, 27 March 2009. Distrust often arose from non-transparent budget allocations and 
spending, resulting in a lack of accountability.  
889 Because of the nature of the issue at hand (moral misconduct), it is not possible to make statements about 
the degree of this practice, much less to quantify cases (which was also not within the scope of my research). 
However, such grievances were voiced in several locations from people whom I had visited several times and 
with whom I had built basic trust. Against this background, I suggest considering their perception valid and 
representative of the ordinary community members’ views.     
890 CCCs were meant to provide “public spaces for larger and open meetings, which are accessible for all 
groups of water users … at central locations.” See Welthungerhilfe (2005: 15).  
891 Field notes from the SMWA-project meeting on 23 July 2007. 
892 Noted by Abdullayev, 9 August 2007. 
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Similarly, in Asqalān the representatives of Tobrakash and Asqalān proper felt that they 
were not taken seriously by the project management because their suggestion for a certain 
size of a CCC was not accepted. Consequently, the irrigators did not see the point of using 
the new venue as they already had several venues of nearly the same size along the 
canal.893 The previous statement also hints at what I want to elaborate next: the perception 
of newly established councils (WUGs, CCs, NRMCs, and CDCs) and their respective 
mandates. In the above case, the objectives of WUG establishment do not seem to have 
resonated with the respondents; the mandate of the SMWA-project and collateral 
interventions were not understood. Although this cannot be generalized to all water users 
in the irrigation schemes, a distinction is necessary. When the SMWA project’s objective 
of improving irrigation management and water distribution was grasped by water users, it 
was taken for granted that the means for achieving these objectives included technical 
solutions and improvement of infrastructure, but not necessarily entirely new decision-
making structures.  
In this context, WUGs have been perceived as alien, a necessary nuisance to tap aid flows 
for infrastructure measures. The following statements illustrate this point. According to the 
head of the Orta Bēk CDC, “The WUG idea is of GAA, because they have taken care of 
the meetings, asked to organize the WUG. … Until now they have not submitted the 
WUGs to communities.” Adding further, “GAA has promised that they will take care of 
infrastructure, not community. The maintenance of the infrastructure can be taken care of 
by the community. The community expects from the WUG that they will bring the money 
from outside, not collecting money from the community.”894 An elder of Haji Sāheb 
Karam manteqa gave the following account,  
The WUG was organized one year ago; I participated in this meeting. I am a kochi, at times I 
am away for pasture migration. The WUG should liaise with foreign organizations and bring 
help to the communities. We do not need cash money, we have our own money. They should 
build the bridge over the canal, should properly manage water; they should build the toilets, 
we do not have toilets. … It is six months now that our spillway is not ready and our canal is 
being silted. … At present, the WUGs do not have the capacity to solve our problems. Elders 
can solve our problems; they can speak to everybody while the WUG is only for our 
manteqa. It does not have the authority to decide; its members can only discuss, but they 
have no power to command people.895 
Given that by design, the initial program proposal of the SMWA project included few 
physical construction measures (Welthungerhilfe 2005), the common perception of 
Welthungerhilfe as a ‘construction-NGO’ is remarkable. It can be traced to the demands 
voiced by target communities on one hand and incremental acquiescence by KRBP and 
SMWA to these demands on the other (see Ch. 6.1), probably at the cost of negligence in 
‘software-engineering’, meaning the creation of sustainable social water management 
capacities through community mobilization. Furthermore, despite the fact that 
                                                             
893 Conversations with Ghayoor and Hāji Rahmat Khān on 2-3 September 2007. These venues included Hāji 
Rahmat Khān’s guesthouse and Friday-praying mosques.  
894 Noted by Abdullayev during a meeting with the head of Orta Bēk CDC, Qal’a-ye Zāl, 9 August 2007. The 
implicit complaint that WUGs ought to be financed by the communities themselves can be read as a further 
indicator of the non-comprehension of the program’s objectives by local users to that date.  
895 Conversation with Hāji Sāheb Karam as recorded by Abdullayev, Hāji Sāheb Karam manteqa, Qal’a-ye 
Zāl, 9 August 2007.  
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compromises regarding infrastructure creation and technical improvement to unforeseen 
extent bought cooperation in the project, local communities perceived KRBP’s selective 
interventions as the unconditional aid they had been familiar with for decades.896 Thus, 
although the community entered into necessary negotiations and set up respective 
structures (in this case WUGs and CCs; in other cases NRMCs, CDCs and other councils) 
for the duration of the implementation of an intervention component, the lack of persuasion 
about the benefits of social project components ranked the KRBP and its projects among 
all previous unconditional aid interventions, undermining the sustainability of any project.  
Since the outbreak of resistance fighting, it had become common that humanitarian 
assistance and small-scale reconstruction projects were implemented by the aid community 
(represented locally by different NGOs) with an increasing emphasis on councils because 
these were deemed more representative and could check the influence of commanders 
(Carter and Connor 1989: 1). Consequently, after 25 years of selective exposure to foreign 
aid at the local level, many local communities disposed of multiple committees or councils 
(shurā). These had existed at one point in time, but after NGO withdrawal they simply 
ceased to exist or were newly launched under a different name with new objectives by 
another NGO offering assistance. Thus, at the community level several NGOs had 
implemented community councils even before the onset of NSP with its subsequent 
creation of CDCs.897 Possibly related was a common scenario I observed, that is, the 
parallel existence of several shurā with different sectoral mandates that were initiated by 
different NGOs, which according to their portfolio represented specific programs (water 
versus health versus education versus agricultural rehabilitation etc.) and distinct donors.898 
Significant for the recent reconstruction and development attempts throughout 
Afghanistan, particularly my research sites, was the side effect that established councils 
were perceived as beign forced to hold assemblies and meetings. Representative of the 
attitude of several interviewees, one respondent offered, “We only meet when the NGO-
people or foreigners come.”899 It is in the interest of communities to meet any 
organization’s demand to form councils in order to tap program funds and undertake 
certain development measures. One-time bugets within the NSP-framework for the 
                                                             
896 See Johnson and Leslie (2002) for an overview on the legacy of aid intervention during the 1980s and 
1990s. The authors stress the tightrope walk between dependence on local elites (‘faction commanders’) and 
the ethos of impartiality commanded by the international community’s standards in circumstances of 
increasing aid conditionality towards the end of the 1990s. Carter and Connor (1989) explicitly examine the 
experience of establishing local councils by the aid community throughout the 1980s. They found, for 
example, that in the 1980s most councils had been set up by commanders for military organizational 
purposes, with varying degrees of outreach to tackle socio-economic issues. Furthermore, the councils were 
of a temporary nature and were constituted based on needs.  
897 The crux was not the prior existence of shurā itself, but their redundancy in the process of NSP 
implementation. In cases where formerly established shurā had gained some clout and were working to some 
extent, such FP practices caused confusion among local community members and perpetuated the locals’ 
perception of temporariness and donor demand-driven shurā establishment as a necessary evil that did have 
not much to do with their usual life-worlds and actual needs. 
898 This was felt especially at the district-level. For example, in 2007, in Khoja Ghar, a northern district of 
Takhār and town with the same name, one NGO had established the DDC, a health committee, an 
education/school committee, and another district council. At the same time, the NSP-FP ACTED was 
establishing the DDA for the district.     
899 Interview Warsaj, 26 March 2009. 
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completion of an infrastructure measure, such as the digging and lining of an irrigation 
canal were funded for several months by cash-for-work financing and material input. Once 
the project was finished, the communities saw no sense in continuing the council (CDC, 
NRMC, etc.). Similarly, ordinary community members who were not elected CDC-
representatives usually saw the latter merely as contact persons for foreigners and NGOs 
visiting a certain location for the initiation of future projects or the implementation of 
already existing ones.900 A group interview in Pyu (see 6.2.1-c) revealed that local dwellers 
shared the common perception that NSP members were no longer in charge since all the 
project money had been used for the construction of the road. Some members of the 
‘former’ CDC were said to be in Kabul to find an activity or job, while others had 
remained in Pyu without tasks, responsibilities, or authority.901  
To illustrate the proportion of disconnect between imposed structures and local rural life-
worlds, I recount an interaction with elders of several communities who had recently 
formed a sub-catchment NRM committee of eight neighboring villages, which was 
registered with the NGO under the name Anjuman-e Farhangiyān aka Salman-e Fars.902 I 
had met them on the way to a communal canal cleaning in Taresht (Warsaj), where 
landowners from several settlements along the same canal had been mobilized to help on 
that day. Interestingly, not the head of the anjuman, but the deputy’s nephew, himself an 
elder with a white turban, had initiated the cleaning. A discussion ensued about local 
responsibilities and project measures. For example, 8,000 meters of water pipes for 
irrigation and drinking water as well as a water tank had been provided by IDEAS, and a 
livelihood program had been implemented by the German Technical Cooperation 
Organization (GTZ). Past and ongoing activities included tree planting, check-dam 
construction, and poultry distribution. Regarding organizational issues, the laborers and 
elders insisted that their joint canal cleaning, although it was on supra-village scale, had 
nothing to do with the NRM association (anjuman). They distinguished sharply between 
kār-e dehqanhā (literally: farmers’ work) and kār-e rasmi (official business or work). The 
latter would involve dealings with outsiders, such as NGOs. The latter entered local 
communities and were met by the head or representatives of the local body formed for 
these purposes. Recently, these included the anjuman, before it referred mostly to the NSP 
council and the local NRMC. They insisted that there was no other purpose for these 
bodies but to please NGOs and tap funding opportunities. Subsequently, the rasmi shurā 
materialized in situations, ad hoc and demand-based, involving the appearance of project 
workers or other potential donors in the local realm. A change of shurā every three years 
or so had been observed by the respondents. In contrast, kār-e dehqanhā was described as 
a constant phenomenon, independent of outside intervention and having no intersection or 
overlap with official (kār-e rasmi-type of) activities.  
                                                             
900 Interview in Mulkik, 11 April 2007 
901 Interview in Pyu, 15 April 2007. 
902 The association had been formed in 2008 (1387) and included Shagan, Deh-e Merān, Deh-e Muzāfar, 
Miyāndeh, Deh-e Uzaq, Magharzar, Deh Khān plus an eighth village (Interview, 26 March 2009). 
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A brief look at the essence of so-called kār-e dehqanhā in this particular example903 shows 
the variety of activities that were undertaken and apparently successfully managed at the 
community and supra-village levels (Table 13). The list is not intended to be exhaustive. 
Nevertheless, it can serve as another example of the common assumption that the total 
breakdown of local social and governance structures is inaccurate. 
Table 13: Examples of locally appointed positions and payment rates (Taresht) 
   Appointed position Local Dari term ‘Salary’ contribution per family 
ranger (chief forest guard) jangalwān-e ‘umumi 0.5 sēr wheat 
(agricultural) warden qoriqmāl-e zamin 1 sēr 
water warden (guarding and 
overseeing water pipe system) 
mirāb-qoriqmāl 0.5 sēr 
official water manager  
(in charge of irrigation canal) 
mirāb-e rasmi depending on individual farmer’s 
yield  
road keeper904 sarakbān 0.5 sēr 
shepherd chupān 1 of 20 sheep per year plus food plus 
1 chārak wheat per household 
cow herder padawān 1 sēr wheat per calf, 2 sēr per cow 
mullah mullā-emām 1 of 20 sheep, 3 sēr wheat 
 
Three position holders, the forest guard, the mirāb of the irrigation canal, and the 
agricultural warden were reportedly registered with the local district government. The 
forest guard is in charge of the command area of 12 villages and the qoriqmāl-e zamin is 
appointed to guard the crops of four villages. In the latter’s case, registration with the 
district authorities was explained as the need to provide him with the backing of the 
government, that is, legitimacy in the event that he would have to strike somebody and use 
force in defense of a farmer’s crop yield. The four individual villages that shared one 
irrigation canal had a mirāb each905 in addition to the oversight mirāb-e rasmi. 
Furthermore, in other locations, such as Miyāndeh or Heyut, a mirāb-e barg, the person in 
charge of switching the electricity on and off and overseeing the maintenance of power 
supply lines and the hydropower system maintenance had been appointed and was 
rewarded with 0.5 ser wheat per family.906 One of the elders mentioned that he would 
spend as much as 25 ser of wheat per year for the payment of communal matters.907 The 
individual in charge was appointed according to demand and urgency. There was no annual 
meeting when all positions were filled or reconfirmed. All these activities passed for kār-e 
                                                             
903 In other places it is called kār-e qawmi and includes all kinds of mutual self-help or communal 
organization of a socio-economic nature, and is not particularly limited to the realm of agricultural farming. 
For example, in conflict cases, respondents from Pyu drew a clear distinction between kār-e qawmi – the 
seeking of local solutions as a matter of reputation – and appealing to the government (Interview at 
Maskashu, 5 August 2007). 
904 In this particular case, it was reported that the main responsibility of the road keeper was to prevent 
farmers from opening their offtakes towards the side of the road because the water would damage the road by 
hollowing it out from below.   
905 This mirāb, designated interchangeably as qoriqmāl-e jangal, seems to have been in charge of both water 
distribution and, as forest guard, guarding the mountainsides.  
906 Interview in Heyut/Miyānshahr (Warsaj), 12 April 2007. 
907 Interview in Deh-e Muzāfar/Taresht (Warsaj), 26 March 2009. 
337 
 
dekhkanhā or kār-e qawmi, both of which always have a communal dimension. In contrast, 
the mutual helping of community members during harvest time (darāw-hashar) was said 
not to belong to the same category because it benefits only one person or family at a time.  
These examples affirm that the mechanisms and processes by which aid interventions were 
implemented contributed to an overall dissociation from outside-induced measures and 
bodies. In Ghashub/Farkhār, respondents reported that by the end of 2008, an inter-village 
agreement between two villages and a management body (anjuman) had been established 
by community mobilizers of IDEAS. However, the real purpose and function of both 
remained obscure for the community members affected. Reportedly, the NGO-workers had 
fixed the agreement and had not been seen since (jur kard wa raft, nafahmidēm…).908 
Thus, it is not surprising to read about difficulties in the formation of sub-catchment NRM 
committees (associations or anjuman) in the third annual IDEAS project report (Concern 
Worldwide/Welthungerhilfe 2008: 14). According to this source, local people cannot be 
convinced of the need to establish the associations and committees to sustainably manage 
natural resources. 
 
8.3 State-making as a dual process: The construction of the image of a state  
The setting up of new councils does not affect local recruitment and decision-making 
structures or management procedures. Neither does it penetrate the life-worlds of rural 
dwellers. As the examples from Warsaj and Farkhār showed, even within the same areas 
and sectors, a clear distinction exists between what people hold as legitimate and valid for 
their intra- and intercommunity living and what is demanded by different NGOs and 
projects. Local councils established by NGOs more often than not constitute artificial 
constructs that are activated only when NGO or project workers enter single communities 
to communicate relevant project information to solicit cooperation. The NSP and KRBP 
projects would have succeeded in their objectives to ‘overhaul’ local governance structures 
had NSP-heads supplanted the positions of local elders, arbāb, and commanders. However, 
they did not because of the comparatively short-term horizon of the NSP measures at one 
location, which left the newly established communities with insufficient sustainability in 
funding and training. Another factor was the hijacking of local councils by local elites 
(section 6.1.3-b). Furthermore, the NSP and other large-scale reconstruction and 
development projects exacerbated existing inequities. Consequently, local power-structures 
remained unchanged, that is, concentrated in few individuals who are able to exercise 
authority. The only fragmentation of power resources and authority could be attributed to a 
stratum of development-brokers who were recruits from local realms, that is, Afghan NGO 
staff (see below). At the same time, these development brokers – a dual tier of rural elites 
in charge of kār-e rasmi, and local NGO-staff in close interaction with rural communities – 
bridged the disconnect between local governance mechanisms and those of the NGOs, 
including the underlying norms and vision of the international aid community concerning 
                                                             
908 Literally: “They fixed it [founded the association, KM] and left. We don’t understand…” The 
conversation with the respondents took place a couple of months after the incident in March 2009.  
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local development.909 In this respect, the development brokers not the community councils 
(see Ch. 8.2.1) could be validly called ‘vanguards’ of state-formation in rural Afghanistan 
from an emic perspective.  
It is necessary to linger on the subject of development brokers910 for a few more 
paragraphs in order to elaborate on the rationale underlying their role in the observed 
development and putative state-building processes.  
 
8.3.1 Construction of counterparts, communities and target groups 
In Chapters 6-7, I described at length the phenomenon of new rural elites as consisting of 
‘conventional’ and ‘novel elders’. Together, they form the first group of development 
brokers. They originate in the logic of the local social order of rural society in northeastern 
Afghanistan. As individuals, not part of a coherent group, they are entrusted with 
legitimacy by the local populace. This legitimacy is rooted in their successful handling of 
the interface between community members and outsiders. Success, in this context, means 
the achievement of allocation and (re)distribution of benefits from projects, such as food 
aid (e.g., food for education), roads and trees, which strengthens their reputation and 
therefore their authority. Elders traditionally (arbāb, bāy, wakil) attended to the interface 
between local social arenas and outsiders (e.g., district administration and aid agencies) 
because of leadership skills, such as speech, good relations, extensive networks for 
securing resource access, as well as the authority ascribed to experience and age. 
Moreover, the ‘novel elders’ rely on the same social logic and mechanisms. However, 
many belong to the nouveau riche, the wealth of which was acquired either by violent 
means during the last roughly 30 years or by payoffs from labor migration to Iran and the 
Persian Gulf states during the same period. The latter development has perpetually altered 
rural class relations and resulted in the steady improvement of rural livelihoods over the 
last decades, despite the long-lasting civil war. A contributing factor in this process has 
been the unscrupulous exploitation of natural resources, especially wood, causing major 
challenges to livelihoods and subsistence of the majority of the rural population today. 
Furthermore, the exile in neighboring countries and overseas of many Afghans has 
provided new knowledge, know-how, and often literacy for the younger generation. After 
2003, this experience and knowledge became power assets in purposeful negotiations of 
the rural elites within the thriving rural development sector. The emergence of ‘novel 
elders’ did not alter traditional representation mechanisms in rural communities because 
                                                             
909 Thomas (2000) introduced the differentiation of vision, process, and practice of development in order to 
make the concept more tangible. As I will show below, the practice dimension that NGOs are in charge of 
regarding the implementation of development projects deviates greatly from the vision of development that is 
prominent mostly in distant policy circles of the international aid community. 
910 I borrow the term from Bierschenk et al. (2002). However, to distinguish from the original concept, which 
was limited to ‘local development brokers’ signifying mediators who represented the local population 
towards the development institution, I include local mediators of the development secotr in this term as they 
are working at the same interface. Olivier de Sardan (2005: 166f) distinguished development agents from 
local development brokers (ibid.: 173f) and emphasized the formers’ role in transmitting technical project 
knowledge into popular knowledge. However, the author, despite a critical stance towards the role of 
development agents and the scope of their shaping the technical knowledge they are supposed to transmit, 
remains neutral regarding the effects of the inherent principal-agent dilemma (see below). For this reason, I 
will refer to both types of mediators as development brokers.  
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their evolution was not contingent upon the active delegation of voice and power by the 
rural populace. Instead, because of local communities’ inertia, anyone could become a 
‘novel elder’ as long as he actively sought this position by claiming decision-making and 
enforcement power, and possessing the resources to maintain it. 
The second group of development brokers is comprised of the national staff members of 
aid organizations. They particularly include local staff who are in contact with the 
population. These so-called social mobilisers or community mobilisers (kārmandān-e 
ejtimā’i) include engineers and translators. Their significance derived from working at the 
interface between interventionists, that is, aid agencies representing international 
development paradigms, and subjects. As practitioners of development, INGOs occupy the 
interface between the vision and practice of development (Thomas 2000). Given the lack 
of the capacity of government agencies and the results of tenacious capacity building 
undertaken so far, these aid organizations have taken on the role of proactive agents in 
sectored institution-building, partly bypassing or even replacing government agencies. This 
places them at the interface of the two distinct orders that were described above: the local 
social order and the interventionist ideal image of order, which has the community 
management paradigm and related concepts (empowerment, human development, 
ownership, participation etc.) at its heart. Because they are located at the nexus of 
intervention and subjects, INGOs hold a strategic position. Thus, the work of local 
personnel who implement development programs and projects is decisive for the successes 
and failures in the political and economic dimensions of the state-building project in 
Afghanistan. Consequently, they are responsible for the kind and quality of legitimacy the 
intervention acquires. Thus, the national staff members of aid organizations may be viewed 
as development brokers.  
I argue that both groups jointly determine the effect of the intervention. By withholding or 
passing on information as they understand it and as it fits their interests in daily working 
practices and benefits, INGO-staff members subsequently transform the objectives of 
projects and programs. Thus, as crucial agents at the interface of practice, the 
implementation of the intervention is in their hands. Similarly, because rural elites adhere 
to the local logic of representation and legitimacy, they conform to the aims and demands 
of community mobilisers, engineers and translators in order to gain the best benefit for 
themselves and their populace. Their own legitimacy is reinstated and confirmed because 
they have managed to allocate ‘goods’ to ‘their’ people. 
It must be emphasized that membership in both groups – rural elites and local INGO-
workers – is not mutually exclusive. Empowered by the intervention, they act as 
gatekeepers in two directions: INGO personnel withhold information and impede 
knowledge transfer between INGO project-management and rural population target groups 
or its representatives. Hence, they actively construct target groups and ‘communities’ in 
two ways: First, they are power conscious and practice selective communication. Secondly, 
they construct target groups unconsciously and accidently because of the staff’s limited 
understanding of project objectives. Within KRBP, this can be demonstrated in all three 
projects discussed here. The establishment of so-called NRM-committees in the five upper 
catchment districts and the creation of WUGs, CCs and WUAs in irrigation schemes are 
cases in point. Moreover, as I have described in Chapter 5, even before physically 
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encountering segments of the rural population, the INGO found it difficult to define the 
spatial unit of intervention. For example, the settlement sprawl that occurred during the last 
decades along irrigation canals in the target area of SMWA forced different challenges 
upon the implementing INGO than those faced by other agencies that worked in remote 
high mountain areas. Because pre-war village lists and settlement maps that are partly 
preserved in the districts’ Land Affairs Department are outdated, before an intervention, 
the INGO needed to decide whether spatial (e.g., village, valley), social (e.g., of a mosque 
community) or action (e.g., user group of a particular natural resource) frames should be 
applied in the implementation of selective development interventions within one canal 
area. For SMWA, this meant considering hydrological units, social factors and land 
ownership and cultivation patterns because they determine irrigation water use. The 
resulting cluster formations were based on a mix of all three elements. However, these 
formations clustered around local centers of power, such as the homes of important elders; 
subsequently, the initially established WUGs were captured by local elites, that is, the big 
landowners who were heads and deputy heads of these councils. I have demonstrated their 
vested interests in project implementation (section 6.1.3-b). However, the short-term 
thinking underlying the large landowners’ initial active engagement to secure their stakes 
causes doubt about their long-term commitment and willingness to participate in the larger 
administrative framework of KRBP. It must be said that until 2009, WUGs neither 
represented all water users nor did they yield disseminator effects. Furthermore, their aims 
and benefits were not understood by the concerned population.      
In comparison, CDP in Burka and Eshkamesh and partly IDEAS followed the existing 
CDCs that had been established during implementation of the countrywide NSP since 
2003. Here, different patterns can be observed: First, community mobilisers insisted on the 
establishment of sub-councils of the CDCs to be responsible for natural resource 
management tasks in the framework of their particular project activities. Second, in other 
localities, CDCs became NRM councils. The risks both of these versions carried were that 
in various cases, the locally appointed or elected CDC-members had lost the trust and 
legitimacy of their constituency because they had either misused funds or hijacked the 
NSP-implementation process from the beginning to ensure ‘their people’ got elected. Thus, 
a rift between the rural population and their local representatives became a common 
pattern in the study area. Although they sensed these rifts and were cognizant of disunity in 
local settings, community mobilisers all too often proved ignorant and consequently 
employed these problematic structures in the framework of the project with which they 
were engaged. They were charged with the enforcement and implementation of equity-
objectives.  
A third variation of creating project counterparts in the localities entailed meetings with the 
local elders, which were often ad-hoc and without prior notice. Social mobilisers would 
talk about their project objectives and indicated that in order to implement the project they 
would need to establish a local council to be in charge of project implementation. The 
researcher witnessed cases in which social mobilisers, in the course of local non-committal 
needs assessments regarding potential project measures in the framework of the IDEAS 
project, set up NRMC lists for the attendees to sign or fingerprint in order to submit these 
to their management as indication of work they had done and of local needs and statements 
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of preparedness for collaboration by the communities they had visited.911 What is 
extraordinary and remarkable about this is the fact that discourse and project mandates 
foresaw the ‘democratic election’ of such a committee by all members of the community 
after everybody was informed about the goals and purpose of the project and possible 
interventions. Instead, in this case, community mobilisers attempted to skip several links in 
the chain of engagement with the rural population in this locality because it would have 
required more visits and explanations of the project regarding its aim and benefits for local 
people. The above-mentioned case of Ghashub in Farkhār, in which mobilizers had 
originated an inter-village agreement during a meeting and left without ever being seen 
again, is another example.  
I have described above (Ch. 5.2.3), how in the framework of NSP-implementation local 
dwellers were usually requested to define clusters (hawza) in the preparation stage for the 
establishment of NSP councils. For example, in Tobrakash (Asqalān), the inhabitants had 
been asked to establish five hawza. However, the particular criteria for these hawza remain 
at the discretion of the FP’s community mobilizers who engage at the interface of the 
MRRD, and local communities. Sketchy concepts of the local frame of reference (see Chs. 
5.2.1 and 5.2.3) leave enough scope for the FP staff to co-determine at least the agenda of 
CDC-community formation. Thus, the FP’s implementation practices have to be viewed as 
hovering between the fulfillment of official guidelines (NSP manual, see MRRD 2003; 
MRRD 2006) and the personal objections of sub-contracted community workers, who have 
to negotiate implementation processes with local communities. Presumably, local elites’ 
priorities are mirrored in the practice of who determines which clusters are formed and 
who unites the populace for the election of representatives in one NSP council.  
From the local elders’ (both novel and conventional) perspective, any INGO engagement 
with their community is welcomed because it promises funds that if necessary can be 
diverted to communal or personal needs. Furthermore, the successful attraction of a project 
or intervention measure in the immediate environment of the community endorses the 
elders’ authority. Following this rationale, rural elites eagerly show interest in any enquiry 
by INGO staff, and they are ready to conform to demands to set up councils and point out 
needs,912 in addition to appointing or electing representatives. Hence, a mutual 
construction of target groups and communities and definition of counterparts as well as of 
reconstruction and development needs by both groups of development brokers takes place.  
Another example from the irrigation realm was the suggestion of an eloquent person as 
participant in the mirāb-training courses and irrigation management workshops in Mazār-e 
Sharif, which were organized by KRBP. This person was said to be the local mirāb, but 
this was merely a claim; instead, the mirāb himself was illiterate, elderly, and not 
interested in travelling long distances. INGO staff accepted the rural elite’s choice of 
                                                             
911 The criteria for the selection of IDEAS’ target communities included need, proximity to the main road, 
and local community members’ willingness to cooperate with the INGO. 
912 For example, in the middle of the Fulol valley, a large-scale cash-for-work-project was carried out, the 
objective of which was to build an irrigation canal over several kilometers in order to irrigate some land and 
enhance its productivity. Local dwellers working on the canal admitted that the water would never reach the 
fields, but they needed the opportunity for employment, and thus the canal digging was not scrutinized 
(Interview in Fulol, 1 April 2009).  
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delegation for the workshop and legitimized the attendance of the eloquent character by 
not calling the attention of the project management to this replacement. Here again, the 
mutual silent agreement of rural elites and local project staff worked to ensure that both 
sides were bothered less in their daily undertakings and derived the maximum benefit. 
Social mobilisers benefitted by saving time and efforts and rural representatives benefitted 
by setting the agenda hand-picking their candidate.  
Similar phenomena were observed during the preparation of infrastructure measures, such 
as a road building contractor entering a community and demanding the consent of the local 
elders and a letter of agreement signed by a representative who would serve as contact 
person. Even in the absence of the latter, locals would never admit that the person was 
absent but present another elder who would put his fingerprint under the name of the one 
who was absent. Therefore, they would ensure that ‘their’ development broker, who was 
absent in the first encounter, maintains his role as middleman. He would meet the road 
builders the next time they appeared, providing workers for cash-for-work contributions 
with the road-building project. This example highlights important features of the local 
social order, its representation mechanism, and the underlying habitus of the rural majority. 
The above analysis of the different types of councils showed the following: 1) they were 
means for the construction of target groups, communities, and needs; 2) they embodied 
failed participation; 3) they facilitated the overhaul of property rights by aiding property-
creation and revamping the usage and management patterns with varying amounts of 
success. A fourth finding showed that local development councils – whether sectoral or 
representative models or mixed – represent challenges to the assumption of ‘good’ local 
governance and administration, which was elaborated throughout Chapters 6 and 7.  
As indicated above, the setup process of NRM committees and representative councils in 
general would usually include a definition of needs in order to determine whether a certain 
community was more vulnerable to natural disasters, for example, than a neighboring 
community and if so, whether including this particular community into a NRM project 
would be justified or not. In this context, local INGO-staff apply superficial participatory 
and rapid rural appraisal techniques. This partly serves as a legitimizing tool for project 
management and staff. It is included in regular project reports in order to validate the 
INGO’s activities from the donor’s perspective as it links with the mainstream discourse 
on local ownership, community driven development, and the emphasis on participation and 
capacity building. It is mutually constitutive that neither INGO-management nor local 
INGO-staff are very interested in deeper engagement with communities, which would 
mean insisting on compliance with internationally fixed standards, rules of community 
representative elections, and so on. It is not clear whether this relaxation of guidelines at 
the interface of the interventionist order on the one hand and the local social order on the 
other hand is chastened by the perception of insurmountable differences between the two 
orders. Furthermore, it is unclear whether this circumvention is consequently mitigated by 
its adoption by INGO personnel and rural elites, whether deliberately or intuitively. I do 
not intend to argue that any kind of deliberated adoption of seemingly incompatible 
demands should be equated with large-scale misuse for the personal gain of the INGO-
workers or with corruption. These observations are made to emphasize the capacities of 
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power and negotiation that development brokers have come to possess. It can be 
characterized as ‘interpretative power’; rural elites or local INGO staff are entitled to 
construe and ascribe meaning to challenges or demands originating in both mainstream 
international development practice and local social order.  
 
8.3.2 Negotiated and appropriated state-making instead of state-building 
I have shown that intervention measures largely perpetuate existing power structures, 
differential access to resources, and inequities in rural Afghan society. Furthermore, the 
state is seen as resource that can be extracted from within and used for personal objectives 
by office-holders. Thus, the state- and institution-building paradigm, which dominates the 
intervention and the international reconstruction paradigm, must be closely examined. 
Policy communiques about the progress of state-building in Afghanistan have been clearly 
qualified by my data. The perceptions and strategies of local community members work to 
incorporate intervention logic into their life-worlds and local governance realms. In 
particular, these strategies refer to the demand-based formation of mostly non-
representative local bodies, the construction of target groups, development and 
reconstruction needs, counterparts and communities, as well as the mental and practical 
separation of official versus communal dealings (kār-e rasmi versus kār-e qawmi).  
Consequently, the concept of state-building (see 8.1) as a top-down administrative 
approach of ordering does not fit the reality in the areas studied in this research. Instead, I 
suggest the term state-making. State-building is thought to be independent of the subjects’ 
agreement, which objectifies them (see Chs. 2.2, 2.3.2). State-making is understood as a 
negotiated process dependent on the subjects’ partial willingness and acceptance, thus 
leaving scope for local arrangements and interpretation. The entering into negotiations of 
locals in state-building attempts from above thus leverages the idea of successful outcomes 
after enough time has passed. In addition to this reading, the notion of state-making 
acknowledges the space of negotiation between full agreement to state-building attempts 
from above and partial willingness and acceptance by the subjects of such attempts. 
Accordingly, the outcome of the process is not fixed, but open in all directions. Agrawal 
dwelled on the concept of state-making in his paper on forest governance in the Kumaon 
Himalaya in India, stating that it describes “… processes of extension of formalized 
control, but always through partial willingness and acceptance of those subject to the 
extension of such control” (Agrawal 2001: 35).913 However, contrary to Agrawal, whose 
analysis is state-centric, my data does not indicate a linear progression and deterministic 
end of these state-making processes in post-intervention Afghanistan and, hence, the 
culmination in successful state-building according to the development vision inherent in 
                                                             
913 Agrawal entitled his paper ‘State formation in community spaces?’, yet he stressed that the difference 
between state formation and state-making as he saw it is negligible, although some authors would prefer to 
talk of state-making to emphasize its negotiated character. See Agrawal (2001: 35, fn. 32). I follow him in 
this claim. The empirical context of Agrawal’s study is that the creation of local forest councils as a 
negotiated outcome of the state’s trying to extend its control over forests and at the same time villagers’ 
attempts to reassert their control over forest resources has changed the incentive structures, interests and 
strategies of all stakeholders involved and brought about a new relationship between state and community 
actors. In Kumaon, this resulted in the sedimentation of state-control on the local ground and included the 
locals’ internalization of rules introduced by the councils. 
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the intervention agenda of the international community. Instead, what is achieved can at 
best be called a mocking extension of formalized control. Agreement with and acceptance 
of intervention measures by the population take place only partially and according to local 
needs and understandings, as I hope to have been able to demonstrate. 
Local development brokers take on the role of active agents of state-making, yet only as far 
as their own interests go, according to how they interpret the challenges that require 
confirmation or rejection in their daily life-worlds and which meaning they ascribe to the 
former. As a result, locally controlled state-making or the creation of the image of a state is 
assisted by organizational personnel and local elites (Figure 11). Moreover, this process 
has been conceived of as successful intervention strategies and state-building by the 
international community. However, this is a misperception.  
The rural populace’s habitus enabled the emergence of novel elders among the rural elite. 
The logic of the international intervention, with its INGO-habitus of being trapped in 
principle-agent dilemmas, promoted the accumulation of power among its staff working at 
the interface between INGO-management and target populations. Both groups of 
development brokers benefit from compliance with the state-building agendas of the 
international community. As development brokers, they form a new stratum in Afghan 
rural society because they are endowed with power resources related to their intermediate 
position. Because of the brokers’ respective conformity, which is distinct from full 
agreement, to the challenges that are rooted in the intervention logic and existing social 
order, they actively reconfirm the kind of existing order according to their own background 
and needs. In this intermediate space, rural elites, including novel elders, are faced with the 
personnel operating in the development sector, such as social mobilisers, engineers and 
translators. Local INGO-staff are expected to implement development measures, that is, 
establish the social and political standards envisaged by their organization’s management 
and headquarters according to the projects’ established logical frameworks.  
The INGO-personnel negotiate how much control they dispense to higher levels, which – 
unconsciously – depends on their understanding of projects, programs and the purpose of 
development intervention, including its goals and mission, as transmitted to their 
counterparts and respective target groups. Thus, on one hand it is a function of the INGO’s 
habitus and internal logic that principle-agent patterns take effect; on the other hand, the 
provenance of local INGO-staff in a local social order shapes their perception of 
management and higher levels as well as development activities and interventions. In many 
cases, Afghans who work with organizations are from rural as opposed to urban settings 
and belong to a family network of rural elites.914 Moreover, it is not uncommon that a 
person from a rural locality working with an organization enjoys the status of an elder 
among his fellow community members because he or she also has an above average 
education and is ascribed with good judgment and knowledge regarding options of 
resource allocation, which might benefit the wider clientele of his or her family and 
network of relatives and other dependents.   
                                                             
914 Accordingly, it is obvious that these mobilizers will approach the big men of the community and put 
participatory appraisals and participatory needs assessments on the back burner.  
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Figure 11: Afghan post-intervention state-making 
In contrast to the bird-eye view of intervention from above, in the perception of the rural 
population hardly anything has changed in terms of control and the alteration of 
governance patterns. Nevertheless, this can be seen in a positive light, given that the 
characteristics of the local order, which constitute a value, are being preserved. The field 
research found that state-making, as partially agreed or negotiated process, let alone state-
building with all its connotations, is not a concern of the ordinary rural populace in 
Afghanistan. Rural dwellers are not actively engaged in the state because they rely on their 
representatives (middlemen) to provide a buffer between local society and the outside 
order. This does not mean that only identified development brokers transgress the 
boundaries between the logic and order of local society and that of development 
intervention. Instead, the latter escapes intervention logic and its cultural positioning 
because it is not transmitted through projects or programs. Instead, it enters local realms 
selectively by exposing the people to other orders, experienced, for example, during 
migratory labor or by media exposure, such as TV, radio, and increasingly ubiquitous 
mobile phones. Local elites show a certain willingness to work with projects and INGOs 
because in addition to personal material profits, they benefit from reconfirming their 
leadership and authoritative status. The superficial acceptance of social mobilisers’ ideas 
and concepts bridges intervention and target group or communities. However, it is clear 
that the information passed on to INGO-representatives is determined by the rural elites. 
This can concern various things, depending on the program’s objective, such as the number 
of livestock (if livestock and food security measures are planned), families, children, 
information on ‘the poor’, ‘the most vulnerable community members’, ‘widows’, the 
number of female-headed households, and so on. The definition of these categories is 
owned by the local elites; thus, they have a monopoly on interpretation. 
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In summary, the logic of the local order as mapped in Chapters 6 and 7 features a two-tier 
system of conformity that allowed the emergence of development brokers and the 
subsequent construction of the image of a state (see Figure 11). This happened on demand 
and situational according to interventionists’ interests and funding, which was conveyed by 
local INGO staff and accepted by rural elites. Consequently, the recent attempts at state-
building and development could have yielded the opposite effect on the objectives in 
northeastern Afghanistan. The intervention has generated a new social stratum of 
development brokers who occupy the sphere of negotiation between interventionists and 
Afghanistan’s population at the interface of two distinct social orders. Nevertheless, the 
way local politics in Afghanistan’s northeast works has enabled the international 
community to plan and advertise the political and development intervention successfully 
for several years. However, the common underlying perception was that more needs to be 
done in an extended timeframe; nevertheless, infrastructure building would continue and 
governance effects would be irreversible. The negotiated image making of the state occurs 
even without direct the direct involvement of donors, aid organizations, or the government. 
It is negotiated and appropriated by two groups of development brokers. The fragmentation 
of power resources in rural society, which have become personified in local INGO-
mobilizers, engineers and translators, has caused a further alienation of the Afghan 
government from local development and target communities. Organizations replace the 
services of government agencies, and in the eyes of local communities, the financial and 
material resources of INGO staff are more substantial than any resources government 
representatives can offer. Investigations in all three project areas showed that the central 
government today is apparently much weaker in the local arenas than it was before the 
outbreak of violent conflict in 1978. In the past, the government could extract resources 
and enforce control via potent middlemen, which is no longer the case (see Chs. 7.1-7.4, 
Table 12). In contrast, the government is now seen as a resource for individual self-service. 
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“… there are limits to customary social organizations. While they can provide 
certain kinds of public goods and act as a deterrent to disputes and other 
conflicts, they are not a panacea. The next problem is explaining the limits of 
community organizations.” 
(Brick 2008: 36f) 
 
9 – Conclusion: (Re-)Constructing Afghanistan? 
 
This thesis depicts the complex logic of local governance and social order in northeastern 
Afghanistan. Any attempt at generalization or efforts to reduce the complexity by higher 
level abstraction would be contrary to the epistemological approach of this thesis (Ch. 3). 
As an academic study, this thesis is unique in several respects: 
 Methodology. The research for this thesis was designed as a bottom-up analysis 
based on long-term qualitative fieldwork. In this regard, three points are 
remarkable: First, the main data collection took place in 2006-2007, a period which 
in hindsight constituted a window of opportunity for the conduct of 
anthropological-type field research. After this period, deteriorating security 
prevented any meaningful first-hand inquiries in the research area. Second, the 
conceptual framework assumed that social order is generated by mutual processes 
of structuring and being structured by social practices and moralities, which 
allowed for scientific inference with the aim of understanding local governance 
processes. The study is to some extent theoretically framed because the conceptual 
assumptions underlying the research were made transparent and reflected upon at 
the outset. However, the content of this conceptual framework did not provide 
hypotheses about the relationship of the empirical findings. Instead, the 
relationships are reconsidered in Chapter 9.2. Third, closely related to this type of 
research design is the method used to present the data – what I called the ‘French 
braid approach’. It began with an empirical description of natural resource 
governance in all three resource-type arenas, but added more analysis in every 
section. Thus, each new section built on the the previous ones. The aim of this 
presentation of cumulative complexity was to offer the reader the opportunity to 
comprehend the topic of local governance and social order by accessing selected, 
meaningful aspects from as close an emic perspective as possible. In other words, I 
hoped that by acknowledging emic categories through sensitive research I would be 
able to discern the emergent structures of meaning, subjectivities, and ideas about 
locals’ positionalities. These insights into rural Afghan life-worlds and local 
conduct are not visible to the short-term visitor or aid worker. Similarly, they are 
not comprehendible to researchers following a mechanistic description of failed 
state characteristics or using culture and religion as explanatory variables.  
 Relevance. The topic of this research is novel in its investigation of local 
governance defined as the exercise of power to organize collective coexistence in 
local communities. Its unique characteristic arose from the distinction of local 
government and technicist local governance understandings, on the one hand, and 
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the consideration of conduct and of the significance of moralities in interplay with 
social practices, on the other hand. Also innovative is the focus on the execution of 
power and its operationalization. However, it is also an uncertain dimension, which 
will be reflected upon in Chapter 9.2.  
 Content. I wanted to provide an empirical analysis of local politics and an 
insightful and thick description of the opportunities and constraints of ordinary 
Afghans’ livelihood-making. Hence, the thesis attempted to solve the puzzle of 
local politics from an emic perspective. Research on Afghanistan was constrained 
for decades and post-2001 studies often focused on categorizing rural society 
according to Western frameworks, such as state(-building), development, rule of 
law and security, thereby focusing on functionality and efficiency and consequently 
‘othering’ customary organizations, Islam, and local structures (see Ch. 4). This 
study intended to allow a deeper understanding of rural Afghan society because it 
began asking questions at the point where other studies had stopped (see epigram 
on this chapter).  
 Scholarship. This research project has proven to be a partial testing ground for the 
usefulness of several concepts that are well known in social science: 
institutionalism, property rights theory, state-society relations, and community 
studies. The research even ventured into political ecology because of the nexus of 
the material world and social practices in the realm of environmental resource 
governance (see below, Ch. 9.2). However, as most significant venture, I see farther 
than these piecemeal contributions to different sub-strands of scholarship. I mean 
the attempt to generate a conceptual tool that can serve as a basis for a qualitatively 
different engagement with Afghanistan and its societies, and possibly beyond 
Afghanistan. The social order approach requires reference to contemporary events 
in their historical, natural-geographic, political and social contexts. The 
contribution of this research project is not only to acknowledge cognitive factors, 
that is, Afgans’ subjectivities, but to relate them to everyday practices and local 
power relations (see below).    
I will try to reconnect the empirical findings with the social order approach outlined in 
Chapter 2. Instead of another summary of aspects of local governance in my research sites, 
I offer selective reflections about power, politics and everyday life in northeastern 
Afghanistan (Ch. 9.1). First, the guiding question of this section is ‘What unique insights 
have I gained’? Second, I ask ‘How do these findings contribute to theory development 
and the existing scholarship’? I answer this question by critically addressing the concepts 
of power, authority and legitimacy (9.2.1). I will revisit the relationship between social 
order, local governance, and politics (9.2.2) in light of the empirical findings. Finally, I 
will reflect upon the implications of my findings for development practice in rural 
Afghanistan (9.3.1) and recommend topics for future research (9.3.2).     
 
349 
 
9.1 Everyday politics in rural northeastern Afghanistan 
In this thesis, I have used case study vignettes to show the variety, complexity, and co-
implications of local governance arrangements – what I called ‘modalities of local 
governance’ in Chapter 7. The perspective included temporal and topical views, that is, I 
investigated selected fields in social action arenas of environmental resource governance in 
the context of historical events and contemporary developments since 2002. The empirical 
findings are summarized in Chapter 7. In the course of my research, I have gained insights 
about the processes and mechanisms characterizing local governance and social order in 
rural northeastern Afghanistan. 
I used the concepts of mundane practices and life-worlds to make the daily life of ordinary 
rural dwellers tangible. Because of the latters’ embeddedness in subsistence livelihoods, 
local governance processes of environmental resources, which most of the population in 
adjacent communities depend on, delineate the arena where contestations between different 
user groups take place. Hence, I attributed to individual life-worlds not only a cognitive 
disposition (subsuming experienced practice, see Ch. 2.3.3) as members of certain 
communities (social space), but also showed their nexus with place-based arenas of 
environmental resource governance. By investigating access patterns to natural resources, 
which are necessary for community members’ livelihoods, I discerned empirical modalities 
of governance in rural northeastern Afghanistan and aspects of their transformation over 
time (Ch. 7).  
The comparative summary of access patterns to irrigation water, pastures and fuel wood 
showed that neither statutory nor customary rights determined community members’ 
ability to benefit from the respective resources. Instead, personalized relations with actors 
who were in control of the resource in question determined access. The underlying 
explanation can be traced to the latters’ repertoire (‘bundle’) of power resources (see 
below). Consequently, the analysis revealed a significant gap between rights-based 
egalitarian claims to access via community membership versus de facto enforcement 
mechanisms of access (see 7.1, Table 10).      
Resulting and thus perpetuated social inequalities are so far largely accepted by average 
community members for the sake of preserving peace and avoiding violent escalation of 
conflict. Personalized relationships and efforts at personal network maintenance are 
characteristic of local social order and underlie the ordinary community member’s 
attribution of value (Ordnungswert) to that social order. Community members are aware 
that justice can be bought or accessed via ‘the right people’, such as patrons, friends, and 
brokers. Similarly, the personal accumulation of wealth and the association of one’s family 
to powerful networks are strategies that overshadow discursively claimed values of 
solidarity, brotherliness, equality, and equity. Consequently, existing inequalities are 
further perpetuated (see Chs. 7.1, 7.2, and 7.5) and the structuring features of the local 
social order are affirmed. The recent development intervention has further reinforced 
differential access mechanisms through reconstruction and social mobilization projects 
despite its aim to equalize resource allocation (Ch. 8.2). 
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State-local relations and the role of rural authorities underwent significant changes over 
time (see Figure 8 in Ch. 7.3.1; Table 12 in Ch. 7.4). In the past, the state under King Zāher 
Shāh enjoyed legitimacy at distance because of its assumed ‘divine’ origin. Government 
representatives at the district-administration level were tolerated at best and usually 
avoided by the average rural dweller. Government-appointed local representatives 
efficiently occupied the interface between the government and rural society. Before 1978, 
the co-existence of government and society was mediated by a few authoritative 
middlemen. However, when local elders, who were already endowed with status and 
wealth, were appointed as representatives (wakil), the relationship between local elites and 
the king in Kabul was tightly interwoven, thus stretching beyond co-existence. During the 
revolution period, the militarization of rural society took effect as commanders ascended 
from among the rural population, based either on former status as elder or qualification as a 
successful fighter. Both government representatives and traditional middlemen were of 
negligible significance in subsequent years. Only with the re-instatement of a transitional 
government in which many of the local protagonists in my field sites occupied posts, did 
government representatives regain administrative legitimacy by default, which was 
fostered by the establishment of a polity and the high expectations of it. At the time of 
fieldwork, government structures were largely captured by individual position holders 
during the Karzai-period (2002-2009). The mujahedin network of the former Northern 
Alliance and Jam’iat-e Islāmi around Ahmad Shāh Mas’ud has penetrated all ranks of local 
government in the three northeastern provinces under investigation as well as central 
government ministry posts. My data provided unique insights into how the second tier of 
the Northern Alliance’s and Jam’iat’s big men, namely those from Warsaj and Farkhār as 
opposed to the first tier, which hailed mainly from Panjshir,915 has taken control of sub-
national governments in Kunduz and Takhār (see Ch. 7.3.1 and Figure 8). At the local 
level, the rise of a new stratum of ‘novel’ elders has discredited the conventional elder 
position to some extent and the traditional status of elders in general. However, in terms of 
legitimacy, the emic distinction is not between novel and conventional elders, but between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ elders, based on the assessment of their conduct towards the rural 
population they claim to represent.   
The dichotomy of state versus society must be differentiated according to local socio-
political and historical contexts. The case studies showed that, because of the elite capture 
of Mas’ud’s second tier followers from Farkhār and Warsaj, the appointment of Northern 
Alliance-affiliated figures to crucial local government posts (district governor, CoP) 
throughout Takhār and to a large extent Kunduz province have facilitated different degrees 
of access to the central government, its agents and resources. Thus, it is striking that Burka, 
Asqalān and to some extent Sofi-Qarayatim have no representatives or effective relations 
with central government position holders. The state is less accessible for them than for an 
average elder from Warsaj or Farkhār. Asqalān is even more sidelined as part of Kunduz 
Markaz district because of its direct sub-ordination to provincial authorities without the 
intermediate tier of district administration. The latter works well for people from Sofi-
Qarayatim, although the appointed district governor had been Hezb-e Islāmi commander 
                                                             
915 Dr Abdullah Abdullah, Foreign Minister, Yonus Qānoni, Interior Minister, and Muhamad Fahim, the 
Defence Minister in the first Karzai government emerged from the so-called Panjshiri faction of Jam’iat 
within the Northern Alliance. The Panjshiri military arm of Jam’iat-e Islāmi captured Kabul in late 2001.  
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and thus an opponent of the victorious Northern Alliance in the past. Nevertheless, he 
earned a reputation by just governing and was appointed to head districts (e.g., Archi and 
Chārdara), the elites of which had not been henchmen of the Northern Alliance. 
Furthermore, I have shown that even outside the formal government realm, ranks of 
government officials can be accessed via non-government offices and statuses (see the case 
of Faiz Umarkhēl of Qarayatim in 7.3.2). Finally, money has been shown to constitute an 
effective means of gaining the attention of government officials and to influence their 
decisions and actions (see the case of Pyu in 6.2.1-c).  
Salāhiyat was detected as emic notion of assigned legitimate authority and capacity to act. 
However, its meaning has broadened in two respects compared with the time before 1978. 
On the one hand, originally designating moral authority, the notion of salāhiyat was locally 
extended to administrative authority, which the government was acknowledged by default 
because of its institutions (see 7.4). On the other hand, salāhiyat was increasingly 
becoming associated with material wealth, which was necessary to accomplish anything 
involving the government. The latter meaning of salāhiyat was reported by ordinary people 
as the perspective of government officials and thus was used as a new (corrupted) signifier 
for ehterām (respect) from the top down. One could conclude that in the common 
perception of ordinary rural dwellers money rules social relations to large extent and it has 
become nearly as significant as social network relations (qawm in the widest sense) based 
on kin, friendship, common experiences, and so on. Indeed, one could claim that money 
had been fueling social relations recently, whereas considerations of kinship and identity 
had become secondary. Such diverse sources of legitimacy, which underlie the execution 
of power and originate in a fluidity of norms, could be interpreted opportunities to avoid 
pre-determined outcomes (e.g., in conflict situations). According to this logic, forum 
shopping enables local individuals to choose the best available option. Norm pluralism 
provides evidence of a myriad of local rules which structure social interaction within local 
communities. However, the application of one or the other rule – if connected to mediation 
or the purchase of justice – again depends on the endowment with power resources of the 
person who has the choice (see 7.4 and below). 
This study did not seek to derive a functional assessment of whether local governance in 
Afghanistan is functional (‘good’) or dysfunctional (‘bad’), but to examine underlying 
mechanisms and emic perceptions from a process perspective. The findings cannot be 
reduced to simple clear-cut propositions. Following Ribot and Peluso’s idea of access as 
the ability to benefit from a certain resource (Ribot and Peluso 2003), I have traced the 
exercise of power in environmental resource-user communities that were conceptualized as 
local governance arenas by looking at the enforcement and realization of access (Ch. 6). In 
this case, it was feasible to take into account power resources when determining who was 
better able to benefit from a resource than were co-community members, and why. I listed 
factors underlying access in the empirical case studies in Table 10 of Chapter 7.1. Given 
the spatial dimension of natural resource usage, the identified factors ranged from place-
based determinants to social identity, authority, social status (especially social network 
relations), and economic resources. 
The habitual reliance of ordinary community members on middlemen and local brokers, 
even though they are not always trusted to work for the benefit of the community, has 
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facilitated piecemeal negotiations for the (re-)construction of infrastructure and selective 
development measures at the local level as well as negotiated state-making at the national 
level. Despite this seemingly self-referential closed circuit logic of the social order, which 
is constantly reinforced by everyday practices in line with relative stable, dominating 
moralities, the scope for change or at least outside influences often comes from ‘exit 
valves’, such as the migration of a large share of the districts’ population to labor in Iran at 
the time of this field research. Other outlets that allow exposure to different orders are 
media broadcasts and mobile phones. These factors provide a potential for agency and the 
possibility of incremental change, which is likely not going to be as significant in 35 years 
as past adaptations in local social order were in the period beginning in 1978. In hindsight, 
although gradual, the shift in power structures that I delineated throughout the thesis and 
summarized in Chapter 7 was heavily facilitated by large-scale mobilization in the name of 
defending Islam. Although facilitated by the same logic – via patron client networks, 
personalized relations and middlemen – events and processes as the murder of an entire 
stratum of local elders and middlemen or the outside supply of weapons and money from 
the party headquarters in Peshawar, which provided power resources to different 
commanders a couple of years later, constituted major factors in changing local power 
structures. The recent development intervention may be a third factor that affected local 
power dynamics and rural elites during the last decade. It largely reinforced existing social 
inequalities in ‘target communities’ and facilitated the rise of a new group of development 
brokers, namely local INGO-personnel working at the interface between the international 
aid community, embodied by the INGO local office and the rural populace targeted by 
development projects.  
It is most remarkable that in the scenario outlined in the previous section, these three 
outside factors – labor migration, the quasi-extinction of a whole stratum of traditional 
elders in 1978 and 1979, and the military and socio-economic aid intervention since 2001 – 
have not transformed the social structure entirely. Instead, in every case, adaptation took 
place within the very same logic of everyday social practices and moralities. Hence, 
murdered elders and middlemen were replaced by sons and brothers in hereditary fashion; 
weapons and money reached commanders who were family members of Peshawar-based 
party and district envoys; Afghan community mobilizers, translators, and engineers 
working for INGOs referred to rural elites for the implementation of project objectives. 
In conclusion, adapting to challenges to mechanisms of a social order is normal and carried 
out according to the logic of that order. Within Afghanistan, even long-term violence and 
war have not challenged the framework and legitimacy of the rural social order in any 
substantial way. When broadly Marxist ideology fueled the coup d’état in 1978, and 
reforms were subsequently introduced at the community level, the challenge to the local 
social order was blighted. Since then the prospects for the reduction of in-built inequalities 
in the prevailing social order have not improved.         
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9.2 Revisiting categories and analytical concepts  
This thesis began with the explicit assumption that social order is constituted by power 
relations. Consequently, the assumption of power as a relational concept was introduced, 
wherein power nests in the mutual interplay of social practices and moralities that shape 
local governance mechanisms and reinforce certain social orders according to the 
surrounding context. The ability of individual community members to benefit from 
resources in specific local governance arenas was found to be determined by the 
availability of power resources. Given the identified flexibility and plurality of local norms 
and legitimation processes, rights-based access mechanisms played a minor role in the 
empirical case studies when compared with the structural-relational preconditions for 
access. Based on the results of the empirical analysis, the following two sub-sections 
discuss the main analytical concepts used in this thesis and answer the question, ‘What 
does the analysis contribute to scholarship?’, that is, both sections provide a selective 
reassessment of the conceptual framework.916 
 
 9.2.1 Power, authority and legitimacy 
In this thesis, I attempted to decipher the logic and local mechanisms of power. Based on 
the findings, I conclude that in a thick description and analysis of power, it is by no means 
sufficient to use the term power; instead, representative concepts and terms are necessary 
to develop an operative concept of power. Consequently, the relational concept of power 
and the implication that power cannot be possessed but manifests in social relationships 
has been useful. My own case studies revealed that the idea of power as a medium to 
achieve goals and influence others’ actions while based on certain resources seems most 
plausible. I have subsequently integrated the idea of different power resources as 
constituting branches of bundles of power into the analysis. Not only the quantity of these 
branches, that is, the availability of power resources to a person but also the quality, that is, 
the type of specific resource endowment determine the potency and probability of 
influencing others’ actions. However, those endowed with power resources do not have to 
be consciously awarene of them. Power resources might reside in a person’s status or 
origin. Uphoff’s elaborations on political resources (Uphoff 2001: 316f) were a useful 
starting point in distinguishing resource categories (economic resources, social status, 
force, legitimacy and authority) and how they are manifest. I showed how closely 
interwoven are the categories of social status, legitimacy and authority. In particular, the 
latter two are awarded and acknowledged within social relations and are thus often 
                                                             
916 Auxiliary concepts, such as life-world and rationality, which underlie the case studies as well as the social 
order approach, have contributed significantly to the results of this study, but they are not discussed 
separately here as concepts in their own right. In particular, the idea of individual life-worlds can be seen as a 
first-order construct constituted by diverse and overlapping arena-based (non-scrutinized) experiences of 
practice. Hence, I distinguished the life-world perspective as an emic construct mirroring Afghans’ 
subjectivities, whereas I considered the local governance-perspective an etic viewpoint that is selectively and 
validly employed by the researcher in order to concentrate on one or more local governance arenas. Both 
perspectives are mutually complementary and together constitute the moralities and social-practices 
dimensions of the social order approach. The allusion to Lebenswelten in the title of this thesis refers to the 
idea of everydayness entailed by the ambiguity of meaning inherent in the popular versus scientific usage of 
the term life-world. 
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dependent on prevailing moralities. In short, social power in northeast Afghanistan’s rural 
communities resides predominantly in social networks, personal patron-client 
relationships, and material wealth.  
The concept of bundles of power is very appropriate to my case study of rural communities 
in northeast Afghanistan because of the large-scale absence of statutory law and the 
disconnection between normative local rules emphasizing equal rights and entitlements on 
the one hand and de facto practices of unequal access on the other hand. An examination of 
power relations, particularly the power resource bundles available to different actors or 
groups of actors, can help explain how the relationship between rules and enforcement 
plays out in everyday resource-use patterns. It was subsequently found that the more 
heavily a person is endowed with power resources both quantitavely and qualitatively the 
better he or she is able to enforce access – even beyond the discursively defined 
entitlements and normative rules attributed to the particular user. As examples from the 
different NRM arenas in this study have shown, local norms such as the equal treatment of 
tail-end and upstream water users (even written in jointly agreed rotation schedules), joint 
usage of pastures and open access to fuel collection have been adjusted for everyday 
practice. Therefore, the most serious contestations occur in cases of irrigation water, and 
the least serious contestations involve fuel wood, probably because the exclusion of users 
from biomass collection at mountainsides would deprive them of the means to heat and 
cook in the absence of alternative energy sources. A focus on the bundle of powers, instead 
of employing the popular bundles-of-rights perspective, explains the ability of local actors 
to benefit from community resources, no matter whether they have rights to them or not. In 
short, any enforcement of rights depends on the availability of – or endowment with – 
power resources.  
The role of property in contexts with no robust enforcement of property rights (rule of law 
frameworks), affects branches of development studies that are concerned with common 
property regimes and community-based natural resource management. First, 
representatives of such approaches often employ an undifferentiated community 
perspective in which power does not figure. Second, they do not define the social or other 
boundaries of the community in question but take their existence for granted. My thesis 
provides a basis for arguing that power is crucial in understanding local resource access 
and use dynamics and, thus, de facto property rights. Hence, I argued that research on 
community-based natural resource management should be free of the biases of property 
rights theory and homogeneous notions of community. Instead, it should acknowledge the 
possibility of social differences within communities and underlying power resources. This 
thesis suggests that community studies could be more fruitfully conducted from a local 
governance perspective wherein rights-based mechanisms would figure as only one of 
several factors under investigation. They could be observed in the social practices of 
deviance and control with regard to community resources. In addition, I demonstrated the 
blurring of boundaries (fuzziness of place) in determining communities. For example, the 
village can be considered a socio-spatial entity and the resource-user community can be 
unit of empirical observation and analysis. The advantage of ‘the resource-user 
community’ is that it can be implemented in data collection. It can also be acknowledged 
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as only one piece of the puzzle of manifold governance arenas of which individual rural 
dwellers are a part. 
A further unique finding concerns the relations among power, authority, legitimacy, wealth 
and local governance. First, regarding the authority-power nexus, I found that moral and 
administrative authority can be attributed to a person without significant power resources 
and thus the ability to exercise power. For example, in war-time conditions, conventional 
elders could not face commanders meaningfully if the latter was ready to use force to 
represent his interest against the interests of the elder or those on whose behalf an elder 
tried to mediate. In peace-time conditions, however, moral authority can be a resource of 
power if the social environment acknowledges the elder’s moral authority and obeys it. 
Similarly, government representatives at provincial and district-administration levels were 
endowed with administrative authority by default because of the very establishment of 
government institutions. However, depending on their conduct in office, they were either 
acknowledged or denied legitimate authority. Only both types of authority would have lent 
a higher degree of legitimacy to their actions; however, full legitimacy was unlikely to be 
achieved because in the absence of material resources from which the populace could 
benefit diminished the government representatives’ legitimacy. Few government 
representatives have earned legitimate authority by balanced decision-making (e.g., Faiz 
Muhamad, see 6.1.2-b/c) that was perceived as just. Others possessed advance credit 
despite non-performance in office because they had been ‘on the right’ side during the war 
– an impression that was shared by the majority of the concerned office-holder’s rural 
constituency, such as in the case of the CoP Warsaj. Moreover, the administrative authority 
these office-holders received by default once they entered their position was subsequently 
enmeshed with their own clout as local big men who had been able to ascend to the post by 
using their own power resources, which comprised family relations or the war-time 
military command network, in addition to money (see 7.3 and 7.4).   
In contrast, legitimate power can be exercised with only little authority or without any at 
all in the view of those benefiting from its usage. In this case, the action would be less 
legitimate in the eyes of the majority, but would find approval with those who benefitted. 
In an (admittedly idealized) in-between stage where power (i.e., the use of resources to 
influence others’ action through action) relies on one type of authority – either 
administrative or moral – actions or the holding of a position are not perceived fully 
legitimate but are accepted for different reasons (conformity) and in the context of diverse 
consequences. These findings reconfirm Popitz’ concept of institutionalization of power as 
not necessarily a one-way process that moves between the stages from mere power to 
authority and subsequent rule (Herrschaft, see Ch. 2.2.2).917 The emic categories of 
salāhiyat and qudrat comply with the idea of assigned legitimate authority based on moral  
factors versus appropriated authority based on power resources without necessarily 
enjoying wide legitimacy. In addition, qudrat is perceived to further salāhiyat (Ch. 7.4). 
                                                             
917 The rule dimension was not part of this thesis. In the conceptual framework, authority was introduced as 
the institutionalized usage of power resources. Note that the difficulty in terminology is caused by the 
overlap of the notions of authority. I discussed authority in relation to legitimacy by distinguishing moral and 
administrative authority as resources of power. At the same time, authority can be understood as derived 
from power resources, thus constituting what Popitz (1968/2004) termed institutionalized power.  
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Because legitimacy underlies the exercise of power, the degree of authority depends on the 
extent of legitimacy.     
Hence, I have conceptualized local governance as the exercise of power with the purpose 
to organize collective coexistence and provide collective goods in communities in rural 
societies (see Ch. 2.4.1). The specific governance characteristics perceived from the emic 
perspective – ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – are determined by and vary with the extent of legitimation 
surfacing in the different practices inherent in the modalities of governance. The logic of 
the accumulation of power and its conversion can only be grasped against the background 
of overlapping social arenas in which different power resources are available and unfold in 
relationships. One example for the conversion of power resources is the elder-turned 
commander phenomenon at the onset of war in the late 1970s. In this instance, authority, 
social status and economic resources coalesced into military leadership. The conversion 
takes place along the same lines even between different types of military leadership, such 
as anti-Soviet resistance to the Taliban. In these cases, the conversion is based on 
authority, the individual’s or his father’s previous reputation as jihadi commander, and 
economic resource endowment. It is perceived legitimate by a sufficiently large proportion 
of the populace to be acknowledged. Another type of power resource conversion is the 
appointment of the mirāb by the largest landowners cum (novel and/or conventional) 
elders, thereby using authority and social status to endorse economic prosperity, if 
necessary at the cost of smaller, less resource-endowed cultivators. Similarly, through 
employment as local (I)NGO staff, the sons of local elites were able to convert their 
endowment with information and knowledge because of the better training and education 
they received. In short, they used their elite status as a power resource to further their own 
economic and social interests and status.  
Chapter 8 focused on the role of local INGO staff as of one group of development brokers 
(the other being rural representatives and elite figures), thereby evolving into a new social 
stratum. However, the question is not whether the recent political and socio-economic aid 
intervention has caused the fragmentation of power resources by adding a new social group 
to local elites versus the concentration of power resources. Both trends are visible: Aid 
programs, such as the NSP, and sector projects, such as the KRBP, obviously provide 
economic resources with the claim to bring equal benefits to a large target group. In fact, 
many of the resources were hijacked by a small, albeit increasingly diversifying stratum of 
rural elites. Hence, a more interesting dimension to assess is whose ability to benefit from 
any resource increases or decreases as the result of aid. My empirical investigation showed 
that middlemen clearly benefit, as do, though to a lesser and controlled extent, their active 
supporters. In contrast, passive clients, that is, the average populace with no special 
relations to any of the local elders or elite figures, are likely to receive minimal trickle-
down benefits and these are rare.918 
 
                                                             
918 For example, trickle-down effects occur when collective goods are created through the targeting of the 
entire community by circumventing the usual representatives. However, in local reality this is seldom the 
case. Most aid programs and projects are sector-based and growth-oriented, which leads to distortions caused 
by, for example, the exclusive privileging of landowners and livestock holders when improving irrigation 
canals and pastures. For further discussion, see section 9.3.1 below. 
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9.2.2 Politics, local governance and social order 
Within the frame of subsistence economic activities and depleting resource stocks, I have 
chosen natural resource governance as a promising field in which to observe contestations 
and negotiations about access and usage because local communities to extents depend on 
environmental resources for survival. This established a close link with ecological 
conditions and provided my research with the dimension of political ecology (see 6.2.3). 
The finiteness of the resources studied, especially fuel wood, and the exhaustion of the 
carrying capacity of rangelands in the study region cannot be denied. Thus, nature cannot 
be treated as static and in equilibrium. According to the logic of the local social order, a 
high degree of adaptation is already observable. However, in line with the same logic, this 
adaptation does not scrutinize the existing practices and sets of values. Adaptation finds 
expression in not only exit strategies, such as labor migration and livelihood 
diversification, but also the shift from wood fuel and non-woody fuel plants to manure for 
heating and cooking purposes. Adaptation is indicated by the purchasing of tube wells by 
tail-end water users and by the accumulation of livestock by subsistence farmers and rich 
families in the upper catchment field sites because of the uncertainty connected with rain-
fed farming, the lack of employment opportunities as well as increasing meat prices. 
However, in the long run these adaptation strategies will backfire because they are not 
sustainable. For example, the uncertainty connected with mountain resource governance, 
which I pointed out in Chapters 6.2.3 and 7.4, points to the need for systematically 
reconciling politico-sociological and ecological perspectives. The interdependence of 
power, politics, and ecology, including the physical environment, must be acknowledged. 
Social science researchers should focus on better integration of all three fields. 
This thesis demonstrated that the binary opposition between state/government and society 
(one could extend the argument to a second binary between society and the individual) 
does not hold and therefore needs qualification. I showed how this binary differed in the 
research field sites. At present, the state is a source of rent extraction for appointed 
government staff. Prior to 1978, Roy (1985: 20) diagnosed that “the state exists outside and 
apart from civil society” and the villages, but members of rural society nevertheless often 
managed to penetrate the ranks of the bureaucracy (ibid.: 21). The major difference today 
is the large-scale appropriation of district governments by rural elites with varying degrees 
of legitimacy. The state or national government administration has passed through a 
transformation from distant exclusiveness, which more or less embodied an enemy to the 
ordinary rural dweller in the pre-revolution period, to ‘no state’ (‘hukumat nabud’) during 
the 1980s and first half of the 1990s. Today the state is negotiated. Ordinary citizens 
connected manifold expectations with the establishment of the Karzai governments after 
2001. They have since witnessed the decline of authority and administrative legitimacy of 
the local government caused by non-delivery of development measures, such as the 
provision of jobs and basic infrastructure. The NSP was not successfully related to the 
local government and even its link to the central government has not always resonated with 
the target population. The allocation of services and the delivery of justice according to the 
personal network logic of office-bearers in local governments and higher-level 
administrations deprived the state of its former exclusiveness. Contrary to before 1978, the 
government after 2001 was not penetrated from the bottom up, but from top down, as the 
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analysis of the first and second rank of Jam’iat-e Islāmi and Shurā-ye Nazār big men 
illustrated.  
I will now summarize how the social order perspective fared as a conceptual framework 
underlying the investigation presented in this thesis. What can be said regarding its validity 
and usefulness? The most significant value is that it provides an epistemological viewpoint 
and conceptual tool for a thoroughly grounded analysis of local societies and subsequently 
enables a better understanding of their different contexts. By focusing on the moralities and 
social practices, the employed life-world perspective acknowledges the emic point of view 
of the concerned persons who more often than not disappear in formal analyses. In 
addition, I propose that the social order concept allows the reflection and conscious choice 
of how a problem is investigated and thus how we know what is presented as research 
findings. The elaboration of guiding theses in Chapter 2.5 and subsequent considerations 
for their methodological implementation (Ch. 3) ensured that I approached the field, data 
collection, and analysis with a focus on emic categories and theory-led inductive inference 
(see Ch. 2). Hence, my own cultural and theoretical biases were controlled. 
In this thesis, the social order perspective has proven useful because the basic patterns of 
local social organization in rural Afghan society were under scrutiny when I prepared the 
investigation and entered the field. The inherently non-state-centric approach of the social 
order concept did not limit me to investigations of local government features, but 
challenged me to go beyond. Hence I conceptualized local governance as etic 
manifestation of social order which could be empirically investigated. Hence, social order 
potentially displays a considerable value in any study of local societies that are distinct 
from Western cultures because the epistemological toolbox leaves room for an neutral 
reception of local social realities. Attempts to investigate these from within take into 
account the cognitive factors of members, as well as the wider historical, socio-political 
and natural environmental contexts. Moreover, the view that governance as the interplay of 
social practices and moralities via underlying structures of power relations constantly 
reproduces social order, allows attributing local governance specific characteristics based 
on emic categories. 
Based on the results of my analysis, I am now able to relate the concept of social order to 
other concepts used in the study of local politics. Social order provides the conceptual 
space in which all other phenomena can be (but must not be) embedded and investigated. 
An analysis of social order – through the mutual interplay of moralities and social practices 
and generic effects produced by this interplay – prepares the ground for the empirical 
investigation of social organization (governance as the exercise of power in a certain 
mode) and includes the entire web of mutually intersected social fields and local 
governance arenas. Within a society, all sorts of meaningful behavior can thus be observed 
without any normative bias exposed from the outside. However, local governance analysis 
is field-related and grounded in patterns of the interplay of social practices and moralities. 
Hence, treating social order as an analytical framework enables the empirical analysis of 
local governance.  
Local governance of community-relevant social fields does not necessarily entail conflict. 
If the factor of scarce natural resources in subsistence economies is disregarded, the 
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regulation of everyday affairs in other fields is unlikely to involve similar amounts of 
contestation and subsequent degrees of politicization of access (Ch. 6.2.3). In other 
instances, however, conflicts are assumed to arise out of contestation over resources. The 
detailed analysis of the field data showed that politics revolves around the mediation of 
conflicts.  
The socio-spatial unit that the term social order refers to in any particular research depends 
on the definition of the problem and subsequent research question. Social order can be 
understood as comprising a complex tapestry of overlapping governable arenas of social 
interaction in a – however large – society. This thesis has approached the organizing 
principles of rural society in northeastern Afghanistan by examining social practices and 
moralities in user communities. The auxiliary concept of life-worlds was included to 
account for the cognitive dimension (mental positioning/subjectivity) and everydayness in 
ordinary environmental resource governance. On one hand, the significance of natural 
resources from the local users’ point of view provides much scope for contestation. On the 
other hand, access patterns represent social differentiations within user communities and 
thus prove a useful magnifier for analyzing power relations. With this focus on the 
ordinary and not necessarily on open, already escalating conflicts, I was able to trace 
contestations of interest and preferences that are normally hidden from direct view and 
thus have not been the subject of research analyses. The heuristic mirroring of rural 
Afghans’ subjectivities by rationales of the aid intervention revealed the prevailing logic of 
state-making in northeastern Afghanistan. These findings could be a basis for imagining 
new ways of academic and practical engagement with Afghanistan. 
 
9.3 Outlook: Implications for development practice and further research 
Development and its dimensions of practice, process and vision (Thomas 2000, 2000a) 
were criticized as a form of trusteeship by Cowen and Shenton (1996) and as a mere 
technology of security by Duffield (2007). Both views hold true for Afghanistan. The 
effect has been the technicization and depoliticization of aid intervention in general and the 
socio-economic programs of the KRBP or the NSP in particular.  
 
9.3.1 Lessons for development practice 
Chapter 8 showed how in practice aid intervention is mediated by a small stratum of rural 
elites and local INGO staff, and the macro-effect of negotiated state-making yields highly 
uncertain outcomes. It implies broad-based norm diffusion because, on the one hand, the 
intervention logic embodies the normative preoccupations of the intervention societies 
inherent in notions such as good governance, growth, democracy, market economy, human 
rights, and freedom to name the main associated buzzwords. On the other hand, both 
Afghan rural elites and average rural dwellers bend these norms by appropriating them into 
their own life-world understandings. Subsequently, a transformation of the intervention 
objectives and means according to individual needs occurs, both consciously and 
unconsciously (Ch. 8.3). Conequently, the top-down development template for 
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Afghanistan (despite existing rhetoric of participation and bottom-up facilitation of 
development, see Ch. 8) is met by local realities that have been misconceived at best by the 
former’s proponents. The most crucial misconception is of the social differences within 
target groups. They were found to be largely neglected in the process of project 
implementation although the mitigation of inequality is a prominent notion in funding 
proposals and equity is a similarly common topos used to describe the normative aim of 
many intervention measures to enhance pro-poor development. In my explications about 
local governance mechanisms with regard to environmental resources – and those of 
conflict mediation and other resource provision, such as access to justice or to aid benefits 
– I showed how political seemingly uneventful ordinary issues can become at the local 
level. Paucity-enhancing factors played a crucial role in contestations over resources and 
the subsequent politicization of access (see section 6.2.3). Accordingly, (I)NGOs or other 
aid agencies that carry out implementation measures that neglect power differentials within 
communities contribute to the overall trend of depoltiticization of target groups and the 
objectification of recipients. Homogenizing depoliticization can be traced to the concrete 
practices I alluded to throughout Chapters 6 to 8. A crucial practice is the mode of 
mobilization of local communities, which occurs only by speaking to the local big men and 
not involving all community members, despite claims of consulting all the people (‘kul-e 
mardum’). Consequently, and in line with the inertia inherent in local moralities, 
participatory rapid appraisal exercises for communities’ needs assessment regularly fall 
short of the participation dimension. This leads to another consequence resulting from the 
mediation by development brokers, namely that many aid intervention measures do not 
reach the neediest social groups but are diffused in the process of project implementation.  
In northeast Afghanistan’s rural society, rights-based mechanisms are overruled by 
structural-relational mechanisms (Chs. 6 and 7). The concept of bundles of power puts 
property rights into perspective (Ribot and Peluso 2003). The latter entail a normative bias 
assuming the inevitableness of uncontested and fixed property rights. Aid practitioners 
follow the same paradigm, if not by default assuming the existence of robust rights, then in 
their vision of development aims. However, I have shown that the vagueness of access and 
use rights, which results from norm pluralism and multiple potential enforcement bodies 
(local shurā, district government, CoP), benefits those who are the most deprived of power 
resources and dependent on fuel resources on mountainsides. If the areas in the mountains 
which are customarily used by one community, were fenced or privatized after breaking up 
the common territory into individual plots, the poorest families of the community would be 
deprived of access and thus lose a source of income that was already at subsistence level.      
On another level, my research showed that the nexus of poverty and environmental 
degradation is not as clear cut as (Neo-)Malthusian thinkers have proposed. According to 
them, degradation and loss of environment and productive land has occured as an 
inevitable result of population pressure and subsequent conflict (Homer-Dixon 1999). 
However, I indicated that although population pressure in the upper catchment districts has 
existed for almost a century, environmental resources were not a factor in local conflicts in 
the past 30 years. Instead, different adaptation strategies – albeit not sustainable – have 
been employed by the local population to cope with decreasing resource stocks. Therefore, 
it might be appropriate to see the developments as part of long-term land use changes as 
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have happened elsewhere in the world. The districts of Farkhār and Warsaj can serve as 
showcase counterexamples for (Neo)Malthusian theory. Moreover, I found that it is not the 
poorest members of social communities who exploit environmental resources to an 
extreme degree. Instead, as the case studies on fuel wood and pastures demonstrated, the 
wealthier strata of local residents put enhanced pressure on the environment because they 
create a heightened demand for fuel wood, which they sell for profit in the provincial 
municipalities. The increased pressure is also a consequence of peace (peace-dividend, see 
Ch. 6.2). Simlarly, the large herds of rich livestock owners put higher pressure on the eco-
systems than do the few animals possessed by poorer families. Rural development 
programs are advised to take into account these qualifications and social differences in 
communities and redesign their programs accordingly. The poverty-degradation nexus 
needs critical reframing. In another example, one of the measures to enhance local 
cooperation and mitigate poverty in Farkhār and Warsaj was the distribution of livestock to 
widows and households headed by women. The effect on the environment 
notwithstanding, the project had overlooked that the recipients did not possess land to 
provide for winter fodder for animals.   
Of final importance are the implications the social order and local governance analysis 
have with regard to social change in northeastern Afghanistan. Given the interplay of the 
local and the interventionist social order and their subsequent mediation towards each other 
by middlemen, social change as the aim of development programs envisaged by the 
international community is impeded. Moreover, longer times will be needed to produce the 
trickle-down effect to the mostly excluded average population, which only benefits if 
mediators and local elites have been saturated. In the process of implementation, policy 
programs fail in their equity dimension. Thus, revised programs would be urgently 
necessary to enhance the impact of aid in Afghanistan, particularly regarding the 
implementation process and the role of social mobilizers, translators and engineers. In 
short, aid representatives that work at the immediate interface with the population should 
have the opportunity to understand fully the programs and their objectives. They should 
receive better training in methodologies of implementation and incentives to grow and 
build a career within one organization in order to ensure that employees are working 
towards the goals for which the funds were allocated. 
One could claim that in the long term, the influx of aid money and projects only 
perpetuates existing inequalities in communities and that social change at the local level is 
best generated through individual abilities, endowments, and self-help. The effects of labor 
migration to Iran over the last decades have been shown to offset the traditional 
relationship between rural elites and laborers in Farkhār and Warsaj. However, I do not 
recommend stopping all aid, which would be counterproductive. However, by shifting the 
focus from large-scale infrastructure to more human capacity-building and taking into 
account rural realities and life-worlds, aid policies could be designed to help people 
according to their own logic and current aid could be used in more meaningful ways, such 
as helping Afghan workers in Iranian and Pakistani cities, launching renewable energy 
projects, providing legal literacy, and, if possible, actively creating local employment 
markets or acknowledging structural unemployment prospects and building alternative 
policies (guest worker programs etc.).   
362 
 
Regarding the engagement in Afghanistan at the political level, it might be worth 
reiterating that this analysis showed how the local social order discards ideology and, thus, 
religion. In addition to the acceptance of local leaders independent of former and current 
factional belonging (see 9.1), this finding entails certain prospects for reconciliation and 
the acceptance of development measures (if conducted ‘right’). However, attempts at 
social change from the top down or reengineering from below have yielded uncertain 
generic outcomes so far.   
 
9.3.2 Future research programs 
 
As an afterthought to several points mentioned above, the findings of present research 
point to the need for future research to reconsider notions of ‘village’, ‘poverty’, 
‘vulnerable people’ and ‘widows’, which are the most relevant for aid practitioners. In my 
view, these notions fail as signifiers of concepts of local counterparts. Because the latter 
are embedded in distinct social realities, their existence and substance need to be 
acknowledged. My analysis revealed several faultlines. Although poverty is generally 
defined according to monetary income, the social reality is that families are rich in 
livestock but have no monetary income or amenities such as electricity. The categories of 
vulnerable people and widows are subject to definition by the community development 
broker. No doubt many Afghan women are widows, but they usually do not have to look 
after themselves alone and can rely on the larger family in rural areas. This is why most 
programs that target widows benefit selected families that might not be the neediest. From 
another viewpoint, this type of project often causes women to deny their husbands, old-
enough sons, and male helpers in order to benefit from the program.919 Follow-up studies 
on these topics in the broader context of local governance in Afghanistan using a similar 
framework of social order would generate further valuable insights and enable the 
comparison of my own work with findings from other distinct social arenas over time. At 
present, however, the possibilities for scholarly work in Afghanistan are severely limited. 
Nevertheless, the most fascinating challenge I see for research arising from the insights 
gained in the present research involves the study of social practices that are vital 
components in local governance and individual life-worlds. However, this approach does 
not fit current research paradigms, which usually ‘other’ such practices as belonging to the 
informal sphere that is not accounted for. The elaborated absence of statutory law and the 
double standard connected to local norms, that is, the distinction between customary norm 
and practice, is an example of why the distinction between formal and informal institutions 
and practices does not have analytical value. Furthermore, this distinction has created 
confusion in attempts to understand local social logic by previous studies. The crucial point 
is that even the ‘informal’ includes putative norms and deviating social realities and 
practices. Thus, within the sphere of the informal, a misalignment is already established, 
which requires thorough analysis. Moreover, the notion of insufficiency and deviance with 
which informal practices were associated imparted non-statutory regulations the bias of 
deficiency and non-functionality.  
                                                             
919 See Daulatzai (2008) for an assessment of the impact of this denial on women’s subjectivity and their 
predicament. 
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I wrote my empirical data and conclusions (Chs. 7-9) without resorting to the concept of 
institutions. Instead I spoke of social practices and their institutionalization (see Ch. 2.1.2). 
The popular understanding of ‘institutions as rules of the game’ does not do justice to the 
complexity of local practices and their underlying, mutually reinforcing moralities. I have 
shown that much can be gained from employing the concept of social order as an 
epistemological approach, without categorizing practices as formal or informal or relying 
on the state-centric view of methodological nationalism. I advocate the establishment of a 
research program on ‘Social order and local governance – Learning from the majority 
world’. This program should include various case studies from rural and urban 
communities throughout the majority world, that is least and low income country contexts 
mostly characterized by non-democratic governance, to investigate local self-organization 
at the community level in relationship to the institutional context of local, national, global 
political, and socio-economic forces.  
Two main assumptions underlie this program: First is the need to acknowledge that the 
majority of the world’s population lives in the so-called informal sector. Countries such as 
Afghanistan and Pakistan generate more than 50 percent of all economic activity and 
output in this sector. Second, although ontological investigations of mechanisms and facts 
have been carried out by numerous studies, there is a need to develop an interdisciplinary 
tool to grasp these realities such that they can be communicated to other academics and 
policy makers in order to lay the groundwork for different forms of academic and political 
engagement with ‘the informal’. Given the striking prominence of studies explaining 
failing statehood, perpetuated poverty, consolidation of authoritarianism instead of 
democratic change, and the gap in between development norms and local realities, the 
norms themselves must be put under scrutiny. An innovative strategy to accomplish this 
goal would be to carry out empirical research on normative frameworks, which can be 
traced only in social practices including discourse beyond the idea of universal 
isomorphism as propagated by the world polity school (Finnemore 1996; Meyer 2005), and 
by investigating commonalities of informality patterns in non-Western contexts. On this 
basis, existing scholarship on sociological institutionalism, patronage, informal institutions, 
and related concepts, which originate largely in exclusively Western contexts, could be 
revised or merged into new heuristic paradigms that replace what is known as ‘the 
informal’. The influence of the policies, cultures and religions of nation-states is likely to 
be revised in the course of this endeavor. Power relations will figure prominently as they 
are operationalized in modalities of local governance. The critical hallmark of the proposed 
research program will be the attempt to make sense of the world from the point of view of 
concerned individuals and social groups. 
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A1 – Documents 
 
A1-a: Translation of Letter of major local commanders in Chārdara, 1989 
 
Request letter for support 
 
 
To all Jihadi commanders and the Islamic Party of 
Chārdara 
 
Greetings! [Peace be upon you] 
 
It has become known that Qarayatim main canal, 
which used to irrigate 40,000 jerib of land, was 
recently damaged and is currently irrigating 40 
percent fewer crops because we could not work 
on the canal during the revolution.  
Currently, we feel it is impossible to irrigate 
40,000 jerib of land with the existing 
infrastructure; our crops are dying. For this 
reason, we have decided to dig a new canal in an 
approximate distance of 1,000 meters. However, 
this is impossible without the support of the 
Irrigation Department and the provision of tools 
and machinery by the government.  
We went to the Irrigation Department and 
explained the above issue and asked them to 
provide us with tractors with necessary tools to 
dig a new canal and thus solve our problems. The 
Irrigation Department agreed to give us tractors 
on the condition that the mujahedin commanders 
of the area guaranteed that they would not destroy 
the tractors and bulldozers.  
Thus, we request from all brothers and Islamic 
party commanders to state their agreement by 
undersigning this letter and not create problems.  
 
Related to the above, it is worth mentioning that 
the new canal will be dug on the lands of refugees 
(muhājerin) [to Pakistan, KM]. In order not to 
infringe upon their rights, we have agreed to 
compensate them for the land by paying 20,000 
Afs per jerib, which is above the current market 
18/7/1368 
 
Order 
 
The intention of this request letter is the 
improvement and solution of community-related 
problems; thus, the provincial-level commander 
agrees and approves it.  
I request the commanders of Khales of the 
provincial department to inform their armed 
groups not to create any problem for the 
bulldozers, because the machinery will be used 
for the benefit of the local community and to 
improve its situation. Furthermore, the vehicles 
have been borrowed by the people from the 
government in return for a guarantee payment.  
 
 
Stamp of Hezb-e Islāmi provincial commander 
Mullā Abdul Aziz  
 
Signature of commander of Jam’iat-e Islāmi 
Chārdara [no name written] 
 
Stamp and signature of Faiz Umarkhēl, 
commander of Etehād-e Islāmi, Zia-ul-Haq 
Shaheed Front 
Signature of Mullā Khairudin, commander of Dr 
Shams-ul Haq Shaheed Front  
 
Signature and Stamp of Ma’lum Samad Khān, 
Provincial commander of Dr Shams-ul Haq 
Shaheed Front 
 
Signature of Jum’adin, commander of Hezb-e 
365 
 
price of land. The muhājerin land owners will 
receive the money upon their return. In the event 
that our canal cuts the sub-streams of the local 
farmers, we will build a concrete aqueduct for the 
owners of the sub-streams. With the proposed 
measure, we intend to put a halt to the agricultural 
losses caused by the damages of the irrigation 
canal, and to compensate financially the owners 
of the particular plots, which will be used for the 
new canal construction. 
Islāmi in Isakhēl village  
 
  Signature of commander Hekam  
(party unknown) 
 
Signature of commander Besmellah (commander 
of Chārdara upper street and Aliābād, party not 
known, though handwritten statement that he 
confirms his party’s Provincial level 
commander’s order) 
 
Signature of Abdul Ghafar, commander of  
Hezb-e Islāmi, Dr Abdul Wahid Front  
 
Finger print of commander Shamsudin  
(party not known)  
 
Shēr Muhamad, military commander of  
Jam’iat-e Islāmi for entire Chārdara 
[Handwritten addition by Shēr Muhamad: “I 
seriously request all Jam’iat commanders not to 
create any problem for the vehicles which will be 
brought by the elders for the digging of the new 
canal”].  
 
Sofi Madad Khān (party unclear)  
 
Rahmatullah, Chārdara Prosecutor 
 
Abdul Manān Mujāhed (party unclear) 
 
[Two more signatures are on the letter, one 
belonging to a Jam’iat-commander, another 
not legible, also names are not clear.]   
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A1-b: Translation of Announcement of the Kunduz Irrigation Department, 2006 
 
 
 
Announcement of the Kunduz Irrigation Department 
 
To the attention of honorable farmers: 
In Sawr this year unprecedented heat caused a rise in the rivers’ water level at a time when 
farmers could not make efficient use of the increased water flow. Moreover, given that we 
know from last years’ precipitation levels that the amount of snow in the mountains is sparse, 
it is likely that in the case of serious heat, the increase in water level would not be sustainable. 
Farmers will possibly face water shortages in Saratān. After the wheat harvest, if farmers in 
irrigation areas do not grow crops that require less water and opt for rice cultivation instead, 
the downstream farmers will suffer from water shortages and crop losses because rain-fed 
cultivation is limited.  
As a result of these recent climatic events, insufficient snow and glacial storage has occurred 
and the Irrigation Department is compelled to caution all farmers to refrain from rice 
cultivation after the wheat harvest because it would likely cause water shortages in Khānabād, 
Aliabād, Chārdara, and Qal’a-ye Zāl.  
Since water management at the field level is the responsibility of both the mirāb and the 
farmers, they are urged to work hard to prevent economic losses. The seriousness of the 
situation should not be underestimated. The Irrigation Department, agricultural extension 
officers, and district authorities should take concerted action to assist the farmers and water 
managers in this task.   
 
Respectfully, 
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A2 – Glossary & Afghan solar calendar 
 
‘ulama    Islamic clergy 
‘urufi    customary legal status 
‘ushr    tax on harvested crop (10 percent) 
ābi    irrigated, irrigable 
Afghāni (Afs)   Afghan currency  
amir    provincial commander 
anjuman   association 
āqsaqāl   elder (Uzbek) 
arbāb    village headman (official post before 1978) 
arbābi (kardan) to fulfill the functions/mandate of an arbāb, to liaise with the 
government administration 
archa    juniper (juniperus excelsa/juniperus communis) 
asnād, asnād-e zerā’ati  receipt document, receipt about tax payments for rain-fed plots 
asnād-e khati   ownership document 
awwal    first 
aylāq    summer pasture and shelter for livestock, herders with families 
bālā    upper 
band    dam 
barakat    holy blessing, endowed with special blessing (also: baraka) 
bashāl    type of tree species (name could not be detected) 
bāy    rich, title for rich person with estate  
bēl    flexible area measuring unit for water allocation (40-60 jerib) 
biswa    measurement unit, 1 jerib = 20 biswa 
buzkashi   horse game (pulling of goat or cow carcass)  
chakbāshi   minute taker at tertiary canal level, subordinate to kokbāshi 
chārak    measurement unit: a quarter of 1 sēr = 1.75 kg; literally: quarter 
chayir plant harvested as devil’s dung-surrogate (heng), English equivalent 
not determined  
dasht    steppe, e.g. Dasht-e Ābdān, Dasht-e Archi 
deh    village 
dubandi   diversion structure; literally: two damns 
duwum    second 
e’tebār    credit (respect) 
ehterām   respect 
Eid    Muslim holiday, Eid-e qurbān/Eid ul-adha – Holiday of Sacrificing 
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ejāra    leasehold of land 
emām-e masjed   prayer leader in mosque 
emlāk Department of Land Affairs at district and provincial level under the 
Ministry of Agriculture  
enqelāb   revolution 
erghay    hawthorn/cotoneaster (crataegus sp.) 
eshān alleged descendant from the lineage of the prophet’s family enjoying 
special status 
eslāhāt-e edāri   Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) 
Etehād-e Islāmi   Unity Party; literally: Islamic Unity (Alliance) 
Ezāfe grammatical conjunction of main word with attribute; literally: 
apposition 
Fārsi    Persian 
ghairi rasmi   extra-official  
gosfanddār   sheep owner 
gozar street demarcating border of neighborhood in city; water point for 
animals in rural areas 
hāji    honorary title, e.g. Hāji Sāheb 
Harakat   Harakat-e ‘enqelāb-e Islāmi: Islamic Revolutionary Movement 
hashar    collective work, mutual help at community/village level 
hawza    police precinct in urban areas; semi-administrative village cluster 
heng dried latex (asafoetida), exuded from a herbal plant with the 
same name; popularly known as devil’s dung     
Hezb-e Islāmi (Hekmatyār) Islamist Party of Gulb’udin Hekmatyār; literally: Islamic Party 
hisiyat    character 
hukumat nabud   there was no government 
huquq’abed   code which allows to settle a crime through traditional authorities  
huququllah code for capital crime settlement through statutory legal authorities  
jabha    local military resistance unit consisting of 20 to 60 men 
jalsa    assembly of wider significance (several villages) 
Jam’iat-e Islāmi  Islamist party; literally: Islamic Society 
jangal an area covered by any kind of vegetation, not necessarily trees and 
dense bushes as the common translation as ‘forest’ suggests 
jang-e barādar brothers’ war (war between brothers), designates civil war period, in 
local periodization equated with mujahedin-period (waqt-e mujāhedin), 
i.e. 1989-1997/98  
jerib    common land area measure, 1 jerib = 0.2 ha 
jihadi     related to jihad (‘holy war’, actual meaning: inner struggle) 
jirga    council, assembly 
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Junbesh   Junbesh-e Melli-ye Islāmi, Party of Abdul Qudus Dostum 
Junbeshi popular name of the Afghan currency issued by Dostum in his area of 
control between the mid-1990s and 2002 
kalān, kalān-e mā  elders, our elders; literally: big [Uzbek term]  
kalanhā-ye qawm  elders oft he qawm 
kanal, kanal-e ‘umumi  canal, main irrigation canal  
kār-e dehqanhā   ordinary agricultural chore 
kār-e rasmi   official dealings 
kelay    ‘village’ (Pashto) 
Khalq    wing of NDPA; literally: people  
khalqi    belonging to the Khalq faction of the NDPA 
khānawāda   household, homestead, extended family 
kochi    nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists 
kokbāshi   assistant of water manager (mirāb) 
kul-e mardum   literally: all the people, everybody 
kumita    committee 
lakh    unit in South Asian numbering system equal to 100,000  
Loya Jirga   National Grand Assembly 
madrasa   religious school  
mahalli    neighborhood -, neighborly  
man    weight measure (Pashto) equal to sēr (7kg) 
manteqa   area, village, valley, neighborhood, home 
maraa    private pasture (Pashto) 
mardikār   day laborer, here: laborer/s required for maintenance work in irrigation   
mawaat   open access pasture (Pashto) 
mawlawi   religious cleric 
mehmānkhāna   guesthouse and reception room/room for hosting guests 
Meshrāno Jirga   Upper house in Parliament, Senate 
mir    past local ruler, traditional title for the leader of a local dynasty 
mirāb water manager; literally: water lord; also: mirāb bāshi, mirāb-e 
‘umumi, mirāb-e kalān  
mirāb-e barg locally appointed person in charge of electricity provision (switching 
on/off and collecting service charges from all users) 
muhājerin   refugees, refugee- 
mulk    homeland, (land) property 
mullā    mullah, head of a mosque 
muysafēd   elder 
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muysafēdi   elders’ dealings 
muzdur    sharecropper, day laborer 
nahr    canal, stream, e.g. Sofi canal (Nahr-e Sofi) 
nām    name, reputation 
namāyenda   deputy 
nang    honor 
nāqel Pashtun migrants from South Afghanistan who were provided land by 
the government in other provinces 
Nawroz   New Year’s celebration (21 March according to Afghan calendar) 
nishr    shady area 
palaw    rice dish 
palaw-khor   rice-eater (metaphor for wealth) 
Parcham   wing of PDPA; literally: flag 
pāyin    lower 
pitaw    sun-receiving area 
posh    artemisia 
qānon    law 
qarya    village 
qawm concept of belonging to social group based on ethnicity, lineage, sub-
lineage, or local community 
qawmi    related to the qawm 
qawmiyat   identity based on certain social group (qawm)-belonging 
qeshlāq    ‘village’, originally: winter quarter with permanent houses 
qomāndān   commander/s 
qudrat appropriated authority/enforcement capacity/power based on different 
resources, such as force, education, wealth 
qulba area measurement unit for water allocation, mostly fixed at 40 jerib; 
literally: plough 
rasmi    official 
rishsafēd   elder, respected person; literally: whitebeard 
salāhiyat assigned legitimate authority and imagined capacity to act, 
traditionally: based on moral, non-material resources, such as conduct, 
reputation and nām in the rural governance realm; or divine authority 
and related Islamic norms in the religious sphere 
sar-e grop   head of army unit 
sarparast head of socio-economic unit (household, herder community at pasture 
camp) 
sarparast-e aylāq  head of pasture camp 
sayed (Pl. sādāt)  descendant/s of the Prophet; group/family name   
371 
 
sēr    measurement/weight unit, 1 sēr = 7kg 
Setam-e Melli   Marxist party; literally: National Oppression 
shara’i    official legal status    
shari’at   Sharia, Islamic law 
shurā    council, assembly 
Shurā-ye Nazār   Supervisory Council 
usufruct   use right of property and right to enjoy the benefits of its usage 
usus    usage, use right 
wakil representative, deputy; Provincial Council member, Provincial Council 
delegate to Meshrāno Jirga 
waqt-e mujāhedin ‚time of the mujahedin‘, according to emic periodization from 1989 
until 1997/98 (depending on location) 
watan    homeland 
Wolesi Jirga   Parliament, Lower House 
wuluswāl   district governor 
wuluswāli   district, district administration, district government 
 
 
 
Afghan solar calendar 
 
season Afghan solar month Gregorian equivalent 
spring/bahār Hamal 21 March-20 April 
 Sawr 21 April-20 May 
 Jawzā 21 May-21 June 
summer/tābestān Saratān 22 June-22 July 
 Asad 23 July-22 August 
 Sonbola 23 August-22 September 
autumn/tiramā Mizān 23 September-22 October 
 Aqrab 23 October-21 November 
 Qaws 22 November-21 December 
winter/zemestān Jadi 22 December-20 January 
 Dalwa 21 January-19 February 
 Hot 20 February-20 March 
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